Word and Object: Difference between revisions

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{{infobox book | <!-- See Wikipedia:WikiProject_Novels or Wikipedia:WikiProject_Books -->

| name = Word and Object

| image = File:Word and Object (first edition).jpg

| caption = Cover of the first edition

| author = [[Willard Van Orman Quine]]

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'''''Word and Object''''' is a 1960 work by the, philosopher [[Willard Van Orman Quine]],'s inmost whichfamous the authorwork, expands uponon the line of thought of his earlier writingsideas in ''From a Logical Point of View'' (1953), and reformulates some of his earlier arguments, such aslike his attack inon the [[analytic–synthetic distinction]] from "[[Two Dogmas of Empiricism]]" on the [[analytic–synthetic distinction]].<ref name="autobio">{{cite book |author= Quine, Willard Van Orman |title=The Time of My Life: An Autobiography |publisher=MIT Press |___location= Cambridge, Massachusetts |year=1985 |page=392 |isbn= 978-0262670043 }}</ref> TheIt introduces the [[thought experiment]] of [[radical translation]] and the accompanyingrelated notionconcept of [[indeterminacy of translation]] are original to ''Word and Object'', which is Quine's most famous book.<ref name="Gibsonarticle">{{cite book |author=Gibson, Roger F. |title=The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy |publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=1999 |isbn=0-521-63722-8 |editor=Audi, Robert |___location=Cambridge |pages=767–768}}</ref>

==Synopsis==

Quine emphasizes his [[Naturalism (philosophy)|naturalism]], the doctrine that philosophy should be pursued as part of natural science.<ref name="Hookway772">{{cite book |author=Hookway, C. J. |editor=Honderich, Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |publisher=Oxford University Press |___location=Oxford |year=2005 |page=779 |isbn=0-19-926479-1 }}</ref> He argues in favor of naturalizing [[epistemology]], [[physicalism]] as against [[phenomenalism]] and [[Mind–body dualism|mind-body dualism]], and [[extensionality]] as against [[intension]]ality. He also develops a behavioristic conception of sentence-meaning, theorizes about language learning, speculates on the ontogenesis of reference, explains various forms of ambiguity and vagueness, and recommends measures for regimenting language so as to eliminate ambiguity and vagueness as well as to make a theory's the logic and [[ontic]] commitments perspicuous ("to be is to be the value of a bound variable"). He argues, moreover, against quantified modal logic and the [[essentialism]] it presupposes, argues for [[Platonic realism]] in mathematics, rejects [[instrumentalism]] in favor of [[scientific realism]], develops a view of philosophical analysis as explication, argues against analyticity and for [[holism]], against countenancing propositions, and tries to show that the meanings of theoretical sentences are indeterminate and that the reference of terms is inscrutable.<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-dictionary-of-philosophy/50389231FC1A5DF1B1BF0F4140264792 |title=The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy |date=2015 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |editor-last=Audi |editor-first=Robert |edition=3 |___location=Cambridge |pages=897–898 |doi=10.1017/cbo9781139057509|isbn=978-1-139-05750-9 }}</ref>

==Behaviorism==

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===Vagaries of reference and referential transparency===

In Chapter 4 of ''Word and Object'', Quine looks at the indeterminacies of reference that are inherent to the (English) language system. A term is ''vague'' if the boundaries of its reference are not clear. For a singular term this means that the boundaries of the object it refers to are not clear,; e.g. with the, 'mountain': for two neighboring mountains, it is not clear where the first mountain stops and the second one begins. General terms can be vague in this same way, but also in yet another way,: namely, that there are some objects of which it is not clear whether or not they should be included inamong the referencereferents of the term. For example, the term 'blue' is vague insofar as it is not clear whether or not some objects are blue or green. A second vagary of reference is ''ambiguity''. Ambiguity differs from vagueness in that for a vague term the (boundaries of) its reference are unsettleduncertain, whereas ambiguous terms do refer to clearly todelineated sets of objects,; however, there are objects of which they are clearly true ''and'' clearly false of the same objectssimultaneously. For example, the term 'light' is clearly true of a dark feather (''vis-á-vis'' weight), but at the same time clearly false of it (''vis-á-vis'' visual brightness).

Quine also introduces the term '[[referential transparency]]'. Quine wants to make explicit the ambiguities in language, and to show different interpretations of sentences, therefore, he has to know whereto what the terms in a sentence refer to. A term is used in ''purely referential position'' if its only purpose is to specify its object so that the rest of the sentence can say something about it. If a term is used in purely referential position, it is subject to the substitutivity of identity: the term can be substituted by a [[Extension (semantics)|coextensive]] term (a term true of the same objects) without changing the truth-value of the sentence. In the sentence, 'Amsterdam rhymes with Peter Pan' you cannot substitute 'Amsterdam' with 'the capital of the Netherlands'. A construction, aconstruction—a way in which a singular term or a sentence is included in another singular term or sentence, has ''referential transparency'': it issentence—is either referentially transparent, or referentially opaque.; Aa construction is referentially transparent if it is the case that ifwhen anthe occurrenceincluded ofterm aor termsentence is purely referential in a sentence then, it is also purely referential also in the containing term or sentence. However(Referential opaqueness is not to be taken as a problem to be corrected, Quinehowever—Quine's goal here is to make clear which positions in a sentence are referentially transparent, not to make them all transparent.)

===Canonical notation===

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