Language-based system: Difference between revisions

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{{Short description|Type of operating system that uses language features to provide security}}

A '''language-based system''' is a type of [[operating system]] that uses [[programming language|language]] features to provide [[Language-based security|security]], instead of or in addition to hardware mechanisms. In such systems, code referred to as the ''trusted base'' is responsible for approving programs for [[execution (computing)|execution]], assuring they cannot perform operations detrimental to the system's stability without first being detected and dealt with.<ref name="Schneider">[httphttps://www.cs.cmu.edu/~rwh/papers/langsec/dagstuhl.pdf A Language-Based Approach to Security], Schneider F., Morrissett G. (Cornell University) and Harper R. (Carnegie Mellon University). Informatics: 10 Years Back, 10 Years Ahead. (2000)</ref> A very common strategy of guaranteeing that such operations are impossible is to base the system around a [[High-level programming language|high-level language]], such as [[Java (programming language)|Java]], whose design precludes dangerous constructs; many are entirely written in such a language, with only the minimum amount of [[low-level programming language|low-level code]] being used.<ref>{{cite web|

title=JX - A flexible Java Operating System (poster)|

url=http://www4.informatik.uni-erlangen.de/Projects/JX/poster/jx-poster.jpg|author1=Michael Golm |author2=Meik Felser |author3=Christian Wawerish |author4=Jürgen Kleinöder |

publisher=University of Erlangen|accessdate=2007-04-21}}</ref> Since language-based systems can assure ahead of time that they cannot do things that can damage the system (such as corrupting memory by dereferencing [[dangling pointer]]s), it is possible for them to avoid expensive address space switches needed by traditional OSes; because of this, [[microkernel]]s are more popular than on traditional systems.{{Citation needed|date=April 2011}} A more extreme form of this is a [[high-level language computer architecture]], where the trusted base is pushed into hardware, and the entire system is written in a high-level language.

author=Michael Golm, Meik Felser, Christian Wawerish, J&uuml;rgen Kleinöder|

publisher=University of Erlangen|accessdate=2007-04-21}}</ref> Since language-based systems can assure ahead of time that they cannot do things that can damage the system (such as corrupting memory by dereferencing [[dangling pointer]]s), it is possible for them to avoid expensive address space switches needed by traditional OSes; because of this [[microkernel]]s are more popular than on traditional systems.{{Citation needed|date=April 2011}}

==Examples==

*[[{{annotated link|Burroughs MCP]]}}

*[[UCSD P-system]]

*[[JX{{annotated link|Cosmos (operating system)|JX]]Cosmos}}

*[[Burroughs MCP]]

*[[{{annotated link|Emerald (programming language)|Emerald]]}}

*[[JX (operating system)|JX]]

*[[Singularity{{annotated link|Inferno (operating system)|Singularity]]Inferno}}

*[[Oberon{{annotated link|JX (operating system)|Oberon]]JX}}

*{{annotated link|Lisp machine}}

*[[Midori (operating system)|Midori]]

*[[Verve{{annotated link|Midori (operating system)|Verve]]Midori}}

*[[Inferno{{annotated link|Oberon (operating system)|Inferno]]Oberon}}

*{{annotated link|RedoxOS|Redox}}

*[[JNode]]

*{{annotated link|Singularity (operating system)|Singularity}}

*[[Emerald (programming language)|Emerald]]

*{{annotated link|Smalltalk}}

* [[Lisp Machine]]

*[https://github.com/theseus-os/Theseus Theseus OS]

*[[{{annotated link|UCSD P-system]]}}

*[[Midori{{annotated link|Verve (operating system)|Midori]]Verve}}

==See also==

* [[High-level language computer architecture]]

==References==

{{Reflist}}

{{refbegin}}

*A Sabelfeld, AC Myers ''[httphttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpldocument/freeabs_all.jsp1159651/;jsessionid=A692CC7FF77CD2C81E9E3E42B7099A2A?arnumber=1159651&isnumber=25986 Language-based information-flow security]'' IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 2003 Volume 21, Issue 1 pp.&nbsp;5–19

*V Haldar, D Chandra, M Franz ''[http://www.vivekhaldar.com/pubs/trustedvm-tr.pdf Semantic remote attestation—a virtual machine directed approach to trusted computing]'' USENIX Virtual Machine Research and Technology Symposium, 2004

*Giacobazzi, Mastroeni ''[http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/964001.964017 Abstract non-interference: parameterizing non-interference by abstract interpretation]'' Proceedings of the 31st ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages pp 186–97 (2004)