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Line 1: {{Short description\|~~Trust~~Secure area of a main processor}} A '''trusted execution environment''' ('''TEE''') is a secure area of a [[Central processing unit\|main processor]]. It ~~guarantees~~helps the code and data loaded inside toit be protected with respect to [[Information security#Confidentiality\|confidentiality and integrity]],. Data ~~integrity —~~confidentiality prevents unauthorized entities from ~~altering data when any entity~~ outside the TEE ~~processes~~from reading data, ~~Code~~while code integrity ~~— the~~prevents code in the TEE ~~cannot~~from bebeing replaced or modified by unauthorized entities, which may also be the computer owner itself as in certain [[Digital_rights_management\|DRM]] schemes described in [[Software_Guard_Extensions\|Intel SGX]]. This is done by implementing unique, immutable, and confidential architectural security ~~such as Intel® Software Guard Extensions (Intel® SGX)~~, which offers hardware-based memory encryption that isolates specific application code and data in memory. ~~Intel® SGX~~This allows user-level code to allocate private regions of memory, called enclaves, which are designed to be protected from processes running at higher privilege levels.<ref>{{cite web \| url=https://blog.quarkslab.com/introduction-to-trusted-execution-environment-arms-trustzone.html \| title=Introduction to Trusted Execution Environment: ARM's TrustZone \| date=19 June 2018 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web\| url=https://globalplatform.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/131023-3-TLabs-livre_blanc.pdf ~~{{Bare~~\| ~~URL~~title=Security evaluation of Trusted execution environments: Why and how? ~~PDF~~\| access-date=~~June 2022~~2024-02-15}}</ref><ref name="oulpita.com">{{cite web \|url=https://poulpita.com/2014/02/18/trusted-execution-environment-do-you-have-yours/ \|title=Trusted Execution Environment, millions of users have one, do you have yours? \|website=Poulpita \|date=2014-02-18 \|access-date=2017-05-17 \|archive-date=2021-01-27 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210127231827/https://poulpita.com/2014/02/18/trusted-execution-environment-do-you-have-yours/ \|url-status=live }}</ref> A TEE as an isolated execution environment provides security features such as isolated execution, integrity of applications executing with the TEE, ~~along with~~and confidentiality of their assets.<ref>{{cite web\|url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PmtQtWpfW3w\|title=The benefits of Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)\|last=Ram Kumar Koppu\|date=26 October 2013\|publisher=[[YouTube]]\|access-date=31 July 2014\|archive-date=1 September 2020\|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200901094254/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PmtQtWpfW3w\|url-status=live}}</ref> In general terms, the TEE offers an execution space that provides a higher level of security for trusted applications running on the device than a rich operating system (OS) and more functionality than a 'secure element' (SE). ==History== The [[''Open Mobile Terminal Platform]]'' (OMTP) first defined TEE in their "Advanced Trusted Environment:OMTP TR1" standard, defining it as a "set of hardware and software components providing facilities necessary to support ~~Applications~~applications," which had to meet the requirements of one of two defined security levels. The first security level, Profile 1, was targeted against only software attacks ~~and~~, while Profile 2, was targeted against both software and hardware attacks.<ref>{{cite web \|url=http://www.gsma.com/newsroom/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/omtpadvancedtrustedenvironmentomtptr1v11.pdf \|title=Omtp Hardware Requirements And Defragmentation \|website=Gsma.org \|date= \|access-date=2017-05-17 \|archive-date=2018-12-14 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181214114609/https://www.gsma.com/newsroom/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/omtpadvancedtrustedenvironmentomtptr1v11.pdf \|url-status=live }}</ref> Commercial TEE solutions based on ARM [[TrustZone]] technology, conforming to the TR1 standard, were later launched, such as Trusted Foundations developed by Trusted Logic.<ref>{{Cite web\|url=http://www.trusted-logic.com/IMG/pdf/TRUSTED_LOGIC_TRUSTED_FOUNDATIONS_OMTP_FINAL.pdf\|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20140903041544/http://www.trusted-logic.com/IMG/pdf/TRUSTED_LOGIC_TRUSTED_FOUNDATIONS_OMTP_FINAL.pdf\|archive-date = 2014-09-03\|title = Gemalto's website has moved to Thales}}</ref> Work on the OMTP standards ended in mid -2010 when the group transitioned into the [[Wholesale Applications Community]] (WAC).<ref>{{cite web\|url=http://www.mobileeurope.co.uk/Press-Wire/omtp-announces-final-documents-prior-to-transition-into-wholesale-application-community\|title=OMTP announces final documents prior to transition into Wholesale Application Community\|website=Mobileeurope.co.uk\|access-date=2014-08-27\|archive-date=2018-12-14\|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181214115741/https://www.mobileeurope.co.uk/Press-Wire/omtp-announces-final-documents-prior-to-transition-into-wholesale-application-community\|url-status=dead}}</ref> The OMTP standards, including those defining a TEE, are hosted by [[GSMA]].<ref>{{cite web\|url=http://www.gsma.com/newsroom/gsmadocuments/omtp-documents/\|title=OMTP documents\|last=\|first=\|date=May 2012\|website=Gsma.com\|access-date=12 September 2014\|archive-date=19 February 2015\|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150219080703/http://www.gsma.com/newsroom/gsmadocuments/omtp-documents/\|url-status=live}}</ref> ==Details== The TEE typically consists of a hardware isolation mechanism, plus a secure operating system running on top of that isolation mechanism, ~~– however~~although the term has been used more generally to mean a protected solution.<ref>{{cite book \|last1=Sabt \|first1=M \|title=2015 IEEE Trustcom/BigDataSE/ISPA \|pages=57–64 \|last2=Achemlal \|first2=M \|last3=Bouabdallah \|first3=A \|chapter=Trusted Execution Environment: What It Isis, and What It Isis Not ~~\|website=IEEE~~ \|publisher=IEEE \|doi=10.1109/Trustcom.2015.357 \|year=2015 \|isbn=978-1-4673-7952-6 \|s2cid=206775888 \|url=https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01246364/file/trustcom_2015_tee_what_it_is_what_it_is_not.pdf \|access-date=2020-04-19 \|archive-date=2020-07-18 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200718094655/https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01246364/file/trustcom_2015_tee_what_it_is_what_it_is_not.pdf \|url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal \|last1=Pinto \|first1=S. \|last2=Santos \|first2=N. \|date=2019 \|title=Demystifying Arm TrustZone: A Comprehensive Survey \|url=https://doi.org/10.1145/3291047 \|journal=ACM Computing Surveys \|volume=51 \|pages=~~1-36~~1–36 \| doi=10.1145/3291047\|s2cid=59337370 \|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal \|last1=Lee \|first1=S \|last2=Lee \|first2=JH \|title=TEE based session key establishment protocol for secure infotainment systems \|journal=Design Automation for Embedded Systems \|volume=22 \|issue=3 \|pages=215–224 \|publisher=Springer \|doi=10.1007/s10617-018-9212-5 \|year=2018 \|s2cid=52081114 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book \|last1=Shepherd \|first1=C \|title=2016 IEEE Trustcom/BigDataSE/ISPA \|pages=168–177 \|last2=Arfaoui \|first2=G \|last3=Gurulian \|first3=I \|last4=Lee \|first4=R \|last5=Markantonakis \|first5=K \|last6=Akram \|first6=R \|last7=Sauveron \|first7=D \|last8=Conchon \|first8=E \|chapter=Secure and Trusted Execution: Past, Present, and Future -- A Critical Review in the Context of the Internet of Things and Cyber-Physical Systems ~~\|website=IEEE~~ \|publisher=IEEE \|doi=10.1109/TrustCom.2016.0060 \|year=2016 \|isbn=978-1-5090-3205-1 \|s2cid=8717045 \|url=https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/77298166.pdf \|access-date=2021-05-14 \|archive-date=2021-05-14 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210514194356/https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/77298166.pdf \|url-status=live }}</ref> Whilst a GlobalPlatform TEE requires hardware isolation, others, such as EMVCo, use the term TEE to refer to both hardware~~/software~~ and ~~only~~ software-based solutions.<ref>{{cite web \|title=Software-Based Mobile Payment Evaluation Process \|url=https://www.emvco.com/processes-forms/product-approval/mobile/sbmp \|publisher=EMVCo \|access-date=2021-10-13 \|archive-date=2021-03-02 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210302083210/https://www.emvco.com/processes-forms/product-approval/mobile/sbmp/ \|url-status=live }}</ref> FIDO uses the concept of TEE in the restricted operating environment for TEEs based on hardware isolation.<ref>{{cite web \|title=FIDO Authenticator Allowed Restricted Operating Environments List \|url=https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-security-requirements-v1.0-fd-20170524/fido-authenticator-allowed-restricted-operating-environments-list_20170524.html \|publisher=FIDO Alliance \|access-date=2021-10-13 \|archive-date=2021-07-13 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210713153906/https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-security-requirements-v1.0-fd-20170524/fido-authenticator-allowed-restricted-operating-environments-list_20170524.html \|url-status=live }}</ref> Only trusted applications running in a TEE have access to the full power of a device's main processor, peripherals, and memory, while hardware isolation protects these from user -installed apps running in a main operating system. Software and ~~cryptographic isolation~~cryptography inside the TEE ~~protect~~protects the trusted applications contained within from each other.<ref>{{cite web\|url=https://www.trustonic.com/products-services/trusted-execution-environment\|title=Solutions - Trustonic- Securing Smart Devices & Mobile Applications\|website=Trustonic.com\|access-date=2014-07-31\|archive-date=2014-08-10\|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140810221846/https://www.trustonic.com/products-services/trusted-execution-environment\|url-status=live}}</ref> Service providers, [[mobile network operator]]s (MNO), operating system developers, [[Mobile Application Development\|application developers]], device manufacturers, platform providers, and silicon vendors are the main stakeholders contributing to the standardization efforts around the TEE.▼ To prevent the simulation of hardware with user-controlled software, a so-called "hardware root of trust" is used. This is a [[Trusted_computing#Endorsement_key\|set of private keys that are embedded directly into the chip during manufacturing]]; one-time programmable memory such as [[eFuse]]s is usually used on mobile devices. These cannot be changed, even after the device resets, and whose public counterparts reside in a manufacturer database, together with a non-secret hash of a public key belonging to the trusted party (usually a chip vendor) which is used to sign trusted firmware alongside the circuits doing cryptographic operations and controlling access. ▲Service providers, [[mobile network operator]]s (MNO), operating system developers, [[Mobile Application Development\|application developers]], device manufacturers, platform providers and silicon vendors are the main stakeholders contributing to the standardization efforts around the TEE. To prevent simulation of hardware with user-controlled software, a so-called "hardware root of trust" is used. This is a set of private keys that are embedded directly into the chip during manufacturing; one-time programmable memory such as [[eFuse]]s are usually used on mobile devices. These cannot be changed, even after device resets, and whose public counterparts reside in a manufacturer database, together with a non-secret hash of a public key belonging to the trusted party (usually a chip vendor) which is used to sign trusted firmware alongside the circuits doing cryptographic operations and controlling access. The hardware is designed in a way ~~which~~that prevents all software not signed by the trusted party's key from accessing the privileged features. The public key of the vendor is provided at runtime and hashed; this hash is then compared to the one embedded in the chip. If the hash matches, the public key is used to verify a [[digital signature]] of trusted vendor-controlled firmware (such as a [[Booting process of Android devices\|chain of bootloaders on Android devices]] or 'architectural enclaves' in SGX). The trusted firmware is then used to implement remote attestation.<ref>{{Cite web\|url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/342833256\|title=Towards Formalization of Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID)-based Remote Attestation in Intel SGX}}</ref> When an application is attested, its untrusted ~~component~~components loads its trusted component into memory; the trusted application is protected from modification by untrusted components with hardware. A [[Cryptographic nonce\|nonce]] is requested by the untrusted party from the verifier's server, and is used as a part of a cryptographic authentication protocol, proving integrity of the trusted application. The proof is passed to the verifier, which verifies it. A valid proof cannot be computed in a simulated hardware (i.e. [[QEMU]]) because in order to construct it, access to the keys baked into hardware is required; only trusted firmware has access to these keys and/or the keys derived from them or obtained using them. Because only the platform owner is meant to have access to the data recorded in the foundry, the verifying party must interact with the service set up by the vendor. If the scheme is implemented improperly, the chip vendor can track which applications are used on which chip and selectively deny service by returning a message indicating that authentication has not passed.<ref>{{cite web \| url=https://optee.readthedocs.io/en/latest/building/devices/qemu.html \| title=QEMU v7 — OP-TEE documentation documentation \| access-date=2022-06-02 \| archive-date=2022-06-25 \| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220625012352/https://optee.readthedocs.io/en/latest/building/devices/qemu.html \| url-status=live }}</ref> To simulate hardware in a way ~~which~~that enables it to ~~illicitly~~ pass remote authentication, an attacker would have to extract keys from the hardware, which is costly because of the equipment and technical skill required to execute it. For example, using [[Focused ion beam\|focused ion beams]], [[scanning electron microscopes]], [[microprobing]], and chip [[decapping\|decapsulation]]<ref>{{Cite web\|url=https://hackaday.com/2014/04/01/editing-circuits-with-focused-ion-beams/\|title=Editing Circuits with Focused Ion Beams\|date=April 2014\|access-date=2020-11-14\|archive-date=2020-11-28\|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201128163919/https://hackaday.com/2014/04/01/editing-circuits-with-focused-ion-beams/\|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web \|url=https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Thomas-Advanced-IC-Reverse-Engineering-Techniques-In-Depth-Analysis-Of-A-Modern-Smart-Card.pdf \|title=~~Archived~~Advanced IC reverse engineering techniques: in depth analysis of a modern smart ~~copy~~card \|access-date=2020-11-14 \|archive-date=2020-11-14 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201114133949/https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Thomas-Advanced-IC-Reverse-Engineering-Techniques-In-Depth-Analysis-Of-A-Modern-Smart-Card.pdf \|url-status=live }}</ref><ref>Finding the AES Bits in the Haystack: Reverse Engineering and SCA Using Voltage Contrast by Christian Kison, Jürgen Frinken, and Christof Paar - https://www.iacr.org/archive/ches2015/92930620/92930620.pdf {{Webarchive\|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201116132154/https://www.iacr.org/archive/ches2015/92930620/92930620.pdf \|date=2020-11-16 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news \|last1=Cassy \|first1=John \|last2=Murphy \|first2=Paul \|date=2002-03-13 \|title=How codebreakers cracked the secrets of the smart card \|language=en-GB \|work=The Guardian \|url=https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2002/mar/13/media.citynews ~~{{Webarchive~~\|access-date=2023-08-09 \|issn=0261-3077 \|archive-date=2021-04-07 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210407025459/https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2002/mar/13/media.citynews \|~~date~~url-status=~~2021-04-07~~live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web \|url=https://spectrum.ieee.org~~/nanoclast/semiconductors/design~~/xray-tech-lays-chip-secrets-bare \|title=X-Ray Tech Lays Chip Secrets Bare - IEEE Spectrum<!-- Bot generated title --> \|date=7 October 2019 \|access-date=2020-11-14 \|archive-date=2020-12-08 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201208180315/https://spectrum.ieee.org/nanoclast/semiconductors/design/xray-tech-lays-chip-secrets-bare \|url-status=live }}</ref><ref>Design Principles for Tamper-Resistant Smartcard Processors by Oliver Kömmerling Advanced Digital Security and Markus G. Kuhn University of Cambridge https://www.usenix.org/legacy/events/smartcard99/full_papers/kommerling/kommerling.pdf {{Webarchive\|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210121185937/https://www.usenix.org/legacy/events/smartcard99/full_papers/kommerling/kommerling.pdf \|date=2021-01-21 }}</ref> is difficult, or even impossible, if the hardware is designed in such a way that reverse-engineering destroys the keys. In most cases, the keys are unique for each piece of hardware, so that a key extracted from one chip cannot be used by others (for example [[Physical unclonable function\|physically unclonable functions]]<ref>{{Cite web\|url=https://semiengineering.com/knowledge_centers/semiconductor-security/physically-unclonable-functions/\|title=Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs)\|website=Semiconductor Engineering\|access-date=2020-11-15\|archive-date=2020-11-16\|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201116222448/https://semiengineering.com/knowledge_centers/semiconductor-security/physically-unclonable-functions/\|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>Areno, Matthew & Plusquellic, J.. (2012). Securing Trusted Execution Environments with PUF Generated Secret Keys. 1188-1193. 10.1109/TrustCom.2012.255.</ref>). Though deprivation of ownership is not an inherent property of TEEs (it is possible to design the system in a way that allows only the user who has obtained ownership of the device first to control the system by burning a hash of their own key into e-fuses), in practice all such systems in consumer electronics are intentionally designed so as to allow chip manufacturers to control access to attestation and its algorithms. It allows manufacturers to grant access to TEEs only to software developers who have a (usually commercial) business agreement with the manufacturer, ~~and~~[[monetization\|monetizing]] the user base of the hardware, to enable such use cases as [[tivoization]] and DRM and to allow certain hardware features to be used only with vendor-supplied software, forcing users to use it despite its [[antifeature]]s, like [[Advertising\|ads]], tracking and use case restriction for [[market segmentation]]. ==Uses== Line 29 ⟶ 33: ===Premium Content Protection/Digital Rights Management=== Note: Much TEE literature covers this topic under the definition "premium content protection," which is the preferred nomenclature of many copyright holders. Premium content protection is a specific use case of ~~Digital~~[[digital ~~Rights~~rights ~~Management~~management]] (DRM), and is controversial among some communities, such as the [[Free Software Foundation]].<ref>{{Cite web \| title = Digital Restrictions Management and Treacherous Computing Free Software Foundation working together for free software \| access-date = 2019-08-20 \| url = https://www.fsf.org/campaigns/drm.html \| archive-date = 2018-07-05 \| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20180705233004/https://www.fsf.org/campaigns/drm.html \| url-status = live }}</ref> It is widely used by ~~copyrights~~copyright holders to restrict the ways in which end users can consume content such as 4K high -definition films. The TEE is a suitable environment for protecting digitally encoded information (for example, HD films or audio) on connected devices such as ~~smart phones~~smartphones, tablets, and HD televisions. This suitability comes from the ability of the TEE to deprive the owner of the device ~~from~~of ~~reading~~access stored secrets, and the fact that there is often a protected hardware path between the TEE and the display and/or subsystems on devices. The TEE is used to protect the content once it is on the device:. ~~while~~While the content is protected during transmission or streaming by the use of encryption, the TEE protects the content once it has been decrypted on the device by ensuring that decrypted content is not exposed to the environment not approved by the app developer ORor platform vendor. ===Mobile financial services=== Mobile ~~Commerce~~commerce applications such as: mobile wallets, peer-to-peer payments, contactless payments or using a mobile device as a point of sale (POS) terminal often have well-defined security requirements. TEEs can be used, often in conjunction with [[~~Near~~near-~~field communication\|near~~ field communication]] (NFC), SEs, and trusted backend systems to provide the security required to enable financial transactions to take place In some scenarios, interaction with the end user is required, and this may require the user to expose sensitive information such as a PIN, password, or biometric identifier to the [[mobile operating system\|mobile OS]] as a means of authenticating the user. The TEE optionally offers a trusted user interface which can be used to construct user authentication on a mobile device. With the rise of cryptocurrency, TEEs are increasingly used to implement crypto-wallets, as they offer the ability to store tokens more securely than regular operating systems, and can provide the necessary computation and authentication applications.<ref>{{cite web \|title=Ethereum Wallet in a Trusted Execution Environment / Secure Enclave \|date=7 June 2018 \|url=https://medium.com/weeves-world/ethereum-wallet-in-a-trusted-execution-environment-secure-enclave-b200b4df9f5f \|publisher=Medium \|access-date=2021-10-13 \|archive-date=2021-07-15 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210715233259/https://medium.com/weeves-world/ethereum-wallet-in-a-trusted-execution-environment-secure-enclave-b200b4df9f5f \|url-status=live }}</ref> ===Authentication=== The TEE is well-suited for supporting biometric IDidentification methods (facial recognition, fingerprint sensor, and voice authorization), which may be easier to use and harder to steal than PINs and passwords. The authentication process is generally split into three main stages: * Storing a reference "template" identifier on the device for comparison with the "image" extracted in the next stage. * Extracting an "image" (scanning the fingerprint or capturing a voice sample~~, for example~~). * Using a matching engine to compare the "image" and the "template". Line 52 ⟶ 56: ===Enterprise, government, and cloud=== The TEE can be used by governments, enterprises, and cloud service providers to enable the secure handling of confidential information on mobile devices and on server infrastructure. The TEE offers a level of protection against software attacks generated in the [[mobile operating system\|mobile OS]] and assists in the control of access rights. It achieves this by housing sensitive, ‘trusted’ applications that need to be isolated and protected from the mobile OS and any malicious malware that may be present. Through utilizing the functionality and security levels offered by the TEE, governments, and enterprises can be assured that employees using their own devices are doing so in a secure and trusted manner. Likewise, server-based TEEs help defend against internal and external attacks against backend infrastructure. ===Secure modular programming=== With the rise of software assets and reuses, [[modular programming]] is the most productive process to design software architecture, by decoupling the functionalities into small independent modules. As each module contains everything necessary to execute its desired functionality, the TEE allows tothe ~~organize~~organization of the complete system featuring a high level of reliability and security, while preventing each module from vulnerabilities of the others. In order for the modules to communicate and share data, TEE ~~provide~~provides means to securely have payloads sent/received between the modules, using mechanisms such as ~~objects~~object serialization, in conjunction with proxies. See [[Component-based software engineering]] == TEE ~~Operating~~operating ~~Systems~~systems == {\| class="wikitable" \|- Line 74 ⟶ 78: \| Cloud Link TEE \| \| [[GlobalPlatform\|GlobalPlatform]] \| Full \| <ref>{{cite web \|title=Alibaba Cloud Link Tee V1.1.3 \|url=https://globalplatform.org/certified-products/alibaba-cloud-link-tee-pro-edition-v113/ \|publisher=GlobalPlatform \|access-date=2021-10-13 \|archive-date=2021-10-26 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211026232042/https://globalplatform.org/certified-products/alibaba-cloud-link-tee-pro-edition-v113/ \|url-status=live }}</ref> \|- \| [[Apple Inc.\|Apple]] \| ~~iOS~~ Secure Enclave \| Separate processor \| Proprietary Line 87 ⟶ 91: \| BeanPod \| \| ~~Arm~~ARM TrustZone \| GlobalPlatform \| Line 94 ⟶ 98: \| [[Huawei]] \| iTrustee \| ~~Arm~~ARM TrustZone \| GlobalPlatform \| Full Line 108 ⟶ 112: \| [[Linaro]] \| OPTEE \| ~~Arm~~ARM TrustZone \| GlobalPlatform \| \| <ref>{{cite web \|title=Security, Trustzone and OP-TEE \|url=https://www.linaro.org/services/security/ \|publisher=[[Linaro]] \|access-date=2021-10-13 \|archive-date=2021-02-27 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210227094924/https://www.linaro.org/services/security/ \|url-status=live }}</ref> \|- \| ProvenRun \| ProvenCore \| ARM TrustZone \| \| ** Penglai Scalable TEE for RISC-V\| <ref>{{cite web \|~~url~~title=ProvenCore \|url=https://~~penglai-enclave~~provenrun.~~systems~~com/provencore/ \|~~title~~publisher= ~~Penglai Enclave \|website= penglai-enclave.systems/~~ProvenRun \|access-date= ~~2021~~2024-06-1023 \|archive-date= ~~2021~~2024-0502-0626 \|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/~~20210506151417~~20240226182841/https://~~penglai-enclave~~provenrun.~~systems~~com/provencore/ \|url-status= live }}</ref>▼ \|- \| [[Qualcomm]] Line 121 ⟶ 132: \|- \| [[Samsung]] \| TEEgris and [[Samsung Knox\|Knox]] \| ~~Arm~~ARM TrustZone \| GlobalPlatform \| Full Line 132 ⟶ 143: \| GlobalPlatform \| \| <ref>{{cite web \|title=Enhance Device Security With T6 \|url=https://www.trustkernel.com/en/products/tee/t6.html \|publisher=TrustKernel \|access-date=2021-10-13 \|archive-date=2021-10-29 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211029203221/https://www.trustkernel.com/en/products/tee/t6.html \|url-status=live }}</ref> \|- \| Trustonic \| Kinibi \| ~~Arm~~ARM TrustZone \| GlobalPlatform \| Full \| <ref name=kinibi>{{cite web \|title=Certificate of Security Evaluation - Kinibi 410A \|url=https://globalplatform.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/GP-TEE-2019_03-CR-1.0_GP190005-Certificate-and-Certification-Report_20191203.pdf \|publisher=GlobalPlatform \|access-date=2021-10-13 \|archive-date=2021-10-26 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211026232004/https://globalplatform.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/GP-TEE-2019_03-CR-1.0_GP190005-Certificate-and-Certification-Report_20191203.pdf \|url-status=live }}</ref> \|- \| Trustonic Line 147 ⟶ 158: \| \| <ref name=kinibi /> \|- \| uberSpark \| uberXMHF \| ARM TrustZone / Intel \| \| Formal Mechanized Proof \| <ref>{{cite web \| title=uberXMHF \|url=https://www.uberxmhf.org}}</ref> \|- \| Watchdata \| WatchTrust \| ~~Arm~~ARM TrustZone \| GlobalPlatform \| Full \| <ref>{{cite web \|title=WatchTrust 2.1.1 on SC9860 \|url=https://globalplatform.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/GP-TEE-2018_01-CR-1.0_GP170003-Certificate-Certification-Report_20180904-signed-1.pdf \|publisher=GlobalPlatform \|access-date=2021-10-13 \|archive-date=2021-10-26 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211026232006/https://globalplatform.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/GP-TEE-2018_01-CR-1.0_GP170003-Certificate-Certification-Report_20180904-signed-1.pdf \|url-status=live }}</ref> \|} Line 160 ⟶ 179: * [[AMD]]: [[AMD Platform Security Processor\|Platform Security Processor]] (PSP)<ref name="amd.com">{{cite web\|url=https://www.amd.com/en-us/innovations/software-technologies/security\|title=AMD Secure Processor (Built-in technology)\|website=Amd.com\|access-date=2017-09-17\|archive-date=2017-09-19\|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170919154841/http://www.amd.com/en-us/innovations/software-technologies/security\|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web \|url=https://classic.regonline.com/custImages/360000/369552/TCC%20PPTs/TCC2013_VanDoorn.pdf \|title=Secure Hardware and the Creation of an Open Trusted Ecosystem \|website=Classic.regonline.com \|access-date=2017-05-17 \|archive-date=2017-01-15 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170115011459/https://classic.regonline.com/custImages/360000/369552/TCC%20PPTs/TCC2013_VanDoorn.pdf \|url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web \|last=Chiappetta \|first=Marco \|url=http://hothardware.com/Reviews/AMD-Beema-and-Mullins-Mainstream-and-LowPower-2014-APUs-Tested/?page=2#!bFIw4K \|title=AMD Beema and Mullins Low Power 2014 APUs Tested - Page 2 \|publisher=HotHardware \|date=2014-04-29 \|access-date=2017-05-17 \|archive-date=2017-04-07 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170407031130/http://hothardware.com/reviews/amd-beema-and-mullins-mainstream-and-lowpower-2014-apus-tested?page=2#!bFIw4K \|url-status=dead }}</ref> AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV)<ref name="OpenVirtualization">{{cite web~~\|first=David~~\|date=April 21, 2016\|title=AMD MEMORY ENCRYPTION\|url=https://developer.amd.com/wordpress/media/2013/12/AMD_Memory_Encryption_Whitepaper_v7-Public.pdf\|~~url~~access-~~status~~date=~~live~~\|~~archive-url~~website=developer.amd.com\|archive-date=October 20, 2020\|~~access~~archive-~~date=\|website~~url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201020150243/http://developer.amd.com/wordpress/media/2013/12/AMD_Memory_Encryption_Whitepaper_v7-Public.pdf\|url-status=live}}</ref> and the Secure Nested Paging extension<ref>{{Cite web\|last=\|first=\|date=January 2020\|title=AMD SEV-SNP: Strengthening VM Isolation with Integrity Protection and More\|url=https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/SEV-SNP-strengthening-vm-isolation-with-integrity-protection-and-more.pdf\|url-status=live\|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201105002318/https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/SEV-SNP-strengthening-vm-isolation-with-integrity-protection-and-more.pdf\|archive-date=2020-11-05\|access-date=\|website=}}</ref> * [[ARM architecture\|ARM]]: [[TrustZone]]<ref>{{cite web\|url=https://community.arm.com/cfs-file/__key/telligent-evolution-components-attachments/01-2142-00-00-00-00-51-36/GlobalPlatform-based-Trusted-Execution-Environment-and-TrustZone-R.pdf\|title=GlobalPlatform based Trusted Execution Environment and TrustZone Ready\|website=Arm.com\|access-date=2020-04-24\|archive-date=2020-07-04\|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200704081700/https://community.arm.com/cfs-file/__key/telligent-evolution-components-attachments/01-2142-00-00-00-00-51-36/GlobalPlatform-based-Trusted-Execution-Environment-and-TrustZone-R.pdf\|url-status=live}}</ref> Realm Management Extension / Confidential Compute Architecture (CCA) * [[IBM]]: [[IBM Secure Service Container]],<ref>{{cite web\|url=https://www.ibm.com/us-en/marketplace/secure-service-container\|title=IBM Secure Service Container\|website=ibm.com\|access-date=2019-07-12\|archive-date=2019-07-12\|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190712013401/https://www.ibm.com/us-en/marketplace/secure-service-container\|url-status=live}}</ref> formerly zACI, first introduced in IBM z13 generation machines (including all LinuxONE machines) in driver level 27.<ref>{{cite web\|url=https://www-01.ibm.com/common/ssi/ShowDoc.wss?docURL=/common/ssi/rep_sm/1/877/ENUS2965-_h01/index.html&lang=en&request_locale=en\|title=Family 2965+01 IBM z13s Models N10 and N20\|website=ibm.com\|date=22 May 2018 \|access-date=2021-10-27\|archive-date=2021-01-26\|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210126093415/https://www-01.ibm.com/common/ssi/ShowDoc.wss?docURL=%2Fcommon%2Fssi%2Frep_sm%2F1%2F877%2FENUS2965-_h01%2Findex.html&lang=en&request_locale=en\|url-status=live}}</ref> [[IBM Secure Execution]],<ref>{{cite web\|url=https://developer.ibm.com/blogs/technical-overview-of-secure-execution-for-linux-on-ibm-z/\|title=Technical overview of Secure Execution for Linux on IBM Z\|website=ibm.com\|access-date=2020-04-15\|archive-date=2020-04-15\|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200415005646/https://developer.ibm.com/blogs/technical-overview-of-secure-execution-for-linux-on-ibm-z/\|url-status=live}}</ref> introduced in IBM z15 and LinuxONE III generation machines on April 14, 2020. * [[Intel]]: [[~~Trusted~~Intel ~~Execution~~Management ~~Technology~~Engine]] * [[Trusted Execution Technology]] (TXT) [[Software Guard Extensions\|SGX Software Guard Extensions]]<ref>{{cite web \|url=http://www.cs.helsinki.fi/group/secures/CCS-tutorial/tutorial-slides.pdf \|title=The Trusted Execution Environments on Mobile Devices \|website=Cs.helsinki.fi \|access-date=2017-05-17 \|archive-date=2016-04-18 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160418104838/https://www.cs.helsinki.fi/group/secures/CCS-tutorial/tutorial-slides.pdf \|url-status=live }}</ref> * [[Software Guard Extensions]] (SGX)<ref>{{cite web \|url=http://www.cs.helsinki.fi/group/secures/CCS-tutorial/tutorial-slides.pdf \|title=The Trusted Execution Environments on Mobile Devices \|website=Cs.helsinki.fi \|access-date=2017-05-17 \|archive-date=2016-04-18 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160418104838/https://www.cs.helsinki.fi/group/secures/CCS-tutorial/tutorial-slides.pdf \|url-status=live }}</ref> *** "Silent Lake" (available on Atom processors)<ref>{{cite web\|url=http://wenku.baidu.com/view/cb01a885c8d376eeaeaa31a9.html\|title=WW46_2014_MCG_Tablet_Roadmap_图文_百度文库\|website=Wenku.baidu.com\|access-date=2017-01-04\|archive-date=2017-02-27\|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170227010510/http://wenku.baidu.com/view/cb01a885c8d376eeaeaa31a9.html\|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web\|url=https://github.com/CyanogenMod/android_device_asus_mofd-common/blob/b52bb27be47485df8646340b43a97f2dda974385/sepolicy/file.te\|title=CyanogenMod/android_device_asus_mofd-common\|website=GitHub\|access-date=2017-01-04\|archive-date=2017-03-24\|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170324095520/https://github.com/CyanogenMod/android_device_asus_mofd-common/blob/b52bb27be47485df8646340b43a97f2dda974385/sepolicy/file.te\|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web\|url=https://github.com/heidiao/sfp_m2_bt/blob/master/source/device/intel/cherrytrail/cht_cr_rvp/init.rc\|title=heidiao/sfp_m2_bt\|website=GitHub\|access-date=2017-01-04\|archive-date=2017-03-24\|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170324095926/https://github.com/heidiao/sfp_m2_bt/blob/master/source/device/intel/cherrytrail/cht_cr_rvp/init.rc\|url-status=live}}</ref> * [[RISC-V]]: Keystone Customizable TEE Framework<ref>{{cite web \|url= https://keystone-enclave.org/2019/07/22/Keystone-Paper.html \|title= Keystone Paper and Customizable TEEs \|website= keystone-enclave.org \|date= 22 July 2019 \|access-date= 2021-06-10 \|archive-date= 2020-07-14 \|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20200714212312/https://keystone-enclave.org/2019/07/22/Keystone-Paper.html \|url-status= live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web\|url=https://www.shwetashinde.org/publications/keystone_eurosys20.pdf\|title=Keystone: An Open Framework for Architecting Trusted Execution Environments\|date=April 2020\|access-date=16 June 2025\|archive-date=31 January 2025\|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250131021253/https://www.shwetashinde.org/publications/keystone_eurosys20.pdf\|url-status=live}}</ref>▼ MultiZone™ Security Trusted Execution Environment<ref>{{cite web \|url= https://hex-five.com/press/hex-five-adds-multizone-security-to-sifive-software-ecosystem \|title= Hex Five Security Adds MultiZone™ Trusted Execution Environment to the SiFive Software Ecosystem \|website= hex-five.com \|access-date= 2018-09-13 \|archive-date= 2018-09-13 \|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20180913223422/https://hex-five.com/press/hex-five-adds-multizone-security-to-sifive-software-ecosystem/ \|url-status= live }}</ref> ▲ Keystone Customizable TEE Framework<ref>{{cite web \|url= https://keystone-enclave.org/2019/07/22/Keystone-Paper.html \|title= Keystone Paper and Customizable TEEs \|website= keystone-enclave.org \|access-date= 2021-06-10 \|archive-date= 2020-07-14 \|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20200714212312/https://keystone-enclave.org/2019/07/22/Keystone-Paper.html \|url-status= live }}</ref> ▲ Penglai Scalable TEE for RISC-V <ref>{{cite web \|url= https://penglai-enclave.systems \|title= Penglai Enclave \|website= penglai-enclave.systems/ \|access-date= 2021-06-10 \|archive-date= 2021-05-06 \|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20210506151417/https://penglai-enclave.systems/ \|url-status= live }}</ref> ==See also==