Embodied embedded cognition: Difference between revisions

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{{Short description|Theory that intelligent behaviour emerges from the interplay between brain, body and world}}

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{{See also|Enactivism|Embodied cognition|Extended cognition}}

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'''Embodied embedded cognition''' ('''EEC''') is a [[philosophy|philosophical]] theoretical position in [[cognitive science]], closely related to [[situated cognition]], [[embodied cognition]], [[embodied cognitive science]] and [[dynamical systems theory]]. The theory states that intelligent [[behaviour]] emerges from the interplay between [[brain]], body and world.<ref name=EEE1>{{cite web|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/embodied-cognition/|title=Embodied Cognition |date=25 July 2011|publisher=Stanford Encyclopedia}}</ref> The world is not just the 'play-ground' on which the brain is acting. Rather, brain, body and world are equally important factors in the explanation of how particular intelligent behaviours come about in practice.

==Embodiment and embeddedness==

'''Embodied Embedded Cognition''' ([[EEC]])is a philosophical theoretical position in [[Cognitive Science]], closely related to [[Situated Cognition]], [[Embodied Cognition]], [[Embodied cognitive science]], [[Embodiment]] and [[Dynamical Systems Theory]].

EEC is divided into two aspects: embodiment and embeddedness (or situatedness).

The theory states that intelligent behavior emerges out of the interplay between brain, body and world. The world is not just the 'play-ground' on which the brain is acting. Rather, brain body and world are equally important factors in the explanation of how particular intelligent behaviors come about in practice.

''Embodiment'' refers to the idea that the body's internal milieu (a.o. [[homeostatic]] and hormonal states) heavily influences the higher 'cognitive' processes in the brain, presumably via the [[emotion]]al system (see e.g. [[Antonio Damasio]]'s theory of [[Somatic markers hypothesis|somatic markers]]). To put it simply: the state of your body is a direct factor of importance on the kinds of [[cognitive process]]es that may arise in the higher parts of your brain.

The theory can be divided in two aspects: Embodiment and Embeddedness (or Situatedness)

Embodiment''Embeddedness'' refers to the idea that thephysical bodies'interaction internalbetween milieuthe (a.o. homeostaticbody and hormonalthe states)world strongly heavily influencesconstrain the higherpossible 'cognitive'behaviours processes inof the brainorganism, presumablywhich viain theturn emotional systeminfluences (seeindeed, e.g.partly Damasio's theory of somatic markersconstitutes). To put it simply: the state of your body is a direct factor of importance on the kinds of cognitive processes that mayemerge arise infrom the higherinteraction partsbetween oforganism yourand brainworld.

The theory is an explicit reaction to the currently dominant [[Cognitivism (psychology)|cognitivist]] paradigm, which states that cognitive systems are essentially computational-representational systems (like computer [[software]]), processing input and generating output (behaviour) on the basis of internal information processing. In cognitivism, the causal root of behaviour lies in the 'virtual' processes governed by the software that runs on our brains. The brain is purely the [[computer hardware|hardware]] on which the software is implemented. The body (sensors and actors) are purely input-output devices that are in service of the brain. The world is merely the play-ground (the object) in which the cognitive agent acts.

Embeddedness refers to the idea that physical interaction between the body and the world strongly constrain the possible behaviors of the organism, which in turn influences (indeed, partly constitutes) the cognitive processes that emerge out of the interaction between organism and world.

The theory is an explicit reaction to the currently dominant cognitivist paradigm, which states that cognitive systems are essentially computational-representational systems (like computer software), processing input and generating output (behavior) on the basis of internal information processing. In cognitivism, the causal root of behavior lies in the 'virtual' processes governed by the software that runs on our brains. The brain is purely the hardware on which the software is implemented. The body (sensors and actors) are purely input-output devices that are in service of the brain. The world is merely the play-ground (the object) in which the cognitive agent acts. In contrast, EEC holds that the actual physical processes in body and in body-world interaction partly constitute whatever it is that we call 'the cognitive system' as a whole. Body, world and brain form a system. Together these system-parts 'cause' intelligent behaviorbehaviour to arise as a system property. [[Dynamical Systems|Dynamical Systems Theory]] is a way of modeling behaviorbehaviour that teams up quite naturalnaturally with the theoretical concepts of EEC. The theory of [[practopoiesis]] describes the rules adaptive systems need to obey if they are to successfully implement embodied and embedded cognition.

Under the umbrella of [[4E cognition]], the theories of the embodied embedded mind are connected with the [[Extended mind thesis|extended mind theory]] and [[enactivism]].

Current discussions:

Current discussions include:

* Is EEC really a (positive) theory of itself, or merely a bunch of complaints about what is wrong about (a too extreme version of) cognitivism?

* Is EEC too 'descriptive', instead of really explaining anything about cognition?

* How can EEC explain [[natural language|linguistic]] processes and processes of explicit conscious [[reasoning]]?

* What would be the most informative empirical hypotheses, starting from an EEC perspective?

* Can we use traditional methods (stimulus-response paradigms) of [[experimental psychology]] to test EECyEEC hypotheses?

==Theorists==

Important theorists that inspired the EEC programme (but might not necessarily adhere to the above position):

Important theoristsTheorists that inspired the EEC programme (but might not necessarily adhere to the above position) include:

* Andy Clark

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* Gerald Edelman

* [[Lawrence Barsalou]]

* Valentino Braitenberg

* [[Randall Beer]]

* Rodney Brooks

* [[Valentino Braitenberg]]

* Randall Beer

* [[Rodney Brooks]]

* [[William (Bill) Clancey]]

* Francisco Varela

* [[Andy Clark]]

* Tom Ziemke

* [[Paul Dourish]]

* [[Gerald Edelman]]

* [[Shaun Gallagher]]

* [[Vittorio Guidano]]

* Pim Haselager

* [[Martin Heidegger]]

* [[Susan Hurley]]

* [[Edmund Husserl]]

* [[Edwin Hutchins]]

* Fred Keijzer

* [[David Kirsh]]

* [[Humberto Maturana]]

* [[Maurice Merleau-Ponty]]

* [[Alva Noë]]

* [[Jean Piaget]]

* [[Eleanor Rosch]]

* [[Mark Rowlands]]

* [[Evan Thompson]]

* [[Francisco Varela]]

* [[Jacob Von Uexküll]]

* [[Dan Zahavi]]

* Tom Ziemke

{{div col end}}

==See also==

{{div col|colwidth=22em}}

*{{annotated link|Autopoesis}}

*{{annotated link|Enactivism}}

*{{annotated link|Extended cognition}}

*{{annotated link|Neuroconstructivism}}

*{{annotated link|Neurophenomenology}}

*{{annotated link|Practopoiesis}}

*{{annotated link|Pragmatism}}

*{{annotated link|Situated cognition}}

{{div col end}}

== References ==

<references />

==External links==

*[https://web.archive.org/web/20060205103318/http://www.nici.kun.nl/~haselag/links/eeclinks.html Some EEC links]

[[Category:Cognitive Science]][[Category:Embodimentscience]]