Local-loop unbundling: Difference between revisions

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{{Short description|Telecommunications regulatory process}}

'''Local loop unbundling''' ('''LLU''') is the regulatory process of allowing multiple [[telecommunications]] operators to use connections from the [[telephone exchange]] to the [[customer]]'s premises. The physical wire connection between the local exchange and the customer is known as a "[[local loop]]". It is owned by the [[incumbent local exchange carrier]] (also referred to as the "ILEC," "local exchange," or in the [[United States]] either a "[[Baby Bell]]" or an [[independent telephone company]]). Other providers are granted [[unbundled access]] to increase competition.

{{Multiple issues|

{{update|date=September 2011}}

{{more citations needed|date=July 2008}}

{{Unreliable sources|date=November 2024}}}}

'''Local loop unbundling''' ('''LLU''' or '''LLUB''') is the regulatory process of allowing multiple [[telecommunications]] operators to use connections from thea [[telephone exchange]] to the [[customer]]'s premises___location. The physical wire connection between the local exchange and the customer is known as a "[[local loop]]". Itand is owned by the [[incumbent local exchange carrier]] (also referred to as the "ILEC,", "local exchange,", or in the [[United States]], either a "[[Baby Bell]]" or an [[independent telephone company]]). OtherTo increase competition, other providers are granted [[unbundled access]] to increase competition.

==Policy background==

LLU is generally opposed by the ILECs, which in most cases are either former investor-owned [[North America]] or state-owned monopoly enterprises forced to open themselves to competition. ILECs argue that LLU amounts to a [[regulatory taking]], that they are forced to provide competitors with essential business inputs, and that LLU stifles infrastructure-based competition and technical innovation because new entrants prefer to 'parasitize' the incumbent's network instead of building their own and that the regulatory interference required to make LLU work (e.g., to set the LLU access price) is detrimental to the market.

==Policy background==

New entrants, on the other hand, argue that since they cannot economically duplicate the incumbent's local loop, they cannot provide certain services, such as [[Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line|ADSL]] without LLU, thus allowing the incumbent to monopolize the respective potentially competitive market(s) and stifle innovation. They point out that alternative access technologies, such as [[wireless local loop]], have proven uncompetitive and impractical and that under current pricing models, the incumbent is, in many cases, depending on the regulatory model, guaranteed a fair price for the use of its facilities, including an appropriate return on investment. Finally, they argue that the ILECs generally did not construct their local loop in a competitive, risky market environment but under legal monopoly protection and using taxpayer's money, which means, according to the new entrants, that ILECs ought not to be entitled to continue to extract regulated rates of return, which often include monopoly rents from the local loop.

{{Unreferenced section|date=July 2008}}

LLU is generally opposed by the ILECs, which inare most cases aregenerally either former investor-owned [[(North America]]) or state-owned monopoly enterprises forced to open themselves to competition. ILECs argue that LLU amounts to a [[regulatory taking]], thatwhich theycauses arethem forcedto be compelled to provide competitors with essential business inputs, andso they believe that LLU stifles infrastructure-based competition and technical innovation because new entrants prefer to 'parasitize'use the incumbent's network instead of building their own and that the regulatory interference required to make LLU work (e.g., to set the LLU access price) is detrimental to the market.

New entrants, on the other hand, argue that since they cannot economically duplicate the incumbent's local loop, they cannot provide certain services, such as [[Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line|ADSL]] without LLU, thus allowing the incumbent to monopolizemonopolise the respective potentially competitive market(s) and stifleprevent innovation. They point outargue that alternative access technologies, such as [[wireless local loop]], have been proven uncompetitive andor impractical, and that under current pricing models, the incumbent is, in many cases, depending on the regulatory model, guaranteed a fair price for the use of its facilities, including an appropriate return on investment. Finally, they argue that the ILECs generally did not construct their local loop in a competitive, risky market environment, but under legal monopoly protection and using taxpayer's money, whichmeaning meansthat, according to the new entrants, that ILECs oughtshould not to be entitled to continue to extract regulated rates of return, which often include monopoly rents from the local loop.

Most industrially developed nations, including the U.S., [[Australia]], the [[European Union member state]]s, and India, have introduced regulatory frameworks providing for LLU. Given the problems mentioned above, regulators face the challenging task of regulating a market that is changing rapidly without stifling any innovation or improperly disadvantaging any competitor.

Most industrially developed nations, including the U.S.US, [[Australia]], the [[European Union member state]]s, and India, have introduced regulatory frameworks providingthat provide for LLU. GivenRegulators the problems mentioned above, regulators face the challengingare tasktasked ofwith regulating a market that is changing rapidlymarket without stifling anypreventing innovation orand without improperly disadvantaging any competitorcompetitors.

The process has been extended - the first action in the E.U. resulted from a report written for the European Commission in 1993. It took several years for the E.U. legislation to require unbundling. In individual E.U. countries, the process took further to mature to become practical and economic rather than simply being a legal possibility.

The first action{{Which|date=November 2024}} in the EU resulted from a report written for the European Commission in 1993. It took several years for the EU legislation to require unbundling and in individual countries in the EU, the process took further time to mature to become practical and economic rather than being a legal possibility. The 1993 report referred to the logical requirement to unbundle optical fiberfibre access butand recommended deferral to a later date when fiberfibre access hadwould becomebe more common. In 2006, thethere firstwere signs were that, (as a result of the municipal fiberfibre networks movement, forin example,countries insuch as Sweden, where unbundled local loop fiberfibre is commercially available from both the incumbent and competitors), policythere maywas evolvea potential for policy evolving in thisa different direction.

In 1996 the United States [[Telecommunications Act of 1996|Telecommunication Act]] (in section 251) defined the [[unbundled access]] as:

{{Blockquote|The duty to provide, to any requesting telecommunications carrier for the provision of a telecommunications service, nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled basis at any technically feasible point on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory by the terms and conditions of the agreement and the requirements of this section and section 252. An incumbent local exchange carrier shall provide such unbundled network elements in a manner that allows requesting carriers to combine such elements to provide such telecommunications service.<ref>{{cite web |title=47 U.S.C. §§ 251(c)(3) |work=[[United States Code]] |publisher=[[Office of the Law Revision Counsel]] of the [[US House of Representatives]] |url=https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/47/251.html |access-date=February 22, 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100222010657/http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/47/251.html |archive-date=February 22, 2010 |url-status=live |df=mdy-all }}</ref>}}

In 1996, Section 251 of the United States [[Telecommunications Act of 1996|Telecommunication Act]] (in section 251) defined the [[unbundled access]] as:

The 1993 report referred to the logical requirement to unbundle optical fiber access but recommended deferral to later when fiber access had become more common. In 2006, the first signs were that (as a result of the municipal fiber networks movement, for example, in Sweden, where unbundled local loop fiber is commercially available from both the incumbent and competitors) policy may evolve in this direction.

{{Blockquote|The duty to provide, to any requesting telecommunications carrier for the provision of a telecommunications service, nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled basis at any technically feasible point on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory byin accordance with the terms and conditions of the agreement and the requirements of this section and section 252. An incumbent local exchange carrier shall provide such unbundled network elements in a manner that allows requesting carriers to combine such elements in order to provide such telecommunications service.<ref>{{cite web |title=47 U.S.C. §§ 251(c)(3) |work=[[United States Code]] |publisher=[[Office of the Law Revision Counsel]] of the [[US House of Representatives]] |url=https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/47/251.html |access-date=February 22, 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100222010657/http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/47/251.html |archive-date=February 22, 2010 |url-status=live |df=mdy-all }}</ref>}}

==Unbundling developments around the world==

===World Trade Organization (WTO)Organisation===

Some provisions of [[World Trade Organization|World Trade Organization (WTO)]] telecommunications law can be read to require unbundling:

* Sect.Section 5(a) of the [[General Agreement on Trade in Services|GATS Annex on Telecommunications]]<ref>{{Cite web |url= http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats_02_e.htm |title=WTO {{!}} legal texts - Marrakesh Agreement |access-date=2004-06-20 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20040623051211/http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats_02_e.htm#articleXXIX |archive-date= 2004-06-23 |url-status=live }}</ref> requires WTO Members to guarantee service suppliers "access to and use of public telecommunications transport networks [...] for the supply of a service". New entrants arguehave argued that withwithout LLU, they cancannot supply services such as [[ADSL]].

* Sect.Section 2.2(b) of the 1998 [[WTO Reference Paper|Reference Paper]],<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/telecom_e/tel23_e.htm |title=WTO {{!}} Services: Telecommunications - Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications April 24, April 1996, |access-date=5 February 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160310122428/https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/telecom_e/tel23_e.htm |archive-date=10 March 2016 |url-status=live |df=dmy-all }}</ref> to which some Members have subscribed, requires "sufficiently unbundled interconnection" with major providers. However, the Paper's definition of interconnection excludesappears to exclude LLU. Section 1 of the paper requires members to maintain "appropriate measures [...] for the purpose of preventing [major] suppliers [...] from engaging in or continuing anti-competitive practices." New entrants argue that such practices include not giving competitors access to facilities necessary for market entry, such as the local loop.

* Sect. One of the Reference Paper requires Members to maintain "appropriate measures ... to prevent [major] suppliers ... from engaging in or continuing anti-competitive practices." New entrants argue that such practices include not giving competitors access to facilities essential to market entry, such as the local loop.

The question has yetnot to bebeen settled before a WTO judicial body, and, atit anyis rate,thought that these obligations may only apply where the respective WTO Membermember has committed itself to open its essentialbasic telecommunications market to competition. About 80 (primarily mostly-developed) Membersmembers have done so since 1998.

===India===

{{Update|inaccurate=yes|date=October 2014}}

LLU has not yet been implemented in Indian cities yet. However, [[BSNL]] stated in recently{{when|date=October 2014}} stated that it willwould open up its copper loops for private participation. In addition to this, theThe proliferation of WiMax and cable broadband has increased broadband penetration and market competition. By 2008, thea price war had reduced basic broadband prices to INR 250 (US$6), including line rental without any long-term contracts. In rural areas, the state player, BSNL, is still the leading, and often the only supplier. Although BSNL is a monopoly, it is used by the government to create competition.

BSNL is a monopoly used as a tool to ensure competition by the Government.

===European Union===

{{Unreferenced section|date=July 2008}}

ImplementingThe implementation of local loop unbundling is a requirement of European Union policy on competition in the telecommunications sector. Atand has been introduced, at various stages of development, it has been introduced in all member states (Operators with Significant Market Power shall publish (from December 31, 2000, and keep updated)as a post referencepostreference offer for unbundled access to their local loops and related facilities. The offeroffers shallare berequired sufficientlyto be unbundled so that the beneficiary does not have to pay for network elements or facilities that are not necessaryunnecessary for the supply ofsupplying its services, and shallare required to contain a description of the components of the offer, associated terms, and conditions, including charges).

European States that approvehave been approved for membership to the E.U.EU musthave an obligation to introduce LLU as part of the liberalizationliberalisation of their communications sector.<!-- (Operators with Significant Market Power shall publish (from 31 December 2000, and keep updated) -->

===United Kingdom===

{{See also|Internet in the United Kingdom#Unbundled local loop}}

{{Update|inaccurate=yes|date=September 2011}}

On 23 January 23, 2001, [[Easynet]] became the first operator in the mainland of the U.K.UK to unbundle a local loop of copper wire from [[BritishBT TelecomGroup|British Telecom]]'s]] network and provide its own broadband service overwith it. <ref>Richardson, Tim (24 January 24, 2001). [https://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/01/24/easynet_coughs_up_to_battersea/ "EasynetEasyNet coughs up to Battersea first"] ''The Register''. Retrieved 24 April 24, 2023.</ref>

By 14 January 14, 2006, 210,000 local loop connections had been unbundled from [[B.T.BT Group|BT]] operation under local loop unbundling. [[Ofcom]] had hoped that 1 million local loop connections would be unbundled by June 2006. However, as reported by ''The Register''<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/06/15/llu_openreach/ |title=UK LLU hits half million |first=Tim |last=Richardson |date=15 June 2006 |access-date=14 August 2022 |work=The Register}}</ref> on June 15 June 2006, the figure had reached only 500,000, but was growing by 20,000 a week. Ofcom announced inIn November 2006, Ofcom announced that 1,000,000 connections had been unbundled.<ref>{{Cite web |url= http://www.offta.org.uk/updates/otaupdate20061107.htm |title=A Million Lines Unbundled in the UK |date=8 November 2006 |author=Office of the Telecoms Adjudicator |access-date=2016-02-05 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20160304105755/http://www.offta.org.uk/updates/otaupdate20061107.htm |archive-date=2016-03-04 |url-status=dead }}</ref> By April 2007, the figure was 2,000,000.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.offta.org.uk/charts.htm |title=Key Performance Indicators |author=Office of the Telecoms Adjudicator |access-date=2007-05-10 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070423050243/http://offta.org.uk/charts.htm |archive-date=2007-04-23 |url-status=dead }}</ref>

By June 2006, AOL UK had unbundled 100,000 lines through its £120 million investment.<ref>{{cite report |author=Ofcom |title=The Communications Market: Broadband. Digital Progress Report |date=April 2, 2007 |url=https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0021/16185/broadband_rpt.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180723135130/https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0021/16185/broadband_rpt.pdf |archive-date=2018-07-23 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|last=Richardson|first=Tim|date=30 June 2006|title=AOL UK chalks up 100k LLU lines|url=https://www.theregister.com/2006/06/30/aol_llu/|website=[[The Register]]|language=en}}</ref>

On 10 October 10, 2006, [[Carphone Warehouse]] announced theits purchase of [[AOL]] UK, the leading LLU operator, for £370m.<ref>

{{cite press release

|url = http://www.timewarner.com/corp/newsroom/pr/0,20812,1544859,00.html

|title = Carphone Warehouse to acquire Time Warner's AOL Internet access business in the U.K.UK for £370 million.

|publisher = Time Warner

|date = 2006-10-11

Line 53 ⟶ 59:

|archive-date = 2006-11-04

|url-status = live

}}</ref> This made Carphone Warehouse the third largest broadband provider and the largest LLU operator, with more than 150,000 LLU customers.<ref>

{{sitecite news

|url = http://www.thinkbroadband.com/news/i/2842.html

|title = State of the nation - local loop unbundling

Line 66 ⟶ 72:

</ref>

On 8 May 8, 2009, [[TalkTalk Group|TalkTalk]], which was owned by Carphone Warehouse, announced that they would purchase ailing Tiscali U.K.UK's assets for £235 million. On 30 June 30, 2009, Tiscali sold its U.K.UK subsidiary to Carphone Warehouse following regulatory approval from the European Union. This purchase made TalkTalk the biggestlargest home broadband supplier in the U.K.UK, with 4.25 million home broadband subscribers, compared withto BB.T.BT's3s 3.9 million. The service was rebranded as TalkTalk in January 2010.

Most LLU operators only unbundle the broadband service, leaving the traditional telephone service using BB.T.BT'scores core equipment (with or without the provision of [[carrier preselect]]). WhereWhen the conventionaltraditional telephone service is also unbundled (full LLU), operators usually prohibit the facility where selected calls can bebeing made usingwith the networks of other telephone providers (i.e., accessed using a three- to five-digit prefix beginning with '1'). These calls can usually still be made by using an 0800 or other non-geographic (NGN) access code.

Although regulators in the U.K.UK admitted that the market could providebecome competitive offerings in dueover time, the purpose of mandatory local loop unbundling in the United Kingdom was to speed up the delivery of advanced services to consumers.<ref>{{cite journal |first1=Jerry A. |last1=Hausman |first2=J. Gregory |last2=Sidak |title=Did Mandatory Unbundling Achieve Its Purpose? Empirical Evidence from Five Countries |volume=1 |issue=1 |journal=Journal of Competition Law and Economics |pages=173–245 |date=March 2005 |url=https://academic.oup.com/jcle/article-abstract/1/1/173/848962 |doi=10.1093/joulesjoclec/nhi005 |publisher=Oxford University Press |access-date=14 August 2022|hdl=1721.1/63450 |hdl-access=free |url-access=subscription }}</ref>

===United States===

UnderPursuant to the [[Telecommunications Act of 1996]], the [[Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) requires that [[Incumbent local exchange carrier|ILECs]] lease local loops to competitors ([[competitive local exchange carrier|CLEC]]s). Prices are set through a market mechanism.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/en/Document.2904.pdf |title=Unbundling Policy in the United States: Players, Outcomes and Effects |publisher=Quello Center for Telecommunication Management and Law |date=March 11, 2005 |access-date=2009-01-24 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081202153609/http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org//en/Document.2904.pdf |archive-date=December 2, 2008 }}</ref>

===New Zealand===

The [[Commerce Commission]] recommended against local loop unbundling in late 2003 as Telecom New Zealand (now [[Spark New Zealand]]) offered a market-led solution. In May 2004, this was confirmed by the [[Fifth Labour Government of New Zealand|New Zealand government]], despite the intense "call4change"<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.call4change.co.nz/ |title=Call for<!--sic--> Change |date=February 2004 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040926051624/http://call4change.co.nz/ |archive-date=2004-09-26 |access-date=14 August 2022}}</ref> campaign made by some of Telecom's competitors. Part of Telecom's commitment to the Commerce Commission to avoid unbundling was a promise to deliver 250,000 new residential broadband connections by the end of 2005, one-third of which were to be wholesaled through other providers. Telecom failed to achieve the number of wholesale connections required, despite anthe attemptmanagement bymaking management toa claim that the agreement had been for only one-third of the growth rather than one-third of the total.<ref>{{cite book |chapter=3. Trade Policy |title=Policy Framework for Investment: A Review of Good Practices |author=OECD |date=24 August 2006 |chapter-url=https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/40287346.pdf |access-date=23 July 2018 |url=https://www.oecd.org/investment/investmentfordevelopment/policyframeworkforinvestmentareviewofgoodpractices.htm}}</ref> The Commerceclaim Commissionwas rejected thatby claimthe Commerce Commission, and the publicizedpublicised figure of 83,333 wholesale connections out of 250,000 was held to be the true target. The achieved number was less than 50,000 wholesale connections, despite total connections exceeding 300,000.

On 3 May 3, 2006, the Governmentgovernment announced it would require the unbundling of the local loop. This was in response to concerns about the low levels of broadband uptake. Regulatory actions such as information disclosure, the separation of theseparate accounting of Telecom New Zealand business operations, and enhanced Commerce Commission monitoring were announced.<ref>{{cite press release|url=http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.aspx?DocumentID=25636 |work=Beehive |first=David |last=Cunliffe |agency=Government of New Zealand |date=3 April 2006 |title=Government moves fast to improve Broadband |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071117061320/http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.aspx?DocumentID=25636 |archive-date=November 17, 2007 |access-date=14 August 2022}}</ref>

On 9 August 9, 2007, Telecom released the keys to exchanges in Glenfield and Ponsonby in [[Auckland]]. In March 2008, Telecom activated [[ADSL 2+]] services from five Auckland exchanges – (Glenfield, Browns Bay, Ellerslie, Mt. Albert, and Ponsonby –), with further plans for the rest of Auckland and other major centerscentres, allowing other ISPs to take advantage.

With the number of copper (DSL) connections falling rapidly in New Zealand as of 2023, a large majority of internet connections are now through [[Fiber-optic communication|fiberfibre]] as opposed to copper, which is wholesaled by Telecom-spunthe offformer Telecom company [[Chorus Limited|Chorus]], rendering local loop unbundling a minor percentage in DSL connections.

===Switzerland===

{{Unreferenced section|date=July 2008}}

[[Switzerland]] is one of the last [[Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development|OECD]] nations to provide for unbundling. because theThe Swiss Federal Supreme Court held in 2001 that the 1996 Swiss Telecommunications Act did not require it. The Governmentgovernment then enacted an unbundling ordinance providing for unbundling in 2003, and the [[Federal Assembly (Switzerland)|Swiss Parliament]] amended the act in 2006. While infrastructure-based access is now generally available, unbundled fast bitstream access is limited to a period of four years after the act entersentry into force of the act.

Unbundling requests tend to be tiedmanaged up beforeby the courts,; however, because unlike in the EU, Swiss law does not provide for the regulator'san ''ex- ante'' regulation of access conditions by the regulator. Instead, under the Swiss ''ex- post'' regulation system, each new entrant must first try to reach an individual agreement with [[Swisscom]], the state-owned ILEC.

===Hong Kong===

Mandatory local loop unbundling policy (termed '''Type II Interconnection''' ([[Traditional Chinese]]:第二類互連) in Hong Kong<ref>{{cite web|url=http://tel_archives.ofca.gov.hk/en/tas/interconnect/ta950603.html|title=Interconnection Configurations and Basic Underlying Principles, Interconnection and Related Competition Issues Statement No 6|author=[[Office of the Telecommunications Authority]], Hong Kong Government|date=1995-06-03|access-date=2009-10-19|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130627070904/http://tel_archives.ofca.gov.hk/en/tas/interconnect/ta950603.html|archive-date=2013-06-27|url-status=live}}</ref>) started on 1 July 1, 1995 (the same day of telephone market liberalizationliberalisation), to ensuregive choicechoices to customers.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://tel_archives.ofca.gov.hk/en/tas/interconnect/ta950328.html|title=Interconnection and Related Competition Issues, Statement No 1|author=Office of the Telecommunications Authority, Hong Kong Government|date=1995-03-28|access-date=2009-10-19|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130411023633/http://tel_archives.ofca.gov.hk/en/tas/interconnect/ta950328.html|archive-date=2013-04-11|url-status=live}}</ref> After 10 years, new operators have built their networks, covering a large region of [[Hong Kong]]; the Governmentgovernment considered it a good time to withdraw mandatory local loop unbundling policy, to persuade operators to build their own networks, and let businesses run themselves with a minimum of government intervention. At the meeting of the Executive Council on July 6 July 2004, the Governmentgovernment decided that the regulatory intervention under the current Type II interconnectionInterconnection policy, which was applicable to telephone exchanges for individual buildings covered by such exchanges, should be withdrawn, subjectas tooutlined by conditions documented in a statement by the [[Office of the Communications Authority|Telecommunications Authority]].<ref>{{cite web |url=http://tel_archives.ofca.gov.hk/en/tas/interconnect/ta20040706.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210127111027/https://tel_archives.ofca.gov.hk/en/tas/interconnect/ta20040706.pdf |archive-date=27 January 2021 |title=Review of Type II Interconnection Policy: Statement of the Telecommunications Authority |date=6 July 2004 |agency=[[Office of the Communications Authority|Telecommunications Authority]] |___location=Hong Kong |access-date=14 August 2022 }}</ref> After that, the terms of interconnection willwould be negotiated between telephone operators. Hong Kong is the only advanced economy that has withdrawn the mandatory local loop unbundling policy.<ref>{{cite press release |url=http://tel_archives.ofca.gov.hk/en/press_rel/2004/Jul_2004_r1.html |title=Type II Interconnection to be Withdrawn |publisher=Office of the Telecommunications Authority, the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region |work=Commerce, Industry, and Technology Bureau (CITB) |date=2004-07-06 |access-date=2008-04-15 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130627074419/http://tel_archives.ofca.gov.hk/en/press_rel/2004/Jul_2004_r1.html |archive-date=2013-06-27 |url-status=live }}</ref>

===South Africa===

On 25 May 25, 2006, the Minister of Communications of South Africa, Dr [[Ivy Matsepe-Casaburri]], established the Local Loop Unbundling Committee (chaired by Professor [[Tshilidzi Marwala]]) to recommend the appropriate local loop unbundling models. The Local Loop Unbundling Committee submitted a report to Minister Matsepe-Casaburri on May 25, May 2007. ThisThe report recommendsrecommended that:

* manyModels companiesthat offer models allowingpermit customers to access both voice and data. Theshould be offered by many different companies; the models recommended arewere Fullfull Unbundlingunbundling, Lineline Sharingsharing, and Bitstreambitstream Access.access
* It is recommended that customersCustomers should exercise carrier pre-selection and thus be able to switch between service providers.
* ItAn is also recommended that an organizationorganisation be created to manage the local loop, and that this organizationorganisation should be under the guidance of the regulatorregulatory organizagtion [[Icasa|ICASA]], and that IcasaICASA be capacitated in terms of resources.
* The committee recommended that serviceService providers approved by IcasaICASA should have access to the telephone exchange infrastructure whenever necessary. The
* committee recommended that aA regulatory guideline should be established and managed by IcasaICASA to guarantee that strategic issues like the quality of the local loop be optimizedoptimised for the regulation and delivery of services.

Based on this report, the Minister has issued policy directives to IcasaICASA to move swiftly withundergo the unbundling process.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.doc.gov.za/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=47 |title=Local Loop Unbundling: A Way Forward for South Africa |format=PDF |work=The Local Loop Unbundling Committee |date=May 23, 2007 |access-date=2008-04-15}}</ref> At the end of March 2010, nothing hashad happenedoccurred; yethowever, however a deadline of November 1, November 2011, was set by the Minister of Communications for the monopoly holder, [[Telkom SS.A.SA]], to finalizefinalise the unbundling process.{{citation needed|date=April 2015}}

==See also==

Line 110 ⟶ 125:

==Further reading==

* [[OrganizationOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development|OECD]], [https://books.google.com/books?id=WpmzcqmgMbAC&q=universal+service+and+rate+restructuring+in+telecommunications ''Universal Service and Rate Restructuring in Telecommunications''], OrganizationOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Publishing, 1991. {{ISBN|92-64-13497-2}}

==External links==

* [http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/24/6869228.pdf OECD, Developments in Local Loop Unbundling]

* [https://web.archive.org/web/20150709014106/http://ec.europa.eu/competition/liberalisation/overview_en.html EE.U.EU telecommunications liberalization framework]

* [http://www.samknows.com/broadband/llu-league.php LLU Exchange List]

* [https://web.archive.org/web/20150709014106/http://ec.europa.eu/competition/liberalisation/overview_en.html EE.U.telecommunications liberalization framework]

* [https://web.archive.org/web/20130514034337/http://www.mlltelecom.com/what-we-do/local-loop-unbundling Local Loop Unbundling - What is it?]

* [https://web.archive.org/web/20130217221535/http://www.broadband-reviews.com/broadband-availability/ LLU Availability]

* [http://www.maccodes.co.uk/ MAC Codes - UU.K.UK Guide for obtaining your MAC code]

{{Authority control}}

{{DEFAULTSORT: Local-Loop Unbundling}}

[[Category: Local loop]]

[[Category: Broadband]]

[[Category: Telecommunications economics]]