Utente:Olonia/Sandbox
German plan
The first German combat units were sent to Italy to bolster its defences against a probabile Allied attack on Italian soil, while Germany and Italy were still allies. The decision to create German units in Italy was taken during the final phase of the Tunisian Campaign; on 9 May 1943, two days after the fall of Tunis, the OKW informed the Italian Supreme Command (Comando Supremo) that three new German units would be formed, mostly employing second-line German units evacuated from Africa. These units would be the Sardinia Command (later 90th Light Infantry Division), the Sicily Command (later 15th Light Infantry Division), and a “ready reserve”. Adolf Hitler wrote to a dubious Mussolini that since these were weak units that needed reinforcements, two additional German divisions would be sent from France. The Fallschirm-Panzer-Division 1 Hermann Göring arrived mid-May 1943 and was sent to Sicily, whereas the 16th Panzer Division arrived in early June and was sent west of Bari. On 19 May also the headquarters of general Hans Hube’s 14th Panzerkorps was also sent from France, to strenghten the command structure of the Oberbefehlshaber Süd field marshal Albert Kesselring.
On 20 May 1943, during a prolonged discussion at his headquarters, Hitler expressed his doubts about the politic stability of the Fascist government and the danger of a collapse of his Italian ally. A special report by SS-Sonderführer Alexander von Neurath exposed the declining morale of the Italian population and the pro-British sentiment spreading through the high bourgeoisie and the military, and Hitler was convinced that the situation in the Mediterranean needed great attention, and that it was needed to prepare a detailed plan in view of a collapse of Italy or an overthrowing of Mussolini. More reports about a speech delivered by the Italian diplomat Giuseppe Bastianini, information by Himmler’s men in Italy, and the presence in Sicily of General Mario Roatta, considered a treacherous person, strenghtened the suspects of Hitler and his collaborators.
On 21 May field marshal Wilhelm Keitel, head of the OKW, issued the guidelines developed to face the possible defection of Italy from the Axis. The plan envisioned a series of operations in different theatres: Operation Alarich, the invasion of the Italian mainland; Operation Konstantin, the neutralization of the Italian forces in the Balkans; Operation Siegfried, occupation of the Italian-occupied areas in Southern France; Operation Nürnberg, to guard the Franco-Spanish frontier; Operation Kopenhagen, to control the passes on the French-Italian frontier.
Meanwhile, German reserves kept being redeployed to face potential threats in the Mediterranean theare. Hitler, seriously worried about the Balkans, and in conflict with the Italian leadership and Mussolini himself due to the collaboration agreements between the Italian and Chetnik forces, decided to send the 1st Panzer Division in the Peloponnese and even considered the possibility to send to Italy his three elite Waffen-SS armoured divisions, currently deployed on the Eastern Front for Operation Citadel.
On 17 June Mussolini, after a partial refusal, urgently asked for two German armoured divisions, as a reinforcement to confront the powerful Allied forces. After more arguments – caused by another change of mind by Mussolini, and by a proposal by General Vittorio Ambrosio, the Chief of Staff of the Italian armed forces, to turn down German reinforcements and move to Italy the Italian troops deployed in France and the Balkans – the ever-deteriorating situation (Pantelleria had surrendered without resistance on 11 June) induced Hitler to send three more German divisions. These were the 3rd Panzergrenadier Division, the 29th Panzergrenadier Division (both newly reconstituted in France after their destruction at Stalingrad) and the 26th Panzer Division. The latter was deployed at Salerno on 9 July, while the 29th Panzergrenadier Division was sent to Foggia mid-June and the 3rd Panzergrenadier Division was deployed north of Rome in the first days of July. Meanwhile, on 24 June, the "Reichsführer-SS"' Brigade had been moved to Corsica, and mid-July the command of the 76th Panzerkorps (General Traugott Herr) also arrived.
Transfer of German forces to Italy
From the invasion of Sicily to the fall of Fascism
On 10 July 1943 the Allied forces launched their invasion of Sicily and soon succeeded in creating solid bridgeheads on the coastline, despite counterattacks by Italian and German forces in the island. The worsening situation immediately had consequences among the political and military leaderships of the two countries: in Rome, pessimism was steadily growing, and Ambrosio suggested Mussolini to ask for unrealistic help by Germany; among the German commands in Italy, Eberhard von Mackensen and Albert Kesselring became increasingly skeptic about the Italian defense capabilities, and asked for reinforcements.
Hitler, more and more worried about an Italian collapse, decided to immediately send to Sicily the 1st Fallschirmjäger-Division and then the command of the 14th Panzerkorps (general Hube) and 29th Panzergrenadier Division, ready for employment in Reggio Calabria; on 17 July it was decided to organize immediately a meeting to verify the attitude by Mussolini and his collaborators, and their resolve to continue the war.
The meeting took place near Feltre on 19 July 1943; on the same day, Rome suffered a heavy bombing by over 500 Allied bombers, which accelerated maneuvers by monarchists, high military officers and even part of the Fascist leadership, more and more concerned with finding a way out of the war. The Feltre meeting had little use; Mussolini, despite pleas by Ambrosio to clearly present the critical situation of Italy and to ask for freedom of action to whitdraw from the war, proved to be weak and undecided and only asked for more German help in the defense of Italy, while Hitler made an exhausting speech in favour of fighting till the end. Moreover, Hitler gave an optimistic view of the situation and refused the exaggerated Italian requests for more land and air support, mentioning technical and operative difficulties; however, he did not either adhere to the vehement requests by Jodl, Keitel and Warlimont, who asked to create an unified command in Italy under German control, to move south (towards the regions attacked by the Allies) the many Italian troops that were in Northern Italy, and to give command of the Axis forces in the theatre to General Wolfram von Richtofen.
After the meeting, Hitler became convinced that he had succeeded in lifting Mussolini’s morale, and therefore, despite warnings by field marshal Erwin Rommel (who had been put in charge of the forces that were being organized in Bavaria for intervention in case of a defection of Italy), who was worried about the fate of the German troops in Sicily and Southern Italy in case of an Italian “betrayal” and interruption of the communication through the Brenner Pass, on 21 July Hitler decided to suspend the planning of “Alaric” and to authorize the dispatch of important German reinforcements to Italy. Right on 25 July, before to learn of the fall of Mussolini, Hitler approved the dispatch of six Heer divisions, including an armoured division, and three Waffen-SS divisions, while Rommel and his headquarters (which was being established in Munich) were sent to Thessaloniki to organize a new army group in the Balkans.
German countermeasures after 25 July
Hitler and the German leadership were thus taken by surprise by the fall of Mussolini on 25 July; due to wrong information from the ambassador Von Mackensen and by the military attacché Von Rintelen, they did not think that the meeting of the Grand Council of Fascism could threaten the Fascist regime, and they instead thought that Mussolini would be able to strenghtn collaboration with the Third Reich. The news of the fall of Mussolini and the creation of a military government led by Marshal Pietro Badoglio surprised and enraged Hitler; he immediately understood that, despite assurances by Badoglio and Italian diplomats, the change of regime was a prelude to an Italian defection, which would endanger the German forces fighting in Southern Italy and the entire Wehrmacht presence in Southern Europe.
At first Hitler thought about intervening immediately with the forces already on site to occupy Rome and arrest Badoglio, the king and the members of the new government; however he soon changed mind and, together with Jodl and Rommel (whom had been urgently recalled from Greece) he decided to re-activate the planning of Operation Alarich, to create a detailed plan to react to the Italian defection and swiftly occupy the Italian peninsula, after sending enough reinforcements. Kesselring was told to be ready to the change of sides and to prepare the whitdrawal of his forces from Sicily, Sardinia and Southern Italy; new directives were issued, with new operational plans.
In a matter of few days, the “Siegfried”, “Konstantin” and “Kopenhagen” plans (ready since May) were confirmed, and new operations were studied: “Schwartz”, to capture the Italian government in Rome; “Achse”, to capture the Italian fleet; “Eiche”, to free Mussolini from captivity; “Student”, to capture Rome. On 28 July, Hitler reviewed the operational planning: the “Konstantin” and “Alarich” plans were combined into a single plan for the occupation of Italy and the Balkans, which was called “Achse”. On 5 August, on the advice of Admiral Ruge and because of the strenghtening of the Italian defenses of Rome, the “Schwartz” plan was abandoned. More problem for Hitler and the German leadeship came from a lack of detailed information about Mussolini’s fate and the refusal of Victor Emanuel III to meet Hitler, which would have been an occasion for a sudden attack on the new Italian leadership.
While the planning was underway, the Wehrmacht command had begun the transfer of the divisions needed to enact the operations at the moment of the Italian defection. Starting on 27 July, the 2. Fallschirmjäger-Division of General Hermann Bernhard Ramcke was moved by air from Southern France to the Pratica di Mare Air Base, a move that surprised both the Italian commands and Kesselring, as neither had been warned beforehand. Meanwhile, on 31 July, General Kurt Student (commander of the 11th Airborne Corps, and due to take command of Ramcke’s paratroopers) and SS-Hauptsturmführer Otto Skorzeny reached Kesselring in Frascati and illustreted to him the “Schwarz” plan, which was however soon cancelled by Hitler.
Meanwhile, at 12:00 on 26 July Rommel had returned from Thessaloniki to Rastenburg, leaving command of the new Army Group F to Field Marshal Maximilian von Weichs, and on 29 July he assumed command in Munich of a fake command, denominated Auffrischungsstab München, to hide the creation of a new army group which on 14 August would me boved to Bologna under the name of Army Group B, and would enact Operation “Achse” in Northern Italy.
At 02:15 on 26 July the 215th Infantry Division was the first German unit to enter Italy, heading for Ligury, while the Panzergrenadier Division Feldherrnhalle and the 715th Infantry Division were deployed to protect the passage through the alpine passes on the French-Italian border. The Italian commands protested and tried to stop the inflow of the divisions with some pretexts, but Kesselring intervened through the Italian Supreme Command on 1 August, and the 305th Division marched on foot first to Genoa and then to La Spezia. Meanwhile, more German units entered Italy: the 76th Infantry Division, on 2 August, heading for Savona; the 94th Infantry Division, on 4 August, heading for Susa and then Alessandria; the 87th Corps headquarters (General Gustav von Zangen), which on 11 August established themselves in Acqui and assumed command of the three newly arrived German divisions.
Some conflicts and incidents between the German troops on passage and the Italian commands and units took place also at Brenner Pass; Romme, worried by the news of a strenghtening of the Italian garrison and minino of the mountain passes, senth the Kampfgruppe Feuerstein south, with part of the 26th Panzer Division and the 44th Infantry Division, with orders to say that they had been sent to help Italy against the common enemy. The Italian Supreme Command in Rome and General Gloria, commander of the Italian 26th Corps in Bozen, complained vehemently and threatened an armed reaction, but after Kesselring’s intervention on 1 August the crisis passed and the German units were allowed to procede; the 44th Infantry Division reached Bozen, assume control of the Brenner Pass and thus ensured the transalpine communications with Germany.
Right after July 25, Hitler had initially decided to immediately send to Italy the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler and the 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich, despite the precarious situation on the Eastern Front. Protests by Field Marshal Von Kluge and further worsening of the situation in the East forced however Hitler to send only the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, without its heavy weapons. This division crossed the Brenner Pass on 3 August and then placed itself between Parma and Reggio Emilia. This was soon followed by the transfer of the 65th Infantry Division from Villach to the Ravenna-Rimini area, and the transfer of the 24th Panzer Division from Tyrol to Modena by 30 August. On 3 August the Waffen-SS Generaloberst Paul Hausser arrived in Reggi Emilia with the headquarters of the 2nd SS-Panzerkorps, to take command of the three incoming divisions.
The last German division to enter Italy was the 71st Infantry Division, which was transferred from Denmark to an area north of Ljubljana on 7 August, and from 25 August started entering Friuli on orders from Rommel, who feared possible hostile actions by the Italians and the mining of the Eastern alpine passes. After another conflict with the Italian Supreme Command, which once again menaced to result in armed clashes, the situation was solved by the intervention of Von Rintelen, and the Division advanced without problems towards Gemona, Gorizia and Opicina; by 2 September it was fully deployed in the Julian March.
8 September 1943
End of an alliance
Right after the removal of Mussolini from power, the new government led by Badoglio had officially proclaimed the decision to continue the war alongside Germany, and kept reassuring the German leadership of its loyalty to the Axis cause, but at the same time it started a series of confused attempts to start secret negotiations with the Allies, to get out of the war and to avoid the consequences of a sudden change of sides. The need to gain time induced the new Italian government to make a show of loyalty to the alliance, asking for a more active participation of the German ally in the defense of the Italian peninsula and thus for the arrival of more German divisions, which however worsened the German threat on Italy.
The Italian leadership tried to keep a grip on this difficult phase by alternating requests for help and obstructionism towards the incoming German forces, and asking to deploy the German divisions in the South, on the frontline; already on 31 July, during the meeting between Ambrosio and Kesselring, arguments began about the positioning and role of the new German divisions. At the conference held in Tarvisio on 6 August between the Italian Foreign Minister Raffaele Guariglia, Ambrosio, Joachim von Ribbentrop and Keitel (with the menacing presence of SS as guards), the mutual distrust became apparent; Ambrosio asked to increase the German divisions from nine to sixteen, but to deploy them in Southern Italy against the Allies, while Keitel and Warlimont instead stated that the new German units would be deployed in Central and Northern Italy, as a strategic reserve force.
A last meeting was held in Bologna on 15 August, between generals Roatta and Jodl, the latter accompanied by Rommel (whom had just been made commander of the new Army Group B in Northern Italy) and by a SS guard of the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler; the Germans consented to recalling to Italy part of the Italian 4th Army from Southern France, but they were alarmed by Roatta’s plans about a positioning of the German forces that, in case of defection, seemed to expose them to the risk of becoming isolated and being destroyed by the Allied forces. The meeting was a failure and convinced the German generals that, despite reassurances from Roatta (possibly not yet informed by Ambrosio of the contacts that were underway with the Allies), who assured that Italy would not defect and added “we are not Saxons!”, that an Italian defection was imminent. The atmosphere at the meeting was so tense that the German delegation refused food and beverages offered by the Italians, fearing they would be poisoned.
The preparations against an Italian “betrayal” therefore proceeded swiftly; detailed dispositions were issued to the subordinated commands, which in turn studied detailed operative plans to act with speed and efficence. The German leadership only expected a weak resistance by the Italian armed forces, and counted on quickly solvine the situation. General Von Horstig, a representative of the weaponry office of the Wehrmacht in Italy, was already preparing plans for the plunder of the resources and the systematic destruction of factories and infrastructures of military importance in Southern Italy. At the end of August, Hitler sent to Italy his new representatives: the diplomat Rudolf Rahn (who replaced the ambassador Von Mackensen) and General Rudolf Toussaint, who replaced Von Rintelen as military attaché.
Kesselring had already authorized General Hans Hube (in command of the 14th Panzerkorps), on orders from OKW, to organize the whitdrawal of his four divisions from Sicily and its redeployment in Calabria, which Hube skillfully carried out on 17 August (Operation Lehrgang). The vast majority of the German troops in Sicily, after an effective fighting retreat, managed to cross the Straits of Messina and even to save a great part of the heavy equipment. In the following days Hube deployed the 14th Panzerkorps (16th Panzer Division, 15th Panzergrenadier Division, and Hermann Goring Division) in the area between Naples and Salerno, while the 1st Parachutist Division was sent to Abulia and General Herr with the 76th Panzerkorps assumed the defense of Calabria with part of the 26th Panzer Division and the 29th Panzergrenadier Division; his orders were to carry out delaying actions in case of Allied attack across the straits.
On 3 September, indeed, a Corps of the British Eighth Army of General Bernard Law Montgomery crossed the straits northwest of Reggio Calabria (Operation Baytown), landed without meeting much resistance and started a cautious advance along the coastal roads towards Pizzo Calabro and Crotone. The 76th Panzerkorps avoided engagement and slowly retreated northwards.
The armistice
After some unrealistic and fruitless attempts by personalities of minor importance (embassy official Blasco Lanza D'Ajeta, Foreign Ministry official Alberto Berio, industrialist Alberto Pirelli) to contact the Allies and start negotiations for an exit of Italy from the war, possibly avoiding the dangerous consequences of a surrender at discretion and a German occupaton, on 12 August General Giuseppe Castellano, Ambrosio’s counselor, left Rome for Madrid, where he met the British ambassador Sir Samuel Hoare. The latter informed Churchill and then directed Castellano to Lisbon where, on 17 August, the first meeting with the Allied emissaries, General Walter Bedell Smith and politic advisers Kenneth W. Strong and George Frost Kennan, took place. The Allies demands, definitely established by the Allied governments at the end of July, called for a completely unconditional surrender; Castellano thus found himself in great hindrance, as the instructions Badoglio had given him required to bargain the exit of Italy from the war and a strong military collaboration with the Allies, including the intervention of as many as fifteen British and American divisions that were to make contemporary landings north and south of Rome simultaneously with the announcement of the armistice, in order to defend the capital and deal with the German reaction. During a new meeting between Castellano and Bedell Smith in Cassibile, Sicily, on 31 August, the Italian envoy unsuccessfully insisted again to be made apart of the Allied operative details; the intervention of an American airborne division to protect Rome and the Italian government (Operation Giant 2) was agreed. On 1 September, after a consultation between the king, Guariglia and Ambrosio, the Allies were radioed the reception of the conditions of the armistice.
On 3 September, Castellano and Bedell Smith therefore signed the armistice of Cassibile, in presence of the representatives of the British and American governments, Harold Macmillan and Robert Daniel Murphy; there was however a grievous mistake about the timing of the announcement of the Italian surrender. The Badoglio government hoped to gain more time to organize the resistance against the German forces, delaying the announcement at least till 12 September. Only in the night of 8 September did Badoglio learn from General Maxwell Taylor (the second-in-command of the 82nd Airborne Division, whose intervention was planned for “Giant 2”, who had been secretly sent to Rome) that General Dwight Eisenhower would make the announcement that very evening. Badoglio protested and vainly tried to obtain another delay; the Italian leaders and generals, extremely worried about the German reaction, made an awful impression on General Taylor, who advised the Allied command to give up Operation “Gian 2”, which he deemed to be destined to fail, given the disorganization of the sizeable Italian forces stationed around Rome.
In the morning of 8 September, while Allied bombers bombed Kesselring’s headquarters in Frascati, failing their objective and causing heavy civilian casualties, and the Allied fleets approached the Gulf of Salerno to launch Operation Avalanche (the main landing of the 5th American Army of General Mark Wayne Clark), Badoglio, more and more anxious, sent Eisenhower a telegram asking for a deferment of the announcement of the armistice. The Allied commander-in-chief, sustained by a peremptory order from Washington of the Allied heads of state, firmly rejected the tardive request, confirmed his intentions in a threatening tone, and cancelled Operation “Giant 2”.
At 18:00 on 8 September a hurried and dramatic Council of the Crown was held at the Quirinale Palace; the king, Badoglio, Ambrosio, Guariglia, General Giacomo Carboni (head of the Military Intelligence Service and commander of the Corpo d'Armata Motocorazzato tasked with defending the capital), General Antonio Sorice (War Minister), Admiral Raffaele De Courten (Minister of the Navy), General Renato Sandulli (Minister of the Air Force), General Paolo Puntoni, General Giuseppe De Stefanis, and Major Luigi Marchesi (secretary of Ambrosio) participated. Faced with the clear instructions transmitted by Eisenhower and the first indiscretions leaking on foreign radios about the armistice, the Italian leadership, after heated discussions where Carboni went as far as to propose that they retracted Castellano’s actions, finally agreed with Marchesi, who said that they should unavoidalby keept the world they had given to the Allies, and confirm the news. At 18:30 general Eisenhower, speaking on Radio Algiers, officially announced the armistice, and at 19:42 Badoglio gave in turn the announcement from the EIAR. During the previous days, the German representatives in Rome had been given reiterated statements of loyalty to the alliance, expressed at the highest levels; on 3 September Badoglio himself had confirmed to Rahn his firm will to remain at the side of Germany, and still on 6 September General Toussaint thought that the Italians had rejected the harsh demands of the Allies. Even in the morning of 8 September, Rahn met the king and the latter reassured him about his decision not to surrender, and in the afternoon Roatta reaffirmed by telephone that news coming from abroad were a propagandist hoax. Rahn was thus taken by surprise when at 19:00 on 8 September, having been warned by Berlin about the news of the armistice, he met Guariglia whom immediately confirmed the news and told him about the exit of Italy from the war and from the Axis alliance. Rahn replied bitterly, then hastily left Rome along with Toussaint and the embassy personnel and went to Frascati, where Kesselring’s headquarters were located.
Despite the initial surprise, the German response, havin been accurately planned and organized in detail, was swift and effective; Hitler, who at 17:00 came back to Rastenburg after spending a few days in Ukraine at the headquarters of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, soon learned of the armistice from a BBC trasmission, and acted with extreme resolve. At 19:50, a few minutes after Badoglio had finished his announcement, the aide of General Jodl broadcasted the coded word “Achse” to all subordinated commands; it was the signal for the German forces to attack Italian forces in all the war theatres of the Mediterranean.
Dissolution of Italian forces in Italy
Uncertainty and confusion
The Italian high commands, in the weeks leading to the armistice, had issued instructions for commanders and troops about the behaviour that should have been held in case of a whitdrawal from the war and possible German aggressions; these orders were the No. 111 Order issued by the Staff of the Italian Army on 10 August, the OP 44 Memorandum issued on 26 August by General Roatta (on Ambrosio’s orders) to the major peripheral commands (only twelve copies), and the No. 1 and No. 2 Memorandums issued on 6 September by the Supreme Command to the Staffs of the three armed forces, containing indications about the deployment of the forces in the different theatres.
These were however general guidelines, lacking details and nearly inapplicabile (also due to excessive secrecy measures); they were ineffective and they contributed, along with the vagueness of Badoglio’s message on the evening of 8 September, to confuse the peripheral commands of the Italian forces about the unexpected news of the change of sides and the aggressiveness of the German forces, thus resulting in insecurity and indecision among those commands. The situation of the Italian armed forces was worsened by the contradictory instructions issued by Ambrosio in the evening of 8 September, which restricted any initiative to mere defensive measures in case of German attacks, and by Roatta in the night of 9 September, who especially demanded to avoid turmoil and ‘seditions’ among the troops.
Faced with the cold efficiency of the German units, which immediately showed harsh aggressiveness and demanded surrender or collaboration with threats and intimidations, most of the Italian commanders, also fearful of the impressive reputation of military capacity of the Wehrmacht, soon abandoned any intent of resistance, with a few exceptions; the troops, left with neither orders nor leaders, often dispersed.
The situation of the German forces in Italy was actually a difficult one; Rommel, with his Army Group B, had the easier task of occupying the northern regions and neutralizing any resistance by Italian forces in that area, but Kesselring, in command of Army Group C, was in great difficulty after September 8: after the bombing of Frascati, he barely managed to receive the communication of the coded word “Achse” and also learned of the Allied landing near Salerno, where only part of the 16th Panzer Division was stationed. At first, he feared that he would not be able to simultaneously contain the Allied advance and carry out his mission against Rome.
Even the OKW considered the possibilità of the loss of the eight German divisions in Southern Italy; Kesselring, however, showed great capability, and his forces fought with ability and effectiveness. Despite advice by Rommel to quickly whitdraw from Southern Italy and retreat to the La Spezia-Rimini line, Kesselring managed to avoid the isolation and destruction of his forces and also to cause trouble to the Allied bridgehead at Salerno, to counterattack with some success (after massing there the 14th and 76th Panzerkorps, with three Panzer divisions and two Panzergrenadier divisions) and then to retreat with minimal losses north of Naples, while simoultaneously carrying out the “Achse” plan and capturing Rome with part of his forces.
Fall of Rome
In order to defend the political and military leadership and to resist to a possible German attack, the Italian commands had concentrated a considerable amount of troops in the area around Rome; the main force consisted in the Corpo d’Armata Motocorazzato of General Carboni, composed of the 135th Armoured Division “Ariete II”, the 136th Armoured Division “Centauro II”, the 10th Motorized Division Piave and the 21st Infantry Division Granatieri di Sardegna. Other units tasked with the defense of Rome were the 103rd Motorised Division Piacenza (part of the 17th Corps of General Giovanni Zangheri), the 12th Infantry Division Sassari and some battalions of the 13th Infantry Division Re and 7th Infantry Division Lupi di Toscana; overall, there were about 55,000 men and 200 armoured fighting vehicles, with a numerical superiority on the German forces in the area. The German forces near Rome consisted in the 11th Airborne Corps of General Kurt Student, headquartered in Pratica di Mare; the Corps comprised the 2nd Parachutist Division (General Walter Barenthin), ready for action south of Rome, and the 3rd Panzergrenadier Division (General Fritz-Hubert Gräser), reinforced by an armoured battalion of the 26th Panzer Division (kampfgruppe Büsing), stationed between Orvieto and Lake Bolsena, north of Rome. These units comprised about 26,000 men and some hundreds armoured fighting vehicles, and were activated by Kesselring in the evening of 8 September: already at 20:30 they attacked the Mezzocamino fuel depot, and the German paratroopers immediately started advancing south, overcoming sporadic resistance by the Piacenza Division in Lanuvio, Albano Laziale and Ardea.
After reaching the EUR district at 21:30, the 2nd Parachutist Division overpowered some units of the Piacenza and Granatieri di Sardegna Divisions and after half an hour, advancing along the Via Ostiensis, reached the Magliana bridge. Meanwhile, the 3rd Panzergrenadier Division advanced from north along the Via Aurelia, Via Cassia and Via Flaminia, but was halted near Lake Bracciano by the Armoured Division Ariete II (General Raffaele Cadorna) and suspended its advance after some negotiations. The paratroopers, instead, went ahead with their action; fierce fighting erupted at Magliana between the German forces and the Granatieri di Sardegna, supported by armoured units of the Ariete II Division, but at 02:00 on 9 September the Ciampino airport was captured, and an hour later news came that German troops ha arrived in Tor Sapienza, along Via Prenestina, just eight km away from the city center.
More and more alarming news pushed the political and military leadership, after some uncertain orders by Ambrosio to try to contact Kesselring, to decide do abandon the city. Roatta exhorted the king and Badoglio to leave Rome by the Via Tiburtina, then he ordered his forces to try to retreat to Tivoli and finally he abandoned the city himself, leaving Carboni without any order. Carboni in turn fled in civilian clothes, then re-entered the city in the morning of 10 September, when the situation was definitely compromised. General Umberto Utili, head of the Operations Division of the General Staff, declared the General Staff as formally dissolved in the morning of 9 September; the subordinate commands and the troops showed signs of bewilderment and confusion.
Meanwhile, at 5:10 on 9 September the king and Badoglio, along with high ranking officers, dignitaries and family members, fled Rome on seven cars; without encountering any difficulties, they passed Tivoli and Avezzano and reached Pescara and later Ortona, where more fleeing officers had gathered. There the king, his relatives, Badoglio, Ambrosio and Roatta boarded the corvette Baionetta, which reached Brindisi at 14:30 on 10 September, the city having already been reached by Allied troops which had safely landed in Italian-controlled Taranto (the 1st British Parachutist Division), Brindisi and Bari (two divisions of the 5th Corps) during Operation Slapstick.
Meanwhile, the defenses of Rome had completely collapsed; in the south, the German paratroopers fought a series of sporadic fights against the Granatieri di Sardegna and units of the Ariete II at Magliana and Cecchignola; at 17:00 on 9 September, Magliana was abandoned by Italian forces and the 2nd Parachutist Division proceeded with its advance, arrivino near Porta San Paolo in the evening. In the north, the AFVs of the 3rd Panzergrenadier Division had restarted their advance; after fighting against the bulk of the Ariete II, they captured Manziana, Monterosi (at 14:00) and Bracciano (at 17:00), while more German units of the same Division advanced towards Civitavecchia and kampfgruppe Büsing reached Cesano and La Storta.
At 20:00 the Piave and Ariete II divisions, as they had been ordered, left their positions and retreated towards Tivoli, while units of the Sassari and Re divisions were deployed along the Via Cassia and Via Salaria. The parachutists of Major Walter Gericke, whom had been parachuted at 09:00 over Monterotondo with the task of capturing the Italian Army headquarters (which however had already been abandoned), were engaged in hard fighting, which they ended in success in the evening of 9 September; meanwhile, units of the 2nd Parachutist Division attacked Porta San Paolo, two kilometres from Piazza Venezia, held by Granatieri di Sardegna units and groups of civilian volunteers. The German troops, mainly consisting in veterans, overcame this resistance after some fierce fighting, and reached the center of Rome in the morning of 10 September. General Siegfrid Westphal, Chief of Staff of Army Group C, had started negotiations with Colonel Giaccone of the Centauro II Armoured Division (the former “M” Armoured Division, composed of blackshirts whose allegiances were highly doubtful, which had led the Italian commands to decide to keep it away from the battle), on instructions from Kesselring and Student, in the evening of 9 September. After a series of threats and an ultimatum, Westphal obtained the capitulation of Rome by the afternoon of 10 September, after discussions with Generals Carboni and Sorice and Marshal Enrico Caviglia, while German artillery was already firing directly inside the city. Westphal promised to spare the city and authorized the creation of a provisional Italian command under General Carlo Calvi di Bergolo.
This evanescent agreement was soon revoked by the Germans; by 15 September all Italian troops were disarmed, on 23 September Calvi di Bergolo was arrested and the German and RSI forces, under Generals Stahel and Chieli, respectively, assume control of the city, despite they stated that the status of “open city” was mantained. This status was never recognized by the Allies, and the Germans exploited it to use Rome as a key logistic junction for the supplies sent to the frontline.
Meanwhile, the Italian units that had retreated towards Tivoli dissolved; a considerable part of the Sassari and Piacenza divisions and of the 211th Coastal Division escaped capture and crossed the frontline, thus joining the Allies, but most of the men of the ten Italian divisions in the area were disarmed. Only a small part of them, however, were interned or deported; the majority was allowed to return to their homes. Overall German casualties for the capture of Rome were about a hundred dead and about 500 wounded, while Italian casualties were 984 killed, of whom 659 were soldiers, 121 civilians and 204 “unidentified”.
Disintegration of Italian forces in Southern Italy
Field Marshal Kesselring, despite being busy with avoiding the isolation of his forces and containing the Allied attacks launched in three different landing areas (Salerno, Abulia and Calabria), still managed to retain control of the situation and to carry out the tasks assigned within the “Achse” plan. He managed to quickly dissolve the Italian forces stationed in his area, to capture Rome and to disengage mobile units that were to be sent south against the Allies (the 3rd Panzergrenadier Division, after capturing Rome, reached Salerno already on 12 September), but he had to restrict himself to summarily disarm the majority of the captured soldiers, then sending them back to their homes. Consequentially, only 24,294 of the 102,340 Italian soldiers captured by Army Group C were held in captivity.
Italian forces in Campania were weak and were quickly overwhelmed by the German troops; the Naples garrison was destroyed after two days of resistance by a German armoured column, and its commander, Colonel Olivier, was executed. The 19th Corps was dissolved on 11 September after its commander, General Del Tetto, abandoned his command post to take shelter in a monastery; the 9th Motorized Division Pasubio (stationed in the Naples area), which was still being re-formed after its near destruction on the Eastern Front, was immediately disarmed, while in the Salerno area the 222nd Coastal Division was attacked and dispersed by the 16th Panzer Division, and its commander, General Ferrante Vincenzo Gonzaga, was killed after refusing to surrender.
The 7th Italian Army of General Mario Arisio was stationed in Calabria, Basilicata and Abulia; German forces in these regions were scarce, and were being moved north. On 9 September the 7th Army headquarters in Potenza were attacked by surprise and captured by the German troops, but the overall weakness of the German forces and the swift intervention of the Allied forces helped the Italian units, the majority of whom mantained cohesion. The 9th Corps (General Roberto Lerici) held central and northern Abulia despite the collapse of the 209th Coastal Division; General Nicola Bellomo held the harbour of Bari till the arrival of the Allied forces, while more south the 51st Corps of General De Stefani held its positions between Grottaglie and Lecce with the 58th Infantry Division Legnano, the 152nd Infantry Division Piceno and the 210th Coastal Division. The situation of the 31st Corps (General Mercalli), stationed in Calabria with three coastal divisions and the 104th Motorised Division Mantova, was in a more difficult situation: it was attacked by the 76th Panzerkorps and sustained casualties, and part of the 185th Parachutist Regiment decided to remain loyal to the previous alliance with Germany and joined the 1st German Prachutist Division.