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{{Short description|Theory that intelligent behaviour emerges from the interplay between brain, body and world}}
{{See also|Enactivism|Embodied cognition|Extended cognition}}
{{refimprove|date=October 2019}}
'''Embodied embedded cognition''' ('''EEC''') is a [[philosophy|philosophical]] theoretical position in [[cognitive science]], closely related to [[situated cognition]], [[embodied cognition]], [[embodied cognitive science]] and [[dynamical systems theory]]. The theory states that intelligent [[behaviour]] emerges
==Embodiment and embeddedness==
EEC is divided into two aspects: embodiment and embeddedness (or situatedness).
▲The theory states that intelligent [[behaviour]] emerges out of the interplay between [[brain]], body and world. The world is not just the 'play-ground' on which the brain is acting. Rather, brain, body and world are equally important factors in the explanation of how particular intelligent behaviours come about in practice.
''Embodiment'' refers to the idea that the
''Embeddedness'' refers to the idea that physical interaction between the body and the world strongly constrain the possible behaviours of the organism, which in turn influences (indeed, partly constitutes) the cognitive processes that emerge
▲''Embodiment'' refers to the idea that the bodies' internal milieu (a.o. [[homeostatic]] and hormonal states) heavily influences the higher 'cognitive' processes in the brain, presumably via the [[emotion]]al system (see e.g. [[Antonio Damasio]]'s theory of somatic markers). To put it simply: the state of your body is a direct factor of importance on the kinds of [[cognitive process]]es that may arise in the higher parts of your brain.
The theory is an explicit reaction to the currently dominant [[Cognitivism (psychology)|cognitivist]] paradigm, which states that cognitive systems are essentially computational-representational systems (like computer [[software]]), processing input and generating output (behaviour) on the basis of internal information processing. In
▲''Embeddedness'' refers to the idea that physical interaction between the body and the world strongly constrain the possible behaviours of the organism, which in turn influences (indeed, partly constitutes) the cognitive processes that emerge out of the interaction between organism and world.
In contrast, EEC holds that the actual physical processes in body and in body-world interaction partly constitute whatever it is that we call 'the cognitive system' as a whole. Body, world and brain form a system. Together these system-parts 'cause' intelligent behaviour to arise as a system property.
▲The theory is an explicit reaction to the currently dominant cognitivist paradigm, which states that cognitive systems are essentially computational-representational systems (like computer [[software]]), processing input and generating output (behaviour) on the basis of internal information processing. In [[cognitivism]], the causal root of behaviour lies in the 'virtual' processes governed by the software that runs on our brains. The brain is purely the [[hardware]] on which the software is implemented. The body (sensors and actors) are purely input-output devices that are in service of the brain. The world is merely the play-ground (the object) in which the cognitive agent acts.
Under the umbrella of [[4E cognition]], the theories of the embodied embedded mind are connected with the [[Extended mind thesis|extended mind theory]] and [[enactivism]].
▲In contrast, EEC holds that the actual physical processes in body and in body-world interaction partly constitute whatever it is that we call 'the cognitive system' as a whole. Body, world and brain form a system. Together these system-parts 'cause' intelligent behaviour to arise as a system property. ''Dynamical Systems Theory'' is a way of modeling behaviour that teams up quite natural with the theoretical concepts of EEC.
Current discussions include:
* Is EEC really a (positive) theory of itself, or merely a bunch of complaints about what is wrong about (a too extreme version of) cognitivism?
* Is EEC too 'descriptive', instead of really explaining anything about cognition?
* How can EEC explain [[natural language|linguistic]] processes and processes of explicit conscious [[reasoning]]?
* What would be the most informative empirical hypotheses, starting from an EEC perspective?
* Can we use traditional methods (stimulus-response paradigms) of [[experimental psychology]] to test
==Theorists==
Important theorists that inspired the EEC programme (but might not necessarily adhere to the above position) include:▼
▲
{{div col|colwidth=18em}}
* [[Lawrence Barsalou]]
* [[Randall Beer]]
* [[Valentino Braitenberg]]
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* [[William Clancey]]
* [[Andy Clark]]
* [[Paul Dourish]]
* [[Gerald Edelman]]
* [[
* [[
* Pim Haselager
* [[Martin Heidegger]]
* [[Susan Hurley]]
* [[Edmund Husserl]]
* [[Edwin Hutchins]]
* Fred Keijzer
* [[David Kirsh]]
* [[Humberto Maturana]]
* [[Maurice Merleau-Ponty]]
* [[Alva Noë]]
* [[Jean Piaget]]
* [[Eleanor Rosch]]
* [[Mark Rowlands]]
* [[Evan Thompson]]
* [[Francisco Varela]]
* [[
* [[Dan Zahavi]]
* Tom Ziemke
{{div col end}}
==See also==
{{div col|colwidth=22em}}
*{{annotated link|Autopoesis}}
*{{annotated link|Enactivism}}
*{{annotated link|Extended cognition}}
*{{annotated link|Neuroconstructivism}}
*{{annotated link|Neurophenomenology}}
*{{annotated link|Practopoiesis}}
*{{annotated link|Pragmatism}}
*{{annotated link|Situated cognition}}
{{div col end}}
== References ==
<references />
==External links==
*[https://web.archive.org/web/20060205103318/http://www.nici.kun.nl/~haselag/links/eeclinks.html Some EEC links]
[[Category:Cognitive science]]
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