Gale–Shapley algorithm: Difference between revisions

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In [[mathematics]], [[economics]], and [[computer science]], the '''Gale–Shapley algorithm''' (also known as the '''deferred acceptance algorithm''',{{r|roth}} '''propose-and-reject algorithm''',{{r|carter-price}} or '''Boston Pool algorithm'''{{r|roth}}) is an [[algorithm]] for finding a solution to the [[stable matching problem]]. It is named for [[David Gale]] and [[Lloyd Shapley]], who published it in 1962, although it had been used for the [[National Resident Matching Program]] since the early 1950s. Shapley and [[Alvin E. Roth]] (who pointed out its prior application) won the 2012 [[Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences|Nobel Prize in Economics]] for work including this algorithm.
 
The stable matching problem seeks to pair up equal numbers of participants of two types, using preferences from each participant. The pairing must be stable: no pair of matched participants should mutually prefer each other to their assigned match. In each round of the Gale–Shapley algorithm, unmatched participants of one type propose a match to the next participant on their preference list. Each proposal is accepted if its recipient prefers it to their current match. The resulting procedure is a [[truthful mechanism]] from the point of view of the proposing participants, who receive their most-preferred pairing consistent with stability. In contrast, the recipients of proposals receive their least-preferred pairing. The algorithm can be implemented to run in time quadratic in the number of participants, and [[linear time|linear]] in the size of the input to the algorithm.
 
The stable matching problem, and the Gale–Shapley algorithm solving it, have widespread real-world applications, including matching American medical students to residencies and French university applicants to schools. For more, see {{slink|Stable marriage problem|Applications}}.
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*[[Deferred-acceptance auction]]
*[[Stable roommates problem]]
*[[Kolkata Paise Restaurant Problem]]
 
==References==
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| publisher = CRC Press
| title = Operations Research: A Practical Introduction
| url = https://books.google.com/books?id=CbFwJLHpX7sC&pg=PA102
| year = 2000}}</ref>
 
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| last = Erickson | first = Jeff
| contribution = 4.5 Stable matching
| contribution-url = https://jeffe.cs.illinois.edu/teaching/algorithms/book/04-greedy.pdf
| access-date = 2023-12-19
| date = June 2019
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| ___location = Montréal, Quebec
| title = Mariages stables et leurs relations avec d'autres problèmes combinatoires
| url = https://www-cs-faculty.stanford.edu/~knuth/mariages-stables.pdf
| year = 1976}} See in particular Problem 6, pp. 87–94.</ref>
 
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| journal = The Brandeis Review
| title = The stable marriage problem
| url = https://www1.cs.columbia.edu/~evs/intro/stable/writeup.html
| volume = 12
| year = 1992}}</ref>