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{{Short description|Method for allocating seats in parliaments}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=June 2023}}
The '''D'Hondt method''',{{efn|English: {{IPAc-en
The method was first described in 1792 by American [[
== Motivation ==
Proportional representation systems aim to allocate seats to parties approximately in proportion to the number of votes received. For example, if a party wins one-third of the votes then it should gain about one-third of the seats. In general, exact proportionality is not possible because these divisions produce fractional numbers of seats. As a result, several methods, of which the D'Hondt method is one, have been devised which ensure that the parties' seat allocations, which are of whole numbers, are as proportional as possible.<ref name="gallagher">{{cite journal |last=Gallagher |first=Michael |date=1991 |title=Proportionality, disproportionality and electoral systems |url=http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/ElectoralStudies1991.pdf |journal=Electoral Studies |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131116104818/http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/ElectoralStudies1991.pdf |archive-date=November 16, 2013|volume=10 |issue=1 |pages=33–51 |doi=10.1016/0261-3794(91)90004-C |access-date=30 January 2016}}</ref>
Although all of these methods approximate proportionality, they do so by minimizing different kinds of disproportionality.
The D'Hondt method minimizes the largest seats-to-votes ratio.<ref name="Medzihorsky2019">{{cite journal |author=Juraj Medzihorsky |title=Rethinking the D'Hondt method |journal=Political Research Exchange |volume=1 |issue=1 |pages=1625712 |year=2019 |doi=10.1080/2474736X.2019.1625712 |doi-access=free}}</ref> Empirical studies based on other, more popular concepts of disproportionality show that the D'Hondt method is one of the least proportional among the proportional representation methods. The D'Hondt favours large [[political party|parties]] and [[Electoral coalition|coalitions]] over small parties due to [[strategic voting]].<ref name="auto">{{cite conference |first=Friedrich |last=Pukelsheim |title=Seat bias formulas in proportional representation systems |book-title=4th ECPR General Conference |url=http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/generalconference/pisa/papers/PP996.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090207140906/http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/generalconference/pisa/papers/PP996.pdf |archive-date=7 February 2009 |year=2007 }}</ref><ref name="Seat biases">{{cite journal |last1=Schuster |first1=Karsten |last2=Pukelsheim |first2=Friedrich |last3=Drton |first3=Mathias |last4=Draper |first4=Norman R. |date=2003 |title=Seat biases of apportionment methods for proportional representation |url=http://www.math.uni-augsburg.de/stochastik/pukelsheim/2003b.pdf |journal=Electoral Studies |volume=22 |issue=4 |pages=651–676 |doi=10.1016/S0261-3794(02)00027-6 |access-date=2016-02-02 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160215162203/http://www.math.uni-augsburg.de/stochastik/pukelsheim/2003b.pdf |archive-date=2016-02-15 |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last=Benoit |first=Kenneth |year=2000 |title=Which Electoral Formula Is the Most Proportional? A New Look with New Evidence |journal=Political Analysis |volume=8 |issue=4 |pages=381–388 |doi=10.1093/oxfordjournals.pan.a029822 |url=http://www.kenbenoit.net/pdfs/PA84-381-388.pdf |access-date=2016-02-11 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180728202050/http://kenbenoit.net/pdfs/PA84-381-388.pdf |archive-date=2018-07-28 |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last=Lijphart |first=Arend |year=1990 |title=The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 1945-85 |journal=The American Political Science Review |volume=84 |issue=2 |pages=481–496 |doi=10.2307/1963530|jstor=1963530 |s2cid=146438586 }}</ref> In comparison, the [[Sainte-Laguë method]] reduces the disproportional bias towards large parties and it generally has a more equal [[seats-to-votes ratio]] for different sized parties.<ref name="auto"/>
The axiomatic properties of the D'Hondt method were studied and they proved that the D'Hondt method is a consistent and monotone method that reduces [[political fragmentation]] by encouraging coalitions.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal|last1=Balinski |last2=Young|first1=M. L. |first2=H. P.|date=1978|title=The Jefferson method of Apportionment|url=http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/597/1/PP-76-006.pdf|journal=SIAM Rev|volume=20 |issue=2|pages=278–284 |doi=10.1137/1020040|s2cid=122291481 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Balinski |last2=Young |first1=M. L. |first2=H. P. |date=1979 |title=Criteria for proportional representation |journal= [[Operations Research (journal)|Operations Research]] |volume=27 |pages=80–95 |doi=10.1287/opre.27.1.80|url=http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/525/1/RR-76-020.pdf }}</ref> A method is consistent if it treats parties that received tied votes equally. Monotonicity means that the number of seats provided to any state or party will not decrease if the house size increases.
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==Example==
In this example, 230,000 voters decide the disposition of 8 seats among 4 parties. Since 8 seats are to be allocated, each party's total votes are divided by 1, then by 2, 3, and 4 (and then, if necessary, by 5, 6, 7, and so on). The 8 highest entries
{| class="wikitable"
! Round <br/>(1 seat per round)▼
! 1
▲(1 seat per round)
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
! Seats won <br />(bold)▼
▲!Seats won<br />(bold)
|-
|Party A quotient <br/>seats after round
|'''100,000<br/>1'''
|50,000<br/>1
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|'''4'''
|-
|Party B quotient <br/>seats after round
|80,000<br/>0
|'''80,000<br/>1'''
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|'''3'''
|-
|Party C quotient <br/>seats after round
|30,000<br/>0
|30,000<br/>0
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|'''1'''
|-
|Party D quotient <br/>seats after round
|20,000<br/>0
|20,000<br/>0
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|'''0'''
|}
While in this example, parties B, C, and D formed a coalition against Party A
{| class="wikitable"
! Round <br/>(1 seat per round)▼
! 1
▲(1 seat per round)
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
! Seats won <br/>(bold)▼
▲!Seats won
|-
|Party A quotient <br/>seats after round
|100,000<br/>0
|'''100,000<br/>1'''
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|'''3'''
|-
|Coalition B-C-D <br/>quotient seats after <br/>round
|'''130,000<br/>1'''
|65,000<br/>1
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{|class="wikitable"
! Denominator
|-
| align="center" | 3.5
|-
| align="center" | 2.8
|-
| align="center" | 1.0
|-
| align="center" | 0.7
|-
! colspan=5 |
! ! |}
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==Jefferson and D'Hondt==
The Jefferson and the D'Hondt methods are equivalent. They always give the same results, but the methods of presenting the calculation are different.
The method was first described in 1792 by [[Thomas Jefferson]], in a letter to [[George Washington]] regarding the apportionment of seats in the [[United States House of Representatives]]:<ref name=":0" />▼
▲The method was first described in 1792 by Statesman and future US President [[Thomas Jefferson]], in a letter to [[George Washington]] regarding the apportionment of seats in the [[United States House of Representatives]] pursuant to the [[1790 United States census|First United States Census]]:<ref name=":0" />
{{blockquote|For representatives there can be no such common ratio, or divisor which ... will divide them exactly without a remainder or fraction. I answer then ... that representatives [must be divided] as nearly as the nearest ratio will admit; and the fractions must be neglected.}}
It was also invented independently in 1878 in Europe, by Belgian mathematician [[Victor D'Hondt]],
{{blockquote|To allocate discrete entities proportionally among several numbers, it is necessary to divide these numbers by a common divisor, producing quotients whose sum is equal to the number of entities to be allocated.}}▼
▲{{blockquote|To allocate discrete entities proportionally among several numbers, it is necessary to divide these numbers by a common divisor, producing quotients whose sum is equal to the number of entities to be allocated.}}
▲The Jefferson and the D'Hondt methods are equivalent. They always give the same results, but the methods of presenting the calculation are different. [[George Washington]] exercised his first veto power on a bill that introduced a new plan for dividing seats in the House of Representatives that would have increased the number of seats for northern states.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-14-02-0233 | title=Founders Online: Proportional Representation, [22 March] 1792 }}</ref> Ten days after the veto, Congress passed a new method of apportionment, now known as Jefferson's Method. Statesman and future US President [[Thomas Jefferson]] devised the method in 1792 for the [[United States congressional apportionment|U.S. congressional apportionment]] pursuant to the [[1790 United States Census|First United States Census]]. It was used to achieve the proportional distribution of seats in the [[United States House of Representatives|House of Representatives]] among the states until 1842.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.maa.org/press/periodicals/convergence/apportioning-representatives-in-the-united-states-congress-jeffersons-method-of-apportionment |title=Apportioning Representatives in the United States Congress – Jefferson's Method of Apportionment |first=Michael |last=Caulfield |work=Mathematical Association of America |access-date=25 June 2017}}</ref>
▲[[Victor D'Hondt]] presented his method in his publication {{lang|fr|Système pratique et raisonné de représentation proportionnelle}}, published in Brussels in 1882{{Citation needed|date=January 2024}}.
The system can be used both for distributing seats in a legislature among states pursuant to populations or among parties pursuant to an election result. The tasks are mathematically equivalent, putting states in the place of parties and population in place of votes. In some countries, the Jefferson system is known by the names of local politicians or experts who introduced them locally. For example, it is known in [[Israel]] as the '''Bader–Ofer system'''.
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| issn = 0038-0288
}}
</ref> [[Hungary]] (5% for single party, 10% for two-party coalitions, 15% for coalitions of 3 or more parties) and [[Belgium]] (5%, on regional basis). In the [[Netherlands]], a party must win enough votes for one strictly proportional full seat (note that this is not necessary in plain D'Hondt), which with 150 seats in the lower chamber gives an effective threshold of 0.67%. In [[Estonia]], candidates receiving the simple quota in their electoral districts are considered elected, but in the second (district level) and third round of counting (nationwide, modified D'Hondt method) mandates are awarded only to candidate lists receiving more than the threshold of 5% of the votes nationally. The vote threshold simplifies the process of seat allocation and discourages fringe parties (those that are likely to gain very few votes) from competing in the elections. Obviously, the higher the vote threshold, the fewer the parties that will be represented in parliament.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://faculty.georgetown.edu/kingch/Electoral_Systems.htm|title=Electoral Systems|first=Charles|last=King|website=Prof. King’s Teaching and Learning Resources|access-date=2018-05-05|archive-date=13 May 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180513092015/http://faculty.georgetown.edu/kingch/Electoral_Systems.htm|url-status=dead}}</ref>
The method can cause a ''natural threshold''.<ref>{{Cite report |author=Venice Commission |date=2008 |title=Comparative report on thresholds and other features of electoral systems which bar parties from access to parliament |url=http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2008)037-e |publisher=Council of Europe |access-date=February 14, 2016 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Gallagher |first1=Michael |last2=Mitchell |first2=Paul |date=2005 |title=The Politics of Electoral Systems |chapter-url=http://www.blogary.ro/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/The_Politics_of_Electoral_Systems.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151010090047/http://www.blogary.ro/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/The_Politics_of_Electoral_Systems.pdf |archive-date=2015-10-10 |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |chapter=Appendix C: Effective threshold and effective magnitude |isbn=9780199257560}}</ref> It depends on the number of seats that are allocated with the D'Hondt method. In [[Elections in Finland#Parliamentary elections|Finland's parliamentary elections]], there is no official threshold, but the effective threshold is gaining one seat. The country is divided into districts with different numbers of representatives, so there is a natural threshold, different in each district. The largest district, [[Uusimaa]] with 33 representatives, has a natural threshold of 3%, while the smallest district, [[South Savo]] with 6 representatives, has a natural threshold of 14%.<ref>Oikeusministeriö. [http://www.om.fi/uploads/p0yt86h0difo.pdf Suhteellisuuden parantaminen eduskuntavaaleissa.]</ref> This favors large parties in the small districts.
In [[Croatia]], the official threshold is 5% for parties and coalitions. However, since the country is divided into 10 voting districts with 14 elected representatives each, sometimes the threshold can be higher, depending on the number of votes of "fallen lists" (lists that do not receive at least 5%). If many votes are lost in this manner, a list that gets 5% will still get a seat, whereas if there is a small number votes for parties that do not pass the threshold, the actual ("natural") threshold is close to 7.15%.
Some systems allow parties to associate their lists together into a single "cartel" in order to overcome the threshold, while some systems set a separate threshold for such cartels. Smaller parties often form pre-election coalitions to make sure they get past the election threshold creating a [[coalition government]]. In the Netherlands, cartels (''lijstverbindingen'') (until 2017, when they were abolished) could not be used to overcome the threshold, but they do influence the distribution of remainder seats; thus, smaller parties can use them to get a chance which is more like that of the big parties.
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==Variations==
In some cases such as the [[Elections in the Czech Republic|Czech regional elections]], the first divisor (when the party has no seats so far, which is normally 1)
In 1989 and 1992, [[Australian Capital Territory Legislative Assembly|ACT Legislative Assembly]] elections were conducted by the [[Australian Electoral Commission]] using
▲In some cases such as the [[Elections in the Czech Republic|Czech regional elections]], the first divisor (when the party has no seats so far, which is normally 1) was raised to favour larger parties and eliminate small ones. In the Czech case, it is set to 1.42 (approximately <math>\sqrt{2}</math>, termed the Koudelka coefficient after the politician who introduced it).
▲In 1989 and 1992, [[Australian Capital Territory Legislative Assembly|ACT Legislative Assembly]] elections were conducted by the [[Australian Electoral Commission]] using the "modified d'Hondt" electoral system. The electoral system consisted of the d'Hondt system, the [[Australian Senate]] system of proportional representation, and various methods for preferential voting for candidates and parties, both within and across party lines.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.elections.act.gov.au/elections_and_voting/past_act_legislative_assembly_elections/modified_dhondt_electoral_system|title=Modified d'Hondt Electoral System|date=2015-01-06|website=elections.act.gov.au|language=en|access-date=2018-05-05}}</ref> The process involves 8 stages of scrutiny. ABC elections analyst [[Antony Green]] has described the modified d'Hondt system used in the ACT as a "monster ... that few understood, even electoral officials who had to wrestle with its intricacies while spending several weeks counting the votes".<ref>{{cite news |last1=Green |first1=Antony |title=Election Preview |url=https://www.abc.net.au/news/elections/act/2020/guide/preview |access-date=16 April 2021 |work=ACT Votes 2020 |publisher=Australian Broadcasting Corporation}}</ref>
▲Some systems allow parties to associate their lists together into a single [[Kartel (electoral alliance)|kartel]] in order to overcome the threshold, while some systems set a separate threshold for cartels. In a system of proportional representation in which the country is divided in multiple [[electoral district]]s, such as [[Belgium]] the [[Election threshold|threshold]] to obtain one seat can be very high (5% of votes since 2003), which also favors larger parties. Therefore, some parties pool their voters in order to gain more (or any) seats.
===Regional D'Hondt===
In most countries, seats for the national assembly are divided on a regional or even a provincial level. This means that seats are first divided between individual regions (or provinces) and are then allocated to the parties in each region separately (based on only the votes cast in the given region). The votes for parties that have not gained a seat at the regional level are thus discarded, so they do not aggregate at a national level. This means that parties which would have gained seats in a national distribution of seats may still end up with no seats as they did not gain enough votes in any region. This may also lead to skewed seat allocation at a national level, such as in Spain in 2011 where the [[People's Party (Spain)|People's Party]] gained an absolute majority in the [[Congress of Deputies (Spain)|Congress of Deputies]] with only 44% of the national vote.<ref name="gallagher"/> It may also skew results for small parties with broad appeal at a national level compared to small parties with a local appeal (e.g. nationalist parties). For instance, in the [[2008 Spanish general election]], [[United Left (Spain)]] gained 1 seat for 969,946 votes, whereas [[Convergence and Union]] (Catalonia) gained 10 seats for 779,425 votes.
===Modified d'Hondt electoral system===
The modified d'Hondt electoral system<ref>Australian Capital Territory Electoral Commission, [https://www.elections.act.gov.au/elections_and_voting/past_act_legislative_assembly_elections/modified_dhondt_electoral_system Modified d'Hondt Electoral System] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220920173142/https://www.elections.act.gov.au/elections_and_voting/past_act_legislative_assembly_elections/modified_dhondt_electoral_system |date=20 September 2022 }}</ref> is a variant of the d'Hondt method with an [[electoral threshold]] for parties. Votes for parties below the electoral threshold are transferred to other candidates according to the [[single transferable voting]] method. This electoral system was used in [[1989 Australian Capital Territory general election|1989]] and [[1992 Australian Capital Territory election]]s.
== Usage by country ==
The D'Hondt method is used to elect the legislatures in [[Åland]], [[Albania]], [[Angola]], [[Argentina]], [[Armenia]], [[Aruba]], [[Austria]], [[Belgium]], [[Bolivia]], [[Brazil]], [[Burundi]], [[Cambodia]], [[Cape Verde]], [[Chile]], [[Colombia]], [[Croatia]], the [[Dominican Republic]], [[East Timor]], [[Estonia]], [[Fiji]], [[Finland]], [[Greenland]], [[Guatemala]], [[Hungary]] (in a [[Electoral system of Hungary|mixed system]]), [[Iceland]], [[Israel]], [[Italy]] (in a [[Mixed electoral system|mixed system]]), [[Japan]], [[Luxembourg]], [[Moldova]], [[Monaco]], [[Montenegro]], [[Mozambique]], [[Netherlands]], [[Nicaragua]], [[North Macedonia]], [[Paraguay]], [[Peru]], [[Poland]], [[Portugal]], [[Romania]], [[San Marino]], [[Serbia]], [[Slovenia]], [[Spain]], [[Switzerland]], [[Turkey]], [[Uruguay]] and [[Venezuela]].
In [[Denmark]] the D'Hondt method is used to elect part of the seats in the [[Folketing]] and the disproportionality of the D'Hondt method is corrected with leveling seats with [[Sainte-Laguë method]].<ref>{{Cite web|title=Danish Parliamentary Election Law|url=https://www.retsinformation.dk/eli/lta/2020/1260}}</ref>{{Additional
==Notes==
{{Wikifunctions|D'hondt method}}
{{notelist}}
==References==
{{reflist|30em}}
{{Voting systems}}
▲{{DEFAULTSORT:D'Hondt Method}}
[[Category:Apportionment methods]]
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