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{{Short description|Type of rule-making; contrasted with direct investments and incentives in climate policy}}
'''Command and Control
==Definition==
Command and Control (CAC) [[Regulation]] can be defined as “the direct regulation of an industry or activity by [[legislation]] that states what is permitted and what is illegal”.<ref name=mcmanus>McManus, P. (2009) Environmental Regulation. Australia: Elsevier Ltd.</ref> This approach differs from other regulatory techniques, e.g. the use of [[economic
The ‘command’ is the presentation of quality standards/targets by a government authority that must be complied with. The ‘control’ part signifies the negative sanctions that may result from non-compliance e.g. prosecution.<ref name="Baldwin"/><ref name="abbot">Abbot, C. (2009) The Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions ACT 2008. ''Environmental Law Review 38''</ref>
CAC encompasses a variety of methods. Influencing behaviour through: laws, incentives, threats, contracts and agreements. In CAC, there is a perception of a problem and the solution for its control is developed and subsequently implemented.<ref name="holling">Holling, C., Meffe, G. (1996) Command and Control
In the case of environmental policy and regulation, the CAC approach strongly relies on the use of standards to ensure the improvements in the quality of the environment. The CAC approach uses three main types of standards. These are ambient standards, emission standards, and technology standards. Although these standards can be used individually, it is also possible to use the standards in combination. In fact, in most pollution control programs, it is the case where there is a combination of standards being implemented.
Although environmental policy has a long history, a proliferation of policy making in this area occurred in the 1970s and continued to today. The CAC approach dominated policy in industrial nations during this decade because the general focus was on that of remedial policies rather than more comprehensive prevention techniques.<ref name="bocher">Bocher, M. (2011) A theorectical framework for explaining the choice of instruments in environmental policy. "Forest Policy and Economics'. Elsevier</ref> Whilst many view CAC negatively, direct regulatory control is still used in many countries' environmental policy.<ref name="bocher"/>
==Enforcement and compliance==
To deliver its objectives, direct regulation must ensure the highest level of compliance possible. This can be achieved through appropriate implementation and enforcement. Non-compliance to CAC regulation presents a serious challenge to its effectiveness <ref name="abbot" /> The manner in which CAC is enforced differs between countries. For example, in the
Enforcement of CAC often involves the use of uniform sanctions, this can result in small businesses feeling the burdens of regulation more severely than companies of a larger size.<ref name="macrory"/>
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A CAC approach in policy is used for several reasons. It has been proposed that by imposing fixed standards with the force of law behind them, CAC can respond more quickly to activities which do not abide by the set standards.<ref name="Baldwin"/> It also has benefits politically as the regulator (often the government) is seen to be acting swiftly and decisively.<ref name="Baldwin"/>
It is far from a problem free form of regulation
Some issues highlighted include:<ref name="Baldwin"/>
*[[
*[[Liberal legalism|Legalism]]: Command and control has been accused of stifling competition and enterprise. It has been posited that this is an inevitable consequence of the inflexible and complicated rules that can be created by the approach. Over-regulation can result, which in turn can lead to ‘over-inclusive’ regulation.
*[[Standard-setting]]: Selecting the appropriate standards when implementing a CAC regime is crucial if the regulation is to avoid causing detriment to those that it regulates. This is a challenging obstacle to overcome as the amount of information required can be severe.
*[[Enforcement]]: This constitutes a very significant dilemma for a CAC regulatory approach. One of the key issues is the expense of enforcement, especially when a complex system of rules has been developed. There are also problems of scope.
Critics of CAC often point to incentive-based regulation as an alternative with terms used such as smart regulation, management-based regulation, responsive regulation and meta-regulation. Possible benefits of this approach may include cheaper administration costs and a reduction in the risk of [[regulatory capture]]. However the view that incentive-based regulation is radically different from CAC has been scrutinised.<ref>FC Simon (2017). Meta-regulation in practice: Beyond normative views of morality and rationality. Routledge</ref> The advantages can be exaggerated, a complex system of rules is often necessary to allow an effective system, this can cause many incentive-based schemes to appear to replicate some of the characteristics of CAC. Inspection and enforcement may also be essential to prevent evasion of liability, again resembling CAC and possibly removing the posited benefits in terms of cost.<ref name="Baldwin"/> While practices may be changed at a superficial level through the use of CAC, it may not be able to achieve the changes of behaviour necessary for more sustainable environmental practices.<ref name="gandg">Gunningham, N., Grabosky, P. (1998) Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy. USA: Oxford University Press.</ref>
There are some commentators on the topic who prefer to use ‘direct regulatory instrument’ instead of ‘command and control’ instrument because of the negative connotations surrounding the term.<ref name="goulder">Goulder, L., Parry, I. (2008) Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy. 2: 2. pp. 152-174.</ref>
==Efficiency==
Much of the literature on regulatory instruments considers efficiency in terms of monetary costs. CAC has been labelled by many critics as ‘inefficient’ as a system that spends resources but generates little revenue.<ref name=sinclair>Gunningham, N., Sinclair, D. (2002) Leaders and Laggards: Next Generation Environmental Regulation. UK: Greenleaf Publishing Ltd.</ref> The cost of compliance is perceived to be high, which can result in costs that are higher than the sanctions for non-compliance. A summary of 10 studies demonstrated significant differences in cost between CAC and least cost alternatives.<ref name="tieten">[[Tietenberg,
Some have moved to defend certain aspects of a CAC approach, arguing against the commonly held belief that these regimes are inherently inefficient.<ref name="candg"/> Economics incentives are frequently referred to as a considerably more efficient approach to regulation. The most commonly used incentives in this method relate to tax. The administrative costs of tax collection can be understated. Advocates of incentives have been accused of making simplifying assumptions and not fully taking into account the costs of administrating tax systems.<ref name="candg">Cole, D., Grossman, P. (2002) Toward a total-cost approach to environmental instrument choice. 20. pp. 223-241.</ref><ref name="ogus"/> In some circumstances, CAC regulation can end up being a less costly option. Whilst economic instruments may act to reduce compliance costs, in certain cases their total costs may actually be higher, This may stem from the high level of monitoring that is required to make an incentivised method viable and successful.<ref name="candg"/>
==Environmental regulation==
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The traditional model of command and control typically involved areas of environmental concern being dealt with by national governments. In recent decades, transboundary environmental problems have risen in prominence. This shift has exposed many of the limitations of a command and control approach when it is applied to a larger and more complex arena.<ref name="james">Evans, J. (2012) Environmental Governance. ''Elsevier.''</ref>
Climate change is often used to exemplify the perceived failings of this regulatory approach. Climate change is good example of a concern that is complex, full of uncertainties and difficult for many people to understand.<ref name="downie">Downie, D. (2005) Global environmental policy: governance through regimes. ''In: Axelrod, R., Downie, D., Vig, N. (Eds.) The Global Environment: Institutions, Law and Policy. 2nd ed.'' Washington DC: CQ pass. pp. 64-82.</ref> This may
One reason for the lack of compatibility with many international environmental agreements is the manner in which the international community is organised. International law cannot be implemented in the same way as law at national level.<ref name="hunter">Hunter, D., Salzman, J., Zaelke, D. (2002) International Environmental Law and Policy. New York: Foundation Press</ref>
===
The international nature of many contemporary environmental issues makes CAC regulatory approaches difficult. Since the 1970s enthusiasm for the implementation of economic incentives for regulation has been on the increase. This is due, in part, to the disenchantment with command and control.<ref name="handm">Harrington, W., Morgenstern, R. (2004) Economic Instruments versus Command and Control. ''Resources. pp. 13-17.''</ref> The shift away from CAC does not seem to be slowing, the increased participation of a variety of actors may be the answer. The role of environmental [[NGOs]] in policy making has changed drastically in recent decades. Their numbers and the influence they exert over national governments and negotiations at international level has risen.<ref name="mc"/> The involvement of NGOs has assisted the development of international policy in a number of ways. A great deal of environmental policy has been influenced by research collected by these organisations. They also act as whistleblowers, updating the regulators of progress and compliance. A blend of different approaches, involving a range of actors and regulatory types may be the best answer. However, it is likely that many governments will persist with CAC because of the political benefits and the fact that it is not always as inflexible and inefficient as many economists would suggest.<ref name="mc">McCormick, J. (1999) The Role of Environmental NGOs in International Regimes. ''In: Vig, N., Axelrod, R. (Eds.) The Global Environment: Institutions, Laws and Policy.'' UK: Earthscan.</ref>
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