PLO's Ten Point Program: Difference between revisions

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{{Short description|Plan drawn up by the Palestine Liberation Organization after the Yom Kippur War}}

{{Multiple issues|

{{NPOV|date=January 2024}}

{{Cleanup|reason=Contains mainly original research|date=September 2015}}

{{More citations needed|date=September 2015}}}}

'''PLO's Ten Point Program''' (in [[Arabic]]: برنامج النقاط العشر), is the name of the plan accepted by the [[Palestinian National Council]] (PNC), the legislative body of the [[Palestine Liberation Organization]] (PLO), during the 12th meeting of the PNC which was held in Cairo on 8 June 1974.

'''PLO's Ten Point Program''' (in [[Arabic]]: برنامج النقاط العشر), is(by Israel called the name'''PLO's ofPhased Plan''') is the plan accepted by the [[Palestinian National Council]] (PNC), the legislative body of the [[Palestine Liberation Organization]] (PLO), duringat theits 12th meeting of the PNC which was held in Cairo on 8 June 1974.

The plan called for the establishment of a national authority "over every part of Palestinian territory that is liberated" with the aim of "completing the liberation of all Palestinian territory". The program implied that the liberation of Palestine may be partial (at least, at some stage), and though it emphasized armed struggle, it did not exclude other means. This allowed the PLO to engage in diplomatic channels, and provided validation for future compromises made by the Palestinian leadership.

The planProgram called for the establishment of a national authority "over every part of Palestinian territory that is liberated" with the aim of "completing the liberation of all Palestinian territory". The program implied that the liberation of Palestine may be partial (at least, at some stage), and though it emphasized armed struggle, it did not exclude other means. This allowed the PLO to engage in diplomatic channels, and provided validation for future compromises made by the Palestinian leadership.

== Overview ==

Following the failure of the armies of Egypt and Syria to defeat Israel in the [[Yom Kippur War]], the Palestinian leadership began formulating a strategic alternative.

Because the Program introduced the concept of a [[two-state solution]] in the PLO, it was rejected by the more radical hard-line factions, which vowed to continue to fight to eliminate [[Israel]], and formed the [[Rejectionist Front]], which was strongly backed by [[Iraq]].

The PLO's Phased Plan did not stipulate clear operational measures and only repeated the principles of the policies which the Palestinian National Council had accepted in the past: the denial of [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 242]] (adopted after the [[Six-Day War]]), the denial of the existence of the [[State of Israel]] and the demand of the return of all [[Palestinian refugees]] to their original homes and the establishment of an Arab-Palestinian state in the entire region of Palestine within the pre-1948 borders. The innovation of PLO's Phased Plan was in the assertion that each step which would lead to the fulfillment of these goals would be a worthy step. It also states that any territory, from the region of Palestine, which would be transferred to an Arab rule should be transferred to Palestinian control, also if the takeover of other territories would be delayed as a result. Some interpret these series of decisions, as a realization of the council in the fact that it can not fulfill all its goals at once, but rather it would be able to do so in gradual small steps, and as a recognition of the council in the possibility of initiating political and diplomatic measures and not just an "[[Palestinian political violence|armed struggle]]" (although PLO's Phased Plan does not consist of a denial of the use of an armed struggle).

== Background ==

The following quotes are taken from three sections of PLO's Phased Plan which the above section refers to:

Following the failure of the armies of [[Egypt]] and [[Syria]] to defeat Israel in 1973 in the [[Yom Kippur War]], the Palestinian leadership began formulating a strategic alternative.

==Specifics of the Program==

* Section 2 states:

The PLO's Phased Plan did not stipulate clear operational measures and only repeated the principles of the policies which the Palestinian National Council had accepted in the past:

<blockquote>The Palestine Liberation Organization will employ all means, and first and foremost armed struggle, to liberate Palestinian territory and to establish the independent combatant national authority for the people over every part of Palestinian territory that is liberated. This will require further changes being effected in the balance of power in favor of our people and their struggle.

</blockquote>

* the denial of [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 242]] (adopted after the [[Six-Day War]])

* Section 4 states:

* the denial of the existence of the [[State of Israel]]

<blockquote>Any step taken towards liberation is a step towards the realization of the Liberation Organization's strategy of establishing the democratic Palestinian State specified in the resolutions of the previous Palestinian National Councils.</blockquote>

* the demand of the return of all [[Palestinian refugees]] to their original homes

* the establishment of an Arab-Palestinian state in the entire region of Palestine within the pre-1948 borders.

The PLO's Phased Plan did not stipulate clear operational measures and only repeated the principles of the policies which the Palestinian National Council had accepted in the past: the denial of [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 242]] (adopted after the [[Six-Day War]]), the denial of the existence of the [[State of Israel]] and the demand of the return of all [[Palestinian refugees]] to their original homes and the establishment of an Arab-Palestinian state in the entire region of Palestine within the pre-1948 borders. The innovation of PLO's Phased Plan was in the assertion that each step which would lead to the fulfillment of these goals would be a worthy step. It also statesstated that any territory, from the region of Palestine, which would be transferred to an Arab rule should be transferred to Palestinian control, also if the takeover of other territories would be delayed as a result. Some interpretinterpreted these series of decisions, as a realization of the council inby the factPNC that it can not fulfill all its goals at once, but rather it would be able to do so in gradual small steps, and as a recognition of the council in the possibility of initiating political and diplomatic measures and not just an "[[Palestinian political violence|armed struggle]]" (although PLO's Phased Plan does not consist of a denial of the use of an armed struggle).{{citation needed|date=December 2019}}

* Section 8 states:

<blockquote>Once it is established, the Palestinian national authority will strive to achieve a union of the confrontation countries, with the aim of completing the liberation of all Palestinian territory, and as a step along the road to comprehensive Arab unity.</blockquote>

* Section 2 of the Plan states:

== Palestinian reaction to PLO's Ten Point Program ==

<blockquote>: The Palestine Liberation Organization will employ all means, and first and foremost armed struggle, to liberate Palestinian territory and to establish the independent combatant national authority for the people over every part of Palestinian territory that is liberated. This will require further changes being effected in the balance of power in favor of our people and their struggle.

The Ten Point Program met with opposition from other hardline factions such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine ([[Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine|PFLP]]), which fought to eliminate Israel. As a result, the Ten Point Program led to several radical PLO factions (such as the [[Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine|PFLP]], [[PFLP-GC]] and others) breaking out to form the [[Rejectionist Front]], which would act independently of PLO over the following years. The Rejectionist front was mainly worried that the Ten Point Program could potentially turn into a peace agreement between the Palestinian leadership and the State of Israel. Suspicion between the Arafat-led mainstream and more hard-line factions, inside and outside the PLO, have continued to dominate the inner workings of the organization ever since, often resulting in paralysis or conflicting courses of action. A temporary closing of ranks came in 1977, as Palestinian factions joined with hard-line Arab governments in the [[Steadfastness and Confrontation Front]] to condemn Egyptian attempts to reach a separate peace with Israel (eventually resulting in the 1979 [[Camp David Accords]]).

* Section 4 of the Plan states:

== Israel's reaction to PLO's Ten Point Program ==

<blockquote>: Any step taken towards liberation is a step towards the realization of the Liberation Organization's strategy of establishing the democratic Palestinian State specified in the resolutions of the previous Palestinian National Councils.</blockquote>

Israel perceived the Ten Point Program as a dangerous policy, mainly because it implied that any future compromise agreement between Israel and the Palestinian leadership would not be honored by the PLO. It raised the fear among Israelis that the Palestinian leadership might be under the intention of exploiting future Israeli territorial compromises in order to "improve positions" for attacking Israel. This program is coined the ''"PLO's Step/stage Program"'' or ''"PLO's Phased Plan"'' (''Tokhnit HaSHlavim'' or ''Torat HaSHlavim'').

* Section 8 of the Plan states:

Over the years, negotiations took place between Israel and the PLO as well as other Palestinian leaderships, all while there was still a strong concern among large parts of the Israeli public and the Israeli leadership that the negotiations were not sincere, and that the Palestinians' willingness to compromise is just a smoke-screen for implementing the Ten Point Program.

<blockquote>:Once it is established, the Palestinian national authority will strive to achieve a union of the confrontation countries, with the aim of completing the liberation of all Palestinian territory, and as a step along the road to comprehensive Arab unity.</blockquote>

== Palestinian reaction to PLO's Ten Point Program ==

When the [[Oslo Accords]] were signed, many Israeli right-wing politicians openly claimed that this is part of the ploy to implement the Ten Point Program.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.nfc.co.il/archive/003-D-6200-00.html?tag=23-15-32 |title=News1 &#124; מבט פלשתיני לפתרון הסכסוך |website=Nfc.co.il |date=2012-10-30 |accessdate=2016-11-19}}</ref><!-- Date, Hebrew title, and translated title would be very useful on this reference.--> Some of them based this claim on the fact that only 12 days before the signing of the Oslo Accords (September 13, 1993), a pre-recorded speech directed towards the Palestinian people by Arafat himself was broadcast on the Jordanian radio, in which Arafat made the following statement about the Oslo agreement:

The Ten Point Program metwas withrejected oppositionby fromthe othermore hardlineradical hard-line factions such asof the PopularPLO, Frontwhich forwere themainly Liberationconcerned ofthat Palestinethe ([[PopularProgram Frontcould forpotentially theturn Liberationinto ofa Palestine|PFLP]]),peace whichagreement fought to eliminatewith Israel. AsThey a result,formed the Ten[[Rejectionist PointFront]] Programand ledvowed to severalcontinue radicalthe PLOarmed struggle to eliminate [[Israel]]. The factions (suchthat asjoined the Rejectionist Front included the [[Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine|PFLP]], [[(PFLP-GC]]), andthe others)second breakinglargest outfaction to formin the [[Rejectionist Front]]PLO, whichafter Fatah. These factions would act independently of the PLO over the following years. The Rejectionist front was mainly worried that the Ten Point Program could potentially turn into a peace agreement between the Palestinian leadership and the State of Israel. Suspicion between the Arafat-led mainstream and the more hard-line factions, inside and outside the PLO, have continued to dominate the inner workings of the organization ever since, often resulting in paralysis or conflicting courses of action.{{citation needed|date=December 2019}} A temporary closing of ranks came in 1977, as Palestinian factions joined with hard-line Arab governments in the [[Steadfastness and Confrontation Front]] to condemn Egyptian attempts to reach a separate peace with Israel, which (eventually resulting in the 1979 [[Camp David Accords]]).{{citation needed|date=December 2019}}

== Israel's reaction to PLO's Ten Point Program ==

{{quote|[the agreement] will be a basis for an independent Palestinian state in accordance with the Palestinian National Council resolution issued in 1974... The PNC resolution issued in 1974 calls for the establishment of a national authority on any part of Palestinian soil from which Israel withdraws or which is liberated.<ref name=autogenerated1>[https://web.archive.org/web/20070622142512/http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Archive/Peace+Process/1996/INCITEMENT%20TO%20VIOLENCE%20AGAINST%20ISRAEL%20BY%20LEADERSHI]

Israel perceivedcalled the TenProgram Pointthe ''"PLO's Step/stage Program"'' or ''"PLO's Phased Plan"'' (''Tokhnit HaSHlavim'' or ''Torat HaSHlavim''), which it regarded as a dangerous policy, mainly because it implied that any future compromise agreement between Israel and the Palestinian leadershipPalestinians would not be honored by the PLO. It raised the fear among Israelis that the PalestinianPalestinians leadershipmay might be under the intention of exploitingexploit future Israeli territorial compromises in order to "improve positions" for attacking Israel. This program is coined the{{Citation ''"PLO'sneeded|date=February Step/stage Program"'' or ''"PLO's Phased Plan"'' (''Tokhnit HaSHlavim'' or ''Torat HaSHlavim'').2024}}

</ref>}}

Over the years, negotiations took place between Israel and the PLO as well asand other Palestinian leadershipsleaders, all while there was still a strong concern among large parts of the Israeli public and the Israeli leadership that the negotiations were not sincere, and that the Palestinians' willingness to compromise iswas just a smoke-screen for implementing the Ten Point Program. {{Citation needed|date=February 2024}}

The [[Foreign Affairs Minister of Israel|Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs]] has regarded that the Palestinian leadership asserted that the Oslo Accord is part of the PLO's 1974 phased plan for Israel's destruction.<ref name=autogenerated1 />

When the [[Oslo Accords]] were signed, many Israeli right-wing politicians openly claimed that this was part of the ploy to implement the Ten Point Program.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.nfc.co.il/archive/003-D-6200-00.html?tag=23-15-32 |title=מבט פלשתיני לפתרון הסכסוך: היעדים המוצהרים של הרשות הפלשתינית|trans-title=A Palestinian perspective on resolving the conflict: The stated goals of the Palestinian Authority|first=יהונתן|last=דחוח-הלוי|website=Nfc.co.il|date=2012-10-30|accessdate=2016-11-19|archive-date=2016-11-20|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161120150617/http://www.nfc.co.il/archive/003-D-6200-00.html?tag=23-15-32}}</ref>

The validity of PLO's Phased Plan nowadays is unclear. PLO's Phased Plan was never officially canceled, but in general, the Palestinian leadership has stopped referring to it since the late 1980s. Recently, however, several statements made by PLO officials on the subject indicate that the Phased Plan has not been abandoned – most notably the statement of the PLO ambassador to Lebanon which stated in an interview that the "two-state solution will lead to the collapse of Israel".<ref>{{cite web|author=www.memri.org |url=http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/3297.htm |title=Palestinian Ambassador to Lebanon Abbas Zaki: Two-State Solution Will Lead to the Collapse of Israel |website=Memri.org |date= |accessdate=2016-11-19}}</ref>

The [[Foreign Affairs Minister of Israel|Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs]] has noted that the Palestinian leadership asserted that the Oslo Accord is part of the PLO's 1974 Phased Plan for Israel's destruction.<ref name=autogenerated1>{{cite web |url=http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Archive/Peace+Process/1996/INCITEMENT%20TO%20VIOLENCE%20AGAINST%20ISRAEL%20BY%20LEADERSHI |title=INCITEMENT TO VIOLENCE AGAINST ISRAEL BY LEADERSHIP OF PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY - 27-Nov-96 |website=www.mfa.gov.il |access-date=15 January 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070622142512/http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Archive/Peace+Process/1996/INCITEMENT%20TO%20VIOLENCE%20AGAINST%20ISRAEL%20BY%20LEADERSHI |archive-date=22 June 2007 |url-status=dead}}</ref>

Nowadays there is a debate within the Israeli public and leadership on whether the PLO's Phased Plan still represent the thinking patterns and official policy of certain factions within the Palestinian leadership and of the Palestinian people and whether the Palestinian public and leadership still aim to ultimately take control over the entire region of [[Palestine (region)|Palestine]] or do Palestinian territorial claims apply only to the [[West Bank]] (including [[East Jerusalem]]) and the [[Gaza Strip]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3344810,00.html |title=ynet מה עושים כשהמודיעין סותר את עצמו? - חדשות |website=Ynet.co.il |date=2014-09-17 |accessdate=2016-11-19}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://reut-institute.org/he/Publication.aspx?PublicationId=113 |title=תוכנית השלבים |language=he |trans-title=Phased Plan |access-date=2016-11-20}}</ref>

The validitystatus of PLO's Phased Plan nowadays is unclear. PLO's PhasedThe Plan was never officially canceled, but in general, the Palestinian leadership has stopped referring to it since the late 1980s. Recently, however, several statements made by PLO officials on the subject indicate that the Phased Plan has not been abandoned – most notably the statement of the PLO ambassador to Lebanon which stated in an interview that the "two-state solution will lead to the collapse of Israel".<ref>{{cite web |author=www.memri.org |url=http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/3297.htm |title=Palestinian Ambassador to Lebanon Abbas Zaki: Two-State Solution Will Lead to the Collapse of Israel |website=Memri.org |date= |accessdate=2016-11-19}}</ref>

Nowadays there is a debate within the Israeli public and leadershipIsrael on whether the PLO's Phased Plan still representrepresents the thinking patterns and official policy of certain factions within the Palestinian leadership and of the Palestinian people and whether the Palestinian public and leadership still aim to ultimately take control over the entire region of [[Palestine (region)|Palestine]] or dowhether Palestinian territorial claims apply only to the [[West Bank]] (including [[East Jerusalem]]) and the [[Gaza Strip]].<ref>{{cite webnews |url=http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3344810,00.html |title=ynet מה עושים כשהמודיעין סותר את עצמו? - חדשות |websitenewspaper=Ynet.co.il |date=2014-09-17 |accessdate=2016-11-19|last1=ארי |first1=יוסי בן }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://reut-institute.org/he/Publication.aspx?PublicationId=113 |title=תוכנית השלבים |language=he |trans-title=Phased Plan |access-date=2016-11-20 |archive-date=2016-11-20 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161120085129/http://reut-institute.org/he/Publication.aspx?PublicationId=113 |url-status=dead }}</ref>

==See also==

* [[Israeli–Palestinian conflict]]

* [[PLO]]

* [[Salami tactics]]

==References==

{{Reflist|2}}

== External links ==

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[[Category:Party platforms]]

[[Category:Palestine Liberation Organization]]

[[Category:Palestinian nationalism]]

[[Category:Foreign relations of the Palestinian National AuthorityPalestine]]

[[Category:1974 documents]]