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== Attestation ==
The SafetyNet Attestation API,<ref>{{Cite web|title=SafetyNet Attestation API|url=https://developer.android.com/training/safetynet/attestation|website=Android Developers|language=en-US}}</ref> one of the APIs under the SafetyNet umbrella, provides verification that the integrity of the device is not compromised.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Hoffman|first=Chris|title=SafetyNet Explained: Why Android Pay and Other Apps Don't Work on Rooted Devices|url=https://www.howtogeek.com/241012/safetynet-explained-why-android-pay-and-other-apps-dont-work-on-rooted-devices/|access-date=2021-09-11|website=How-To Geek|date=4 February 2016 |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|date=2020-06-29|title=Google's dreaded SafetyNet hardware check has been spotted in the wild|url=https://www.androidpolice.com/2020/06/29/googles-dreaded-safetynet-hardware-check-has-been-spotted-in-the-wild/|access-date=2021-09-11|website=Android Police|language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last1=Ibrahim|first1=Muhammad|last2=Imran|first2=Abdullah|last3=Bianchi|first3=Antonio|title=Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications, and Services |chapter=SafetyNOT |date=2021-06-24|language=en|___location=Virtual Event Wisconsin|publisher=ACM|pages=150–162|doi=10.1145/3458864.3466627|isbn=978-1-4503-8443-8|doi-access=free}}</ref> In practice, non-official ROMs such as [[LineageOS]] fail the hardware attestation and thus
Due to this, some consider this a monopolistic practice deterring the entrance of competing [[mobile operating system]]s in the market.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Schwab |first1=Andreas |last2=Echeverria |first2=Pablo Arias |title=Time to restore fairness and contestability in digital markets |url=https://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/opinion/time-to-restore-fairness-and-contestability-in-digital-markets/ |website=www.euractiv.com |date=24 March 2022}}</ref>
It requires a network connection to Google servers and validates the hardware signatures. Amongst the checks, the API looks for [[Bootloader unlocking|bootloader unlock]] status, ROM signatures, kernel strings, it also uses [[Verified boot|AVB2.0]] and [[dm-verity]] attestations. Upon successful checks, [[Google Play]] will mark the device as ''Certified''. The attestation runs in an environment called DroidGuard (<code>com.google.android.gms.unstable</code>).<ref name=":0" />
The SafetyNet Attestation API (one of the four APIs under the SafetyNet umbrella) has been deprecated.<ref name="timeline">{{Cite web|title=SafetyNet Deprecation Timeline|url=https://developer.android.com/privacy-and-security/safetynet/deprecation-timeline|website=Android Developers|language=en-US}} {{Retrieved|access-date=2023-10-06}}</ref> {{As of|2023|10|6|post=,}} Google planned to replace it with the '''Play Integrity API''' by the end of January 2025.<ref name="timeline" /><ref>{{cite web |title=Migrating from the SafetyNet Attestation API {{!}} Google Play |url=https://developer.android.com/google/play/integrity/migrate |website=Android Developers |language=en}}</ref> The
== Google Play Protect ==
Under the same
== Criticism ==
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Critics have also argued that the Play Integrity API undermines competition by effectively requiring developers to rely on Google's proprietary services, strengthening its monopoly over the Android ecosystem and disadvantaging alternative, privacy-focused operating systems.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Stallman |first=Richard |title=Can You Trust Your Computer? |url=https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/can-you-trust.html |access-date=2025-07-07 |website=[[GNU Project]]}}</ref>
Users have also developed tools, such as the ''Play Integrity Fix'' module for [[Magisk (software)|Magisk]]/[[KernelSU]]/APatch, which tricks the attestation using leaked fingerprints of vulnerable devices.<ref>{{Citation |last=Renshaw |first=Chris |title=osm0sis/PlayIntegrityFork |date=2025-07-07 |url=https://github.com/osm0sis/PlayIntegrityFork |access-date=2025-07-07}}</ref><ref>{{Cite tweet |number=1925727131180356008 |user=GrapheneOS |title=Hardware-based attestation can be secure, but the way the Play Integrity API uses it is also highly insecure. It can be bypassed via leaked keys from the most insecure Android devices in the ecosystem. Secure way to use it is pinning, not trusting everything chaining to a root. |first=GrapheneOS |date=2025-05-23 |access-date=2025-07-07}}</ref> Some developers made petitions on sites like [[Change.org]].<ref>{{Cite web |last=TastyDepartureFrom |date=2024-11-21 |title=Stop Google from limiting access to Custom ROMS via Play Integrity. |url=http://www.reddit.com/r/degoogle/comments/1gwed3u/stop_google_from_limiting_access_to_custom_roms/ |access-date=2025-07-07 |website=r/degoogle}}</ref>
Furthermore, some have questioned the effectiveness of the attestation, claiming it does not deliver the level of security promised by Google and instead serves more as a form of [[vendor lock-in]] than a meaningful security measure. Activists have also raised concerns that it may violate antitrust and competition laws, like the [[Digital Markets Act]].
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