Demographic transition: Difference between revisions

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The theory is based on an interpretation of [[demography|demographic]] history developed in 1930 by the American demographer [[Warren Thompson, demographer|Warren Thompson]] (1887–1973).<ref name=DemenyAndMcNicoll>{{cite encyclopedia|title=Warren Thompson|encyclopedia=Encyclopedia of Population|volume=2|pages=[https://archive.org/details/encyclopediaofpo0000unse/page/939 939–40]|publisher=[[Macmillan Publishers|Macmillan Reference]]|year=2003|isbn=978-0-02-865677-9|url-access=registration|url=https://archive.org/details/encyclopediaofpo0000unse/page/939}}</ref> [[Adolphe Landry]] of France made similar observations on demographic patterns and population growth potential around 1934.<ref name=":4">{{cite journal|last1=Landry|first1=Adolphe|title=Adolphe Landry on the Demographic transition Revolution|journal=Population and Development Review|date=December 1987|volume=13|issue=4|pages=731–740|doi=10.2307/1973031|jstor=1973031}}</ref> In the 1940s and 1950s [[Frank W. Notestein]] developed a more formal theory of demographic transition.<ref name="Woods2000">{{cite book|last=Woods|first=Robert|title=The Demography of Victorian England and Wales|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=75DZmQtybMwC&pg=PA18|date=2000-10-05|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-0-521-78254-8|pages=18}}</ref> In the 2000s [[Oded Galor]] researched the "various mechanisms that have been proposed as possible triggers for the demographic transition, assessing their empirical validity, and their potential role in the transition from stagnation to growth."<ref name="jstor.org"/> In 2011, the [[unified growth theory]] was completed, the demographic transition becomes an important part in unified growth theory.<ref name="Unified Growth Theory"/> By 2009, the existence of a negative correlation between fertility and industrial development had become one of the most widely accepted findings in social science.<ref name="Nature" />

The [[Jews of Bohemia and Moravia]] were among the first populations to experience a demographic transition, in the 18th century, prior to changes in mortality or fertility in other [[European Jews]] or in Christians living in the [[Czech lands]].<ref>{{cite book |last1=Vobecka |first1=Jana |title=Demographic Avant-Garde: Jews in Bohemia between the Enlightenment and the Shoah |date=2013 |publisher=Central European University Press |isbn=978-615-5225-33-8 |page=xvi |language=en}}</ref> [[John Caldwell (demographer)]] explained fertility rates in the third world are not dependent on the spread of industrialization or even on economic development and also illustrates fertility decline is more likely to precede industrialization and to help bring it about than to follow it.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=John C|first1=Caldwell|date=1976|title=Toward A Retatement of Demographic Transition Theory |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/1971615|journal=Population and Development Review |volume=2|issue=3|pages=321–366|doi=10.2307/1971615 |jstor=1971615 |url-access=subscription}}</ref>

==Summary==

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Some countries have [[sub-replacement fertility]] (that is, below 2.1–2.2 children per woman). Replacement fertility is generally slightly higher than 2 (the level which replaces the two parents, achieving equilibrium) both because boys are born more often than girls (about 1.05–1.1 to 1), and to compensate for deaths prior to full reproduction. Many European and East Asian countries now have higher death rates than birth rates. [[Population aging]] and [[population decline]] may eventually occur, assuming that the fertility rate does not change and sustained mass immigration does not occur.

Using data through 2005, researchers have suggested that the negative relationship between development, as measured by the [[Human Development Index]] (HDI), and birth rates had reversed at very high levels of development. In many countries with very high levels of development, fertility rates were approaching two children per woman in the early 2000s.<ref name="Nature" /><ref>{{Citation | title= The best of all possible worlds? | url = https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2009/08/06/the-best-of-all-possible-worlds | newspaper = The Economist | date = 6 August 2009}}.</ref> However, fertility rates declined significantly in many very high development countries between 2010 and 2018, including in countries with high levels of [[gender parity]]. The global data no longer support the suggestion that fertility rates tend to broadly rise at very high levels of national development.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal|last=Gaddy|first=Hampton Gray|date=2021-01-20|title=A decade of TFR declines suggests no relationship between development and sub-replacement fertility rebounds|url=https://www.demographic-research.org/volumes/vol44/5/|journal=Demographic Research|language=en|volume=44|pages=125–142|article-number=5 |doi=10.4054/DemRes.2021.44.5|issn=1435-9871|doi-access=free}}</ref>

From the point of view of [[evolutionary biology]], wealthier people having fewer children is unexpected, as [[natural selection]] would be expected to favor individuals who are willing and able to convert plentiful resources into plentiful fertile descendants. This may be the result of a departure from the [[Evolutionary psychology#Environment of evolutionary adaptedness|environment of evolutionary adaptedness]].<ref name=bbc_sure /><ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Clarke | first1 = Alice L. | last2 = Low | first2 = Bobbi S. | year = 2001 | title = Testing evolutionary hypotheses with demographic data |journal = Population and Development Review | volume = 27 | issue = 4| pages = 633–660 | doi=10.1111/j.1728-4457.2001.00633.x| url = https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/74296/1/j.1728-4457.2001.00633.x.pdf | hdl = 2027.42/74296| hdl-access = free }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Daly |first1= Martin |last2=Wilson |first2=Margo I |title=Human evolutionary psychology and animal behaviour |journal= Animal Behaviour |url= http://courses.washington.edu/evpsych/Daly%26Wilson-HEP-AB1999.pdf |publisher= Department of Psychology, McMaster University |access-date=14 November 2018 |date=26 June 1998|volume= 57 |issue= 3 |pages= 509–519 |doi= 10.1006/anbe.1998.1027 |pmid= 10196040 |s2cid= 4007382 }}</ref>

Most models posit that the birth rate will stabilize at a low level indefinitely. Some dissenting scholars note that the modern environment is exerting [[evolutionary pressure]] for higher fertility, and that eventually due to individual natural selection or cultural selection, birth rates may rise again. Part of the "cultural selection" hypothesis is that the variance in birth rate between cultures is significant; for example, some religious cultures have a higher birth rate that is not accounted for by differences in income.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Kolk|first1=M.|last2= Cownden |first2=D.|last3=Enquist|first3=M. |title=Correlations in fertility across generations: can low fertility persist?|journal=Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences|date=29 January 2014|volume=281|issue=1779|page = 20132561 |doi=10.1098/rspb.2013.2561|pmid= 24478294 |pmc=3924067}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last1=Burger|first1=Oskar|last2= DeLong|first2=John P.|title= What if fertility decline is not permanent? The need for an evolutionarily informed approach to understanding low fertility|journal= Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences|date=28 March 2016|volume=371|issue=1692|page = 20150157|doi= 10.1098/rstb.2015.0157 |pmid= 27022084|pmc= 4822437}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title= Population paradox: Europe's time bomb |url= https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/population-paradox-europes-time-bomb-888030.html |access-date=31 March 2019 |work=The Independent |date=9 August 2008}}</ref> In his book ''Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth?'', [[Eric Kaufmann]] argues that demographic trends point to religious fundamentalists greatly increasing as a share of the population over the next century.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Shall the religious inherit the earth?|url=https://www.mercatornet.com/articles/view/shall_the_religious_inherit_the_earth/|date=April 6, 2010|website=Mercator Net|access-date=February 27, 2020|archive-date=June 23, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190623040350/https://www.mercatornet.com/articles/view/shall_the_religious_inherit_the_earth/|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=McClendon|first=David|date=Autumn 2013|title=Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth? Demography and Politics in the Twenty-First Century, by ERIC KAUFMANN|url=https://academic.oup.com/socrel/article-abstract/74/3/417/1640161|journal=Sociology of Religion|volume=74|issue=3|pages=417–9|doi=10.1093/socrel/srt026|url-access=subscription}}</ref>

[[Jane Falkingham]] of [[Southampton University]] has noted that "We've actually got population projections wrong consistently over the last 50 years... we've underestimated the improvements in mortality... but also we've not been very good at spotting the trends in fertility."<ref name= bbc_sure /> In 2004 a United Nations office published its guesses for global population in the year 2300; estimates ranged from a "low estimate" of 2.3 billion (tending to −0.32% per year) to a "high estimate" of 36.4 billion (tending to +0.54% per year), which were contrasted with a deliberately "unrealistic" illustrative "constant fertility" scenario of 134 trillion (obtained if 1995–2000 fertility rates stay constant into the far future).<ref name= bbc_sure /><ref>{{cite web|title= World Population to 2300|url= https://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/longrange2/WorldPop2300final.pdf |publisher=United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs |access-date= 24 May 2016|date= 2004}}</ref>

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====China====

China experienced a demographic transition with high death rate and low fertility rate from 1959 to 1961 due to the great famine.<ref name=":3" /> However, as a result of the economic improvement, the birth rate increased and mortality rate declined in China before the early 1970s.<ref name=":4" /> In the 1970s, China's birth rate fell at an unprecedented rate, which had not been experienced by any other population in a comparable time span. The birth rate fell from 6.6 births per women before 1970 to 2.2 births per women in 1980.The rapid fertility decline in China was caused by government policy: in particular the "later, longer, fewer" policy of the early 1970s and in the late 1970s the one-child policy was also enacted which highly influence China demographic transition.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=John|first1=Bongaarts|last2=Susan|first2=Greenhalgh|date=1985|title=An alternative to the One-Child Policy in China|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/1973456|journal=Population and Development Review|volume=11|issue=4|pages=585–617|doi=10.2307/1973456 |jstor=1973456 |url-access=subscription}}</ref> As the demographic dividend gradually disappeared, the government abandoned the one-child policy in 2011 and fully lifted the two-child policy from 2015.The two-child policy has had some positive effects on the fertility which causes fertility constantly to increase until 2018.However fertility started to decline after 2018 and meanwhile there was no significant change in mortality in recent 30 years.

===Madagascar===

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* [[Neolithic demographic transition]]

* [[Zelinsky Model|Migration transition model]]

* [[Population change]]

* [[Population pyramid]]

* [[Rate of natural increase]]