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===Early development===
The interest in newer transit buses was sparked in part by laws passed in the late 1960s and early 1970s granting federal subsidies for public transportation equipment, including buses.<ref name=TBMP/>{{rp|3–8}} [[General Motors]] (GM) began developing a replacement for its ubiquitous [[GM New Look bus|New Look]] bus in 1964, demonstrating a three-axle, turbine-powered{{efn|The RTX used the same [[GM Whirlfire engine|GT-309 gas turbine engine]] previously developed and installed in the 1966 prototype [[Chevrolet Turbo Titan III]] truck.<ref name=BSC-16/>}} prototype named Rapid Transit eXperimental (RTX) in 1968.<ref name=TBMP/>{{rp|4–7}} <ref name=BSC-16>{{cite web |url=https://www.curbsideclassic.com/bus-stop-classic/bus-stop-classics-general-motors-rapid-transit-series-rts-ii-coach-a-sure-bet/ |title=Bus Stop Classic: General Motors Rapid transit Series (RTS) II Coach — GM Deadly Sin #27 — A Sure Bet? |author=Brophy, Jim |date=November 27, 2016 |website=Curbside Classic |accessdate=9 October 2020}}</ref> That same year, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) published a report providing recommendations for buses that would reduce costs and improve ridership.<ref>{{cite report |title=Design and Performance Criteria for Improved Nonrail Urban Mass Transit Vehicles and Related Urban Transportation Systems |author=Highway Research Board |date=May 1968 |publisher=U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development}}</ref> Although RTX would have met many of the objectives from the 1968 NAS report, testing and evaluation showed several issues: the lowered floor of the RTX, at {{convert|22|in|abbr=on}}, meant novel chassis, suspension, and brake components were needed, adding to the complexity, weight, and cost of the RTX design.<ref name=Hearing77/>{{rp|11}}
GM wrote a letter to [[United States Department of Transportation]] Secretary [[John Volpe]] in 1971, complaining that it had begun work on the RTX-derived [[Rapid Transit Series]] (RTS) to meet the goals of the 1968 NAS report,<ref name=UMTA-oversight-hearing/>{{rp|4}} but could not start serial production until UMTA changed its low-bid policy to allow federal subsidies for the RTS.<ref name=TBMP/>{{rp|4–7}} At the time, the three major U.S. transit bus manufacturers offered 'New Look' style buses that were functionally equivalent,{{efn|These were the [[GM New Look]], [[Flxible New Look]], and [[Flyer 700/800/900 series|AM General Metropolitan]].}} and to qualify for federal subsidies, the transit agency was required to award its bus procurement contracts to the lowest bidder.<ref name=UMTA-oversight-hearing/>{{rp|152}} GM later reversed its stance and announced in May 1973 it would begin producing the RTS.<ref name=UMTA-oversight-hearing/>{{rp|4}} The first RTS prototype was produced in 1974, followed by the 1975 RTS-II prototype,<ref name=Hearing77/>{{rp|11}} which was evaluated in demonstration service by several transit agencies.
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The Transbus specification requirement led three transit agencies{{efn|name=79bid}} to request bids for a joint procurement of 530 buses in January 1979.<ref name=Reason-80/> It was estimated that a single Transbus would cost 60% more than a comparable New Look bus, driven mainly by the low-floor requirement, which in turn would require significant investments to develop axle, drivetrain, suspension, and tire technologies. In addition, the terms of the 1979 procurement made the bidders responsible for significant risks and performance guarantees.<ref name=Whitford-83>{{cite journal |url=https://trid.trb.org/view/196256 |title=Federal Government and Integrated Vehicle Development: U.S. Experience |author=Whitford, R.K. |date=1983 |journal=Transportation Research Record |issn=0361-1981 |publisher=Transportation Research Board |issue=909 |accessdate=9 October 2020}}</ref>
By March 1979, [[Grumman]] Flxible{{efn|[[Grumman]] acquired [[Flxible]] from [[Rohr, Inc.|Rohr]] on January 3, 1978 for {{USD|55000000|1978|round=-4}}. The acquisition included two hand-built prototypes of and the design for the [[Flxible Metro|Model 870]].<ref name=GrummanVRohr>{{cite court |vol=748 |reporter=F.2d |opinion=729 |court=[[United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit|2d Cir.]] |date=1984 |litigants=Grumman Allied Industries, Inc. v. Rohr Industries, Inc. |url=https://casetext.com/case/grumman-allied-industries-v-rohr-industries|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230519101506/https://casetext.com/case/grumman-allied-industries-v-rohr-industries|url-status=dead|archive-date=May 19, 2023}}</ref>}} announced it did not intend to bid on the new contract, and GM stated it was unlikely to bid. The president of Grumman Flxible, Thomas J. Bernard, said that internal estimates put the bid price at {{USD|230000|1979|round=-3}} per bus, nearly double the {{USD|120000|1979|round=-3}} cost per conventional New Look bus, and added the Department of Transportation "has been seeking a more productive bus. We believe that a bus that weighs more, gets fewer miles per gallon, has fewer seats and less standing room is not a more productive bus."<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.newspapers.com/newspage/147073438/ |title=Lack Of Bids Threatens 'Wheelchair' Bus |date=March 14, 1979 |newspaper=The Pittsburgh Press |accessdate=9 October 2020}}</ref> Flxible also stated that component suppliers (such as [[Rockwell International]], who built transit bus axles) would need federal support to develop the new technologies needed for Transbus, as the limited transit bus market meant most component suppliers were unwilling to develop them.<ref name=UMTA-oversight-hearing/>{{rp|114}}
When the bidding period closed that May, neither GM, Flxible, nor any foreign manufacturers had provided a bid.<ref name=Reason-80/> Secretary Adams said he was "deeply disappointed" that no bids had been received; the companies countered the Transbus design was impossible to implement and their ADB designs already met accessibility requirements.<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.newspapers.com/newspage/147100831/ |title=Transbus: Too Many Design Handicaps, Builders Say |author=Raspberry, William |date=May 9, 1979 |newspaper=The Pittsburgh Press |accessdate=9 October 2020}}</ref> A Congressional hearing was held later in May regarding the failure of the procurement.<ref name=UMTA-oversight-hearing>{{cite report |url=https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/002949644 |title=Oversight of the Urban Mass Transportation Administration's Technology Development and Equipment Procurement Programs |date=May 16–22, 1979 |publisher=U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Oversight and Review, Committee on Public Works and Transportation |accessdate=10 October 2020}}</ref> With the failure of the 1979 procurement, the requirement to procure new, federally subsidized buses to the Transbus specification was suspended in August.<ref name=TBMP/>{{rp|3–11}}
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