Content deleted Content added
Entranced98 (talk | contribs) m Reverted edit by 2409:40C2:205B:9AD2:A538:5680:61C6:7201 (talk) to last version by Azuuuu |
TXstockman5 (talk | contribs) Added article-number. | Use this tool. Report bugs. | #UCB_Gadget |
||
| (9 intermediate revisions by 9 users not shown) | |||
Line 15:
The theory is based on an interpretation of [[demography|demographic]] history developed in 1930 by the American demographer [[Warren Thompson, demographer|Warren Thompson]] (1887–1973).<ref name=DemenyAndMcNicoll>{{cite encyclopedia|title=Warren Thompson|encyclopedia=Encyclopedia of Population|volume=2|pages=[https://archive.org/details/encyclopediaofpo0000unse/page/939 939–40]|publisher=[[Macmillan Publishers|Macmillan Reference]]|year=2003|isbn=978-0-02-865677-9|url-access=registration|url=https://archive.org/details/encyclopediaofpo0000unse/page/939}}</ref> [[Adolphe Landry]] of France made similar observations on demographic patterns and population growth potential around 1934.<ref name=":4">{{cite journal|last1=Landry|first1=Adolphe|title=Adolphe Landry on the Demographic transition Revolution|journal=Population and Development Review|date=December 1987|volume=13|issue=4|pages=731–740|doi=10.2307/1973031|jstor=1973031}}</ref> In the 1940s and 1950s [[Frank W. Notestein]] developed a more formal theory of demographic transition.<ref name="Woods2000">{{cite book|last=Woods|first=Robert|title=The Demography of Victorian England and Wales|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=75DZmQtybMwC&pg=PA18|date=2000-10-05|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-0-521-78254-8|pages=18}}</ref> In the 2000s [[Oded Galor]] researched the "various mechanisms that have been proposed as possible triggers for the demographic transition, assessing their empirical validity, and their potential role in the transition from stagnation to growth."<ref name="jstor.org"/> In 2011, the [[unified growth theory]] was completed, the demographic transition becomes an important part in unified growth theory.<ref name="Unified Growth Theory"/> By 2009, the existence of a negative correlation between fertility and industrial development had become one of the most widely accepted findings in social science.<ref name="Nature" />
The [[Jews of Bohemia and Moravia]] were among the first populations to experience a demographic transition, in the 18th century, prior to changes in mortality or fertility in other [[European Jews]] or in Christians living in the [[Czech lands]].<ref>{{cite book |last1=Vobecka |first1=Jana |title=Demographic Avant-Garde: Jews in Bohemia between the Enlightenment and the Shoah |date=2013 |publisher=Central European University Press |isbn=978-615-5225-33-8 |page=xvi |language=en}}</ref> [[John Caldwell (demographer)]] explained fertility rates in the third world are not dependent on the spread of industrialization or even on economic development and also illustrates fertility decline is more likely to precede industrialization and to help bring it about than to follow it.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=John C|first1=Caldwell|date=1976|title=Toward A Retatement of Demographic Transition Theory |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/1971615|journal=Population and Development Review |volume=2|issue=3|pages=321–366|doi=10.2307/1971615 |jstor=1971615 |url-access=subscription}}</ref>
==Summary==
Line 90 ⟶ 89:
Some countries have [[sub-replacement fertility]] (that is, below 2.1–2.2 children per woman). Replacement fertility is generally slightly higher than 2 (the level which replaces the two parents, achieving equilibrium) both because boys are born more often than girls (about 1.05–1.1 to 1), and to compensate for deaths prior to full reproduction. Many European and East Asian countries now have higher death rates than birth rates. [[Population aging]] and [[population decline]] may eventually occur, assuming that the fertility rate does not change and sustained mass immigration does not occur.
Using data through 2005, researchers have suggested that the negative relationship between development, as measured by the [[Human Development Index]] (HDI), and birth rates had reversed at very high levels of development. In many countries with very high levels of development, fertility rates were approaching two children per woman in the early 2000s.<ref name="Nature" /><ref>{{Citation | title= The best of all possible worlds? | url = https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2009/08/06/the-best-of-all-possible-worlds | newspaper = The Economist | date = 6 August 2009}}.</ref> However, fertility rates declined significantly in many very high development countries between 2010 and 2018, including in countries with high levels of [[gender parity]]. The global data no longer support the suggestion that fertility rates tend to broadly rise at very high levels of national development.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal|last=Gaddy|first=Hampton Gray|date=2021-01-20|title=A decade of TFR declines suggests no relationship between development and sub-replacement fertility rebounds|url=https://www.demographic-research.org/volumes/vol44/5/|journal=Demographic Research|language=en|volume=44|pages=125–142|article-number=5 |doi=10.4054/DemRes.2021.44.5|issn=1435-9871|doi-access=free}}</ref>
From the point of view of [[evolutionary biology]], wealthier people having fewer children is unexpected, as [[natural selection]] would be expected to favor individuals who are willing and able to convert plentiful resources into plentiful fertile descendants. This may be the result of a departure from the [[Evolutionary psychology#Environment of evolutionary adaptedness|environment of evolutionary adaptedness]].<ref name=bbc_sure /><ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Clarke | first1 = Alice L. | last2 = Low | first2 = Bobbi S. | year = 2001 | title = Testing evolutionary hypotheses with demographic data |journal = Population and Development Review | volume = 27 | issue = 4| pages = 633–660 | doi=10.1111/j.1728-4457.2001.00633.x| url = https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/74296/1/j.1728-4457.2001.00633.x.pdf | hdl = 2027.42/74296| hdl-access = free }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Daly |first1= Martin |last2=Wilson |first2=Margo I |title=Human evolutionary psychology and animal behaviour |journal= Animal Behaviour |url= http://courses.washington.edu/evpsych/Daly%26Wilson-HEP-AB1999.pdf |publisher= Department of Psychology, McMaster University |access-date=14 November 2018 |date=26 June 1998|volume= 57 |issue= 3 |pages= 509–519 |doi= 10.1006/anbe.1998.1027 |pmid= 10196040 |s2cid= 4007382 }}</ref>
Most models posit that the birth rate will stabilize at a low level indefinitely. Some dissenting scholars note that the modern environment is exerting [[evolutionary pressure]] for higher fertility, and that eventually due to individual natural selection or cultural selection, birth rates may rise again. Part of the "cultural selection" hypothesis is that the variance in birth rate between cultures is significant; for example, some religious cultures have a higher birth rate that is not accounted for by differences in income.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Kolk|first1=M.|last2= Cownden |first2=D.|last3=Enquist|first3=M. |title=Correlations in fertility across generations: can low fertility persist?|journal=Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences|date=29 January 2014|volume=281|issue=1779|page = 20132561 |doi=10.1098/rspb.2013.2561|pmid= 24478294 |pmc=3924067}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last1=Burger|first1=Oskar|last2= DeLong|first2=John P.|title= What if fertility decline is not permanent? The need for an evolutionarily informed approach to understanding low fertility|journal= Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences|date=28 March 2016|volume=371|issue=1692|page = 20150157|doi= 10.1098/rstb.2015.0157 |pmid= 27022084|pmc= 4822437}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title= Population paradox: Europe's time bomb |url= https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/population-paradox-europes-time-bomb-888030.html |access-date=31 March 2019 |work=The Independent |date=9 August 2008}}</ref> In his book ''Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth?'', [[Eric Kaufmann]] argues that demographic trends point to religious fundamentalists greatly increasing as a share of the population over the next century.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Shall the religious inherit the earth?|url=https://www.mercatornet.com/articles/view/shall_the_religious_inherit_the_earth/|date=April 6, 2010|website=Mercator Net|access-date=February 27, 2020|archive-date=June 23, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190623040350/https://www.mercatornet.com/articles/view/shall_the_religious_inherit_the_earth/|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=McClendon|first=David|date=Autumn 2013|title=Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth? Demography and Politics in the Twenty-First Century, by ERIC KAUFMANN|url=https://academic.oup.com/socrel/article-abstract/74/3/417/1640161|journal=Sociology of Religion|volume=74|issue=3|pages=417–9|doi=10.1093/socrel/srt026|url-access=subscription}}</ref>
[[Jane Falkingham]] of [[Southampton University]] has noted that "We've actually got population projections wrong consistently over the last 50 years... we've underestimated the improvements in mortality... but also we've not been very good at spotting the trends in fertility."<ref name= bbc_sure /> In 2004 a United Nations office published its guesses for global population in the year 2300; estimates ranged from a "low estimate" of 2.3 billion (tending to −0.32% per year) to a "high estimate" of 36.4 billion (tending to +0.54% per year), which were contrasted with a deliberately "unrealistic" illustrative "constant fertility" scenario of 134 trillion (obtained if 1995–2000 fertility rates stay constant into the far future).<ref name= bbc_sure /><ref>{{cite web|title= World Population to 2300|url= https://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/longrange2/WorldPop2300final.pdf |publisher=United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs |access-date= 24 May 2016|date= 2004}}</ref>
Line 134 ⟶ 133:
====China====
China experienced a demographic transition with high death rate and low fertility rate from 1959 to 1961 due to the great famine.<ref name=":3" /> However, as a result of the economic improvement, the birth rate increased and mortality rate declined in China before the early 1970s.<ref name=":4" /> In the 1970s, China's birth rate fell at an unprecedented rate, which had not been experienced by any other population in a comparable time span. The birth rate fell from 6.6 births per women before 1970 to 2.2 births per women in 1980.The rapid fertility decline in China was caused by government policy: in particular the "later, longer, fewer" policy of the early 1970s and in the late 1970s the one-child policy was also enacted which highly influence China demographic transition.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=John|first1=Bongaarts|last2=Susan|first2=Greenhalgh|date=1985|title=An alternative to the One-Child Policy in China|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/1973456|journal=Population and Development Review|volume=11|issue=4|pages=585–617|doi=10.2307/1973456 |jstor=1973456 |url-access=subscription}}</ref> As the demographic dividend gradually disappeared, the government abandoned the one-child policy in 2011 and fully lifted the two-child policy from 2015.The two-child policy has had some positive effects on the fertility which causes fertility constantly to increase until 2018.However fertility started to decline after 2018 and meanwhile there was no significant change in mortality in recent 30 years.
===Madagascar===
Line 146 ⟶ 145:
Russia entered stage two of the transition in the 18th century, simultaneously with the rest of Europe, though the effect of transition remained limited to a modest decline in death rates and steady population growth. The population of Russia nearly quadrupled during the 19th century, from 30 million to 133 million, and continued to grow until the First World War and the turmoil that followed.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.tacitus.nu/historical-atlas/population/russia.htm|title=Population of Eastern Europe|website=tacitus.nu|access-date=2015-09-30|archive-date=2018-01-08|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180108232321/http://www.tacitus.nu/historical-atlas/population/russia.htm|url-status=dead}}</ref> Russia then quickly transitioned through stage three. Though fertility rates rebounded initially and almost reached 7 children/woman in the mid-1920s, they were depressed by the 1931–33 famine, crashed due to the Second World War in 1941, and only rebounded to a sustained level of 3 children/woman after the war. By 1970 Russia was firmly in stage four, with crude birth rates and crude death rates on the order of 15/1000 and 9/1000 respectively. Bizarrely, however, the birth rate entered a state of constant flux, repeatedly surpassing the 20/1000 as well as falling below 12/1000.
In the 1980s and 1990s, Russia underwent a unique demographic transition; observers call it a "demographic catastrophe": the number of deaths exceeded the number of births, life expectancy fell sharply (especially for males) and the number of suicides increased.<ref>{{Citation | editor-first = George J | editor-last = Demko | others = et al | title = Population under Duress: The Geodemography of Post-Soviet Russia | year = 1999 | url = | publisher = Westview Press |isbn=0813389399
=== United States ===
Line 171 ⟶ 170:
DTM assumes that the birth rate is independent of the death rate. Nevertheless, demographers maintain that there is no historical evidence for society-wide fertility rates rising significantly after high mortality events. Notably, some historic populations have taken many years to replace lives after events such as the [[Black Death]].
Some have claimed that DTM does not explain the early fertility declines in much of Asia in the second half of the 20th century or the delays in fertility decline in parts of the Middle East. Nevertheless, the demographer [[John Caldwell (demographer)|John C. Caldwell]] has suggested that the reason for the rapid decline in fertility in some [[developing country|developing countries]] compared to Western Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand is mainly due to government programs and a massive investment in education both by governments and parents.<ref name=Caldwell10/>
DTM does not well explain the impact of government policies on birth rate. In some developing countries, governments often implement some policies to control the growth of fertility rate. China, for example, underwent a fertility transition in 1970, and the Chinese experience was largely influenced by government policy. In particular the "later, longer, fewer" policy of 1970 and one birth policy was enacted in 1979 which all encouraged people to have fewer children in later life. The fertility transition indeed stimulated economic growth and influenced the demographic transition in China.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Carl-johan|first1=dalgaard|last2=pablo|first2=selaya|date=2015|title=Climate and the Emergence of Global Income|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/26160242|journal=The Review of Economic Studies|volume=83|issue=4|pages=1334–1363|jstor=26160242 }}</ref>
Line 178 ⟶ 177:
The Second Demographic Transition (SDT) is a conceptual framework first formulated in 1986 by Ron Lesthaeghe and [[Dick van de Kaa|Dirk van de Kaa]].<ref name="Lesthaeghe_2011">{{citation |author=Ron J. Lesthaeghe |date=2011 |title=The "second demographic transition": a conceptual map for the understanding of late modern demographic developments in fertility and family formation |journal=Historical Social Research |volume=36 |number=2 |pages=179–218 |url=http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-342259}}</ref>{{rp|181}}<ref name="Lesthaeghe_2011"/><ref name="Bevolking">{{cite book|author1=Ron Lesthaeghe |author2=Dirk van de Kaa|author-link2=Dick van de Kaa|title=Bevolking: groei en krimp [Population: growth and shrinkage]|date=1986|publisher=Deventer : Van Loghum Slaterus|isbn=9789036800181|pages=9–24|chapter=Twee demografische transities? [Second Demographic Transition]}}(in Dutch with summaries in English)</ref><ref name="Lesthaeghe_1991">{{citation |author=Ron J. Lesthaeghe |date=1991 |title=The Second Demographic Transition in Western countries: An interpretation |url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/257928736 |format=PDF |series=IPD Working Paper, Interuniversity Programme in Demography |access-date=February 26, 2017}}</ref> SDT addressed the changes in the patterns of sexual and reproductive behavior which occurred in North America and Western Europe in the period from about 1963, when the [[combined oral contraceptive pill|birth control pill]] and other cheap effective contraceptive methods such as the IUD were adopted by the general population, to the present. Combined with the [[sexual revolution]] and the increased role of women in society and the workforce the resulting changes have profoundly affected the demographics of industrialized countries resulting in a [[sub-replacement fertility]] level.<ref name="Kaa012902">{{cite journal|author1=Dirk J. van de Kaa|title=The Idea of a Second Demographic Transition in Industrialized Countries|date=29 January 2002|url=http://websv.ipss.go.jp/webj-ad/WebJournal.files/population/2003_4/Kaa.pdf|access-date=May 6, 2016|archive-date=29 October 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201029113743/http://websv.ipss.go.jp/webj-ad/WebJournal.files/population/2003_4/Kaa.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref>
The changes, including increased numbers of women choosing to not marry or have children, increased cohabitation outside marriage, increased childbearing by single mothers, increased participation by women in higher education and professional careers, and other changes are associated with increased individualism and autonomy, particularly of women. Motivations have changed from traditional and economic ones to those of self-realization.<ref name="PNAC122314">{{cite journal|author1=Ron Lesthaeghe|title=The second demographic transition: A concise overview of its development|journal=Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America|date=December 23, 2014 |volume=111|issue=51|pages=18112–18115|doi=10.1073/pnas.1420441111|pmid=25453112|pmc=4280616|bibcode=2014PNAS..11118112L|doi-access=free}}</ref>
In 2015, Nicholas Eberstadt, political economist at the [[American Enterprise Institute]] in Washington, described the Second Demographic Transition as one in which "long, stable marriages are out, and divorce or separation are in, along with serial cohabitation and increasingly contingent liaisons."<ref name="WSJ_Eberstadt_2015">{{citation |quote='They're getting divorced, and they'll do anything NOT to get custody of the kids." So reads the promotional poster, in French, for a new movie, "Papa ou Maman"|title=The Global Flight From the Family: It's not only in the West or prosperous nations—the decline in marriage and drop in birth rates is rampant, with potentially dire fallout |author=Nicholas Eberstadt |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/nicholas-eberstadt-the-global-flight-from-the-family-1424476179|date=February 21, 2015 |access-date=February 26, 2017 |publisher=Wall Street Journal }}</ref>[[S. Philip Morgan]] thought future development orientation for SDT is Social demographers should explore a theory that is not based on stages, a theory that does not set a single line, a development path for some final stage—in the case of SDT, a hypothesis that looks like the advanced Western countries that most embrace postmodern values.
However, the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) theory has not proposed a single line or teleological evolution based on phases, as was the case for the theories of the First Demographic Transition (FDT). Instead, and this is strikingly in evidence in Lesthaeghe's empirical studies, major attention is being paid to historical path dependency, heterogeneity in the SDT patterns of development, forms of family and lineage organisation, economic and especially ideational developments.<ref>Johan Surkyn and Ron Lesthaeghe, 2004: Value Orientations and the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) in Northern, Western and Southern Europe- An Update. Demographic Research, Special collection, 3: 45-86. Ron Lesthaeghe, 2010: The Unfolding Story of the Second Demographic Transition. Population and Development Review, 36 (2), 211-251</ref>
Line 204 ⟶ 202:
* [[Neolithic demographic transition]]
* [[Zelinsky Model|Migration transition model]]
* [[Population change]]
* [[Population pyramid]]
* [[Rate of natural increase]]
| |||