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{{Short description|Part of the Vietnam War (1969)}}
{{history-wikify}}
{{For|the 1987 film set during the battle|Hamburger Hill}}
The '''Battle of Hamburger Hill''' was one of the fiercest battles of the [[Vietnam War]].
{{more footnotes|date=May 2016}}
{{Infobox military conflict
| conflict = Battle of Hamburger Hill
| partof = the [[Vietnam War]]
| image = Soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division climb Hamburger Hill after the battle in May 1969.jpg
| caption = US Army photographers climb Hill 937 at Dong Ap Bia after the battle, May 1969
| date = 13–20 May 1969<br />({{Age in years, months, weeks and days|month1=05|day1=13|year1=1969|month2=05|day2=20|year2=1969}})
| coordinates = {{coord|16|15|11|N|107|10|29|E|type:mountain|name=Ap Bia A Shau Valley, South Vietnam|display=it}}
| casus =
| place = [[A Sầu Valley]], [[South Vietnam]]
| map_type = Vietnam
| map_relief = 1
| territory =
| result = Inconclusive
| combatant1 = {{flag|United States}}<br>{{flag|South Vietnam}}
| combatant2 = {{flagicon|North Vietnam}} [[North Vietnam]]
| commander1 = {{flagicon|United States}} MG [[Melvin Zais]]<br>Lt. Col. Weldon Honeycutt, Maj. John Collier
| commander2 = {{flagicon|North Vietnam}} Ma Vĩnh Lan
| units1 = {{flagicon|United States}} [[101st Airborne Division#Vietnam War|3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)]]<br>{{flagicon|South Vietnam}} [[1st Division (South Vietnam)|3rd Regiment, 1st Infantry Division]]
| units2 = 29th Regiment
*7th Battalion
*8th Battalion
| strength1 = ~1,800 infantry<br>Artillery and air-strike support
| strength2 = 2 battalions, ~800 infantry
| casualties1 = {{flagicon|United States}} 56 killed<br/>367 wounded<br>7 missing<ref name=AAR>{{cite web|url=https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/images/1683/168300010494.pdf|title=Battle of Dong Ap Bia - Hill 937 10-21 May 1969|publisher=Headquarters 101st Airborne Division|date=24 May 1969|access-date=26 May 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190515114632/https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/images/1683/168300010494.pdf|archive-date=15 May 2019|url-status=dead}}{{PD-notice}}</ref><br>{{flagicon|South Vietnam}} 31 killed{{Citation needed|date=August 2023}}
'''PAVN Claim:''' 1,500 killed and wounded<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.tienphong.vn/content/Nzc4ODM4.tpo|title=Người phụ nữ chỉ huy trận đánh trên 'Đồi thịt băm'|date=4 May 2015|website=Báo điện tử Tiền Phong}}</ref>
| casualties2 = '''US Claim:''' 630 killed ([[body count#Vietnam War|body count]])<br>3 captured<br>89 individual and 22 crew-served weapons recovered<ref name=AAR/><ref name=west>{{cite web|url=http://www.weststpaulantiques.com/hamburgerhill.html|title=Battles of the Vietnam War}}</ref>
| campaignbox = {{Campaignbox Vietnam War}}
}}
 
The '''Battle of Hamburger Hill''' (13–20 May 1969) was fought by [[US Army]] and [[Army of the Republic of Vietnam]] (ARVN) forces against [[People's Army of Vietnam]] (PAVN) forces during [[Operation Apache Snow]] of the [[Vietnam War]]. Though the heavily fortified [[Hill 937]], a ridge of the mountain [[Dong Ap Bia]] in central [[Vietnam]] near its western border with [[Laos]], had little strategic value, US command ordered its capture by a frontal assault, only to abandon it soon thereafter. The action caused a controversy among both the US armed services and the public back home, and marked a turning point in the U.S. involvement.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web |date=2023-10-03 |title=Why the Battle for Hamburger Hill Was So Controversial |url=https://www.history.com/news/hamburger-hill-controversy |access-date=2024-05-30 |website=HISTORY |language=en}}</ref>
The battle took place on [[Dong Ap Bia]] ([[Ap Bia Mountain]]) in the rugged, [[jungle]]-shrouded [[mountain]]s along the Laotian border of [[South Vietnam]]. Rising from the floor of the western [[A Shau Valley]], [[Ap Bia Mountain]] is a looming, solitary [[massif]], unconnected to the ridges of the surrounding Annamite range. It dominates the northern valley, towering some 937 [[meters]] above [[sea level]]. Snaking down from its highest peak are a series of ridges and fingers, one of the largest extending southeast to a height of 900 meters, another reaching south to a 916-meter peak. The entire mountain is a rugged, uninviting wilderness blanketed in double- and triple-canopy jungle, dense thickets of [[bamboo]], and waist-high [[elephant grass]]. Local [[Montagnard]] tribesmen called Ap Bia "the mountain of the crouching beast."1 Lieutenant Colonel [[Weldon Honeycutt]], commander of the 3d Battalion, 187th Infantry (the "Rakkasans"), called it "Hill 937." The soldiers who fought there dubbed it "Hamburger Hill!"2
 
The battle was primarily an infantry engagement, with the US troops moving up the steeply sloped hill against well-entrenched troops. Attacks were repeatedly repelled by the PAVN defenses. Bad weather also hindered operations. Nevertheless, the Airborne troops took the hill through direct assault with heavy use of artillery and airstrikes, causing extensive casualties to the PAVN forces.
The fight on Hamburger Hill occurred during [[Operation Apache Snow]], the second part of a three-phased campaign intended to destroy [[People's Army of Vietnam|NVA]] bases in the treacherous A Shau Valley.3 This campaign was the latest in a long series of attempts to neutralize the [[A Shau]], which proved a persistent thorn in the side of the previous Military Assistance Command, Vietnam ([[MACV]]) commander, General [[William C. Westmoreland]]. Each effort met with results ranging in degree from ineffectual to disastrous. Lieutenant General [[Richard Stilwell]], commander of XXIV Corps, resolved to succeed with his [[military|operation]], however, and amassed almost two divisions of [[infantry]] and a daunting array of [[air power]] to ensure victory.4
 
==Background==
Leading the attack were five infantry [[battalion]]s under Major General [[Melvin Zais]], commander of the legendary 101st Airborne (Airmobile) Division. Three units were American (the 1/506th, 2/501st, and 3/187th Infantry), and two came from the 1st Army of the Republic of Vietnam ([[ARVN]]) Division (the 2/1st and 4/1st ARVN).5 Colonel [[Joseph Conmy]], commander of the 3d Brigade of the 101st Airborne, controlled the main effort. He characterized the operation as a [[reconnaissance in force]] (YUF). His plan called for each of the five battalions to "combat assault" into the valley by helicopter on [[10 May]] [[1969]] and to comb its assigned sector for enemy troops and supplies. If a battalion made heavy contact with the NVA, Conmy would reinforce it with one of the other units. In theory, the Americans, utilizing [[helicopters]], could reposition their forces quickly enough to keep the enemy from massing on any one unit. Conversely, an American force discovering an NVA unit would fix it while the reinforcing battalion flew in to cut off the enemy's retreat and destroy him. Unfortunately, practice does not always realize theory.
===Etymology===
Local [[Degar]] tribesmen call the mountain ''Ap Bia'', "the mountain of the crouching beast." Official histories of the engagement refer to it as Hill 937 after the elevation displayed on US Army maps, but the US soldiers who fought there dubbed it "Hamburger Hill," suggesting that those who fought on the hill were "ground up like hamburger meat." "Have you ever been inside a hamburger machine? We just got cut to pieces by extremely accurate machine gun fire," recalled a sergeant.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2017-05-24 |title=Troops count cost of Vietnam's Hamburger Hill – archive, 1969 |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/24/troops-count-cost-vietnam-hamburger-hill-archive-1969 |access-date=2024-05-30 |work=The Guardian |language=en-GB |issn=0261-3077}}</ref>
 
===Terrain===
The American and South Vietnamese units participating in Apache Snow knew, based on existing [[military intelligence|intelligence]] and previous experiences in the A Shau, that they were in for a tough fight. Beyond that, however, they had little evidence as to the enemy's actual strength and dispositions. Masters of camouflage, the NVA completely concealed their bases from aerial surveillance. When the NVA moved, they did so at night along trails covered by triple-canopy jungle, again confounding observation from above. They effected their command and control mainly by runner and wire, leaving no electronic signature for the Americans to monitor or trace. Technology, therefore, provided scant assistance to the American battalion commander trying to "see the enemy" during Apache Snow. He had to generate his own [[Military tactic|tactical]] intelligence. Patrols, captured equipment, [[military installation|installations]], documents, and occasionally [[prisoner of war|prisoners]] provided combat commanders with the raw data from which to draw their assessment of the enemy order of battle and dispositions. Gathering this information took time, though. Moreover, intelligence about the enemy's strength and dispositions did not necessarily illuminate his commander's intent. It took days to ascertain this, and the learning experience proved decidedly unpleasant for the Americans.
The battle took place on [[Dong Ap Bia]] (''Ap Bia Mountain'', {{langx|vi|Đồi A Bia}}) in the rugged, jungle-shrouded mountains of [[South Vietnam]], {{convert|1.2|mi|km|sp=us}} from the [[Laos|Laotian]] border.<ref>Sheet 6441-IV, Series L7014, Defense Mapping Agency, 2070.</ref> Rising from the floor of the western [[A Sầu Valley]], Ap Bia Mountain is a solitary [[massif]], unconnected to the ridges of the surrounding [[Annamite Range]]. It dominates the northern valley, towering some {{convert|937|m|ft|sp=us|abbr=|sigfig=4}} above sea level. Snaking down from its highest peak are a series of ridges and fingers, one of the largest extending southeast to a height of {{convert|900|m|ft|sp=us|abbr=|round=|sigfig=4}}, another reaching south to a {{convert|916|m|ft|sp=us|adj=on|abbr=|sigfig=4}} peak. The entire mountain is a rugged wilderness blanketed in double- and triple-canopy jungle, dense thickets of [[bamboo]], and waist-high [[Miscanthus sinensis|elephant grass]].
 
===Order of battle===
At first, the battle went deceptively well. The American and South Vietnamese units experienced only light enemy contact on the first day. But documents captured by Lieutenant Colonel Honeycutt's 3/187th Infantry indicated that the entire 29th NVA Regiment, nicknamed the "Pride of [[Ho Chi Minh]]," was somewhere in the A Shau Valley. Moreover, intelligence indicated that the enemy was looking for a big fight.6 Honeycutt was eager to oblige. Past experience indicated the enemy would resist violently for a short time and then withdraw as the Americans brought overwhelming firepower to bear against him. This was a familiar pattern in many of the larger encounters with the NVA and in the previous A Shau battles. The big battles, such as [[Dak To]] and [[Ia Drang]], where the enemy offered prolonged, determined resistance, were rare.7 Considering this, Honeycutt anticipated his battalion would be able to handle whatever he found on Hill 937. As insurance, he prudently requested and received the [[brigade]]'s reserve, his own [[Bravo Company]]. He intended to find the NVA force located in his part of the valley and punish it before it could escape into [[Laos]].
The battle on Hamburger Hill occurred in May 1969, during Operation Apache Snow, the second part of a three-phased campaign intended to destroy PAVN Base Areas in the remote A Sầu Valley. This campaign was a series of operations intended to do damage to the PAVN forces in the A Sầu Valley, which had been an infiltration route into South Vietnam prior to 1966, when the PAVN seized the [[Special Forces]] camp in the valley during the [[Battle of A Shau]] and established a permanent presence. Subsequent US efforts were aimed at damaging enemy forces in the valley rather than attempting to clear or occupy the valley. Lieutenant General [[Richard G. Stilwell]], commander of [[XXIV Corps (United States)|XXIV Corps]], amassed the equivalent of two divisions, and substantial artillery and air support, to once again launch a raid into the valley. The PAVN had moved their 6th, 9th, and 29th Regiments into the area to recover from losses sustained during a previous [[United States Marine Corps]] operation ([[Operation Dewey Canyon]]) in February.<ref name=Trass>{{cite book|last=Trass|first=Adrian|title=Transition November 1968-December 1969|publisher=Center of Military History United States Army|year=2018|isbn=978-1098914356|url=https://history.army.mil/Portals/143/Images/Publications/Publication%20By%20Title%20Images/T%20PDF/cmhPub_76-6.pdf?ver=yNooibAxluthLPQG6cXy0g%3d%3d}}{{PD-notice}}</ref>{{rp|30}}
 
Assigned to Apache Snow were three airmobile infantry battalions of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), commanded by Major General [[Melvin Zais]]. These units of the division's 3rd Brigade (commanded by Colonel Joseph Conmy) were the 3rd Battalion, [[187th Infantry Regiment (United States)#Vietnam War (interim edit)|187th Infantry]] (Lt. Col. Weldon Honeycutt); 2d Battalion, [[501st Parachute Infantry Regiment (United States)#Vietnam|501st Infantry]] (Lt. Col. Robert German); and the 1st Battalion, [[506th Infantry Regiment (United States)#Vietnam|506th Infantry]] (Lt. Col. John Bowers). Two battalions of the ARVN [[1st Division (South Vietnam)|1st Infantry Division]] (the 2/1st and 4/1st) had been temporarily assigned to the 3d Brigade in support. Other major units participating in Apache Snow included the [[9th Marine Regiment (United States)#Vietnam War|9th Marine Regiment]]; and 3d Squadron, [[5th Cavalry Regiment (United States)#Vietnam War|5th Cavalry]] and the 3rd ARVN Regiment.
On [[11 May]], Honeycutt dispersed his [[Rakkasans]] and scoured the vicinity to the north and northwest of Ap Bia Mountain. His men swept west toward the nearby Laotian border and south up the north slope of the mountain itself. When Bravo Company made heavy contact with some NVA late in the day, Honeycutt responded quickly by directing [[Cobra helicopter]] gunships, known as aerial rocket artillery (ARA), to support a hasty assault. Unfortunately, in the heavy jungle, the Cobras mistook the battalion [[command post]] for an NVA unit and attacked and killed two Americans and wounded thirty-five, including Honeycutt himself.8 The [[fratricide]] incident temporarily eliminated all battalion command and control of the battle and forced 3/197th to withdraw into night defensive positions. Bravo Company was separated from its objective, the summit of Dong Ap Bia, by less than 1,000 meters. The incident confirmed what Honeycutt already suspected, that there was an enemy force on the mountain, However, the contact was serious enough for him to adjust his estimate of the enemy's strength from "a few trail watchers" to a reinforced [[platoon]] or even a [[Company (military unit)|company]].9 The Rakkasans could still deal with a force that size, but they would have to concentrate to do so.
 
===Planning===
For the next three days, Honeycutt fought the mountain and the NVA to bring his scattered companies together for a coordinated battalion attack. Despite the fact that, since the initial assault, no company was more than about 1,500 meters from the crest of the mountain, it took two days to consolidate the battalion for a three-company assault. Time and again, the American infantrymen found themselves hampered as much by the [[topography]] as by the enemy. The rugged terrain slowed dismounted movement to a crawl. Between 12 and 14 May, for example, [[Delta Company]] was virtually immobilized when it went down a steep ravine and was caught there by the enemy. In one grueling five-hour period, the company labored to advance a total of only 500 meters.10 The steep, mud-covered slopes, more than the enemy, kept this company from fulfilling Honeycutt's intent. In the end, the troops had to abandon their attack and withdraw the way they had come.
Conmy characterized the operation as a [[reconnaissance in force]]. His plan called for the five battalions to "combat assault" into the valley by helicopter on 10 May 1969, and to search their assigned sectors for PAVN troops and supplies. The overall plan of attack called for the Marines and the 3/5th Cavalry to reconnaissance in force toward the Laotian border, while the ARVN units cut the highway through the base of the valley. The 501st and the 506th were to destroy the PAVN in their own operating areas and block escape routes into Laos. If a battalion made heavy contact with the PAVN, Conmy would reinforce it by helicopter with one of the other units. In theory, the 101st could reposition its forces quickly enough to keep the PAVN from massing against any one unit, and a US battalion discovering a PAVN unit would fix it in place until a reinforcing battalion could lift in to cut off its retreat and destroy it.
 
The US and the ARVN units participating in Apache Snow knew, based on existing intelligence information and previous experience in the A Sầu, that the operation was likely to encounter serious resistance from the PAVN. However, they had little other intelligence as to the actual strength and dispositions of PAVN units. The area was extremely remote and difficult to access. Aerial surveillance was difficult, and US battalion commanders had to generate their own tactical intelligence by combat patrols, capturing equipment, installations, documents, and occasionally prisoners of war to provide the raw data from which to draw their assessment of the PAVN order of battle and dispositions. It was this time-consuming and hit-or-miss task force which characterized the main efforts of Honeycutt's 3/187th Infantry during the first four days of the operation.
These three days were a period of intensely unpleasant "discovery learning" for Honeycutt and his men. Map reconnaissance and helicopter overflights did not indicate that his initial scheme of maneuver was impractical. It took Delta Company's three-day ordeal to do so. Though Honeycutt had a long and distinguished record as a combat commander in both [[Vietnam]] and [[Korea]], he underestimated Ap Bia Mountain and the NVA facing him. Although his estimate of the enemy strength was incorrect, his miscalculation was not immediately apparent to him or to any of the American leadership. It took three days of assaults by Bravo and Charlie Companies, each bloodily repulsed, before the situation became clearer. The enemy was stronger than anticipated, much stronger than company strength, and he grew more powerful every night as he received reinforcements from Laos. The NVA commander's demonstrated tenacity and willingness to replace heavy losses indicated he intended to put up a stiff fight for Hill 937.
 
Initially, the operation went routinely for the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile). Its units experienced only light contact on the first day, but documents captured by 3/187th indicated that the PAVN 29th Regiment, nicknamed the "Pride of [[Ho Chi Minh]]" and a veteran of the 1968 [[Battle of Hue]], was somewhere in the valley. Past experience in many of the larger encounters with PAVN indicated they would resist violently for a short time and then withdraw before the Americans brought overwhelming firepower to bear against them. Prolonged combat, such as at [[Battle of Dak To|Dak To]] and [[Battle of Ia Drang|Ia Drang]], had been relatively rare. Honeycutt anticipated his battalion had sufficient capability to carry out a reconnaissance on Hill 937 without further reinforcement, although he did request that the brigade reserve, his own Company B, be released to his control.
By [[13 May]], it had become clear to the brigade commander, Conmy, that Ap Bia Mountain contained more NVA than the 3/187th Infantry could handle alone. At midday, he decided to send 1/506th Infantry (the Currahees) north from their RIF area of operations to assist Honeycutt. This action conformed to the American tactic of maneuvering an uncommitted battalion to support a battalion in heavy contact. Hoping to cut off enemy reinforcements to Dong Ap Bia, Conmy ordered the 1/506th Infantry to attack north, cross-country, to hit the NVA facing Honeycutt from the rear.11 Starting from positions that were only about 4,000 meters from Hill 937, Conmy could have reasonably expected the Currahees to be ready to provide support to 3/187th Infantry no later than the morning of [[15 May]]. Yet it took 1/506th Infantry five and a half days, until [[19 May]], to reach Honeycutt. By the standards of dismounted movement routinely practiced by today's light infantry at the [[Joint Readiness Training Center]] (JRTC), 1/506th Infantry's pace was glacial. In one forty-hour period over 13-14 May, the battalion was able to cover only 1,500 of the 4,000 meters separating it from its objective on Ap Bia Mountain. Rough terrain and the ever-present enemy [[sniper]]s made the difference. Conmy and the 1/506th Infantry, like Honeycutt, learned the hard way that Ap Bia Mountain and the enemy on it defied previous experience.
 
Honeycutt was a protégé of General [[William C. Westmoreland]], the former commander of the US forces in Vietnam. He had been assigned command of the 3/187th in January and had by replacement of many of its officers given it a personality to match his own aggressiveness. His stated intention was to locate the PAVN force in his area of responsibility and to engage it before it could escape into Laos.
Treacherous terrain and an enemy that knew how to exploit it continually threw off the tempo of American tactical operations at Hamburger Hill. Both airborne infantry battalions were "ground-bound" in the jungle, maneuvering at the pace of their foot soldiers. Not even the helicopter, the transcendent theme of American technological superiority in this war, offered much hope of speeding up maneuver. Steep gradients and dense vegetation provided few natural [[landing zone]]s in the vicinity of the mountain. The rugged terrain also masked the NVA positions, making it nearly impossible to suppress enemy air defense fires. Throughout the battle, unseen NVA soldiers maneuvered in the jungle around the American landing zones and shot down or damaged numerous helicopters with small arms fire and even [[Rocket propelled grenade|rocket-propelled grenades]]. In fact, the dense terrain covered the movement of enemy forces so completely that it created the effect of a nonlinear battlefield. The NVA continuously slipped behind the American lines, hitting [[logistical]] support landing zones (LZs) and command posts (CPs) no less than four times. This problem caused each company and battalion commander to leave a substantial portion of his force in the rear to cover his LZ and CP and ensure the flow of supplies, the evacuation of casualties, and uninterrupted command and control. In addition to securing their LZs, attacking companies had to provide for 360-degree security as they maneuvered, since the terrain prevented them from mutually supporting each other until the final assaults on the mountain. Even so, time and again, NVA platoon- and company-size elements struck maneuvering American forces from the flanks and rear as the Rakkasans and Currahees directed their attention toward the mountain top.
 
Rather than retreat, the PAVN in the valley determined to stand and to fight in a series of well-prepared concentric bunker positions on Hill 937.
The effectiveness of U.S. maneuver forces was further constrained by the narrow trails along which the Americans advanced through heavy vegetation. For much of the battle, each of the attacking American companies assaulted on a [[squad]] or platoon front. Thus, at the point of attack, American squads and. platoons frequently faced NVA platoons and companies. To overcome this firepower disparity, the American infantrymen traditionally responded with [[artillery]] and [[close air support]]. With most small arms engagements on Hamburger Hill limited to tens of meters, however, American indirect fire support was severely restricted. Often, the enemy was too close and the situation too fluid for units in contact to get timely, accurate supporting fires. In close combat, American infantrymen had to succeed with their own direct fires or, as frequently happened on Ap Bia, pull back and await artillery, close air support, and ARA. Even then, there was no guarantee that the artillery and close air would do the job. The dense jungle and wild, irregular contours of Ap Bia served to dampen the effects of American fire support, NVA [[bunker]]s were well sited to take advantage of these, contours and the jungle cover. Furthermore, bunkers were well built, with substantial overhead cover that withstood days of pounding. Over time, U.S. bombs and napalm stripped away the foliage and exposed the NVA's bunkers. But they were so numerous and so well constructed that they could not be destroyed by indirect firepower alone.12 [[Napalm]] and infantry [[recoilless rifle]] fire proved to be the weapons of choice for busting the bunkers.
 
==Battle==
Under these fluid conditions, battle command was decidedly decentralized. Though Honeycutt constantly prodded his company commanders to push on, he could to do little to direct their tactics as they fought through the jungle. Only in the closing days of the battle, when his companies maneuvered in close proximity over the barren mountain top, was he able to coordinate mutual support among his subordinates.13 Fire support for units in contact with the enemy was also decentralized. Artillery, ARA, and close air support (with airborne [[forward air controller]] [FAC] assistance) were responsive to units down to platoon level Yet in the evolving, often confusing, maneuver battle, it was inevitable that command and control of supporting fires suffered. Fighting on Ap Bia Mountain produced no less than five incidents of air-to-ground fratricide over a ten-day period. Pilots (and sometimes the FACs) were unable to distinguish friend from enemy in the intense and confusing fighting around the mountain. In at least one incident, the pilots themselves became lost and attacked more than a kilometer off their intended target.14
[[File:Battle of Hamburger Hill 11-17 May 1969.jpg|thumb|right|American movements from 11–17 May 1969]]
===Reinforcing the assault on Hill 937===
Having made no significant contacts in its area of operations, at midday on 13 May, the 3rd Brigade commander, Conmy, decided it would move to cut off PAVN reinforcement from Laos and to assist Honeycutt by attacking Hill 937 from the south. Company B was heli-lifted to Hill 916, but the remainder of the 3/187th made the movement on foot, from an area {{convert|4|km|mi|sp=us}} from Hill 937, and both Conmy and Honeycutt expected the 1/506th to be ready to provide support no later than the morning of 15 May. Although Company B seized Hill 916 on 15 May, it was not until 19 May that the 3/187th as a whole was in position to conduct a final assault, primarily because of nearly impenetrable jungle.
 
The 3/187th conducted multi-company assaults on 14 May, incurring heavy casualties, while the 1/506th, led by 1st. Lt. Roger Leasure, made probing attacks on the south slopes of the mountain on 16 and 17 May. The difficult terrain and well organized PAVN forces continually disrupted the tempo of the US tactical operations on Hills 916, 900, and 937. Steep gradients and dense vegetation provided few natural landing zones (LZs) in the vicinity of the mountain and made helicopter redeployments impractical. The terrain also masked the positions of the PAVN 29th Regiment, making it nearly impossible to suppress anti-aircraft fire, while the jungle covered the movement of PAVN units so completely that it created a nonlinear battlefield. PAVN soldiers, able to maneuver freely around the LZs, shot down or damaged numerous helicopters with small arms fire, [[Rocket-propelled grenade]]s, and crew-served weapons. The PAVN also assaulted nearby logistical support LZs and command posts at least four times, forcing deployment of units for security that might otherwise have been employed in assaults. Attacking companies had to provide for 360-degree security as they maneuvered, since the terrain largely prevented them from mutually supporting one another. PAVN platoon- and company-sized elements repeatedly struck maneuvering US forces from the flanks and rear.
On 14 and 15 May, Honeycutt launched two coordinated battalion attacks against Ap Bia Mountain. Each day, he expected support from 1/506th Infantry, and when it failed to appear, he attacked alone. Honeycutt rightly believed that each day he left the North Vietnamese undisturbed on the mountain gave them more time to improve their defenses. Nevertheless, both attacks failed. Although Honeycutt's Bravo Company attacked to within 150 meters of the summit, enemy fire, steep terrain, and rain combined to force the Rakkasans back down the slope. On 16 May, 1/506th Infantry attacked north toward Dong Ap Bia but was stopped after seizing Hill 916-still some 2,000 meters from its objective. With the two battalions so far out of supporting distance, the brigade commander ordered Honeycutt to wait for 1/506th Infantry.
 
===Tactical difficulties===
About the same time 1/506th Infantry attacked, the 101st Airborne Division commander, Zais, experienced a new and. uncomfortable aspect of battle command--one with which modern commanders have become increasingly familiar. The [[Associated Press]] "discovered" the battle at Ap Bia and sent correspondent [[Jay Sharbutt]] to investigate it--on the ground. Sharbutt met with Zais and, in the course of the interview, challenged his decision to prosecute the battle.15 Zais answered Sharbutt's questions politely and honestly, but the journalist was not satisfied. His subsequent newspaper accounts of "Hamburger Hill" stirred up a storm of controversy that swept the nation and resounded in the halls of [[Congress]].16 For the next four days, more and more journalists poured into the base camps, firebases, headquarters, and landing zones supporting the battle. Commanders found they had a new and largely unwelcome duty: conducting public relations while also fighting a battle.
[[File:101st Airborne Division Soldiers are loaded on to a UH-1 during Operation Apache Snow , May 1969.jpg|right|thumb|Wounded 101st Airborne soldiers being loaded onto a UH-1 medevac helicopter]]
The effectiveness of US maneuver forces was limited by narrow trails that funneled attacking companies into squad or platoon points of attack, where they encountered PAVN platoons and companies with prepared fields of fire. With most small arms engagements thus conducted at close range, US fire support was also severely restricted. Units frequently pulled back and called in artillery fire, close air support, and aerial rocket artillery, but the PAVN bunkers were well-sited and constructed with overhead cover to withstand bombardment. During the course of the battle the foliage was eventually stripped away and the bunkers exposed, but they were so numerous and well constructed that many could not be destroyed by indirect fire. [[Napalm]], [[recoilless rifle]] fire, and dogged squad and platoon-level actions eventually accounted for the reduction of most fortifications, though at a pace and price thoroughly unanticipated by American forces.
 
US command of small units was essentially decentralized. Though Honeycutt constantly prodded his company commanders to push on, he could do little to coordinate mutual support until the final assaults, when the companies maneuvered in close proximity over the barren mountain top. Fire support for units in contact was also decentralized. Supporting fires, including those controlled by airborne [[Forward air control during the Vietnam War|forward air controllers]], were often directed at the platoon level. Eventually human error led to five attacks by supporting aircraft on the 3/187th, killing seven and wounding 53. Four of the incidents involved [[Bell AH-1 Cobra#US military|Cobra gunship]] helicopters, which in one case were more than {{convert|1|km|mi|sp=us}} away from their intended target.
The next day, [[17 May]], 1/506th Infantry attacked again but made little progress. Although the Currahees were still almost 1,500 meters from the top of Ap Bia Mountain, the brigade commander ordered a coordinated two-battalion assault for 18 May. With 1/506th Infantry attacking from the south and 3/187th Infantry attacking from the north, he hoped the enemy would not be able to concentrate against either battalion. Fighting to within seventy-five meters of the summit, Delta Company, 3/187th Infantry, almost realized Conmy's wish. Unfortunately, with every officer in the company killed or wounded and over 50 percent casualties, the battle degenerated into an uncontrollable brawl, with NVA and GIs exchanging small arms and grenade fire within twenty meters of each other. Honeycutt committed three companies into the fray, coordinating their movements from a light observation helicopter. As they prepared for the final assault, however, a roaring thunderstorm washed over the battlefield, reduced visibility to nothing, and caused all firing to stop. Unable to advance in the torrential rains on a battlefield tamed into a quagmire, the Rakkasans reluctantly withdrew down the mountain again. The 1/506th Infantry met with heavy opposition for the first time in the battle, but its three converging companies managed nonetheless to get to about 1,200 meters of the top of Dong Ap Bia.
 
===Hamburger Hill===
In view of the heavy casualties already sustained in the battle, Zais seriously considered stopping the attack on Dong Ap Bia. Although he was under great pressure from the unwanted attention of the press, he decided to continue the fight. Both his corps commander Lieutenant General Stilwell and the MACV commander, General Creighton Abrams, backed him. He decided to commit three fresh battalions- the 2/50 1st Infantry, 2/3d Infantry (1st ARVN Division), and 2/506th Infantry. The 3/187th Infantry's casualties to this point were staggering. Not counting replacements, Alpha and Bravo Companies had lost 50 percent of their original strength, while Charlie and Delta Companies had lost 80 percent. Furthermore, two of the four original company commanders were casualties, as well as eight of twelve platoon leaders.17 Considering these crippling losses, Zais initially decided to relieve the 3/187th Infantry with the 2/506th Infantry. Honeycutt, however, demanded that Zais allow the Rakkasans to take the mountain, and the [[Division (military)|division]] commander relented.18
[[File:Soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division inspect damage in the surrounding area of Dong Ap Bia during Operation Apache Snow, May 1969.jpg|thumb|right|101st Airborne soldiers inspect damage in the surrounding area of Dong Ap Bia]]
On 16 May [[Associated Press]] correspondent Jay Sharbutt learned of the ongoing battle on Hill 937, traveled to the area and interviewed Zais, in particular asking why infantry, rather than firepower, was used as the primary offensive tool on Hill 937. More reporters followed to cover the battle, and the term "Hamburger Hill" became widely used. The US brigade commander ordered a coordinated two-battalion assault for 18 May, 1/506th attacking from the south and 3/187th attacking from the north, trying to keep the 29th Regiment from concentrating on either battalion. Fighting to within {{convert|75|m|ft|sp=us}} of the summit, Company D, 3/187th nearly carried the hill but experienced severe casualties, including all of its officers. The battle was one of close combat, with the two sides exchanging small arms and grenade fire within {{convert|20|m|ft|sp=us}} of one another. From a light observation helicopter, the battalion commander attempted to coordinate the movements of the other companies into a final assault, but an exceptionally intense thunderstorm reduced visibility to zero and ended the fighting. Unable to advance, 3/187th again withdrew down the mountain.<ref name=Trass/>{{rp|36-7}} The three converging companies of 1/506th struggled to take Hill 900, the southern crest of the mountain, encountering heavy opposition for the first time in the battle. Because of the heavy casualties already sustained by his units and under pressure from the unwanted attention of the press, Zais seriously considered discontinuing the attack but decided otherwise. Both the corps commander and the [[COMUSMACV]] General [[Creighton W. Abrams]], publicly supported the decision. Zais decided to commit three fresh battalions to the battle and to have one of them relieve the 3/187th in place. The 3/187th's losses had been severe, with approximately 320 killed or wounded, including more than sixty percent of the 450 troops who had assaulted into the valley. Two of its four company commanders and eight of twelve platoon leaders had become casualties. The battalion commander of the 2/506th, Lt. Col. Gene Sherron, arrived at Honeycutt's command post on the afternoon of 18 May to coordinate the relief. 3/187th was flying out its latest casualties, and its commander had not yet been informed of the relief. Before any arrangements were made, Zais landed and was confronted by Honeycutt, who argued that his battalion was still combat effective. After a sharp confrontation, Zais relented, although he assigned one of Sherron's companies to Honeycutt as reinforcement for the assault.
 
===Final assault===
The Americans launched the final attack on Dong Ap Bia on the morning of [[20 May]] [[1969]]. The Rakkasans had been reinforced with a company from 2/506th. Infantry, and the division had airmobiled two additional battalions onto the battlefield. Ten days after the battle had begun, the 101st Airborne Division finally brought overwhelming combat power to bear against the NVA. The attack began with two hours of close air support and ninety minutes of artillery prep fires. Four battalions attacked simultaneously, and within two hours, 3/187th Infantry became the first battalion to reach the top of Ap Bia, Some of the enemy chose to flee, but many fought in their bunkers to the end. The 3/187th Infantry finally secured Hill 937 about 1700 on 20 May.
[[File:Battle of Hamburger Hill 20 May 1969.jpg|thumb|right|American movements on 20 May 1969]]
Two fresh battalions, the 2/501st Infantry and ARVN 2/3d Infantry, were airlifted into landing zones northeast and southeast of the base of the mountain on 19 May. Both battalions immediately moved onto the mountain to positions from which they would attack the following morning. Meanwhile, the 1/506th for the third consecutive day struggled to secure Hill 900.<ref name=Trass/>{{rp|37}}
 
The 3rd Brigade launched its four-battalion attack at 11:00 on 20 May, including two companies of the 3/187th reinforced by Company A 1/506th. The attack was preceded by two hours of close air support and ninety minutes of artillery preparatory fires. The battalions attacked simultaneously, and by 12:00 elements of the 3/187th reached the crest, beginning a reduction of bunkers that continued through most of the afternoon. Some PAVN units were able to withdraw into Laos, and Hill 937 was secured by 17:00.<ref name=Trass/>{{rp|37-8}}
The ten day Battle of Hamburger Hill had cost 70 American dead and 372 wounded. To take the position, the Americans eventually committed five infantry battalions, about 1,800 men, and ten artillery batteries.20 In addition, the [[U.S. Air Force]] flew 272 attack [[sortie]]s and expended more than 1 million pounds (450 t) of bombs and 152,000 pounds (69 t) of napalm.21 This massed firepower took a devastating toll on the NVA. The 7th and 8th Battalions of the 29th NVA Regiment were virtually wiped out. Over 630 dead NVA were discovered on and around the battlefield and many more undoubtedly covered the trails and draws leading back into Laos.22 Yet the repercussions of the battle were more political than military. Questions raised by the press concerning the necessity of the battle stirred controversy for weeks after the fighting stopped. These issues flared up again when the 101st Airborne quietly abandoned the hill to the enemy in June. Eventually, the investigation into the Battle of Hamburger Hill reached Congress and led to a reappraisal of American [[Military strategy|strategy]] in Vietnam.
 
===ARVN participation===
[[Category:Vietnam War operations and battles]]
The ARVN 2nd Battalion, 3rd Regiment, 1st Division participated in the battle. Author Andrew Wiest wrote in 2007, particularly based on the statements by Abrams in "The Abrams Tapes," says its role in the final assault was as follows: The unit was positioned on a stretch of the PAVN defense line that was lightly defended, and sent a scout party to test the forward enemy lines earlier than the proposed assault time; this party was quickly able to discern the minimal enemy strength. The 2/3 commanding officer decided to exploit the situation, and attack in advance of the other units. The 2/3 reached the crest of Hamburger Hill around 10:00, ahead of the 3/187th, but was ordered to withdraw from the summit because allied artillery was to be directed on to the top of the hill. The opportunity to threaten the PAVN lines facing the 3/187th was lost. Shortly after the 2/3 completed their withdrawal, the 3/187th was able to break through the PAVN defenses and occupy the summit.<ref>{{cite book|last=Wiest|first=Andrew|title=Vietnam's Forgotten Army: Heroism and Betrayal in the ARVN|publisher=NYU Press|year=2007|isbn=9780814794678|page=168}}</ref>
 
==Aftermath==
Despite the claims that the hill had no real military significance, Honeycutt alleged that the hill needed to be taken as it overlooks a good deal of the A Sầu Valley, which was a major supply and staging area for the PAVN.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=VlpIAAAAIBAJ&pg=6482%2C3855523|publisher=Toledo Blade|title=B-52s pound enemy bunkers on mountain|date=19 May 1969|access-date=14 April 2020}}</ref>
 
As it had no real military significance aside from the presence of the PAVN on it, Major General [[John M. Wright]] who replaced MG Zais as commander of the 101st Airborne in May abandoned the hill on 5 June as the operations in the valley were concluded. Zais would comment: "This is not a war of hills. That hill had no military value whatsoever." and "We found the enemy on Hill 937 and that's where we fought him."<ref name=Boston>{{cite book|last1=Lipsman|first1=Samuel|last2=Doyle|first2=Edward|title=Fighting for Time (The Vietnam Experience)|publisher=Boston Publishing Company|year=1984|isbn=9780939526079|url-access=registration|url=https://archive.org/details/fightingfortime00lips}}</ref>{{rp|22}} The battle brought into sharp focus the changing US tactics from Westmoreland's [[search and destroy]] operations designed to engage PAVN/VC forces whenever and wherever they were located, to Abrams' new approach of attacking the PAVN/VC logistics "nose," which would be prepositioned to support attacks, and which, if disrupted, would prevent large-scale PAVN/VC attacks.<ref name=Boston/>{{rp|22–3}}
 
The controversial U.S casualties during the battle lead to the [[GI Underground Press|G.I underground newspaper]] “G.I says” in Vietnam placing a $10,000 bounty on Honeycutt, leading to multiple unsuccessful [[fragging]] attempts against him.<ref> {{cite AV media |people=Kenneth Anderberg |date= |title='G.I. Says' |trans-title= |type=Documentary |language= |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NoUhjwVd0tw |access-date= |archive-url= |archive-date= |format=Video |time= |___location= |publisher=Jason Rosette of Camerado Media |id= |isbn= |oclc= |quote= }} </ref><ref>{{cite news |url=https://alphahistory.com/vietnamwar/robert-heinl-collapse-armed-forces-1971/ |title=COLONEL ROBERT HEINL: THE COLLAPSE OF THE ARMED FORCES (1971) |work=Alpha History}}</ref>
 
The debate over Hamburger Hill reached the [[United States Congress]], with particularly severe criticism of military leadership by Senators [[Ted Kennedy|Edward Kennedy]], [[George McGovern]], and [[Stephen M. Young]]. In its 27 June issue, [[Life (magazine)|''Life''
magazine]] published the photographs of 242 Americans killed in one week in Vietnam; this is now considered a watershed event of negative public opinion towards the Vietnam War. While only five of the 241 featured photos were of those killed in the battle, many Americans had the perception that all of the photos featured in the magazine were casualties of the battle.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Lee|first1=J. Edward|last2=Haynsworth|first2=Toby|title= Nixon, Ford and the Abandonment of South Vietnam|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=ja2zCgAAQBAJ&q=June+27++Life+Magazine+vietnam+hamburger+hill&pg=PA20|year=2002|isbn=9780786413027|page=20|publisher=McFarland }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.life.com/history/faces-of-the-american-dead-in-vietnam-one-weeks-toll-june-1969/|title=Faces of the American Dead in Vietnam: One Week's Toll, June 1969|date=15 May 2014 |publisher=Life Magazine|access-date=10 July 2020}}</ref>
 
The controversy over the conduct of the Battle of Hamburger Hill led to a reappraisal of US strategy in South Vietnam. As a direct result, to minimize casualties, General Abrams discontinued a policy of "maximum pressure" against the PAVN to one of "protective reaction" for troops threatened with combat action, while simultaneously President [[Richard Nixon]] announced the first troop withdrawal from South Vietnam.
 
US losses during the ten-day battle totaled 56 killed and 367 wounded.<ref name=AAR/> To take the position, the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) eventually committed five infantry battalions and ten batteries of artillery. In addition, the [[US Air Force]] flew 272 missions and expended more than 1200 tons of ordnance, nearly 20000 rounds of artillery were fired.<ref name=":0" />
 
US estimates of the losses incurred by the PAVN 7th and 8th Battalions of the 29th Regiment included 630 dead (bodies discovered on and around the battlefield); including many found in makeshift mortuaries within the tunnel complex. There is no count of the PAVN running off the mountain, the wounded and dead carried into Laos, or the dead buried in collapsed bunkers and tunnels.<ref name=west/> During the ten-day battle, US forces captured 89 individual weapons and 22 crew‑served weapons.<ref name=AAR/>
 
==See also==
* [[G.I. movement]]
* [[1969 in the Vietnam War]]
 
==References==
{{Reflist}}
 
==Further reading==
* Zaffiri, Samuel, ''Hamburger Hill, May 10- May 20, 1969'' (1988), {{ISBN|0-89141-706-0}}
* Linderer, A, Gary, ''Eyes Behind The Lines: L Company Rangers in Vietnam'', 1969 (1991) {{ISBN|0-8041-0819-6}}
* Boccia, Frank, ''The Crouching Beast: A United States Army Lieutenant's Account of the Battle for Hamburger Hill, May 1969'' (2013), {{ISBN|978-0786474394}}
 
==External links==
*{{cite magazine |title =The Battle for Hamburger Hill |magazine = Time |date =1969-05-30 |url =http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,840113,00.html |access-date = 2007-04-04 }}
*[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U4BFnRvbgmU Oral history interview with Vietnam Veteran, Arthur Wiknik describing his experiences during the Battle for Hamburger Hill] from the [https://web.ccsu.edu/vethistoryproject/ Veterans History Project at Central Connecticut State University]
 
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{{DEFAULTSORT:Hamburger Hill, Battle of}}
[[Category:Battles of the Vietnam War involving the United States]]
[[Category:May 1969 in Asia]]
[[Category:Battles and operations of the Vietnam War in 1969]]