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| patched = 2019 via [[DMA attack|Kernel DMA Protection]]
| discoverer = Björn Ruytenberg
| affected hardware = Computers manufactured before 2019, and some after that, having the [[Thunderbolt (interface)|Intel Thunderbolt 3 (and
| website = {{URL|thunderspy.io}}
}}
'''Thunderspy''' is a type of [[Vulnerability (computing)|security vulnerability]], based on the [[Thunderbolt (interface)|Intel Thunderbolt 3 port]], first reported publicly on 10 May 2020, that can result in an [[Evil maid attack|evil maid]] (
According to Björn Ruytenberg, the discoverer of the vulnerability, "All the evil maid needs to do is unscrew the backplate, attach a device momentarily, reprogram the firmware, reattach the backplate, and the evil maid gets full access to the laptop. All of this can be done in under five minutes."<ref name="WRD-20200510" /> The malicious firmware is used to clone device identities which makes classical DMA attack possible.<ref name="TSY-2020"/> == History ==
The Thunderspy security vulnerabilities were first publicly reported by Björn Ruytenberg of [[Eindhoven University of Technology]] in the [[Netherlands]] on 10 May 2020.<ref name="TSY-20200417">{{cite news |last=Ruytenberg |first=Björn |title=Breaking Thunderbolt Protocol Security: Vulnerability Report. 2020. |url=https://thunderspy.io/assets/reports/breaking-thunderbolt-security-bjorn-ruytenberg-20200417.pdf |date=17 April 2020 |work=Thunderspy.io |accessdate=11 May 2020 |archive-date=11 May 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200511032830/https://thunderspy.io/assets/reports/breaking-thunderbolt-security-bjorn-ruytenberg-20200417.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> Thunderspy is similar to [[Thunderclap (security vulnerability)|Thunderclap]],<ref name="TC-20190226">{{cite news |author=Staff |title=Thunderclap: Modern computers are vulnerable to malicious peripheral devices |url=http://thunderclap.io/ |date=26 February 2019 |accessdate=12 May 2020 }}</ref><ref name="VRG-20190227">{{cite news |last=Gartenberg |first=Chaim |title='Thunderclap' vulnerability could leave Thunderbolt computers open to attacks - Remember: don't just plug random stuff into your computer |url=https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/27/18243503/thunderclap-vulnerability-thunderbolt-computers-attack |date=27 February 2019 |work=[[The Verge]] |accessdate=12 May 2020 }}</ref> another security vulnerability, reported in 2019, that also involves access to computer files through the Thunderbolt port.<ref name="SR-20200511" />
== Impact ==
{{more citations needed|section|date=May 2020}}
The security vulnerability affects millions of Apple, Linux and Windows computers, as well as all computers manufactured before 2019, and some after that.<ref name="WRD-20200510" /><ref name="FRBS-20200511" /><ref name="TSY-2020" /> However, this impact is restricted mainly to how precise a bad actor would have to be to execute the attack. Physical access to a machine with a vulnerable Thunderbolt controller is necessary, as well as a writable ROM chip for the Thunderbolt controller's firmware.<ref name="TSY-2020" /> Additionally, part of Thunderspy, specifically the portion involving re-writing the firmware of the controller, requires the device to be in sleep,<ref name="TSY-2020" /> or at least in some sort of powered-on state, to be effective.<ref name="HR-20200513">{{Cite web |last=Grey |first=Mishka |title=7 Thunderbolt Vulnerabilities Affect Millions of Devices: 'Thunderspy' Allows Physical Hacking in 5 Minutes - Do you own a Thunderbolt equipped laptop, and have bought it after 2011? Well, we've news for YOU. 7 newly discovered Intel Thunderbolt vulnerabilities have exposed your device to hackers. Learn what to do? |url=https://www.hackreports.com/7-thunderbolt-vulnerabillity-thunderspy-exploit-thunderbolt-hacked/ |date=13 May 2020 |work=HackReports.com |accessdate=18 May 2020 |archive-date=4 August 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200804174216/https://www.hackreports.com/7-thunderbolt-vulnerabillity-thunderspy-exploit-thunderbolt-hacked/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Machines that force power-off when the case is open may assist in resisting this attack to the extent that the feature (switch) itself resists tampering.
Due to the nature of attacks that require extended physical access to hardware, it's unlikely the attack will affect users outside of a business or government environment.<ref name="HR-20200513" /><ref name="YT-20200511">{{cite news |author=codeHusky |title=Video (11:01) - Thunderspy is nothing to worry about - Here's why |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c9Z3hQh0NxY |date=11 May 2020 |work=[[YouTube]] |accessdate=12 May 2020 |archive-date=19 June 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200619195525/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c9Z3hQh0NxY&gl=US&hl=en |url-status=live }}</ref>
== Mitigation ==
The researchers claim there is no easy software solution, and may only be mitigated by disabling the Thunderbolt port altogether.<ref name="WRD-20200510" /> However, the impacts of this attack (reading kernel level memory without the machine needing to be powered off) are largely mitigated by anti-intrusion features provided by many business machines.<ref name="msdoc-kdma-protecton-for-thunderbolt">{{cite web |author=Staff |title=Kernel DMA Protection for Thunderbolt™ 3 (Windows 10) - Microsoft 365 Security |url=https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/kernel-dma-protection-for-thunderbolt |date=26 March 2019
== References ==
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