Modal metaphysics: Difference between revisions

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{{Short description|Branch of philosophy}}

'''Modal metaphysics''' is a branch of [[philosophy]] that investigates the [[metaphysics]] underlying statements about what is [[subjunctive possibility|possible]] or necessary[[metaphysical statementsnecessity|necessary]].<ref>[http://www.iep.utm.edu/mod-meta/ "Modal Metaphysics"] – ''[[Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]''</ref> These include propositions such as "It is possible that I become a dentist" or "Necessarily, 2 + 2 = 4." Unlike ordinary factual statements, modal statements concern not just what is actual but what '''could''' or '''must''' be the case. Modal metaphysics seeks to understand what makes such statements true or false—what grounds their truth.

One influential framework for understanding modal claims comes from the development of [[modal logic]], especially in the work of [[Saul Kripke]]. Kripke introduced the use of [[possible worlds]] as a formal tool: abstract representations of how things could have been. On this view, a statement like "Possibly, p" is true if there exists at least one possible world where ''p'' is true; "Necessarily, p" is true if ''p'' holds in every possible world.

However, while Kripke’s logic provided a powerful semantic apparatus, it did not resolve the metaphysical question at the heart of modal metaphysics: ''What are possible worlds?'' And ''what makes them the truth-makers of modal statements?'' In other words, even if modal logic explains how modal statements are evaluated, it does not explain why they are true.

==See also==