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'''Algorithmic mechanism design''' ('''AMD''') lies at the intersection of economic [[game theory]], [[optimization]], and [[computer science]]. The prototypical problem in [[mechanism design]] is to design a system for multiple self-interested participants, such that the participants' self-interested actions at equilibrium lead to good system performance. Typical objectives studied include revenue maximization and social [[welfare maximization]]. Algorithmic mechanism design differs from classical economic mechanism design in several respects. It typically employs the analytic tools of [[theoretical computer science]], such as [[worst case analysis]] and [[approximation ratio]]s, in contrast to classical mechanism design in economics which often makes distributional assumptions about the agents. It also considers computational constraints to be of central importance: mechanisms that cannot be efficiently implemented in [[Time complexity|polynomial time]] are not considered to be viable solutions to a mechanism design problem. This often, for example, rules out the classic economic mechanism, the [[Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction]].
==History==
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