Objective precision: Difference between revisions

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{{Short description|"objective" aspect of abstraction}}

{{Refimprove|date=May 2008}}

{{Use dmy dates|date=October 2023}}

In [[philosophy]] and [[second scholasticism]], '''objective precision''' (Latin ''{{langx|la|praecisio obiectiva''}}) is the "objective" aspect of [[abstraction]]. Objective precision is the process by which certain features (the [[differentia]]e) of the real object of a [[formal concept]] are excluded from the comprehension of that concept; the object is thus being intentionally transformed into a universal [[objective concept]]. Objective precision is thus a process by which universal objective concepts<ref>{{cite web |last1=Novak |first1=Mgr. Lukas |title=DUNS SCOTUS’S THEORY OF UNIVOCITY |url=http://www.skaut.org/ln/docs/univocity.pdf |website=www.skaut.org |publisher=University of South Bohemia in Budweis (Ceske Budejovice) Czech Republic |access-date=27 March 2024 |date=13 July 2005}}</ref> arise. It is the "objective" aspect of the process of (total) [[abstraction]] or concept-formation.

== Objective precision and formal precision ==

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== Ontological requirements on the part of the object ==

The schools are divided in their opinion what constitutes the necessary condition on the part of the object in order that objective precision be possible. According to the [[Thomism|Thomists]] a [[virtual distinction]] on the part of the object between the excluded differentia and the arising abstracted objective concept is sufficient to make objective precision possible. According to the [[Scotism|Scotists]], a [[formal distinction]] is generally required, although certain Scotists (like [[Bartolomeo Mastri]]) regard virtual distinction as sufficient in certain special cases. [[Francisco Suárez|Suárez]] defends objective precision but he rejects any distinctions on the part of the object. The nominalists (conceptualists) agree with the Scotists that a formal distinction would be necessary to enable objective precision, but since they regard such a distinction as impossible, they reject objective precision altogether.

== See also ==

* [[Abstract object theory]]

==References==

{{Reflist}}

==Sources==

* Daniel Heider, Andersen Claus A. (eds.), ''Cognitive Issues in the Long Scotist Tradition'', Schwabe Verlag, 2023.

[[Category:Abstraction]]

[[Category:Concepts in metaphysics]]

[[Category:Scholasticism]]