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{{short description|Cryptographic hardware}}
{{NPOV language|date=April 2013}}
'''Hardware-based full disk
Hardware-FDE has two major components: the hardware encryptor and the data store.
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=== Hard disk drive FDE ===
Usually referred to as '''self-encrypting drive''' ('''SED''').
HDD FDE is made by HDD vendors using the [[Opal Storage Specification|OPAL]] and Enterprise standards developed by the [[Trusted Computing Group]].<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/solutions/data_protection |title=Trusted Computing Group Data Protection page |publisher=Trustedcomputinggroup.org |date= |access-date=2013-08-06 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://
[[Hitachi]], [[Micron Technology|Micron]], [[Seagate Technology|Seagate]], [[Samsung]], and [[Toshiba]] are the disk drive manufacturers offering [[Trusted Computing Group]] [[Opal Storage Specification]] [[Serial ATA]] drives. HDDs have become a commodity so SED allow drive manufacturers to maintain revenue.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Skamarock |first1=Anne |title=Is Storage a commodity |url=https://www.itworld.com/article/2799690/is-storage-a-commodity-.html |website=ITWorld.com |publisher=Network World |accessdate=2020-05-22 |date=2020-02-21 }}{{Dead link|date=August 2025 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref> Older technologies include the proprietary Seagate DriveTrust, and the older, and less secure, [[Parallel ATA|PATA]] Security command standard shipped by all drive makers including [[Western Digital]]. Enterprise SAS versions of the TCG standard are called "TCG Enterprise" drives.
=== Enclosed hard disk drive FDE ===
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*Tampering is not an issue for SEDs as they cannot be read without the decryption key, regardless of access to the internal electronics {{Clarify|reason=see Talk page, decryption keys can be recovered from the internal electornics in several cases|date=July 2016}}.
=== Removable hard drive FDE ===
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*This is an improvement on removing [unencrypted] [[hard disk drive|hard drives]] from a [[computer]] and storing them in a [[safe]] when not in use.
*This design can be used to encrypt multiple [[hard disk drive|drives]] using the same [[Cryptographic key|key]].
*Generally they are not securely locked<ref>{{cite web |title=Sapphire Cipher Snap-In |url=https://www.addonics.com/products/ssna256eu.php |website=Addonics.com |publisher=Addonics |accessdate=2020-05-15 |archive-date=2020-12-01 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201201214820/https://www.addonics.com/products/ssna256eu.php |url-status=dead }}</ref> so the drive's interface is open to attack.
=== Chipset FDE ===
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Hardware-based encryption when built into the drive or within the drive enclosure is notably transparent to the user. The drive, except for bootup authentication, operates just like any drive, with no degradation in performance. There is no complication or performance overhead, unlike [[disk encryption software]], since all the encryption is invisible to the [[operating system]] and the host [[Central processing unit|computer's processor]].
The two main use cases are [[Data at
For Data at
==={{anchor|Crypto erase}}Disk sanitisation===
[[Crypto-shredding]] is the practice of 'deleting' data by (only) deleting or overwriting the encryption keys.
When a cryptographic disk erasure (or crypto erase) command is given (with proper authentication credentials), the drive self-generates a new media encryption key and goes into a 'new drive' state.<ref>{{cite web |title=10 Reasons to Buy Self-Encrypting Drives |url=https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/10-Reasons-to-Buy-SEDs_Sept.2010.pdf |year=2010 |publisher=Trusted Computing Group |accessdate=2018-06-06}}</ref> Without the old key, the old data becomes irretrievable and therefore an efficient means of providing [[Data erasure|disk sanitisation]] which can be a lengthy (and costly) process. For example, an unencrypted and unclassified computer hard drive that requires sanitising to conform with [[United States Department of Defense|Department of Defense]] Standards must be overwritten 3+ times;<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20130723215341/http://www-03.ibm.com/systems/resources/IBM_Certified_Secure_Data_Overwrite_Service_SB.pdf www-03.ibm.com] {{Bare URL PDF|date=March 2022}}</ref> a one Terabyte Enterprise SATA3 disk would take many hours to complete this process. Although the use of faster [[solid-state drive]]s (SSD) technologies improves this situation, the take up by enterprise has so far been slow.<ref>{{cite web |title=Slow on the Uptake |url=https://docplayer.net/30164112-Ssd-story-slow-on-the-uptake.html |access-date=18 February 2021}}</ref> The problem will worsen as disk sizes increase every year. With encrypted drives a complete and secure data erasure action takes just a few milliseconds with a simple key change, so a drive can be safely repurposed very quickly. This sanitisation activity is protected in SEDs by the drive's own key management system built into the firmware in order to prevent accidental data erasure with confirmation passwords and secure authentications related to the original key required.
When [[Cryptographic key|keys]] are self-generated randomly, generally there is no method to store a copy to allow [[data recovery]]. In this case protecting this data from accidental loss or theft is achieved through a consistent and comprehensive data backup policy. The other method is for user-defined keys, for some Enclosed hard disk drive FDE,<ref>{{cite web |title=Eclypt Core Encrypted Internal Hard Drive |url=https://www.viasat.com/products/cybersecurity/data-at-rest-encryption/ |website=Viasat.com |publisher=Viasat |accessdate=2021-02-17 |date=2020}}</ref> to be generated externally and then loaded into the FDE.
===Protection from alternative boot methods===
Recent hardware models circumvents [[booting]] from other devices and allowing access by using a dual [[Master Boot Record]] (MBR) system whereby the MBR for the operating system and data files is all encrypted along with a special MBR which is required to boot the [[operating system]]. In SEDs, all data requests are intercepted by their [[firmware]], that does not allow decryption to take place unless the system has been [[Booting|booted]] from the special SED [[operating system]] which then loads the [[Master boot record|MBR]] of the encrypted part of the drive. This works by having a separate [[Disk partitioning|partition]], hidden from view, which contains the proprietary [[operating system]] for the encryption management system. This means no other boot methods will allow access to the drive.{{citation needed|date=December 2024}}
=== Vulnerabilities ===
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=== Criticism ===
Hardware solutions have
In addition, implementing system wide hardware-based full disk encryption is prohibitive for many companies due to the high cost of replacing existing hardware. This makes migrating to hardware encryption technologies more difficult and would generally require a clear migration and central management solution for both hardware- and software-based [[Disk encryption#Full disk encryption|full disk encryption]] solutions.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.secude.com/html/?id=1375|archive-url=https://archive.today/20120909075410/http://www.secude.com/html/?id=1375|url-status=dead|archive-date=September 9, 2012|title=Closing the Legacy Gap|publisher=Secude|date=February 21, 2008|accessdate=2008-02-22}}</ref> however Enclosed hard disk drive FDE and Removable Hard Drive FDE are often installed on a single drive basis.
==See also==
* [[Disk encryption software]]
* [[Crypto-shredding]]
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