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{{Short description|Plan drawn up by the Palestine Liberation Organization after the Yom Kippur War}}
{epeated the principles of the policies which the Palestinian National Council had accepted in the past:▼
{{Multiple issues|
{{NPOV|date=January 2024}}
{{Cleanup|reason=Contains mainly original research|date=September 2015}}
{{More citations needed|date=September 2015}}}}
'''PLO's Ten Point Program''' (in [[Arabic]]: برنامج النقاط العشر) (by Israel called the '''PLO's Phased Plan''') is the plan accepted by the [[Palestinian National Council]] (PNC), the legislative body of the [[Palestine Liberation Organization]] (PLO), at its 12th meeting held in Cairo on 8 June 1974.
The Program called for the establishment of a national authority "over every part of Palestinian territory that is liberated" with the aim of "completing the liberation of all Palestinian territory". The program implied that the liberation of Palestine may be partial (at least, at some stage), and though it emphasized armed struggle, it did not exclude other means. This allowed the PLO to engage in diplomatic channels, and provided validation for future compromises made by the Palestinian leadership.
Because the Program introduced the concept of a [[two-state solution]] in the PLO, it was rejected by the more radical hard-line factions, which vowed to continue to fight to eliminate [[Israel]], and formed the [[Rejectionist Front]], which was strongly backed by [[Iraq]].
== Background ==
Following the failure of the armies of [[Egypt]] and [[Syria]] to defeat Israel in 1973 in the [[Yom Kippur War]], the Palestinian leadership began formulating a strategic alternative.
==Specifics of the Program==
▲
* the denial of [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 242]] (adopted after the [[Six-Day War]])
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* the establishment of an Arab-Palestinian state in the entire region of Palestine within the pre-1948 borders.
The innovation of PLO's Phased Plan was in the assertion that each step which would lead to the fulfillment of these goals would be a worthy step. It also stated that any territory, from the region of Palestine, which would be transferred to an Arab rule should be transferred to Palestinian control, also if the takeover of other territories would be delayed as a result. Some interpreted these series of decisions, as a realization by the PNC that it can not fulfill all its goals at once, but rather it would be able to do so in gradual small steps, and as a recognition of the council in the possibility of initiating political and diplomatic measures and not just an "[[Palestinian political violence|armed struggle]]" (although PLO's Phased Plan does not consist of a denial of the use of an armed struggle).{{citation needed|date=December 2019}}
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== Israel's reaction ==
Israel called the Program the ''"PLO's Step/stage Program"'' or ''"PLO's Phased Plan"'' (''Tokhnit HaSHlavim'' or ''Torat HaSHlavim''), which it regarded as a dangerous policy, mainly because it implied that any future compromise agreement between Israel and the Palestinians would not be honored by the PLO. It raised the fear among Israelis that the Palestinians may exploit future Israeli territorial compromises to "improve positions" for attacking Israel. {{Citation needed|date=February 2024}}
Over the years, negotiations took place between Israel and the PLO and other Palestinian leaders, while there was a strong concern among large parts of the Israeli public and the Israeli leadership that the negotiations were not sincere, and that the Palestinians' willingness to compromise was just a smoke-screen for implementing the Ten Point Program.▼
▲Over the years, negotiations took place between Israel and the PLO and other Palestinian leaders, while there was a strong concern among large parts of the Israeli public and the Israeli leadership that the negotiations were not sincere, and that the Palestinians' willingness to compromise was just a smoke-screen for implementing the Ten Point Program. {{Citation needed|date=February 2024}}
When the [[Oslo Accords]] were signed, many Israeli right-wing politicians openly claimed that this was part of the ploy to implement the Ten Point Program.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.nfc.co.il/archive/003-D-6200-00.html?tag=23-15-32 |title=מבט פלשתיני לפתרון הסכסוך: היעדים המוצהרים של הרשות הפלשתינית|trans-title=A Palestinian perspective on resolving the conflict: The stated goals of the Palestinian Authority|first=יהונתן|last=דחוח-הלוי|website=Nfc.co.il|date=2012-10-30|accessdate=2016-11-19|archive-date=2016-11-20|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161120150617/http://www.nfc.co.il/archive/003-D-6200-00.html?tag=23-15-32}}</ref>
The [[Foreign Affairs Minister of Israel|Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs]] has
The status of PLO's Phased Plan nowadays is unclear. The Plan was never officially canceled, but in general, the Palestinian leadership has stopped referring to it since the late 1980s. Recently, however, several statements made by PLO officials on the subject indicate that the Phased Plan has not been abandoned – most notably the statement of the PLO ambassador to Lebanon which stated in an interview that the "two-state solution will lead to the collapse of Israel".<ref>{{cite web |author=www.memri.org |url=http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/3297.htm |title=Palestinian Ambassador to Lebanon Abbas Zaki: Two-State Solution Will Lead to the Collapse of Israel |website=Memri.org |date= |accessdate=2016-11-19}}</ref>
Nowadays there is a debate within Israel on whether the Phased Plan still represents the thinking and official policy of certain factions within the Palestinian leadership and of the Palestinian people and whether the Palestinian public and leadership still aim to ultimately take control over the entire region of [[Palestine (region)|Palestine]] or whether Palestinian territorial claims apply only to the [[West Bank]] (including [[East Jerusalem]]) and the [[Gaza Strip]].<ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3344810,00.html |title=ynet מה עושים כשהמודיעין סותר את עצמו? - חדשות |newspaper=Ynet |date=2014-09-17 |accessdate=2016-11-19|last1=ארי |first1=יוסי בן }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://reut-institute.org/he/Publication.aspx?PublicationId=113 |title=תוכנית השלבים |language=he |trans-title=Phased Plan |access-date=2016-11-20 |archive-date=2016-11-20 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161120085129/http://reut-institute.org/he/Publication.aspx?PublicationId=113 |url-status=dead }}</ref>
==See also==
* [[Israeli–Palestinian conflict]]
* [[Salami tactics]]
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__NOTOC__
[[Category:Party platforms]]
[[Category:Palestine Liberation Organization]]
[[Category:Palestinian nationalism]]
[[Category:Foreign relations
[[Category:1974 documents]]
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