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{{short description|System used to prevent non-paying customers from accessing content that requires payment}}
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'''Conditional access''' (
== In software ==
Conditional access is a function that lets an organization manage people's access to the software in question, such as email, applications, and documents. It is usually offered as [[Software as a service|SaaS]] (Software-as-a-Service) and deployed in organizations to keep company data safe. By setting conditions on the access to this data, the organization has more control over who accesses the data and where and in what way the information is accessed.
Under the [[Digital Video Broadcasting]] (DVB) standard, conditional access system (CAS) standards are defined in the specification documents for DVB-CA (conditional access), [[Common Scrambling Algorithm|DVB-CSA]] (the common [[Scrambler|scrambling]] algorithm) and [[DVB-CI]] (the [[Common Interface]]). These standards define a method by which one can obfuscate a digital-television stream, with access provided only to those with valid decryption [[smart cards|smart-cards]]. The DVB specifications for conditional access are available from the [http://www.dvb.org/technology/standards/index.xml#conditional standards page on the DVB website].▼
When setting up conditional access, access can be limited to or prevented based on the policy defined by the system administrator. For example, a policy might require that access is available from certain networks, or access is blocked when a specific [[web browser]] is requesting the access.
==In digital television==
▲Under the [[Digital Video Broadcasting]] (DVB) standard, conditional access system (CAS) standards are defined in the specification documents for DVB-CA (conditional access), [[Common Scrambling Algorithm|DVB-CSA]] (the common [[Scrambler|scrambling]] algorithm) and [[DVB-CI]] (the [[Common Interface]]).<ref>{{Cite web |title=Security |url=https://dvb.org/solutions/security/ |access-date=2022-12-05 |website=DVB |language=en-US |archive-date=2022-12-05 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221205161912/https://dvb.org/solutions/security/ |url-status=live }}</ref> These standards define a method by which one can obfuscate a digital-television stream, with access provided only to those with valid decryption [[smart cards|smart-cards]]. The DVB specifications for conditional access are available from the [https://web.archive.org/web/20130116162443/http://www.dvb.org/technology/standards/index.xml#conditional standards page on the DVB website].
This is achieved by a combination of [[scrambler|scrambling]] and [[encryption]]. The data stream is scrambled with a 48-bit secret key, called the ''control word''. Knowing the value of the control word at a given moment is of relatively little value, as under normal conditions, content providers will change the control word several times per minute. The control word is generated automatically in such a way that successive values are not usually predictable; the DVB specification recommends using a physical process for that.
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In order for the receiver to unscramble the data stream, it must be permanently informed about the current value of the control word. In practice, it must be informed slightly in advance, so that no viewing interruption occurs. [[Encryption]] is used to protect the control word during transmission to the receiver: the control word is encrypted as an ''entitlement control message'' (ECM). The CA subsystem in the receiver will decrypt the control word only when authorised to do so; that authority is sent to the receiver in the form of an ''entitlement management message'' (EMM). The EMMs are specific to each [[subscriber]], as identified by the smart card in his receiver, or to groups of subscribers, and are issued much less frequently than ECMs, usually at monthly intervals. This being apparently not sufficient to prevent unauthorized viewing, [[Télévision Par Satellite|TPS]] has lowered this interval down to about 12 minutes. This can be different for every provider, [[British Sky Broadcasting|BSkyB]] uses a term of 6 weeks. When [[Nagravision|Nagravision 2]] was hacked, [[Digital+]] started sending a new EMM every three days to make unauthorized viewing more cumbersome.
The contents of ECMs and EMMs are not standardized and as such they depend on the conditional access system being used.<ref>[https://www.itu.int/dms_pubrec/itu-r/rec/bt/R-REC-BT.1852-1-201701-I!!PDF-E.pdf Conditional-access systems for digital broadcasting 2016-10] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230301233307/https://www.itu.int/dms_pubrec/itu-r/rec/bt/R-REC-BT.1852-1-201701-I!!PDF-E.pdf|date=2023-03-01}}</ref>
The control word can be transmitted through different ECMs at once. This allows the use of several conditional access systems at the same time, a DVB feature called ''simulcrypt'', which saves bandwidth and encourages multiplex operators to cooperate. [https://web.archive.org/web/20130116162443/http://www.dvb.org/technology/standards/index.xml#conditional DVB Simulcrypt] is widespread in Europe; some channels, like the [[CNN International]] Europe from the [[Hot Bird]] satellites, can use
The decryption cards are read, and sometimes updated with specific access rights, either through a [[conditional-access module]] (CAM), a [[PC card]]-format card reader meeting DVB-CI standards, or through a built-in [[ISO/IEC 7816]] card reader, such as that in the [[Digibox (Sky Digital)|Sky Digibox]].
Several companies provide competing CA systems; ABV, [[VideoGuard]], Irdeto, [[Nagravision]], [[Conax]], [[Viaccess]], [[Synamedia Ltd.|Synamedia]], [[Mediaguard]] (a.k.a. [[Nagra France|SECA]]) are among the most commonly used CA systems.
Due to the common usage of CA in DVB systems, many tools to aid in or even [[Pirate decryption|directly circumvent]] encryption exist. CAM emulators and multiple-format CAMs exist which can either read several card formats or even directly decrypt a compromised encryption scheme. Most multiple format CAMs and all CAMs that directly decrypt a signal are based on [[reverse engineering]] of the CA systems. A large proportion of the systems currently in use for DVB encryption have been opened to full decryption at some point, including Nagravision, Conax, Viaccess, Mediaguard (v1) as well as the first version of VideoGuard.
=== Conditional access in North America ===
In
Cable companies in the
The main appeal of such approaches is that the [[access control]] may be upgraded dynamically in response to security breaches without requiring expensive exchanges of physical
=== Conditional access systems ===
Conditional access systems include:
==== Analog systems ====
*[[EuroCrypt]]
*[[Nagravision]]
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*[[VideoCrypt]]
==== Digital systems ====
{|class="wikitable"
|-
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| 0x4AEB || Abel Quintic || Abel DRM Systems || 2009 || Secure ||
|-
| 0x4A64, 0x4AF0, 0x4AF2, 0x4B4B, 0x4B4C || ABV CAS || ABV International Pte. Ltd || 2006 || Secure (Farncombe Certified) ||CA, DRM, Middleware & Turnkey Solution Provider For DTH, DVBT/T2, DVBC, OTT, IPTV, VOD, Catchup TV, Audience Measurement System, EAD etc.
|-
| 0x4AFC || Panaccess || Panaccess Systems GmbH || 2010 || Secure (Farncombe Certified) || CA for DVB-S/S2, DVB-T/T2, DVB-C, DVB-IP, OTT, VOD, Catchup etc.
|-
| 0x4B19 || RCAS or RIDSYS cas || RIDSYS, INDIA || 2012 || Secure || CA for DVB-C, IPTV, OTT, VOD, Catchup etc.
|-
| 0x4B30, 0x4B31 || ViCAS || Vietnam Multimedia Corporation (VTC) || Unknown || Secure (Farncombe Certified) ||
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| ||
|-
| 0x1700 – 0x1701, 0x1703 – 0x1721, 0x1723 – 0x1761, 0x1763 – 0x17ff, 0x5601 – 0x5604 || VCAS DVB || Verimatrix Inc. ||
| ||
|-
| 0x2600
0x2610 | [[BISS]] BISS-E | [[European Broadcasting Union]] || | Compromised ||▼
2018
▲| Compromised, BISS-E secure ||
|-
|0x27A0-0x27A4
|ICAS (Indian CAS)
|ByDesign India Private Limited
|2015
|Advanced Embedded Secure
|
|-
| 0x4900 || China Crypt || CrytoWorks (China) (Irdeto) || Unknown
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| ||
|-
| 0x0700 ||
| Compromised || [[DVB-S2]] compatible, used for retail BUD dish service and for commercial operations as source programming for cable operators.
Despite the Programming Center
|-
| 0x4A70 || DreamCrypt || Dream Multimedia || 2004
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| ||
|-
|0x5448,0x6448
|Gospell VisionCrypt
|GOSPELL DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD.
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|-
|-
| 0x0606 || Irdeto 1 || Irdeto || 1995 || rowspan="2" | Compromised (Cardsharing and MOSC available) || rowspan="2" |
|-
| 0x0602, 0x0604, 0x0606, 0x0608, 0x0622, 0x0626, 0x0664, 0x0614 || Irdeto 2 || Irdeto || 2000
|-
|
|-
|
|-
| 0x4AA1 || [[KeyFly]] || SIDSA || 2006
| Partly compromised (v. 1.0) ||
|-
| 0x0100 || Seca [[Mediaguard]] 1 || [[Nagra France|SECA]] ||
| Compromised ||
|-
| 0x0100 || Seca [[Mediaguard]] 2 (v1+) || [[Nagra France|SECA]] ||
| Partly compromised (MOSC available) ||
|-
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| 0x1801 || Nagravision - ELK || Nagravision || Circa 2008 || IPTV
|-
| 0x4A02 || Tongfang || [[Tsinghua Tongfang Company]] ||
| Secure ||
|-
| 0x4AD4 || OmniCrypt || [https://go.buydrm.com/thedrmblog/topic/google-widevine-drm Widevine Technologies] || 2004 || ||
|-
| 0x0E00 || [[PowerVu]] || [[Scientific Atlanta]] || 1998
| rowspan="2" | Compromised || rowspan="2" | Professional system widely used by cable operators for source programming
|-
| 0x0E00 || PowerVu+ || Scientific Atlanta ||
|-
| 0x1000 || RAS (Remote Authorisation System) || [[Tandberg Television]] || Unknown
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| 0xA101 || [https://web.archive.org/web/20110726100247/http://www.niir.ru/eng/page.php?trid=96 RosCrypt-M] ||NIIR || 2006 || ||
|-
| 0x4A60, 0x4A61, 0x4A63 || SkyCrypt/Neotioncrypt/Neotion SHL || AtSky/Neotion<ref>{{cite web |url=http://sat.uz/2008/01/17/skycrypt.html |title=Skycrypt |
|-
| Unknown || T-crypt || Tecsys
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| ||
|-
| 0x4A80 || ThalesCrypt || Thales Broadcast & Multimedia<ref>
| || Viaccess modification. Was developed after TPS-Crypt was compromised.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://sat.uz/2008/01/17/tpscrypt.html |title=TPSCrypt |
|-
| 0x0500 || TPS-Crypt || France Telecom || Unknown
| rowspan="7" | Compromised || Viaccess modification used with Viaccess 2.3
|-
| 0x0500 || [[Viaccess]] PC2.3, or Viaccess 1 || [[France Telecom]] ||
|
|-
| 0x0500 || Viaccess PC2.4, or Viaccess 2 || France Telecom || 2002 ||
|-
| 0x0500 || Viaccess PC2.5, or Viaccess 2 || France Telecom ||
|
|-
| 0x0500 || Viaccess PC2.6, or Viaccess 3 || France Telecom || 2005 ||
|-
| 0x0500 || Viaccess PC3.0 || France Telecom ||
|
|-
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|-
| Unknown
| Viaccess PC6.0 || France Telecom ||
|
|-
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| 0x0911, 0x0960 || Synamedia [[VideoGuard]] 2 || [[NDS Group|NDS (now part of Synamedia)]] || 1999 || Secure || rowspan="3" |
|-
| 0x0919, 0x0961, 0x09AC, 0x09C4, 0x091F, 0x0944, 0x09AA || Synamedia [[VideoGuard]] 3 || [[NDS Group|NDS (now part of Synamedia)]] ||2004 || Secure
|-
| 0x0927, 0x09BF, 0x0910, 0x0913, 0x098C, 0x098D, 0x098E, 0x0911, 0x0950, 0x09BB, 0x0987, 0x0963,
|-
|-
| 0x4AD0, 0x4AD1 || X-Crypt || XCrypt Inc. || || Secure ||▼
| 0x56D0 || Onnet CA/DRM || Onnet Systems India Pvt. Ltd. || 2021 || Secure || CA/DRM, IPTV Middleware, OTT, Interactive Services, STB Middleware, AR/VR
|-
| Secure ||
|-
| 0x4AE0, 0x4AE1, 0x7be1|| DRE-Crypt || [http://cifratech.com/ Cifra] || 2004 || Secure ||
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* [[Card sharing]]
* [[Compression Networks]]
* [[
* [[DigiCipher 2]]
* [[Digital rights management]]
* [[Pirate decryption]]
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==External links==
*[https://web.archive.org/web/20090113130339/http://sl65.helloz.info/viewtopic.php?t=4004 CAS history] in Spanish
*[http://www.dvbservices.com/identifiers/ca_system_id CA ID list on dvbservices.com]
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