Self-categorization theory: Difference between revisions

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{{short description|Theory in social psychology}}
{{Self sidebar}}'''Self-categorization theory''' is a theory in [[social psychology]] that describes the circumstances under which a person will perceive collections of people (including themselves) as a group, as well as the consequences of perceiving people in group terms.<ref name="Haslam (1997)">{{cite journal|last=Haslam|first=S. A.|title=Stereotyping and social influence: Foundations of stereotype consensus|journal=The Social Psychology of Stereotyping and Group Life|year=1997|pages=119–143|editor1-first=R.|editor1-last=Spears|editor2-first=P.J.|editor2-last=Oakes|editor3-first=N.|editor3-last=Ellemers|editor4-first=S.A.|display-editors = 3 |editor4-last=Haslam}}</ref> Although the theory is often introduced as an explanation of psychological group formation (which was one of its early goals), it is more accurately thought of as general analysis of the functioning of [[categorization]] processes in [[social perception]] and interaction that speaks to issues of individual identity as much as group phenomena.<ref name="Oakes et al. (1994).">{{cite book | last1 = Oakes | first1 = Penny | last2 = Haslam | first2 = Alex | last3 = Turner | first3 = John | title = Stereotyping and social reality | year = 1994 | publisher = Oxford | ___location = Blackwell}}</ref> It was developed by [[John C. Turner (psychologist)|John Turner]] and colleagues, and along with [[social identity theory]] it is a constituent part of the [[social identity approach]]. It was in part developed to address questions that arose in response to social identity theory about the mechanistic underpinnings of social identification.<ref name="Turner & Oakes (1986).">{{cite journal|last1 = Turner|first1 = John|last2=Oakes|first2=Penny|title = The significance of the social identity concept for social psychology with reference to individualism, interactionism and social influence|journal = British Journal of Social Psychology|volume = 25| issue = 3| pages = 237–252|year = 1986|doi=10.1111/j.2044-8309.1986.tb00732.x|doi-access = free}}</ref><ref name="Haslam et al. (1996).">{{cite journal | last1 = Haslam | first1 = Alex | last2 = Oakes | first2 = Penny | last3 = Turner | first3 = John | last4 = McGarty | first4 = Craig | editor-last = Sorrentino | editor-first = Richard | editor2-last = Higgins | editor2-first = Edward | year = 1996 | title = Social identity, self-categorization, and the perceived homogeneity of ingroups and outgroups: The interaction between social motivation and cognition | journal = Handbook of Motivation and Cognition: The Interpersonal Context, Handbook of Motivation and Cognition | volume = 3 | pages = 182–222 }}</ref><ref name="Turner (1999)">{{cite journal|last=Turner|first=J. C.|title=Some current issues in research on social identity and self-categorization theories|journal=Social Identity|year=1999|pages=6–34|editor1-first=N.|editor1-last=Ellemers|editor2-first=R.|editor2-last=Spears|editor3-first=B.|editor3-last=Doosje}}</ref><ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001).">[[Alex Haslam|Haslam, A. S.]] (2001). Psychology in Organizations. London, SAGE Publications.</ref>
 
Self-categorization theory has been influential in the academic field of [[social psychology]] and beyond.<ref name="Postmes, T. & Branscombe, N. (2010)">Postmes, T. & Branscombe, N. (2010). Sources of social identity. In T. Postmes & N. Branscombe (Eds). Rediscovering Social Identity: Core Sources. Psychology Press.</ref> It was first applied to the topics of [[Self-categorization theory#Social influence|social influence]], [[Group cohesiveness|group cohesion]], [[group polarization]], and [[collective action]].<ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987).">Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D. & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory. Oxford: Blackwell</ref> In subsequent years the theory, often as part of the social identity approach, has been applied to further topics such as [[leadership]],<ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001)."/><ref name="Haslam, et al. (2011)."/> [[personality]],<ref name="Turner & Onorato (1998)">{{cite journal|last1=Turner|first1=J. C.|last2=Onorato|first2=R. S.|title=Social identity, personality, and the self-concept: A self-categorization perspective|journal=The Psychology of the Social Self|volume=26|issue=4|year=1998|pages=11–46|editor1-first=T. R.|editor1-last=Tyler|editor2-first=R. M.|editor2-last=Kramer|editor3-first=O. P.|editor3-last=John|doi=10.1080/03060497.1998.11085868}}</ref> [[Self-categorization theory#Out-group homogeneity|outgroup homogeneity]], and [[power (social and political)|power]].<ref name="Turner (2005)">{{cite journal|last=Turner|first=J. C.|title=Explaining the nature of power: A three-process theory|journal=European Journal of Social Psychology|year=2005|volume=35|issue=1|pages=1–22|doi=10.1002/ejsp.244|doi-access=free}}</ref> One tenet of the theory is that the self should not be considered as a foundational aspect of [[cognition]], but rather the self should be seen as a product of the cognitive system at work.<ref name="Turner & Onorato (1998)"/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1994).">{{cite journal | last1 = Turner | first1 = J. C. | last2 = Oakes | first2 = P. J. | last3 = Haslam | first3 = S. A. | last4 = McGarty | first4 = C. | year = 1994 | title = Self and collective: Cognition and social context | journal = Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin | volume = 20 | issue = 5| pages = 454–463 | doi=10.1177/0146167294205002| s2cid = 143918437 }}</ref><ref name="Reynolds & Turner (2006).">{{cite journal |last1= Reynolds |first1= K. J. |last2= Turner |first2= J. C.|year= 2006|title= Individuality and the prejudiced personality |journal= European Review of Social Psychology| volume= 17|issue= 1|pages= 233–270|doi=10.1080/10463280601050880|s2cid= 143708527 }}</ref><ref name="Onorato & Turner (2004)">{{cite journal|last=Onorato|author2=Turner |title=Fluidity in the self-concept: The shift from personal to social identity|journal=European Journal of Social Psychology|year=2004|volume=34|issue=3 |pages=257–278|doi=10.1002/ejsp.195 |doi-access=free}}</ref>
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Drawing inspiration from cognitive psychology,<ref name="Turner (1985)">{{cite journal| last1=Turner| first1=J.C.| editor-last =Lawler| editor-first =E. J.| year=1985| title=Social categorization and the self-concept: A social cognitive theory of group behavior| journal=Advances in Group Processes: Theory and Research|volume=2|pages=77–122}}</ref><ref name="Oakes & Turner (1990)">{{cite journal|last1=Oakes|first1=P. J.|last2=Turner|first2=J. C.|title=Is limited information processing capacity the cause of social stereotyping|journal=European Review of Social Psychology|year=1990|volume=1|issue=1|pages=111–135|doi=10.1080/14792779108401859}}</ref><ref name="Turner, J. C. & Reynolds, K. J. (2010)">Turner, J. C. & Reynolds, K. J. (2010). The story of social identity. In T. Postmes & N. Branscombe (Eds). Rediscovering Social Identity: Core Sources. Psychology Press.</ref> self-categorization theory assumes that the self can be categorized at various levels of abstraction. In other words, humans may categorize the self as a singular "I"(personal identity), or as a more inclusive "we"(social identity). In the latter case the self is cognitively grouped as identical and interchangeable to other stimuli within that category.<ref name="Turner & Oakes (1986)."/> It is argued that it is this variation in self categorization that underpins many intergroup phenomena,<ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/> including those described in social identity theory.<ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001)."/>
 
To demonstrate the notion of varying [[Principle of abstraction|levels of abstraction]] and inclusiveness, three types of self category are often given as examples.<ref name="Turner & Oakes (1986)."/><ref name="Haslam et al. (1996)."/><ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001)."/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/> The lowest level of abstraction is given as a personal self, where the perceiver self categorizes as "I". A higher level of abstraction corresponds to a social self, where the perceiver self categorizes as "we" in comparison to a salient outgroup (them). A highest level of abstraction is represented by ''we humans'', where the salient outgroup is animals or other non-humans. A common misconception is that these three example categories represent ''the'' self categories that humans use. Instead, the theory posits that there are innumerable self categories that a perceiver may use (see, [[Self-categorization theory#Online category formation|online category formation]]), and in particular that there are a myriad of different personal and social identities that a perceiver may invoke in his or her day-to-day life.<ref name="Turner & Onorato (1998)"/><ref name="Reynolds & Turner (2006)."/> The misconception may also be attributable to the early writing of Turner where a singular social identity was contrasted against a singular personal identity.<ref name="Turner (1982)">{{cite journal| last1=Turner| first1=J.C.| editor-last =Tajfel| editor-first =H.| year=1982| title=Toward a cognitive redefinition of the social group| journal=Social Identity and Intergroup Relations| pages=15–40}}</ref> This however predates the formal statement of self-categorization theory.
 
====Accentuation====
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===Determinants of categorization===
In self-categorization theory the formation and use of a social category in a certain context is predicted by an interaction between [[Self-categorization theory#Perceiver readiness|perceiver readiness]] and category-stimulus fit. The latter being broken down into [[Self-categorization theory#Comparative fit|comparative fit]] and [[Self-categorization theory#Normative fit|normative fit]].<ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1994)."/><ref>{{cite journal|last=Voci|first=Alberto|title=Relevance of social categories, depersonalization and group processes: two field tests of self-categorization theory|journal=European Journal of Social Psychology|date=1 January 2006|volume=36|issue=1|pages=73–90|doi=10.1002/ejsp.259|doi-access=free}}</ref> This predictive interaction was heavily influenced by [[Jerome Bruner|Bruner's]] accessibility and fit formula.<ref name="Turner, J. C. & Reynolds, K. J. (2010)"/><ref name="Bruner (1957)">{{cite journal | last1 = Bruner | first1 = J. S. | year = 1957 | title = On perceptual readiness | journal = Psychological Review | volume = 64 | issue = 2| pages = 123–152 | pmid = 13420288 | doi=10.1037/h0043805}}</ref> A social category that is currently in use is called a ''salient'' social category, and in the case of a self category is called a ''salient social identity''.<ref name="Turner & Oakes (1986)."/> The latter should not be confused with ''level of identification'', which is a component of perceiver readiness.<ref name="McGarty, C. (2001)">{{cite journal | last1 = McGarty | first1 = C. | year = 2001 | title = Social Identity Theory does not maintain that identification produces bias, and Self-categorization Theory does not maintain that salience is identification: Two comments on Mummendey, Klink and Brown | journal = British Journal of Social Psychology | volume = 40 | issue = Pt 2| pages = 173–176 | pmid = 11446223 | doi=10.1348/014466601164777}}</ref>
 
====Perceiver readiness====
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{{main|Social influence}}
 
Self-categorization theory provides an account of social influence.<ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001)."/><ref name="Haslam, et al. (2011)."/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/><ref name="Turner (1985)"/><ref name="Turner (1982)"/><ref name="Turner, J. C. (1991)">Turner, J. C. (1991). Social influence. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.</ref> This account is sometimes referred to as the theory of ''referent informational influence''.<ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/><ref name="Turner (1985)"/><ref name="Turner (1982)"/> According to self-categorization theory, as social identities become salient, and depersonalization and self-stereotyping occurs, people adopt the norms, beliefs, and behaviors of fellow ingroup members. They also distance themselves from the norms, beliefs, and behaviors of comparison outgroup members. When someone observes a difference between themselves and a fellow ingroup member that person will experience subjective uncertainty. That uncertainty can be resolved by either a) recategorizing people or the situation to reflect those perceived differences, or b) engaging in a social influence process whereby one person makes changes to become more similar to the other. Which person adopts the views or behaviors of the other (i.e. who influences who) is predicted to be that person who is most prototypical of the ingroup. In other words, the person who exemplifies the norms, values, and behaviors of the ingroup the most. The self-categorization theory account of social influence has received a large amount of empirical support.<ref name="McGarty & Turner (1992).">{{cite journal|last1 = McGarty|first1 = C.|last2=Turner|first2=J. C. |title = The effects of categorization on social judgement|journal = British Journal of Social Psychology|volume = 31|issue = 4| pages = 253–268|year = 1992|doi=10.1111/j.2044-8309.1992.tb00971.x}}</ref><ref name="Makie & Wright (2001)">{{cite book | last1 = Mackie | first1 =D. M. | last2 = Wright | first2 = C. L. | editor1-last = Brown | editor1-first = Rupert | editor2-last = Gaertner |editor2-first = Sam L. | year = 2001 | chapter = Social Influence in an Intergroup context |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LNZHf3K4xzMC&pg=PA281| title = Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology: Intergroup Processes |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LNZHf3K4xzMC| volume = 3 | issue = 1 | publisher =John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-0-470-69270-7 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last1=Livingstone|first1=A. G.|last2=Haslam|first2=S. A.|last3=Postmes|first3=T.|last4=Jetten|first4=J.|title="We Are, Therefore We Should": Evidence That In-Group Identification Mediates the Acquisition of In-Group Norms|journal=Journal of Applied Social Psychology|year=2011|volume=41|issue=8|pages=1857–1876|doi=10.1111/j.1559-1816.2011.00794.x}}</ref>
 
Self-categorization theory's account of social influence differs from other social psychological approaches to social influence. It rejects the traditional distinction between [[informational influence]] and [[normative influence]],<ref name="Turner & Oakes (1986)."/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/><ref name="Turner (1985)"/><ref name="Turner, J. C. (1991)"/><ref name="Turner & Oakes, (1997)">{{cite journal | last1 = Turner | first1 = J. C. | last2 = Oakes | first2 = P. J. | editor1-last = McGarty | editor1-first = C. | editor2-last = Haslam | editor2-first = S. A. | year = 1997 | title = The socially structured mind | journal = The Message of Social Psychology | pages = 355–373 }}</ref> where informational influence involves the assessment of social information based on its merit and normative influence involves public compliance to the expectations of group members. For self-categorization theory social information does not have merit independent of self-categorization. Instead, information is perceived as valid to the extent that it is perceived to be a normative belief of the ingroup. Normative influence, on the other hand, is not normative at all. Rather, it is counter-normative influence based compliance to expectations of psychological outgroup members. In a similar vein self-categorization theory also challenges the distinction between objective [[reality testing]] and social reality testing (e.g. the [[elaboration likelihood model]]).<ref name="Oakes et al. (1994)."/><ref name="Turner & Oakes (1986)."/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/><ref name="Turner (1985)"/><ref name="Turner (1982)"/><ref name="Turner, J. C. (1991)"/><ref name="Turner & Oakes, (1997)"/><ref name="Oakes & Reynolds (1997)">{{cite journal|last1=Oakes|first1=P. J.|last2=Reynolds|first2=R. J.|title=Asking the accuracy question: is measurement the answer?|journal=The Social Psychology of Stereotyping and Group Life|year=1997|pages=119–143|editor1-first=R.|editor1-last=Spears|editor2-first=P.J.|editor2-last=Oakes|editor3-first=N.|editor3-last=Ellemers|editor4-first=S.A.|display-editors = 3 |editor4-last=Haslam}}</ref> It argues that there is no such thing as objective reality testing isolated from social reality testing. Sensory data is always interpreted with respect of the beliefs and ideas of the perceiver, which in turn are bound up in the psychological group memberships of that perceiver.
 
===Out-group homogeneity===
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===Category hierarchies===
Self-categorization theory emphasises the role of category hierarchies in social perception.<ref name="Turner (1999)"/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/> That is, much like a biological [[Taxonomy (biology)|taxonomy]], social groups at lower [[Self-categorization theory#Levels of abstraction|levels of abstraction]] are subsumed within social groups at higher levels of abstraction. A useful example comes from the world of [[team sport]]s, where a particular social group such as [[Manchester United F.C.|Manchester United]] [[Fan (person)|fans]] may be an ingroup for a perceiver who may compare with a relevant outgroup (e.g., [[Liverpool F.C.|Liverpool]] fans). However, at a higher level of abstraction, both social groups may be subsumed into the singular category of [[Association football|football]] fans. This is known as a superordinate category, and in this context those Liverpool fans once considered outgroup members are now considered fellow ingroup members. The new salient outgroup might instead be [[Rugby union|rugby]] fans. Awareness of category hierarchies has led to the development of the [[common ingroup identity]] model. This model suggests that conflict at one level of abstraction (e.g., between Manchester United fans and Liverpool fans) might be ameliorated by making salient a more inclusive superordinate ingroup.<ref name=" (1993).">{{cite journal | last1 = Gaertner | first1 = S. L. |author2-link=John Dovidio| last2 = Dovidio | first2 = J. F. | last3 = Anastasio | first3 = P. A. | last4 = Bachman | first4 = B. A. | last5 = Rust | first5 = M. C. | year = 1993 | title = The common ingroup identity model: Recategorization and the reduction of intergroup bias | journal = European Review of Social Psychology | volume = 4 | pages = 1–26 | doi=10.1080/14792779343000004}}</ref>
 
It has been noted, however, that very few social groups can be described in hierarchical terms. For example, [[Catholics|Catholic people]] in [[Germany]] cannot be always considered a subordinate category of Germans, as there are Catholic people throughout the globe. McGarty proposes that the theory's use of hierarchies as an organizing principle must be relaxed. The alternative proposition is that social psychologists should look to [[Venn diagram|Venn]]-like structures for descriptions of social structure.<ref name="McGarty, C (1999)."/><ref name="McGarty (2002)"/><ref name="McGarty, C. (2006).">McGarty, C. (2006). Hierarchies and minority groups: The roles of salience, overlap, and background knowledge in selecting meaningful social categorizations from multiple alternatives. In R. J. Crisp and M. Hewstone (Eds.), Multiple Social Categorization: Processes Models and Applications (pp. 25-49). Psychology Press.</ref> The awareness of crossed cutting social categories has allowed for the development of further intergroup conflict reduction strategies.<ref name=" (2006).">Dovidio., J. F., Gaertner, S. L., Hodson, G., Riek, B. M., Johnson, K. M., & Houlette, M. (2006). Recategorization and crossed categorization: The implications of group salience and representations for reducing bias. In R. J. Crisp & M. Hewstone, (Eds.). Multiple social categorization: Processes, models and application (pp, 65-89). . New York: Psychology Press. .</ref>
 
===Motivation in the theory===
Brewer and Brown describe self-categorization theory as a "version of social identity theory" that is heavily cognitive and is not attentive to many motivational and affective processes.<ref name="Brewer & Brown (1998)">{{cite journal | last1 = Brewer | first1 = M. B. | last2 = Brown | first2 = R. J. | editor-last = Gilbert | editor-first = D. T. | editor2-last = Fiske | editor2-first = S. T. | editor3-last = Lindzey | editor3-first = G. | year = 1998 | title = Intergroup relations | journal = The Handbook of Social Psychology | volume = 2 | pages = 554–594 }}</ref> Turner and Reynolds, in response to this style of commentary, counter that describing self-categorization theory as a replacement to social identity theory is an error, and that self-categorization theory was always intended to complement social identity theory.<ref name="Turner & Reynolds (2001)">{{cite book | last1 = Turner | first1 = John C. | last2 = Reynolds | first2 =Katherine J. | editor1-last = Brown | editor1-first = Rupert | editor2-last = Gaertner | editor2-first = Sam L. | year = 2001 | chapter = The Social Identity Perspective in Intergroup Relations: Theories, Themes, and Controversies |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LNZHf3K4xzMC&pg=PA133 | title = Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LNZHf3K4xzMC | volume = 3 | issue = 1 | publisher = John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-0-470-69270-7 }}</ref> Turner and Reynolds also argue that such commentary unreasonably discounts the motivational concerns that are articulated in self-categorization theory.<ref name="Turner & Reynolds (2001)"/> For example, the motivation to maintain positive self categories and the motivation to achieve ingroup consensus.<ref name="Turner (1985)"/>
 
==References==