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{{short description|Theory in social psychology}}
{{Self sidebar}}'''Self-categorization theory''' is a theory in [[social psychology]] that describes the circumstances under which a person will perceive collections of people (including themselves) as a group, as well as the consequences of perceiving people in group terms.<ref name="Haslam (1997)">{{cite journal|last=Haslam|first=S. A.|title=Stereotyping and social influence: Foundations of stereotype consensus|journal=The Social Psychology of Stereotyping and Group Life|year=1997|pages=119–143|editor1-first=R.|editor1-last=Spears|editor2-first=P.J.|editor2-last=Oakes|editor3-first=N.|editor3-last=Ellemers|editor4-first=S.A.|display-editors = 3 |editor4-last=Haslam}}</ref> Although the theory is often introduced as an explanation of psychological group formation (which was one of its early goals), it is more accurately thought of as general analysis of the functioning of [[categorization]] processes in [[social perception]] and interaction that speaks to issues of individual identity as much as group phenomena.<ref name="Oakes et al. (1994).">{{cite book | last1 = Oakes | first1 = Penny | last2 = Haslam | first2 = Alex | last3 = Turner | first3 = John | title = Stereotyping and social reality | year = 1994 | publisher = Oxford | ___location = Blackwell}}</ref> It was developed by [[John
Self-categorization theory has been influential in the academic field of [[social psychology]] and beyond.<ref name="Postmes, T. & Branscombe, N. (2010)">Postmes, T. & Branscombe, N. (2010). Sources of social identity. In T. Postmes & N. Branscombe (Eds). Rediscovering Social Identity: Core Sources. Psychology Press.</ref> It was first applied to the topics of [[Self-categorization theory#Social influence|social influence]], [[Group cohesiveness|group cohesion]], [[group polarization]], and [[collective action]].<ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987).">Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D. & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory. Oxford: Blackwell</ref> In subsequent years the theory, often as part of the social identity approach, has been applied to further topics such as [[leadership]],<ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001)."/><ref name="Haslam, et al. (2011)."/> [[personality]],<ref name="Turner & Onorato (1998)">{{cite journal|last1=Turner|first1=J. C.|last2=Onorato|first2=R. S.|title=Social identity, personality, and the self-concept: A self-categorization perspective|journal=The Psychology of the Social Self|volume=26|issue=4|year=1998|pages=11–46|editor1-first=T. R.|editor1-last=Tyler|editor2-first=R. M.|editor2-last=Kramer|editor3-first=O. P.|editor3-last=John|doi=10.1080/03060497.1998.11085868}}</ref> [[Self-categorization theory#Out-group homogeneity|outgroup homogeneity]], and [[power (social and political)|power]].<ref name="Turner (2005)">{{cite journal|last=Turner|first=J. C.|title=Explaining the nature of power: A three-process theory|journal=European Journal of Social Psychology|year=2005|volume=35|issue=1|pages=1–22|doi=10.1002/ejsp.244|doi-access=free}}</ref> One tenet of the theory is that the self should not be considered as a foundational aspect of [[cognition]], but rather the self should be seen as a product of the cognitive system at work.<ref name="Turner & Onorato (1998)"/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1994).">{{cite journal | last1 = Turner | first1 = J. C. | last2 = Oakes | first2 = P. J. | last3 = Haslam | first3 = S. A. | last4 = McGarty | first4 = C. | year = 1994 | title = Self and collective: Cognition and social context
==Aspects of the theory==
[[File:UNSW Rugby players.jpg|thumb|alt= Rugby operates using self-categorization theory processes.|The clear intergroup structure of team sports means that such contexts are often used to illustrate self-categorization theory processes.<ref name="McGarty, C (1999)."/><ref name="Haslam, et al. (2011).">{{cite book |
===Levels of abstraction===
Drawing inspiration from cognitive psychology,<ref name="Turner (1985)">{{cite journal| last1=Turner| first1=J.C.| editor-last =Lawler| editor-first =E. J.| year=1985| title=Social categorization and the self-concept: A social cognitive theory of group behavior| journal=Advances in Group Processes: Theory and Research|volume=2|pages=77–122}}</ref><ref name="Oakes & Turner (1990)">{{cite journal|last1=Oakes|first1=P. J.|last2=Turner|first2=J. C.|title=Is limited information processing capacity the cause of social stereotyping|journal=European Review of Social Psychology|year=1990|volume=1|issue=1|pages=111–135|doi=10.1080/14792779108401859}}</ref><ref name="Turner, J. C. & Reynolds, K. J. (2010)">Turner, J. C. & Reynolds, K. J. (2010). The story of social identity. In T. Postmes & N. Branscombe (Eds). Rediscovering Social Identity: Core Sources. Psychology Press.</ref> self-categorization theory assumes that the self can be categorized at various levels of abstraction. In other words, humans may categorize the self as a singular "I"(personal identity), or as a more inclusive "we"(social identity). In the latter case the self is cognitively grouped as identical and interchangeable to other stimuli within that category.<ref name="Turner & Oakes (1986)."/> It is argued that it is this variation in self categorization that underpins many intergroup phenomena,<ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/> including those described in social identity theory.<ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001)."/>
To demonstrate the notion of varying
====Accentuation====
In self-categorization theory, categorizing people does not simply involve the redescription of characteristics and categories present in social stimuli. Rather, salient ''social categories'' form the basis of a social world that is enriched with meaning. This is achieved through a non-conscious process of accentuation, where ''differences between'' social categories are accentuated along with the ''similarities within'' social categories.<ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1994)."/><ref name="Haslam et al. (1995)">{{cite journal | last1 = Haslam | first1 = S. A. | last2 = Oakes | first2 = P. J. | last3 = Turner | first3 = J. C. | last4 = McGarty | first4 = C. | year = 1995 | title = Social categorization and group homogeneity: Changes in the perceived applicability of stereotype content as a function of comparative context and trait favourableness
The accentuation component of self-categorization theory stems from prior research that demonstrated an [[accentuation effect]] for categorized non-social stimuli.<ref name="Turner, J. C. & Reynolds, K. J. (2010)"/> A prototypical example of non-social accentuation came from Tajfel and Wilkes, who found that when a categorization scheme corresponded to line length participants would view lines belonging to different categories as more different than if no categorization scheme was present.<ref name="Tajfel & Wilkes (1963)">{{cite journal|last1=Tajfel|first1=H.|last2=Wilkes|first2=A. L.|title=Classification and quantitative judgement|journal=British Journal of Psychology|year=1963|volume=54|issue=2|pages=101–114|pmid=13980241|doi=10.1111/j.2044-8295.1963.tb00865.x|s2cid=41404673 }}</ref> Consistent with the idea that an efficient cognitive system would, where possible, use the same systems regardless of the social or non-social nature of the stimuli,<ref name="Van rooy et al. (2003)">{{cite journal | last1 = Van Rooy | first1 = D. | last2 = Van Overwalle | first2 = F. | last3 = Vanhoomissen | first3 = T. | last4 = Labiouse | first4 = C. | last5 = French | first5 = R. | year = 2003 | title = A recurrent connectionist model of group biases
===Depersonalization and self-stereotyping ===
According to self-categorization theory, depersonalization describes a process of [[Self-Stereotyping|self-stereotyping]]. This is where, under conditions of social category [[Self-categorization theory#Determinants of categorization|salience]] and consequent accentuation, "people come to see themselves more as the interchangeable exemplars of a social category than as unique personalities defined by their differences from others".<ref name="Turner (1985)"/> Under these conditions a perceiver directly bases their behaviour and beliefs on the [[norm (social)|norms]], goals and needs of a salient ingroup.<ref name="Haslam, et al. (2011)."/><ref name="Brown, R. J. & Turner, J. C. (1981).">Brown, R. J. & Turner, J. C. (1981). Interpersonal and intergroup behaviour. In J. C. Turner & H. Giles (Eds.), Intergroup Behaviour (pp. 33-65). Oxford: Blackwell
Turner and colleagues stress that depersonalization is not a loss of self, but rather a ''redefinition'' of the self in terms of group membership.<ref name="McGarty, C (1999)."/> A depersonalized self, or a social identity, is every bit as valid and meaningful as a personalized self, or personal identity.<ref name="Haslam, et al. (2011)."/> A loss of self is sometimes referred to using the alternative term [[deindividuation]]. Further, although the term [[depersonalization]] has been used in [[clinical psychology]] to describe a type of disordered experience, this is completely different from depersonalization in the sense intended by self-categorization theory authors.
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===Determinants of categorization===
In self-categorization theory the formation and use of a social category in a certain context is predicted by an interaction between [[Self-categorization theory#Perceiver readiness|perceiver readiness]] and category-stimulus fit. The latter being broken down into [[Self-categorization theory#Comparative fit|comparative fit]] and [[Self-categorization theory#Normative fit|normative fit]].<ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1994)."/><ref>{{cite journal|last=Voci|first=Alberto|title=Relevance of social categories, depersonalization and group processes: two field tests of self-categorization theory|journal=European Journal of Social Psychology|date=1 January 2006|volume=36|issue=1|pages=73–90|doi=10.1002/ejsp.259|doi-access=free}}</ref> This predictive interaction was heavily influenced by [[Jerome Bruner|Bruner's]] accessibility and fit formula.<ref name="Turner, J. C. & Reynolds, K. J. (2010)"/><ref name="Bruner (1957)">{{cite journal | last1 = Bruner | first1 = J. S. | year = 1957 | title = On perceptual readiness
====Perceiver readiness====
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Self-categorization theorists posit "self-categorization is comparative, inherently variable, fluid and context dependent."<ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1994)."/> They reject the notion that self concepts are stored invariant structures that exist ready for application.<ref name="Oakes & Turner (1990)"/> Where stability is observed in self perception this is not attributed to stored stable categories, but rather to stability in both the perceiver and the social context in which the perceiver is situated.<ref name="Oakes et al. (1994)."/><ref name="McGarty, C (1999).">McGarty, C. (1999). Categorization in social psychology. Sage Publications: London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi.</ref><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1994)."/> This variability is systematic and occurs in response to the changing context in which the perceiver is situated. As an example, the category of [[psychologists]] can be perceived quite differently if compared to [[physicists]] as opposed to [[artists]] (with variation perhaps on how [[Scientific method|scientific]] psychologists are perceived to be).<ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001)."/> In self-categorization theory contextual changes to the salient social category are sometimes referred to as shifting [[Self-categorization theory#Prototypicality|prototypicality]].
Although the theory accepts that prior categorization behaviour impacts present perception (i.e., as part of perceiver readiness), self-categorization theory has key advantages over descriptions of social categorization where categories are rigid and invariant cognitive structures that are stored in comparative isolation prior to application. One advantage is that this perspective removes the [[implausibility]] of storing enough categorical information to account for all the nuanced categorization that humans use daily.<ref name="McGarty, C (1999)."/><ref name="Turner & Onorato (1998)"/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1994)."/> Another advantage is that it brings social cognition in line with a [[Connectionism|connectionist approach]] to cognition.<ref name="McGarty (2002)"/> The connectionist approach is a neurologically plausible model of cognition where semantic units are not stored, but rather semantic information forms as a consequence of network pattern activation (both current and prior).<ref name="Smith, E. R. (1996).">{{cite journal | last1 = Smith | first1 = E. R. | year = 1996 | title = What do connectionism and social psychology offer each other?
===Prototypicality===
In social psychology a category [[prototype]] may be thought of as a "representative exemplar" of a category.<ref name="Billig, M. (1987)">Billig, M. (1987). Arguing and thinking: A rhetorical approach to social psychology: Cambridge University Press.</ref> Self-categorization theory predicts that what is prototypical of a category is contingent on the context in which the category is encountered.<ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001)."/> More specifically, when the [[Self-categorization theory#Comparative fit|comparative context]] changes (i.e., the psychologically available stimuli change) this has implications for how the self category is perceived and the nature of subsequent [[Self-categorization theory#Depersonalization and self-stereotyping|depersonalization]]. Self-categorization theory predicts that individuals adopt the features of a salient self category (self-stereotyping), and the content of the category they adopt depends on the present comparative context.
An individual's degree of prototypicality also varies in relation to changes in the comparative context, and self-categorization theory expects this to have direct implications for interpersonal phenomenon. Specifically, prototypicality plays an important role in the social identity approach to [[Social identity approach#Leadership|leadership]],<ref name="Platow, M. J. et al. (1997).">{{cite journal | last1 = Platow | first1 = M. J. | last2 = Hoar | first2 = S. | last3 = Reid | first3 = S. Harley | last4 = Morrison | first4 = D. | last5 = Morrison | first5 = Dianne | year = 1997 | title = Endorsement of distributively fair and unfair leaders in interpersonal and intergroup situations
Levels of individual prototypicality may be gauged using the meta-contrast principle, and indeed it is this purpose the meta-contrast ratio is more often used for.<ref name="McGarty, C (1999)."/> Furthermore, although prototypicality is most often discussed in relation to the perception of individuals within a group, groups may also be assessed in terms of how prototypical they are of a superordinate category.<ref>Rubin, M. (2012). Group status is related to group prototypicality in the absence of social identity concerns. ''Journal of Social Psychology, 152, 386–389. doi: 10.1080/00224545.2011.614648''[http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00224545.2011.614648 [View<nowiki>]</nowiki>]</ref>
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===Social influence===
{{main|
Self-categorization theory provides an account of social influence.<ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001)."/><ref name="Haslam, et al. (2011)."/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/><ref name="Turner (1985)"/><ref name="Turner (1982)"/><ref name="Turner, J. C. (1991)">Turner, J. C. (1991). Social influence. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.</ref> This account is sometimes referred to as the theory of ''referent informational influence''.<ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/><ref name="Turner (1985)"/><ref name="Turner (1982)"/> According to self-categorization theory, as social identities become salient, and depersonalization and self-stereotyping occurs, people adopt the norms, beliefs, and behaviors of fellow ingroup members. They also distance themselves from the norms, beliefs, and behaviors of comparison outgroup members. When someone observes a difference between themselves and a fellow ingroup member that person will experience subjective uncertainty. That uncertainty can be resolved by either a) recategorizing people or the situation to reflect those perceived differences, or b) engaging in a social influence process whereby one person makes changes to become more similar to the other. Which person adopts the views or behaviors of the other (i.e. who influences who) is predicted to be that person who is most prototypical of the ingroup. In other words, the person who exemplifies the norms, values, and behaviors of the ingroup the most. The self-categorization theory account of social influence has received a large amount of empirical support.<ref name="McGarty & Turner (1992).">{{cite journal|last1 = McGarty|first1 = C.|last2=Turner|first2=J. C. |title = The effects of categorization on social judgement|journal = British Journal of Social Psychology|volume = 31|issue = 4| pages = 253–268|year = 1992|doi=10.1111/j.2044-8309.1992.tb00971.x}}</ref><ref name="Makie & Wright (2001)">{{cite book | last1 = Mackie | first1 =D. M. | last2 = Wright | first2 = C. L. | editor1-last = Brown | editor1-first = Rupert | editor2-last = Gaertner |editor2-first = Sam L. | year = 2001 | chapter = Social Influence in an Intergroup context |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LNZHf3K4xzMC&pg=PA281| title = Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology: Intergroup Processes |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LNZHf3K4xzMC| volume = 3 | issue = 1 | publisher =John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-0-470-69270-7 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last1=Livingstone|first1=A. G.|last2=Haslam|first2=S. A.|last3=Postmes|first3=T.|last4=Jetten|first4=J.|title="We Are, Therefore We Should": Evidence That In-Group Identification Mediates the Acquisition of In-Group Norms|journal=Journal of Applied Social Psychology|year=2011|volume=41|issue=8|pages=1857–1876|doi=10.1111/j.1559-1816.2011.00794.x}}</ref>
Self-categorization theory's account of social influence differs from other social psychological approaches to social influence. It rejects the traditional distinction between [[informational influence]] and [[normative influence]],<ref name="Turner & Oakes (1986)."/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/><ref name="Turner (1985)"/><ref name="Turner, J. C. (1991)"/><ref name="Turner & Oakes, (1997)">{{cite journal | last1 = Turner | first1 = J. C. | last2 = Oakes | first2 = P. J. | editor1-last = McGarty | editor1-first = C. | editor2-last = Haslam | editor2-first = S. A. | year = 1997 | title = The socially structured mind | journal = The Message of Social Psychology | pages = 355–373 }}</ref> where informational influence involves the assessment of social information based on its merit and normative influence involves public compliance to the expectations of group members. For self-categorization theory social information does not have merit independent of self-categorization. Instead, information is perceived as valid to the extent that it is perceived to be a normative belief of the ingroup. Normative influence, on the other hand, is not normative at all. Rather, it is counter-normative influence based compliance to expectations of psychological outgroup members. In a similar vein self-categorization theory also challenges the distinction between objective [[reality testing]] and social reality testing (e.g. the [[elaboration likelihood model]]).<ref name="Oakes et al. (1994)."/><ref name="Turner & Oakes (1986)."/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/><ref name="Turner (1985)"/><ref name="Turner (1982)"/><ref name="Turner, J. C. (1991)"/><ref name="Turner & Oakes, (1997)"/><ref name="Oakes & Reynolds (1997)">{{cite journal|last1=Oakes|first1=P. J.|last2=Reynolds|first2=R. J.|title=Asking the accuracy question: is measurement the answer?|journal=The Social Psychology of Stereotyping and Group Life|year=1997|pages=119–143|editor1-first=R.|editor1-last=Spears|editor2-first=P.J.|editor2-last=Oakes|editor3-first=N.|editor3-last=Ellemers|editor4-first=S.A.|display-editors = 3 |editor4-last=Haslam}}</ref> It argues that there is no such thing as objective reality testing isolated from social reality testing. Sensory data is always interpreted with respect of the beliefs and ideas of the perceiver, which in turn are bound up in the psychological group memberships of that perceiver.
===Out-group homogeneity===
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Outgroup homogeneity can be defined as seeing the outgroup members as more homogeneous than ingroup members.<ref name="Quattrone & Jones (1980)">{{cite journal|last1=Quattrone|first1=George A.|last2=Jones|first2=Edward E.|title=The perception of variability within in-groups and out-groups: Implications for the law of small numbers.|journal=Journal of Personality and Social Psychology|volume=38|issue=1|year=1980|pages=141–152|issn=0022-3514|doi=10.1037/0022-3514.38.1.141}}</ref> Self-categorization accounts for the outgroup homogeneity effect as a function of perceiver motivation and the resultant [[Self-categorization theory#Comparative fit|comparative context]],<ref name="Haslam et al. (1996)."/><ref name="McGarty, C (1999)."/> which is a description of the psychologically available stimuli at any one time. The theory argues that when perceiving an outgroup the psychologically available stimuli include both ingroup and outgroup members. Under these conditions the perceiver is more likely to categorize in accordance with ingroup and outgroup memberships and is consequently naturally motivated to [[Self-categorization theory#Accentuation|accentuate]] intergroup differences as well as intragroup similarities. Conversely, when perceiving an ingroup the outgroup members may not be psychologically available. In such circumstances there is no ingroup-outgroup categorization and thus no accentuation. Indeed, accentuation of intragroup differences may occur under these circumstances for the same sense making reasons.
In line with this explanation it has been shown that in an intergroup context both the ingroup and outgroup is perceived as more homogeneous, while when judged in isolation the ingroup is perceived as comparatively [[Homogeneity and heterogeneity|heterogeneous]].<ref name="Haslam et al. (1995)"/><ref name=" Haslam, et al. (1996).">Halsam, S. A., Oakes, P. J., Turner, J. C., & McGarty, C. (1995). Social identity, self-categorization and the perceived homogeneity of ingroups and outgroups: the interaction between social motivation and cognition. In R. M. Sorrentino & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Handbook of Motivation and Cognition (Vol. 3, pp. 182-222). New York: Guilford</ref> This is also congruent with depersonalization, where under certain circumstances perceivers may see themselves as interchangeable members of the ingroup.<ref name="De Cremer 138–146">{{cite journal| last=De Cremer| first=David| title= Perceptions of group homogeneity as a function of social comparison: The mediating role of group identity| journal=Current Psychology| date=1 August 2001| volume=20| issue=2| pages=138–146| doi=10.1007/s12144-001-1021-4| s2cid=143658588}}</ref> The self-categorization theory eliminates the need to posit differing processing mechanisms for ingroups and outroups, as well as accounting for findings of outgroup homogeneity in the [[minimal group paradigm]].<ref name="McGarty, C (1999)."/>
==Controversies==
===Meta-theoretical debate===
The social identity approach explicitly rejects the metatheory of research that regards limited information processing as the cause of social stereotyping.<ref name="Oakes et al. (1994)."/><ref name="McGarty (2002)">{{cite book |last= McGarty|first= C. |year= 2002|
===Category hierarchies===
Self-categorization theory emphasises the role of category hierarchies in social perception.<ref name="Turner (1999)"/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/> That is, much like a biological [[Taxonomy (biology)|taxonomy]], social groups at lower [[Self-categorization theory#Levels of abstraction|levels of abstraction]] are subsumed within social groups at higher levels of abstraction. A useful example comes from the world of [[team sport]]s, where a particular social group such as [[Manchester United F.C.|Manchester United]] [[Fan (person)|fans]] may be an ingroup for a perceiver who may compare with a relevant outgroup (e.g., [[Liverpool F.C.|Liverpool]] fans). However, at a higher level of abstraction, both social groups may be subsumed into the singular category of [[Association football|football]] fans. This is known as a superordinate category, and in this context those Liverpool fans once considered outgroup members are now considered fellow ingroup members. The new salient outgroup might instead be [[Rugby union|rugby]] fans. Awareness of category hierarchies has led to the development of the [[common ingroup identity]] model. This model suggests that conflict at one level of abstraction (e.g., between Manchester United fans and Liverpool fans) might be ameliorated by making salient a more inclusive superordinate ingroup.<ref name=" (1993).">{{cite journal | last1 = Gaertner | first1 = S. L. |author2-link=John Dovidio| last2 = Dovidio | first2 = J. F. | last3 = Anastasio | first3 = P. A. | last4 = Bachman | first4 = B. A. | last5 = Rust | first5 = M. C. | year = 1993 | title = The common ingroup identity model: Recategorization and the reduction of intergroup bias
It has been noted, however, that very few social groups can be described in hierarchical terms. For example, [[Catholics|Catholic people]] in [[Germany]] cannot be always considered a subordinate category of Germans, as there are Catholic people throughout the globe. McGarty proposes that the theory's use of hierarchies as an organizing principle must be relaxed. The alternative proposition is that social psychologists should look to [[Venn diagram|Venn]]-like structures for descriptions of social structure.<ref name="McGarty, C (1999)."/><ref name="McGarty (2002)"/><ref name="McGarty, C. (2006).">McGarty, C. (2006). Hierarchies and minority groups: The roles of salience, overlap, and background knowledge in selecting meaningful social categorizations from multiple alternatives. In R. J. Crisp and M. Hewstone (Eds.), Multiple Social Categorization: Processes Models and Applications (pp. 25-49). Psychology Press.</ref> The awareness of crossed cutting social categories has allowed for the development of further intergroup conflict reduction strategies.<ref name=" (2006).">Dovidio
===Motivation in the theory===
Brewer and Brown describe self-categorization theory as a "version of social identity theory" that is heavily cognitive and is not attentive to many motivational and affective processes.<ref name="Brewer & Brown (1998)">{{cite journal | last1 = Brewer | first1 = M. B. | last2 = Brown | first2 = R. J. | editor-last = Gilbert | editor-first = D. T. | editor2-last = Fiske | editor2-first = S. T. | editor3-last = Lindzey | editor3-first = G. | year = 1998 | title = Intergroup relations | journal = The Handbook of Social Psychology | volume = 2 | pages = 554–594 }}</ref> Turner and Reynolds, in response to this style of commentary, counter that describing self-categorization theory as a replacement to social identity theory is an error, and that self-categorization theory was always intended to complement social identity theory.<ref name="Turner & Reynolds (2001)">{{cite book | last1 = Turner | first1 = John C. | last2 = Reynolds | first2 =Katherine J. | editor1-last = Brown | editor1-first = Rupert | editor2-last = Gaertner | editor2-first = Sam L. | year = 2001 | chapter = The Social Identity Perspective in Intergroup Relations: Theories, Themes, and Controversies |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LNZHf3K4xzMC&pg=PA133 | title = Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LNZHf3K4xzMC | volume = 3 | issue = 1 | publisher = John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-0-470-69270-7 }}</ref> Turner and Reynolds also argue that such commentary unreasonably discounts the motivational concerns that are articulated in self-categorization theory.<ref name="Turner & Reynolds (2001)"/> For example, the motivation to maintain positive self categories and the motivation to achieve ingroup consensus.<ref name="Turner (1985)"/>
==References==
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[[Category:Conceptions of self]]
[[Category:Majority–minority relations]]
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