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VulcanSphere (talk | contribs) Rescuing 10 sources and tagging 0 as dead.) #IABot (v2.0.9.5 |
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The approach of AACS provisions each individual player with a unique set of decryption keys which are used in a [[broadcast encryption]] scheme. This approach allows licensors to "revoke" individual players, or more specifically, the decryption keys associated with the player. Thus, if a given player's keys are compromised and published, the AACS LA can simply revoke those keys in future content, rendering the keys and the player useless for decrypting new titles.
AACS also incorporates [[traitor tracing]] techniques. The standard allows for multiple versions of short sections of a movie to be encrypted with different keys, while a given player will only be able to decrypt one version of each section. The manufacturer embeds varying [[Digital watermarking|digital watermarks]] (such as [[Cinavia]]) in these sections, and upon subsequent analysis of the pirated release the compromised keys can be identified and revoked (this feature is called ''Sequence keys'' in the AACS specifications).<ref>{{cite web |author=Hongxia Jin |author2=Jeffery Lotspiech |author3-link=Nimrod Megiddo |author3=Nimrod Megiddo |title=Efficient Traitor Tracing |date=4 October 2006 |url=http://domino.watson.ibm.com/library/cyberdig.nsf/papers/AF8C220CB33D5A98852571FF00570458/$File/rj10390.pdf |access-date=2 May 2007 |archive-date=5 February 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120205202528/http://domino.watson.ibm.com/library/cyberdig.nsf/papers/AF8C220CB33D5A98852571FF00570458/$File/rj10390.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web
|title = AACS Reference: Pre-recorded Video Book
|url = http://www.aacsla.com/specifications/specs091/AACS_Spec_Prerecorded_0.91.pdf
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On 24 February 2001, Dalit Naor, Moni Naor and Jeff Lotspiech published a paper entitled "Revocation and Tracing Schemes for Stateless Receivers", where they described a [[broadcast encryption]] scheme using a construct called Naor-Naor-Lotspiech subset-difference trees. That paper laid the theoretical foundations of AACS.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.playfuls.com/news_05648_HD_DVDs_AACS_Protection_Bypassed_In_Only_8_Days.html |title=HD DVD's AACS Protection Bypassed. In Only 8 Days?! |access-date=25 October 2007 |author=Dan Nicolae Alexa |date=28 December 2006 |work=playfuls.com |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080210005229/http://www.playfuls.com/news_05648_HD_DVDs_AACS_Protection_Bypassed_In_Only_8_Days.html |archive-date=10 February 2008 }}</ref>
The AACS LA consortium was founded in 2004.<ref>{{cite magazine |url=http://archive.wired.com/entertainment/music/news/2004/07/64212 |title=Can Odd Alliance Beat Pirates? |access-date=20 January 2015 |author
|url = http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/jan05/2703
|title = Loser: DVD Copy Protection, Take 2
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|archive-date = 8 June 2007
|url-status = dead
}}</ref> The final AACS standard was delayed,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.pcworld.com/article/id,123924-page,1/article.html |title=Toshiba Hints at HD-DVD Delay |access-date=19 October 2007 |author=Martyn Williams |date=14 December 2005 |work=pcworld.com |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071005171717/http://www.pcworld.com/article/id%2C123924-page%2C1/article.html |archive-date=5 October 2007 |url-status=live }}</ref> and then delayed again when an important member of the Blu-ray group voiced concerns.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.heise.de/english/newsticker/news/69559 |title=AACS copy protection for Blu-ray disc and HD DVD delayed again |access-date=19 October 2007 |author =Craig Morris |date=14 February 2006 |work=heise.de | archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20071102222432/http://www.heise.de/english/newsticker/news/69559| archive-date= 2 November 2007 | url-status= live}}</ref> At the request of Toshiba, an interim standard was published which did not include some features, like managed copy.<ref name=pcworld-burning-questions /> On July 5, 2009 the license of AACS1 went online.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Calonge |first=Juan |date=8 June 2009 |title=AACS Final License Goes Online |url=https://www.blu-ray.com/news/?id=2849 |access-date=11 March 2023 |website=blu-ray.com |archive-date=11 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230311133556/https://www.blu-ray.com/news/?id=2849 |url-status=live }}</ref>
==Unlicensed decryption==
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| access-date = 3 May 2007
|date=24 January 2007
| work = Engadget| archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20070516060453/http://www.engadget.com/2007/01/24/backupbluray-available-now-too/| archive-date= 16 May 2007 | url-status= live}}</ref> Blu-ray Copy is a program capable of copying Blu-rays to the [[hard drive]] or to blank BD-R discs.<ref>{{cite news|title=Get Blu-ray Copy (Win) for free|url=http://reviews.cnet.com/8301-33153_7-57468788-10391733/get-blu-ray-copy-win-for-free/|first=Rick|last=Broida|date=9 July 2012|work=[[CNET]]|access-date=18 July 2013|archive-date=26 July 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130726081316/http://reviews.cnet.com/8301-33153_7-57468788-10391733/get-blu-ray-copy-win-for-free/|url-status=live}}</ref>
==Security==
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| title = HD-DVD Content Protection already hacked?
| work = TechAmok
| date = 28 December 2006
| access-date = 2 January 2007
| archive-date = 10 September 2023
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20230910210905/http://www.techamok.com/?pid=1849
| url-status = live
}}</ref><ref>{{cite news
| url = http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6301301.stm
| title = Hi-def DVD security is bypassed
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|title=WinDVD 8 Device Key Found!
|access-date=4 May 2007
|author
|date=24 February 2007
|work=Doom9.net forums
|archive-date=21 June 2007
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070621014631/http://forum.doom9.org/showthread.php?t=122664
|url-status=live
}}</ref>
(used to calculate the Processing Key) and a Host Private Key<ref>{{cite web
|url=http://forum.doom9.org/showthread.php?t=122969
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|url=http://www.chillingeffects.org/notice.cgi?sID=3218
|title=AACS licensor complains of posted key
|access-date=2 May 2007
|archive-date=1 May 2007
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070501142633/http://www.chillingeffects.org/notice.cgi?sID=3218
|url-status=live
}}</ref>
Some sites that rely on user-submitted content, like [[Digg]] and Wikipedia, tried to remove any mentions of the key.<ref>{{cite magazine
|url=http://blog.wired.com/business/2007/05/wikipedia_locks.html
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The AACS key extractions highlight the inherent weakness in any DRM system that permit software players for PCs to be used for playback of content. No matter how many layers of encryption are employed, it does not offer any true protection, since the keys needed to obtain the unencrypted content stream must be available somewhere in memory for playback to be possible. The PC platform offers no way to prevent memory snooping attacks on such keys, since a PC configuration can always be emulated by a [[virtual machine]], in theory without any running program or external system being able to detect the virtualization. The only way to wholly prevent attacks like this would require changes to the PC platform (see [[Trusted Computing]]) which could provide protection against such attacks. This would require that content distributors do not permit their content to be played on PCs without trusted computing technology, by not providing the companies making software players for non-trusted PCs with the needed encryption keys.
On 16 April 2007, the AACS consortium announced that it had expired certain encryption keys used by PC-based applications. Patches were available for [[WinDVD]] and [[PowerDVD]] which used new and uncompromised encryption keys.<ref>
{{cite web| url= http://www.aacsla.com/press/| title= Press Messages: AACS – Advanced Access Content System| access-date= 2 May 2007| archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20070430070403/http://www.aacsla.com/press/| archive-date= 30 April 2007| url-status= dead| df= dmy-all}}
</ref><ref>
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}}
</ref>
The AACS LA has sent [[DMCA takedown notice]]s to such sites on at least one occasion.<ref>{{cite web
|url=http://forum.doom9.org/attachment.php?attachmentid=7071&d=1176327932
|title=Illegal Offering of Title/Volume Keys to Circumvent AACS Copyright Protection: hdkeys.com
|format=pdf
|access-date=29 May 2007
|author
|date=5 April 2007
|work=DMCA takedown notice
|archive-date=26 September 2007
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070926213835/http://forum.doom9.org/attachment.php?attachmentid=7071&d=1176327932
|url-status=live
}}</ref>
There is also commercial software ([[AnyDVD|AnyDVD HD]]) that can circumvent the AACS protection. Apparently this program works even with movies released after the AACS LA expired the first batch of keys.<ref>
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|work=US Patent Office
|display-authors=etal}}
</ref> and "Digital signatures on a Smartcard."<ref>{{cite web
|url=https://patents.google.com/patent/US6704870
|title=Digital signatures on a Smartcard
|access-date=31 May 2007
|author
|date=29 August 2001
|work=US Patent Office
|display-authors=etal
|archive-date=27 March 2019
</ref> The patents were filed in 1999 and 2001 respectively, and in 2003 the [[National Security Agency]] paid $25 million for the right to use 26 of Certicom's patents, including the two that Sony is alleged to have infringed on.<ref>▼
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190327011204/https://patents.google.com/patent/US6704870
|url-status=live
▲}}</ref> The patents were filed in 1999 and 2001 respectively, and in 2003 the [[National Security Agency]] paid $25 million for the right to use 26 of Certicom's patents, including the two that Sony is alleged to have infringed on.<ref>
{{cite web
|url=https://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070531-encryption-vendor-claims-aacs-infringes-its-patents-sues-sony.html
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| date=2009-05-27
| publisher=justia.com
| access-date=2013-08-12
| archive-date=18 September 2020
| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200918180848/https://dockets.justia.com/docket/texas/txedce/2:2007cv00216/103383
| url-status=live
}}</ref>
==See also==
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==External links==
{{wikinews|High definition anti-piracy DRM possibly hacked}}
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20100306013059/http://www.aacsla.com/home Old AACS homepage]
* [https://www.aacsla.com Current AACS homepage]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20070128110342/http://www.aacsla.com/specifications/ AACS specifications]
* [http://forum.doom9.org/showthread.php?t=122363 Understanding AACS], an introductory forum thread. {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120205101739/http://forum.doom9.org/showthread.php?t=122363|date=dmy}} with the diagrams working.
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