Homomorphic signatures for network coding: Difference between revisions

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[[Network coding]] has been shown to optimally use [[Bandwidth (computing)|bandwidth]] in a network, maximizing information flow but the scheme is very inherently vulnerable to pollution attacks by malicious nodes in the network. A node injecting garbage can quickly affect many receivers. The pollution of [[network packet]]s spreads quickly since the output of (even an) honest node is corrupted if at least one of the incoming packets is corrupted.

An attacker can easily corrupt a packet even if it is encrypted by either forging the signature or by producing a collision under the [[hash function]]. This will give an attacker access to the packets and the ability to corrupt them. Denis Charles, Kamal Jain and Kristin Lauter designed a new [[homomorphic encryption]] signature scheme for use with network coding to prevent pollution attacks.<ref>{{Cite journal |citeseerx = 10.1.1.60.4738 |title = Signatures for Network Coding |year = 2006 |url = https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.60.4738 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/detailsweb/signatures_for_network_coding20211121060603/https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.60.4738 |archive-date = 2021-11-2021 |url-status = livebot: unknown |access-date = 2021-11-21 }}</ref>

The homomorphic property of the signatures allows nodes to sign any linear combination of the incoming packets without contacting the signing authority. In this scheme it is computationally infeasible for a node to sign a linear combination of the packets without disclosing what [[linear combination]] was used in the generation of the packet. Furthermore, we can prove that the signature scheme is secure under well known [[Cryptography|cryptographic]] assumptions of the hardness of the [[discrete logarithm]] problem and the computational [[Elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman]].

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==History==

Krohn, Freedman and Mazieres proposed a theory<ref>{{cite book |last1=Krohn |first1=Maxwell N. |last2=Freedman |first2=Michael J |last3=Mazières |first3=David |title=IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2004. Proceedings. 2004 |chapter=On-the-fly verification of rateless erasure codes for efficient content distribution |journal=IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2004. Proceedings. 2004 |date=2004 |pages=226–240 |doi=10.1109/SECPRI.2004.1301326 |chapter-url=https://www.cs.princeton.edu/~mfreed/docs/authcodes-sp04.pdf |access-date=17 November 2022 |___location=Berkeley, California, USA |language=en-us |issn=1081-6011|isbn=0-7695-2136-3|s2cid=6976686 }}</ref> in 2004 that if we have a hash function

<math>H : V \longrightarrow G</math> such that:

* <math>H</math> is [[Collision resistance|collision resistant]] – it is hard to find <math>x</math> and <math>y</math> such that <math>H(x) = H(y)</math>;