Causal theory of reference: Difference between revisions

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{{Short description|Theory that terms acquire referents via a chain of usage events}}

A '''causal theory of reference''' or '''historical chain theory of reference''' is a theory of how terms acquire specific [[reference|referents]] based on evidence. Such theories have been used to describe many referring terms, particularly logical terms, [[proper names]], and [[natural kind]] terms. In the case of names, for example, a causal theory of reference typically involves the following claims:

النظرية السببية للمرجع هي نظرية عن كيفية اكتساب المصطلحات لمراجع محددة بناءً على الأدلة. تم استخدام مثل هذه النظريات لوصف العديد من مصطلحات الإحالة ، وخاصة المصطلحات المنطقية والأسماء المناسبة والمصطلحات اللطيفة الطبيعية. في حالة الأسماء ، على سبيل المثال ، تتضمن نظرية المرجع السببي عادةً الادعاءات التالية:

* a name's [[reference|referent]] is fixed by an original act of naming (also called a "dubbing" or, by [[Saul Kripke]], an "initial baptism"), whereupon the name becomes a [[rigid designator]] of that object.

* later uses of the name succeed in referring to the referent by being linked to that original act via a [[Causality|causal chain]].

Weaker versions of the position (perhaps not properly called "causal theories"), claim merely that, in many cases, events in the causal history of a speaker's use of the term, including when the term was first acquired, must be considered to correctly assign references to the speaker's words.

Causal theories of names became popular during the 1970s, under the influence of work by Saul Kripke and [[Keith Donnellan]]. Kripke and [[Hilary Putnam]] also defended an analogous causal account of [[natural kind]] terms.

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* We use names to speak hypothetically about what ''could'' have happened to a person. A name functions as a [[rigid designator]], while a definite description does not. (One could say 'If Aristotle had died young, he would never have taught Alexander the Great.' But if 'the teacher of Alexander the Great' were a component of the ''meaning'' of 'Aristotle' then this would be nonsense.)

A causal theory avoids these difficulties. A name refers rigidly to the bearer to which it is causally connected, regardless of any particular facts about the bearer, and in all [[possible worlds]] where the bearer exists.

The same motivations apply to causal theories in regard to other sorts of terms. Putnam, for instance, attempted to establish that 'water' refers rigidly to the stuff that we do in fact call 'water', to the exclusion of any possible identical water-like substance for which we have no causal connection. These considerations motivate [[semantic externalism]]. Because speakers interact with a natural kind such as water regularly, and because there is generally no naming ceremony through which their names are formalized, the multiple groundings described above are even more essential to a causal account of such terms. A speaker whose environment changes may thus observe that the referents of his terms shift, as described in the [[Twin Earth thought experiment|Twin Earth]] and [[Swampman]] [[thought experiment]]s.

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Variations of the causal theory include:

* The '''causal-historical theory of reference'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> is the original version of the causal theory. It was put forward by [[Keith Donnellan]] in 1972<ref>Donnellan, Keith. (1972). "Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions." In Donald Davidson; Gilbert Harman (eds.). ''Semantics of Natural Language''. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. pp. 356–379.</ref> and [[Saul Kripke]] in 1980.<ref>Kripke, S. "A Puzzle about Belief", in A. Margalit (ed.), ''Meaning and Use'', Reidel, pp. 239–83 (1979).</ref><ref name=SEP>[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/names/ Names (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)]</ref> This view introduces the idea of reference-passing links in a causal-historical chain.<ref name=SEP/>

* The '''descriptive-causal theory of reference'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> (also '''causal-descriptive theory of reference'''),<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--><ref name=Psillos279>[[Stathis Psillos]], ''Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth'', Routledge, 1999, p. 279.</ref> a view put forward by [[David Lewis (philosopher)|David Lewis]]<ref name=Psillos279/><ref name=Gattei>Stefano Gattei, ''Thomas Kuhn's 'Linguistic Turn' and the Legacy of Logical Empiricism: Incommensurability, Rationality and the Search for Truth'', Ashgate Publishing, 2012, p. 122.</ref> in 1984,<ref>D. K. Lewis (1984), "Putnam's Paradox." ''Australasian Journal of Philosophy'', '''62'''(3), 221–36; reprinted in D. Lewis (1999), ''Papers on metaphysics and epistemology'', Cambridge University Press, pp. 56–77.</ref> introduces the idea that a minimal descriptive apparatus needs to be added to the causal relations between speaker and object.<ref name=Gattei/> ({{efn|See also [[Structuralism (philosophy of science)#Further criticism|Criticism of structuralism]].)}}

== Criticism of the theory ==

[[Gareth Evans (philosopher)|Gareth Evans]] argued that the causal theory, or at least certain common and over-simple variants of it, have the consequence that, however remote or obscure the causal connection between someone's use of a proper name and the object it originally referred to, they still refer to that object when they use the name. (Imagine a name briefly overheard in a train or café.) The theory effectively ignores context and makes reference into a magic trick. Evans describes it as a "[[photograph]]" theory of reference.<ref>{{Cite journal|lastlast1=Evans|firstfirst1=Gareth|last2=Altham|first2=J. E. J.|date=1973|title=The Causal Theory of Names|journal=Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes|volume=47|pages=187–225|issn=0309-7013|jstor=4106912|doi=10.1093/aristoteliansupp/47.1.187}}</ref>

The links between different users of the name are particularly obscure. Each user must somehow pass the name on to the next, and must somehow "mean" the right individual as they do so (suppose "Socrates" is the name of a pet [[aardvark]]). Kripke himself notes the difficulty, [[John Searle]] makes much of it.{{Citation needed|reason=Reliable source needed for the whole sentence|date=September 2015}}

[[Mark Sainsbury (philosopher)|Mark Sainsbury]] argued<ref>Sainsbury, R.M., ''Departing From Frege: Essays in the Philosophy of Language'', Routledge, 2002, Essay XII.</ref> for a causal theory similar to Kripke's, except that the baptised object is eliminated. A "baptism" may be a baptism of nothing, he argues: a name can be intelligibly introduced even if it names nothing.<ref>{{

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==Notes==

{{notelist}}

==Citations==

{{reflist}}

== References ==

* [[Gareth Evans (philosopher)|Evans, G.]] (1985). "The Causal Theory of Names". In [[Aloysius Martinich|Martinich, A. P.]], ed. ''The Philosophy of Language''. Oxford University Press, 2012.

* Evans, G. ''The Varieties of Reference'', Oxford 1982.

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* [[John McDowell|McDowell, John.]] (1977) "On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name."

* [[Nathan Salmon|Salmon, Nathan]]. (1981) ''Reference and Essence'', Prometheus Books.

* {{cite journal |last1=Machery |first1=E. |last2=Mallon |first2=R. |last3=Nichols |first3=S. |last4=Stich |first4=S. P. |year=2004 |title=Semantics, Cross-cultural Style |journal=Cognition |volume=92 |issue=3 |pages=B1–B12 |ref=harv |doi=10.1016/j.cognition.2003.10.003|pmid=15019555 |citeseerx=10.1.1.174.5119 |s2cid=15074526 }}

* {{cite book |last=Sainsbury |first=R.M. |chapter=Sense without Reference |title=Building on Frege |editor1-last=Newen |editor1-first=A. |editor2-last=Nortmann |editor2-first=U.| editor3-last=Stuhlmann Laisz |editor3-first=R. |___location=Stanford |date=2001 |ref=harv}}

{{philosophy of language}}