Language-based system: Difference between revisions

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{{Short description|Type of operating system that uses language features to provide security}}

A '''language-based system''' the [[operating system]] has both the [[kernel (computer science)|kernel]] and applications implemented using a [[High-level programming language|high level]] [[programming language]], such as [[Java (programming language)|Java]].<ref>{{cite web|

A '''language-based system''' is a type of [[operating system]] that uses [[programming language|language]] features to provide [[Language-based security|security]], instead of or in addition to hardware mechanisms. In such systems, code referred to as the ''trusted base'' is responsible for approving programs for [[execution (computing)|execution]], assuring they cannot perform operations detrimental to the system's stability without first being detected and dealt with.<ref name="Schneider">[https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~rwh/papers/langsec/dagstuhl.pdf A Language-Based Approach to Security], Schneider F., Morrissett G. (Cornell University) and Harper R. (Carnegie Mellon University). Informatics: 10 Years Back, 10 Years Ahead. (2000)</ref> A very common strategy of guaranteeing that such operations are impossible is to base the system around a [[High-level programming language|high-level language]], such as [[Java (programming language)|Java]], whose design precludes dangerous constructs; many are entirely written in such a language, with only the minimum amount of [[low-level programming language|low-level code]] being used.<ref>{{cite web|

title=JX - A flexible Java Operating System (poster)|

url=http://www4.informatik.uni-erlangen.de/Projects/JX/poster/jx-poster.jpg|author1=Michael Golm |author2=Meik Felser |author3=Christian Wawerish |author4=Jürgen Kleinöder |

publisher=University of Erlangen|accessdate=2007-04-21}}</ref> Since language-based systems can assure ahead of time that they cannot do things that can damage the system (such as corrupting memory by dereferencing [[dangling pointer]]s), it is possible for them to avoid expensive address space switches needed by traditional OSes; because of this, [[microkernel]]s are more popular than traditional systems.{{Citation needed|date=April 2011}} A more extreme form of this is a [[high-level language computer architecture]], where the trusted base is pushed into hardware, and the entire system is written in a high-level language.

author=Michael Golm, Meik Felser, Christian Wawerish, J&uuml;rgen Klein&ouml;der|

publisher=University of Erlangen|accessdate=2007-04-21}}</ref>

==Protection==

In a language-based protection system, the kernel will only allow code to execute that has been produced by a trusted language [[compiler]]. The language may then be designed such that it is impossible for the programmer to instruct it to do something that will violate a security requirement.<ref name="Schneider">[http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~rwh/papers/langsec/dagstuhl.pdf A Language-Based Approach to Security], Schneider F., Morrissett G. (Cornell University) and Harper R. (Carnegie Mellon University). Informatics: 10 Years Back, 10 Years Ahead. (2000)</ref>

==Examples==

*{{annotated link|Burroughs MCP}}

*[[JX (operating system)]]

*[[Singularity{{annotated link|Cosmos (operating system)]]|Cosmos}}

*{{annotated link|Emerald (programming language)|Emerald}}

*[[{{annotated link|Inferno (operating system)]]|Inferno}}

*[[{{annotated link|JX (operating system)]]|JX}}

*{{annotated link|Lisp machine}}

*{{annotated link|Midori (operating system)|Midori}}

*{{annotated link|Oberon (operating system)|Oberon}}

*{{annotated link|RedoxOS|Redox}}

*{{annotated link|Singularity (operating system)|Singularity}}

*{{annotated link|Smalltalk}}

*[https://github.com/theseus-os/Theseus Theseus OS]

*{{annotated link|UCSD P-system}}

*{{annotated link|Verve (operating system)|Verve}}

==See also==

* [[High-level language computer architecture]]

==References==

{{Reflist}}

{{refbegin}}

*A Sabelfeld, AC Myers ''[httphttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpldocument/freeabs_all.jsp1159651/;jsessionid=A692CC7FF77CD2C81E9E3E42B7099A2A?arnumber=1159651&isnumber=25986 Language-based information-flow security]'' IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 2003 Volume: 21, Issue: 1 pp. 5- 19&nbsp;5–19

*V Haldar, D Chandra, M Franz ''[http://www.vivekhaldar.com/pubs/trustedvm-tr.pdf Semantic remote attestation—a virtual machine directed approach to trusted computing]'' USENIX Virtual Machine Research and Technology Symposium, 2004

*Giacobazzi, Mastroeni ''[http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/964001.964017 Abstract non-interference: parameterizing non-interference by abstract interpretation]'' Proceedings of the 31st ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages Pages: 186 - 197pp 186–97 (2004)

*Algis Rudys, Dan S. Wallach ''[http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/505586.505589 Termination in language-based systems]'' ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) Volume 5 , Issue 2 (May 2002) pp. 138 - 168 &nbsp;138–68

{{refend}}

[[Category:Operating system kernels]]

{{operating-system-stub}}