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| name = Bluetooth mesh networking
| image = Bluetooth logo (2016).svg
| standard =
| developer = [[Bluetooth Special Interest Group|Bluetooth SIG]]
| introdate = {{Start date|2017|07|13}}
| industry
| connector =
| hardware =
| range
}}
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* has a TTL ≥ 2
can be retransmitted with TTL = TTL
Communication is carried in the messages that may be up to 384 bytes long, when using Segmentation and Reassembly (SAR) mechanism, but most of the messages fit in one segment, that is 11 bytes. Each message starts with an opcode, which may be a single byte (for special messages), 2 bytes (for standard messages), or 3 bytes (for vendor-specific messages).
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A key unique to a device known as "Device Key" is derived from elliptic curve shared secret on provisioner and device during the provisioning process. This device key is used by the provisioner to encrypt messages for that specific device.
The security of the provisioning process has been analyzed in a paper presented during the [[IEEE Communications Society|IEEE CNS]] 2018 conference.<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Adomnicai|first1=A.|last2=Fournier|first2=J. J. A.|last3=Masson|first3=L.|title=2018 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS) |chapter=Hardware Security Threats Against Bluetooth Mesh Networks |date=2018-05-30|pages=1–9
The provisioning can be performed using a Bluetooth GATT connection or advertising using the specific bearer.<ref name=":0" />
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