Content deleted Content added
No edit summary Tags: Reverted Visual edit Mobile edit Mobile web edit |
UmbyUmbreon (talk | contribs) Reverted 1 edit by 178.73.75.172 (talk): Unexplained removal of references and links |
||
(7 intermediate revisions by 7 users not shown) | |||
Line 4:
{{SHA-box}}
* the probability of a particular <math>n</math>-bit output result ([[hash value]]) for a random input string ("message") is <math>2^{-n}</math> (as for any good hash), so the hash value can be used as a representative of the message;
* finding an input string that matches a given hash value (a ''pre-image'') is infeasible, ''assuming all input strings are equally likely.'' The ''resistance'' to such search is quantified as [[security strength]]: a cryptographic hash with <math>n</math> bits of hash value is expected to have a ''preimage resistance'' strength of <math>n</math> bits, unless the space of possible input values is significantly smaller than <math>2^{n}</math> (a practical example can be found in {{section link||Attacks on hashed passwords}});
Line 31:
In practice, collision resistance is insufficient for many practical uses. In addition to collision resistance, it should be impossible for an adversary to find two messages with substantially similar digests; or to infer any useful information about the data, given only its digest. In particular, a hash function should behave as much as possible like a [[random function]] (often called a [[random oracle]] in proofs of security) while still being deterministic and efficiently computable. This rules out functions like the [[SWIFFT]] function, which can be rigorously proven to be collision-resistant assuming that certain problems on ideal lattices are computationally difficult, but, as a linear function, does not satisfy these additional properties.{{sfn|Lyubashevsky|Micciancio|Peikert|Rosen|2008| pp=54–72}}
Checksum algorithms, such as [[
=== Degree of difficulty ===
|