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'''Power transition theory''' is a theory about the nature of [[war]], in relation to the [[power in international relations]].<ref name="Organski">{{Cite book|last=Organski|first=AFK|authorlink=A.F.K. Organski|title=World Politics|year=1958|___location=[[New York City|New York]]}}</ref><ref name="Wittkopf">{{Cite book|last=Wittkopf|first=Eugene R.|title=World Politics: Trend and Transformation|year=1997|publisher=St. Martin's Press|___location=[[New York City|New York]]}}</ref><ref name="Tammen">{{Cite book|last=Tammen|first=Ronald L.|title=Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century|year=2000|publisher=Seven Bridges Press}}</ref> The theory was first published in 1958 by its creator, [[A.F.K. Organski]], in his textbook, ''World Politics'' (1958).
==
Organski first described power transition theory.<ref name=":Ma&Kang" />{{Rp|page=22}} According to Organski in his textbook, ''World Politics'' (1958):<blockquote>An even distribution of political, economic, and military capabilities between contending groups of states is likely to increase the probability of war; peace is preserved best when there is an imbalance of national capabilities between disadvantaged and advantaged nations; the aggressor will come from a small group of dissatisfied strong countries; and it is the weaker, rather than the stronger power that is most likely to be the aggressor.<ref>Organski 1980, 19</ref></blockquote>Steve Chan summarizes the theory as "the danger of systemic war is greatest when a rising challenger catches up with or even overtakes a declining hegemon."<ref name=":Ma&Kang" />{{Rp|page=23}} The underlying logic is that a rising power that is satisfied with the order of the international system has little incentive to challenge the status quo, while a dissatisfied rising power may wish to challenge the status quo.<ref name=":Ma&Kang" />{{Rp|pages=23-24}}▼
▲<blockquote>An even distribution of political, economic, and military capabilities between contending groups of states is likely to increase the probability of war; peace is preserved best when there is an imbalance of national capabilities between disadvantaged and advantaged nations; the aggressor will come from a small group of dissatisfied strong countries; and it is the weaker, rather than the stronger power that is most likely to be the aggressor.<ref>Organski 1980, 19</ref></blockquote>
Power transition theory interprets the international system as a hierarchical pyramid with the dominant power at the apex, then lesser [[Great power|great powers]], then other medium and small states and dependences.<ref name=":Ma&Kang" />{{Rp|page=22}}
While Organski's hierarchy initially referred only to the entire international system, Douglas Lemke later expanded the hierarchy model to include regional hierarchies, arguing that each region contains its own dominant, great, and small powers. Thus regional hierarchies exist embedded into the larger international hierarchy.<ref>Mold, Andrew. (2003). Regions of war and peace edited by Douglas Lemke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 235). Journal of International Development. 15. 805–806. {{doi|10.1002/jid.1014}}.</ref>
==Historical application==
[[Image:Storck, Four Days Battle.jpg|thumb|350px|''The Royal Prince and other vessels at the Four Days Fight, 11–14 June 1666'' by ''Abraham Storck'' depicts a battle of the [[Second Anglo-Dutch War]]. This period marked the beginning of a significant threat to Dutch hegemony in Europe]]Power transition theory often cites the [[Peloponnesian War]] between [[Athens]] and [[Sparta]] and [[Thucydides|Thucydides']] assertions that war was inevitable because of "the growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Sparta" and "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must."<ref name=":Ma&Kang" />{{Rp|page=21}}
▲The theory leads to the ''[[Long Cycle Theory|long cycle theory]]'' of war and seeks to explain trends between warring states in the past 500 years. The general trend is that a nation achieves [[hegemony|hegemonic power]] and then is challenged by a [[great power]]. This leads to a war which, in the past, has created a transition between the two powers. Eugene R. Wittkopf explores past wars and their relation to Power Transition theory in his book ''World Politics: Trend and Transformation''. He explains this using [[George Modelski]]'s Seapower Concentration Index.<ref name="Wittkopf"/>
Power transition theory uses European historical cases as its theoretical basis and for deriving its causal propositions.<ref name=":Ma&Kang" />{{Rp|page=31}}
At 1518, [[Portugal]] assumed a hegemonic position in world politics. However, as the [[Netherlands]] (which was experiencing the [[Dutch Golden Age]]) rose in power, a series of struggles led to the destruction of Portugal's power and a transition to Dutch hegemony. Dutch hegemony was brought into question again in 1688 with the Wars of Louis XIV, which resulted in what is referred to as the "Britain I Cycle", the [[Napoleonic Wars]] interrupted this cycle and questioned the hegemony Britain possessed. However, Britain's victory resulted in maintenance of power and the "Britain II Cycle".<ref name="Wittkopf"/> This cycle ended with the World Wars and Wittkopf shows the period of 1914–1945 as one of particular turbulence in which no power maintained hegemony, even after the [[Treaty of Versailles]].<ref name="Wittkopf"/> After the second World War, a drastic increase in seapower concentration by the [[United States]] was experienced and it – along with the [[Soviet Union]] – became the world's first [[superpower]]s.<ref name="Wittkopf"/>▼
▲
In general, hegemonic periods last approximately 60 to 90 years and conflicts which result in a period stabilization of power distribution last approximately 20 years.<ref name="Wittkopf"/> This can be explained through [[war-weariness]] and the tendency (although this was broken in the first half of the 20th century) for nations not to engage themselves in another conflict after being involved in a power transition.<ref name="Wittkopf"/>▼
A review by academics Xinru Ma and David C. Kang of articles first-tier journals found that the case most analyzed under power transition theory was the [[Germany–United Kingdom relations|Anglo-German]] rivalry of the 20th century.<ref name=":Ma&Kang" />{{Rp|page=25}} No articles within their review discussed an East Asian case from earlier than the late 19th century.<ref name=":Ma&Kang" />{{Rp|pages=27-28}}
Power transitions play an important role in applications of the [[bargaining model of war]] where wars are more likely to break out and be severe in situations of uncertainty and commitment problems. During power transitions, it is harder for actors to credibly commit to abide by any agreement, thus creating major commitment problems.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal|last=Powell|first=Robert|date=2006|title=War as a Commitment Problem|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818306060061|journal=International Organization|volume=60|issue=1|pages=|doi=10.1017/s0020818306060061|s2cid=15861342|issn=0020-8183|via=}}</ref><ref name=":3">{{Cite book|last=Weisiger|first=Alex|date=2013|title=Logics of War: Explanations for Limited and Unlimited Conflicts|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt1xx5pk|language=en|publisher=Cornell University Press|volume=|pages=|jstor=10.7591/j.ctt1xx5pk|isbn=9780801451867|via=}}</ref>▼
▲In general, hegemonic periods last approximately 60 to 90 years and conflicts which result in a period stabilization of power
▲Power transitions play an important role in applications of the [[bargaining model of war]] where wars are more likely to break out and be severe in situations of uncertainty and of commitment problems. During power transitions, it is harder for actors to credibly commit to abide by any agreement, thus creating major commitment problems.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal|last= Powell |first= Robert|date=2006|title=War as a Commitment Problem|url= http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818306060061 |journal=International Organization|volume= 60|issue= 1|pages= |doi= 10.1017/s0020818306060061|s2cid= 15861342|issn= 0020-8183|via= |url-access= subscription}}</ref><ref name=":3">{{Cite book|last= Weisiger|first= Alex|date= 2013|title= Logics of War: Explanations for Limited and Unlimited Conflicts|url= https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt1xx5pk |language= en|publisher=Cornell University Press|volume= |pages= |jstor= 10.7591/j.ctt1xx5pk|isbn= 9780801451867 |via= }}</ref>
International relations scholars [[Randall Schweller]] and Xiaoyu Pu find that the challenger not only seeks to increase its material power but also to promote its own ideological and normative frameworks as alternatives to those propagated by the hegemon.<ref>Schweller, R. L., & Pu, X. (2011). After unipolarity: China's visions of international order in an era of US decline. ''International security'', ''36''(1), 41-72.</ref>
[[Michael Beckley (political scientist) |Michael Beckley]], writing in 2023, states that conflict between [[great power]]s can happen even when a power transition does not appear to be likely. He argues that rising powers have historically <blockquote>"lashed out when they realized that they would not catch their rivals or achieve their grand ambitions—unless they took drastic action. These peaking power dynamics help explain some of the most consequential geopolitical events of the past 150 years, including the surge of [[U.S. imperialism]] in the late nineteenth century, the outbreak of World War II, and Russia's 2014 [[Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation| annexation of Crimea]] and [[Russo-Ukrainian War | intervention in eastern Ukraine]]."<ref>{{Cite journal |last= Beckley |first=Michael |date= 2023 |title=The Peril of Peaking Powers: Economic Slowdowns and Implications for China's Next Decade |url= https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00463 |journal= International Security|volume=48 |pages=7–46 |doi=10.1162/isec_a_00463 |s2cid=260736779 |doi-access=free }}</ref>
</blockquote>Publishing in 2024, Academics Xinru Ma and David C. Kang write that nearly all of the cases analyzed under power transition theory are post-1820s European cases.<ref name=":Ma&Kang">{{Cite book |last=Ma |first=Xinru |title=Beyond Power Transitions: The Lessons of East Asian History and the Future of U.S.-China Relations |last2=Kang |first2=David C. |date=2024 |publisher=[[Columbia University Press]] |isbn=978-0-231-55597-5 |series=Columbia Studies in International Order and Politics |___location=New York}}</ref>{{Rp|page=6}} They write that this approach creates a Eurocentric "blind spot" and overemphasizes the importance and generalizability of the European and Western historical experience.<ref name=":Ma&Kang" />{{Rp|page=6}} They contend that this "has led to an overexpectation that power transitions are a principal cause for war and that the theory is universally applicable across time and space."<ref name=":Ma&Kang" />{{Rp|page=9}}
Academics [[Richard Ned Lebow]] and [[Benjamin Valentino]] write, "Power transition theorists have been surprisingly reluctant to engage historical cases in an effort to show that wars between great powers have actually resulted from the motives described by their theories."<ref name=":Ma&Kang" />{{Rp|page=31}}
==See also==
* [[Thucydides trap]]
* [[Kindleberger Trap]]
{{International power}}▼
==References==
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==External links==
* [http://demonstrations.wolfram.com/HegemonicZonesOfInfluence/ Hegemonic Zones of Influence] by Michael Schreiber, [[The Wolfram Demonstrations Project]].
* [https://www.ciris.info/learningcenter/power-transition-theory/ Power Transition Theory] by CIRIS, [[CIRIS Learning Center]].
▲{{International power}}
{{DEFAULTSORT:Power Transition Theory}}
[[Category:1958 introductions]]
[[Category:International relations terminology]]
[[Category:International relations theory]]
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