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{{Short description|1941 Japanese surprise attack on the United States}}
{{Infobox Military Conflict
{{Redirect|December 7, 1941|the date|December 1941#December 7, 1941 (Sunday)}}
|conflict=Attack on Pearl Harbor
{{pp-protected|small=yes}}
|partof=the [[Pacific War|Pacific Theater]] of [[World War II]]
{{pp-move|small=yes}}
|image=[[Image:Pearl Harbor bombings map.jpg|300px]]
{{Use American English|date=April 2019}}
|caption=The two attack sorties of [[Imperial Japanese Navy]] were approached from different directions. The U.S. Army radar operator spotted the Japanese attack force at 136 miles, but did not specifiy nautical or statute miles. [http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/myths/radar/lockard3.html].
{{Use mdy dates|date=August 2019}}
|date=[[December 7]], [[1941]]
{{Infobox military conflict
|place=[[Pearl Harbor]], [[Hawaii|Hawai{{okina}}i]], [[USA]]
| conflict = Attack on Pearl Harbor
|result=Decisive Japanese victory; [[Infamy Speech|United States declares war on the Empire of Japan]] and enters [[World War II]] on the side of [[Allies]]; [[Tripartite Pact#German declaration of war against the United States|Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy declare war on the United States]].
| partof = the [[Asiatic-Pacific Theater]] of [[World War II]]
|casus=<!--Sustained aggressive military expansion by [[Japan]];--> Oil and trade embargo by the [[United States]]; [[diplomacy|diplomatic]] stalemate between Japan and the US.
| image = File:Attack on Pearl Harbor Japanese planes view.jpg
|combatant1=[[Image:US_flag_48_stars.svg|20px]] [[United States]]
| image_size = 300px
|combatant2={{border|[[Image:Naval_Ensign_of_Japan.svg|20px]]}} [[Empire of Japan]]
| caption = Photograph of [[Battleship Row]] taken from a Japanese plane at the beginning of the attack. The explosion in the center is a torpedo strike on {{USS|West Virginia|BB-48|6}}.<!--see image at commons--> Two attacking Japanese planes can be seen: one over {{USS|Neosho|AO-23|6}} and one over the [[Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard|Naval Yard]].
|commander1=[[Image:US_flag_48_stars.svg|20px]][[Husband Kimmel]] <small>([[United States Navy|USN]])</small>, <br>[[Image:US_flag_48_stars.svg|20px]][[Walter Short]] <small>([[United States Army|USA]])</small>
| date = {{start date and age|1941|12|7}}
|commander2={{border|[[Image:Naval_Ensign_of_Japan.svg|20px]]}}[[Chuichi Nagumo]] <small>([[Imperial Japanese Navy|IJN]])</small>, <br>{{border|[[Image:Naval_Ensign_of_Japan.svg|20px]]}}[[Mitsuo Fuchida]] <small>([[Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service|IJNAS]])</small>, <br>{{border|[[Image:Naval_Ensign_of_Japan.svg|20px]]}}[[Shigekazu Shimazaki]] <small>([[Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service|IJNAS]])
| place = [[Oahu]], [[Territory of Hawaii]], US
|strength1=8 battleships,<br/> 8 cruisers,<br/> 29 destroyers,<br/> 9 submarines,<br/> ~50 other ships, <br/> ~390 planes
| coordinates = {{Coord|21.365|-157.950|format=dms|type:event_region:US-HI|display=inline,title}}
|strength2=6 aircraft carriers,<br/>9 destroyers,<br/>2 battleships,<br/> 2 heavy cruisers,<br/>1 light cruiser,<br/> 8 tankers,<br/> 23 fleet submarines,<br/> 5 midget submarines,<br/> 441 planes
| result = Japanese victory
|casualties1=2335 military and 68 civilians killed, <br> 1143 military and 35 civilians wounded,<br>4 battleships sunk,<br>4 battleships damaged,<br>3 cruisers damaged,<br>3 destroyers sunk,<br>2 other ships sunk,<br>188 planes destroyed,<br>155 planes damaged
* United States joins the [[United States declaration of war on Japan|Allied Forces]]
|casualties2=55 airmen, 9 submariners killed and 1 captured, <br>29 planes destroyed,<br> 4 mini-submarines sunk}}
| map_type = Hawaii#Pacific Ocean
| map_size = 300
| combatant1 = {{flag|United States|1912}}
| combatant2 = {{flagcountry|Empire of Japan}}
| commander1 = {{indented plainlist|
*[[Husband E. Kimmel]]
*[[Walter Short]]
}}
| commander2 = {{indented plainlist|
*[[Isoroku Yamamoto]]
*[[Chūichi Nagumo]]
}}
| units1 = {{indented plainlist|
*{{flagdeco|USA|1912}} [[United States Pacific Fleet|U.S. Pacific Fleet]]}}
| units2 = {{indented plainlist|
*{{flagdeco|Empire of Japan|naval}} [[1st Air Fleet]]}}
| strength1 = {{indented plainlist|
*8 [[battleship]]s
*8 [[cruiser]]s
*30 [[destroyer]]s
*4 [[submarine]]s
*73 other ships<ref>{{Citation |date=November 13, 2020 |url=https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/s/ships-present-at-pearl-harbor.html |title=Ships and District Craft Present at Pearl Harbor, 0800 7 December 1941 |website=The Navy Department Library |publisher=[[Naval History and Heritage Command]] |access-date=December 8, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211118145021/https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/s/ships-present-at-pearl-harbor.html |archive-date=November 18, 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref>{{refn|Total includes {{USCGC|Taney|WHEC-37}}, {{USCGC|Reliance|WSC-150}}, and {{USCGC|Tiger|WSC-152}}.<ref>{{Citation |last=Thiesen |first=William H. |date=December 7, 2017 |title=The Long Blue Line: The Attack on Pearl Harbor – "a date that will live in infamy" |url=http://coastguard.dodlive.mil/2017/12/the-long-blue-line-the-attack-on-pearl-harbor-a-date-that-will-live-in-infamy/ |website=Coast Guard Compass |access-date=December 8, 2017 |archive-date=December 9, 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171209100049/http://coastguard.dodlive.mil/2017/12/the-long-blue-line-the-attack-on-pearl-harbor-a-date-that-will-live-in-infamy/}}</ref><ref>{{Citation |date=2017 |title=U.S. Coast Guard Units in Hawaii: December 7, 1941 |url=https://media.defense.gov/2017/Jul/01/2001772263/-1/-1/0/PEARLHARBOR.PDF |website=media.defense.gov |access-date=December 8, 2017 |archive-date=December 9, 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171209100100/https://media.defense.gov/2017/Jul/01/2001772263/-1/-1/0/PEARLHARBOR.PDF |url-status=live}}</ref>|group=nb}}
*390 aircraft
}}
| strength2 = {{indented plainlist|
*6 [[aircraft carrier]]s
*2 battleships
*2 [[heavy cruiser]]s
*1 [[light cruiser]]
*9 destroyers
*8 tankers
*23 [[fleet submarine]]s
*5 [[midget submarine]]s
*414 [[Carrier-based aircraft|aircraft]] (353 took part in the raid)
}}
| casualties1 = {{indented plainlist|
*4 battleships sunk
*4 battleships damaged
*1 ex-battleship sunk
*1 harbor [[tug]] sunk
*3 [[light cruiser]]s damaged{{refn|Unless otherwise stated, all vessels listed were salvageable.{{sfn|Nimitz|1942}}|group=nb}}
*3 destroyers damaged
*3 other ships damaged
*188 aircraft destroyed
*159 aircraft damaged
*2,008 [[Personnel of the United States Navy|sailors]] killed
*109 [[United States Marine Corps|Marines]] killed
*218 soldiers killed<ref name=USN>{{Citation |date=December 2, 2020 |title=Overview of The Pearl Harbor Attack, 7 December 1941 |url=https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/p/the-pearl-harbor-attack-7-december-1941.html |access-date=December 8, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210602043203/https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/p/the-pearl-harbor-attack-7-december-1941.html |archive-date=June 2, 2021 |url-status=live |website=The Navy Department Library |publisher=[[Naval History and Heritage Command]]}}</ref>
*68 civilians killed<ref name=censusfactsheet /><ref name=USN />
*2,403 total killed<ref name=censusfactsheet>[https://www.census.gov/history/pdf/pearl-harbor-fact-sheet-1.pdf "A Pearl Harbor Fact Sheet"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230516060130/https://www.census.gov/history/pdf/pearl-harbor-fact-sheet-1.pdf |date=May 16, 2023 }} [[United States Census Bureau]]</ref><ref name=USN />
*1,178 military and civilians wounded<ref name=USN />
}}
| casualties2 = {{indented plainlist|
*4 [[midget submarine]]s sunk
*1 midget submarine grounded
*29 aircraft destroyed
*74 aircraft damaged
*129 killed<ref name=PHFS>{{Cite web |title=Remembering Pearl Harbor: A Pearl Harbor Fact Sheet |url=https://www.census.gov/history/pdf/pearl-harbor-fact-sheet-1.pdf |website=www.census.gov |publisher=[[The National WWII Museum]] |via=[[United States Census Bureau]]}}</ref><ref name=Kimberly>{{Cite book |last=Sarmiento |first=Kimberly |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=AsvqDQAAQBAJ |title=Events That Changed the Course of History: The Story of the Attack on Pearl Harbor 75 Years Later |date=2017-01-17 |publisher=Atlantic Publishing Company |isbn=978-1-62023-149-4 |language=en |quote=Only 129 Japanese soldiers were killed during that attack, and one was taken prisoner.}}</ref>
*[[Kazuo Sakamaki|1 sailor]] captured{{sfn|Gilbert|2004|p=272}}
}}
| notes = <div style="text-align: center;">'''Civilian casualties'''</div>{{indented plainlist|
*68 killed<ref>{{Harvnb|Gailey|1997|p=96}}: "There were 103 civilian casualties, including 68 dead."</ref><ref>{{Citation |title=Full Pearl Harbor Casualty List |publisher=USSWestVirginia.org |url=http://www.usswestvirginia.org/ph/phresults.php |access-date=December 8, 2021 |url-status=live |archive-date=January 17, 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130117104216/http://www.usswestvirginia.org/ph/phresults.php}}</ref>
*35 wounded{{sfn|Conn|Engelman|Fairchild|2000|p=194}}
*3 aircraft shot down }}
| campaignbox = {{Campaignbox Hawaiian Islands Campaign}}
{{Campaignbox Pacific 1941}}
{{Campaignbox Pacific Ocean}}
}}
{{History of Hawaii}}
 
The '''attack on Pearl Harbor'''<ref group=nb>Also known as the '''Battle of Pearl Harbor'''</ref> was a surprise [[military strike]] by the [[Empire of Japan]] on the [[United States Pacific Fleet]] at [[Naval Station Pearl Harbor|its naval base]] at [[Pearl Harbor]] on [[Oahu]], [[Territory of Hawaii|Hawaii]], on December 7, 1941. At the time, the U.S. was a [[Neutral powers during World War II|neutral country]] in [[World War II]]. The air raid on Pearl Harbor, which was launched from [[Aircraft carrier|aircraft carriers]], resulted in the U.S. declaring war on Japan the next day. The [[Imperial General Headquarters|Japanese military leadership]] referred to the attack as the '''Hawaii Operation''' and '''Operation AI''',{{refn|For the Japanese designator of Oahu.{{sfn|Wilford|2002|p=32 fn. 81}}|group=nb}} and as '''Operation Z''' during its planning.{{sfn|Fukudome|1955b}}{{sfn|Goldstein|Dillon|2000|pp=17ff}}{{sfn|Morison|2001|pp=101, 120, 250}}
The '''Attack on Pearl Harbor''' or '''Bombing of the Harbor''' was a surprise attack on the [[United States]] naval base on [[Pearl Harbor]], [[Oahu]], [[Hawaii]].
It was launched on the morning of Sunday, [[December 7]], [[1941]] ([[Hawaii-Aleutian time zone|Hawaii time]]) by the [[Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service|Empire of Japan]]'s [[1st Air Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy|1st Air Fleet]] against the [[U.S. Pacific Fleet]] and other US armed forces stationed at the harbor and also on the other side of [[Oahu]]. The attack spurred the U.S. into entering [[World War II]]. American casualties were 2403 dead and 1178 wounded;<ref>Out of over 40000 Army, Navy, and Marine personnel on the island: eight battleships with crews around 1500 each, 78 other ships, two infantry divisions, a PBY patrol wing, two fighter groups, and assorted others. See Nimitz, ''Memoirs''; Prange ''et al.'', ''December 7th 1941''; Blair, ''Silent Victory''; Willmott, ''Barrier and the Javelin''</ref>
5 obsolete<ref>Willmott, ''op. cit.''</ref> battleships, 3 destroyers, 3 cruisers, and 188 planes (mostly obsolescent P-40s or obsolete P-36s<ref>Caidin, ''Ragged, Rugged Warriors''.</ref>) were destroyed. By contrast, Japan's losses were 64 dead, 1 captured, 29 planes, and 4 midget submarines. When [[US President]] [[Franklin Roosevelt]] addressed the shocked American people, he called it "a date which will live in infamy." The date is commemorated each year in the U.S.
 
The attack on Pearl Harbor was preceded by months of negotiations between the U.S. and Japan over the future of the [[Pacific Ocean|Pacific]]. Japanese demands included that the U.S. [[ABCD line|end its sanctions against Japan]], cease aiding [[Republic of China (1912-1949)|China]] in the [[Second Sino-Japanese War]], and allow Japan to access the resources of the [[Dutch East Indies]]. Japan sent out its naval attack group on November 26, 1941, just prior to receiving the [[Hull note]], which stated the U.S. desire that Japan withdraw from China and [[French Indochina]]. [[Isoroku Yamamoto]], commander of the Japanese [[Combined Fleet]], planned the attack as a pre-emptive strike on the Pacific Fleet, based at Pearl Harbor since 1940 in order to prevent it from interfering with Japan's planned actions in [[Southeast Asia]]. Yamamoto hoped that the strike would enable Japan to make quick territorial gains and negotiate a peace. In addition to Pearl Harbor, over seven hours Japan launched coordinated attacks on the U.S.-held [[Philippines campaign (1941–1942)|Philippines]], [[Battle of Guam (1941)|Guam]], and [[Battle of Wake Island|Wake Island]]; and on the [[British Empire]] in [[Japanese invasion of Malaya|Malaya]], [[Battle of Singapore#Outbreak of war|Singapore]], and [[Battle of Hong Kong|Hong Kong]].<ref name="Gill85">{{Harvnb|Gill|1957|p=485}}</ref>
The [[Battle of the Philippines (1941-42)]], the Japanese invasion of what was then a U.S. colony, began nine hours later.
 
The attack force, commanded by [[Chūichi Nagumo]], began its attacks at 7:48{{spaces}}a.m. Hawaiian time (6:18{{spaces}}p.m. GMT) on December 7, 1941.{{refn|name=Hawaii time|In 1941, Hawaii was half an hour different from the majority of other time zones. See [[UTC−10:30]].|group=nb}} The base was attacked by 353 [[fighter aircraft|fighter]]s, [[Bomber|level and dive bomber]]s, and [[torpedo bomber]]s in two waves launched from six aircraft carriers.<ref name="parillo288">{{Harvnb|Parillo|2006|p=288}}</ref> Of the eight U.S. [[battleship]]s present, all were damaged and four were sunk. All but {{USS|Arizona|BB-39|2}} were later raised, and six were returned to service during the war. The Japanese also sank or damaged three [[cruiser]]s, three [[destroyer]]s, an anti-aircraft training ship,{{refn|{{USS|Utah|BB-31|6}}; the former battleship ''Utah'' was moored in the space intended to have been occupied by the aircraft carrier ''Enterprise'' which, returning with a task force, had been expected to enter the channel at 0730 on December 7; delayed by weather, the task force did not reach Pearl Harbor until dusk the following day.<ref>{{Harvnb|Thomas|2007|pp=57–59}}.</ref>|group=nb}} and a [[minelayer]]. More than 180 U.S. aircraft were destroyed.<ref>{{cite web |title=Pearl Harbor attack &#124; Date, History, Map, Casualties, Timeline, & Facts &#124; Britannica |url=https://www.britannica.com/event/Pearl-Harbor-attack |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220408061328/https://www.britannica.com/event/Pearl-Harbor-attack |archive-date=April 8, 2022 |access-date=11 April 2022 |website=www.britannica.com}}</ref> A total of 2,403 Americans were killed and 1,178 others were wounded, while the Japanese lost a total of 29 aircraft, five [[Midget submarine|midget submarines]], and 130 men. The three U.S. carriers stationed at Pearl Harbor were at sea at the time, and important base installations, including its oil storage and naval repair facilities, were not attacked.
==Background==
{{mainarticle|Empire of Japan}} {{catmore1|[[Causes of World War II]] }}
===Industrialization===
After the [[Meiji Restoration]], which removed the previous government among others, the [[Empire of Japan]] embarked on a rapid economic, political, and military expansion to achieve parity with the [[Europe]]an and [[North America]]n countries in terms of power. Part of this strategy included extending territorial and economic control to increase access to populations, bases, and natural resources which were thought needed to do this because of the lack of abundant resource in the Japanese islands. The rapid industrialization demanded more resources. In order to deter Western powers, Japan rapidly developed its military and economy under the [[slogan]] "National Wealth and Military Strength." Military personnel played an increasing role in policy and then in government, especially after the early years of the 20th century. Asassination, attempted coup, and internal pressure were tactics used by extreme elements in the military and elsewhere in Japanese society. Eventually, [[General]]s [[Hideki Tojo]] and [[Kuniaki Koiso]] even became Prime Ministers. From about 1910 through the 1930s, Japan became extensively militarized, in particular building a large and modern [[Imperial Japanese Navy|navy]], the third largest in the world at the time and a large and modern [[Imperial Japanese Army|army]].
 
[[Japanese declaration of war on the United States and the British Empire|Japan declared war]] on the U.S. and the British Empire later that day (December 8 in [[Tokyo]]), but the declarations were not delivered until the next day. On December 8, both the [[United Kingdom declaration of war on Japan|United Kingdom]] and [[United States declaration of war on Japan|U.S. declared war on Japan]]. On December 11, though they had no formal obligation to do so under the [[Tripartite Pact]] with Japan, [[German declaration of war against the United States (1941)|Germany]] and [[Italian declaration of war on the United States|Italy]] each declared war on the United States, which responded with a declaration of war against [[1941 United States declaration of war upon Germany|Germany]] and [[United States declaration of war upon Italy|Italy]]. While there were historical precedents for unannounced military action by Japan, the lack of a formal warning and perception that the attack had been unprovoked led U.S. president [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] to famously label December 7, 1941, "[[Day of Infamy speech|a date which will live in infamy]]". The attack was the deadliest event ever in Hawaii,<ref>{{cite web |title=The deadliest disaster to ever happen in each state |url=https://www.msn.com/en-us/travel/news/the-deadliest-disaster-to-ever-happen-in-each-state/ss-AA15iVyW?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=b852eb5146d44c5497c7b7a63e1e26f8&ei=70#image=12 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230425014953/https://www.msn.com/en-us/travel/news/the-deadliest-disaster-to-ever-happen-in-each-state/ss-AA15iVyW?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=b852eb5146d44c5497c7b7a63e1e26f8&ei=70#image=12 |archive-date=April 25, 2023 |access-date=25 April 2023 |website=MSN}}</ref> and the deadliest foreign attack on the U.S. until the [[September 11 attacks]] of 2001.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Robertson |first1=Albert |title=Attacks on American Soil: Pearl Harbor and September 11 |url=https://dp.la/primary-source-sets/attacks-on-american-soil-pearl-harbor-and-september-11 |website=Digital Public Library of America |publisher=DPLA}}</ref>
===Expansion===
[[Image:Tojo2.jpg|thumb|right|140px|[[Prime Minister of Japan]] [[Hideki Tojo]].]]
Japan looked outwards to gain resources and power. Japan's expansionist policy directly caused wars with other countries, initially with [[Korea]], [[China]] and [[Russia]], ranging from deliberate attack (eg, the [[Panay incident]]), war (against Russia and China around 1900, as part of WWI, and against China again beginning in the early 30s), to diplomatic reactions (leaving the League of Nations, threatening postures, ...) and trade restrictions (mostly by others in reaction). The largest one being the [[First Sino-Japanese War]] with China in 1894, in which Japan took control of [[Taiwan]], and the [[Russo-Japanese War]] with Russia in 1904, by which Japan gained territory in and around China, including the [[Korean peninsula]]. After [[World War I]], the [[League of Nations]] awarded Japan custody of most of Imperial Germany's possessions and colonies in [[East Asia]] and the [[Pacific]]. In 1931, Japan imposed the [[puppet state]] of [[Manchukuo]] in eastern [[Manchuria]] by force. Starting in 1937, Japan escalated its conflict with mainland China with the staged incident at the [[Marco Polo Bridge]] and started the [[Second Sino-Japanese War]].
 
{{TOC limit|limit=3}}
===Condemnation===
The attacks against china were condemned by the [[League of Nations]], U.S., the UK, Australia, and the Netherlands; all but the League had territorial interests in [[Southeast Asia]] and the [[Philippines]]. These nations also already had become aware of the military power of Japan for instance after the [[Russo-Japanese war]] when they destroyed almost all of the Russian naval power. In response to diplomatic pressures, Japan resigned from the League of Nations. Then in July 1939, the U.S. terminated the 1911 U.S.-Japan commercial treaty, an action which showed official disapproval and, more concretely, allowed the U.S. to impose trade restrictions as an additional pressure measure. Nevertheless, Japan continued the war in China and signed the [[Anti-Comintern Pact]] with [[Nazi Germany]], which formally ended [[World War I]] hostilities between the two countries and declared common interests. In 1940, Japan also signed the [[Tripartite Pact]] with Germany and [[Fascist Italy]] forming the [[Axis Powers]].
 
==Background==
These actions led the U.S. to [[embargo]] scrap metal and gasoline shipments to Japan and to close the [[Panama Canal]] to Japanese shipping. In 1941, with the acceptance (under pressure) of [[Vichy France]],{{Fact|date=February 2007}} Japan moved into northern [[Việt Nam]]. The U.S. responded by freezing Japan's assets in the U.S. and instituting a complete oil embargo.<ref>Roland H. Worth, Jr., ''No Choice But War: the United States Embargo Against Japan and the Eruption of War in the Pacific'' (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland, 1995). ISBN 0-7864-0141-9</ref> Oil was Japan's most crucial lack in resources; her own supplies were very limited -- 80% of Japan's imports came from the U.S. The Imperial Navy relied entirely on imported bunker oil stocks.<ref>Yuichi Arima, [http://www.american.edu/TED/ice/japan-oil.htm The Way to Pearl Harbor: U.S. vs Japan], ICE Case Studies Number 118, December, 2003 (accessed April 10, 2006).</ref> To secure its oil supplies, and other resources, Japanese planners had long been looking to the South, especially the [[Dutch East Indies]]. The Navy was certain any attempt to seize this region would bring the U.S. into the war. With the oil embargo, determination to seize the necessary resources increased. Planning (espionage, logistics, etc) continued.
{{Main|Prelude to the attack on Pearl Harbor}}
 
===WarDiplomacy===
[[File:Pearl Harbor looking southwest-Oct41.jpg|thumb|[[Pearl Harbor]] on October 30, 1941, a month prior to the attack, with [[Ford Island]] visible (in the center)]]
With the [[Hull note]] of [[November 26]], [[1941]], Japan's leaders decided not to cancel the Pearl Harbor attack, in planning for 10 months and in serious training for most of the year. In fact, the attack had already been finally approved at a second Imperial Conference in September, while the fleet had been assembling in the Kuriles, and indeed sailed on the day the Hull note was sent. U.S. and UK demands to back down from their actions in China and surrounding areas were perhaps seen as meaning a loss of international prestige, "[[losing face]]," losing national pride, losing everything gained in the [[Second Sino-Japanese war]], losing access to [[oil]], and losing future possibilities, despite heavy investments in the military. The economy and policy of Japan already had become war-focused and there was little opposition to militarization in the leadership. As planned, the force would execute a [[pre-emptive strike]] to gain better position when war began. On [[September 4]], [[1941]], at the second of two Imperial Conferences concerning an attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese [[Cabinet]] met in the presence of the Emperor to consider the attack plans prepared by [[Imperial General Headquarters]], which officially declared the intent of war. It was decided:
War between the [[Empire of Japan]] and the [[United States]] was seen as a possibility since the 1920s. Japan had been wary of American territorial and military expansion in the Pacific and Asia since the late 1890s, followed by the annexation of islands, such as [[Overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom|Hawaii]] and the [[Insular Government of the Philippine Islands|Philippines]], which were close to or within Japan's perceived [[sphere of influence]].{{sfn|Worth|2014}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}{{sfn|Bailey|Farber|2019}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}<ref>{{Cite news |mode=cs2 |last=Burress |first=Charles |date=July 19, 2001 |title=Biased history helps feed U.S. fascination with Pearl Harbor |work=The Japan Times |url=https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2001/07/19/commentary/world-commentary/biased-history-helps-feed-u-s-fascination-with-pearl-harbor/ |access-date=2021-02-28 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210812140356/https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2001/07/19/commentary/world-commentary/biased-history-helps-feed-u-s-fascination-with-pearl-harbor/ |archive-date=August 12, 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |mode=cs2 |title=United States Maritime Expansion across the Pacific during the 19th Century |website=Milestones: 1830–1860 |publisher=United States Department of State, Office of the Historian |url=https://history.state.gov/milestones/1830-1860/pacific-expansion |access-date=2021-02-28 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210321022956/https://history.state.gov/milestones/1830-1860/pacific-expansion |archive-date=March 21, 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref>
{{cquote|[[Empire of Japan|Our Empire]], for the purpose of self-defense and self-preservation, will complete preparations for war ... <nowiki>[</nowiki>and is<nowiki>]</nowiki> ... resolved to go to war with the [[United States]], [[Great Britain]] and the [[Netherlands]] if necessary. Our Empire will concurrently take all possible diplomatic measures vis-a-vis the United States and Great Britain, and thereby endeavor to obtain our objectives ... In the event that there is no prospect of our demands being met by the first ten days of October through the diplomatic negotiations mentioned above, we will immediately decide to commence hostilities against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands.}}
 
At the same time, Japanese strategic thinkers believed that Japan needed economic self-sufficiency in order to wage modern war. The experiences of World War I had taught the Japanese that modern wars would be protracted, require total mobilization, and create vulnerabilities for [[trade embargo]]es and encirclement. As a consequence, Japan needed access to strategically important resources (e.g., iron, oil) that could not be extracted at sufficient levels in the home islands.{{sfn|Barnhart|1987|pp=17–49}}<ref>{{Cite book |last=Iriye |first=Akira |url=https://www.routledge.com/The-Origins-of-the-Second-World-War-in-Asia-and-the-Pacific/Iriye/p/book/9780582493490 |title=The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific |date=1987 |publisher=Longman |isbn=978-0-582-49349-0 |pages=168–177 |language=en |access-date=July 21, 2023 |archive-date=July 21, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230721172204/https://www.routledge.com/The-Origins-of-the-Second-World-War-in-Asia-and-the-Pacific/Iriye/p/book/9780582493490 |url-status=live }}</ref>
==Japanese strategy and plans==
{{mainarticle|Imperial Japanese Navy|Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service}}
[[Image:Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto.jpg|thumb|[[Fleet Admiral]] [[Isoroku Yamamoto]], commander of the [[Combined Fleet]] and the architect and implementer at the throne.]]
[[Image:Naval Ensign of Japan.svg|left|thumb|200px|[[Ensign of the Imperial Japanese Navy]] and presently of [[Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force]].]]
In preparation for the expected war, planning began in early 1941 for the Pearl Harbor attack. For the next several months, planning, training, weapons development, espionage, and coordination with other plans to invade British and Dutch colonies to the South occupied much of the Japanese military's time and attention. The decision to attack, unless the U.S. agreed with the Japanese positions in China, Indochina, and elsewhere, was finalized in September 1941 at the second of the two Imperial Conferences which considered it. Preparations for attacks against Malaya, the Philippines, and assorted Pacific islands were ready by the planned date of early December.<ref name=phops/> Pearl Harbor attack planning was a part of the Japanese expectation the US would be inevitably drawn into the war after a Japanese attack against Malaya and Singapore.<ref>Peattie & Evans, ''op.cit.''</ref>
 
Although Japan had begun to take a hostile stance against the United States after the rejection of the [[Racial Equality Proposal]],<ref>{{Cite news |mode=cs2 |last1=Axelrod |first1=Josh |date=August 11, 2019 |title=A Century Later: The Treaty Of Versailles And Its Rejection Of Racial Equality |website=NPR |url=https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2019/08/11/742293305/a-century-later-the-treaty-of-versailles-and-its-rejection-of-racial-equality |access-date=2021-02-28 |archive-date=April 13, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210413202236/https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2019/08/11/742293305/a-century-later-the-treaty-of-versailles-and-its-rejection-of-racial-equality |url-status=live}}</ref> their relationship was cordial enough to remain trading partners.{{sfn|Lauren|1978}}<ref name="PaW-94,96">{{Harvnb|Department of State|1943|pp=94, 96}}</ref> Tensions did not seriously grow until [[Japanese invasion of Manchuria|Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931]]. Over the next decade, Japan expanded into [[Republic of China (1912–1949)|China]], leading to the [[Second Sino-Japanese War]] in 1937. Japan spent considerable effort trying to isolate China and endeavored to secure enough independent resources to attain victory on the mainland. The "[[Nanshin-ron|Southern Operation]]" was designed to assist these efforts.{{sfn|Bailey|Farber|2019}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}{{sfn|Barnhart|1987}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}} Nevertheless, Japan would still rely heavily on U.S. oil imports, including to Japanese forces in [[Manchukuo|Japan-occupied Manchuria]].<ref name=teaglejapan>{{cite web|url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1934v03/d649|title=Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) of a Conversation With the President of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey (Walter C. Teagle)|author=Office of the Historian|publisher=U.S State Department|date=October 24, 1934|accessdate=January 18, 2025}}</ref> In a memorandum dated October 24, 1934, Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs [[Stanley K. Hornbeck]] discussed his meeting with [[ExxonMobil|Standard Oil New Jersey]] head [[Walter C. Teagle]] to U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The memo described that Teagle was uncooperative with U.S. recommendations and how Standard Oil was given special treatment by the Japanese government, which made the company less subject to Japan's national business regulation policies than other companies.<ref name=teaglejapan /> Hornbeck noted in the memorandum that as a result of Teagle's business dealings with Japan, "the major portion of the petroleum and petroleum products now imported into Japan is of American origin."<ref name=teaglejapan />
The intent of the pre-emptive strike on Pearl Harbor was to neutralize [[U.S. Pacific Fleet|American naval power]] in the Pacific, if only for a year or so. After approval at the first Imperial Conference the plan was incorporated into a [[theater (warfare)|theater]]-wide, near-simultaneous coordinated attack against several different countries, to be carried out if the differences with the United States could not be resolved. Thus, the future of Imperial Japan hinged on her successfully dealing with the Pacific Fleet. The difficulties of such an attack were twofold. First, the Pacific Fleet was a formidable force, and would not be easy to defeat or to surprise, thus decreasing chances of success. Second, for aerial attack, Pearl Harbor's shallow waters made using conventional air-dropped [[torpedo]]es ineffective. On the other hand, Hawaii's isolation meant that a successful surprise attack could not be blocked by forces from the continental US.
 
Starting in December 1937, events such as the Japanese attack on [[USS Panay incident|USS ''Panay'']], the [[John Moore Allison|Allison incident]], and the [[Nanking Massacre]] swung Western public opinion sharply against Japan. The United States unsuccessfully proposed a joint action with the United Kingdom to blockade Japan.<ref>{{Harvnb|Gruhl|2007|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ow5Wlmu9MPQC&pg=PA39 39]}}</ref> In 1938, following an appeal by President Roosevelt, American companies stopped providing Japan with implements of war.<ref>{{Harvnb|Gruhl|2007|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ow5Wlmu9MPQC&pg=PA40 40]}}</ref>
===Strategic concepts===
Several Japanese naval officers had been impressed by British Admiral [[Andrew Browne Cunningham, 1st Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope|Andrew Cunningham]]'s Operation ''<small>JUDGEMENT</small>'' (the [[Battle of Taranto]]), in which 20 [[obsolescent]] [[Fairey Swordfish]], launched from a [[aircraft carrier]] far from the main British base at [[Alexandria, Egypt|Alexandria]], disabled half the [[Regia Marina|Italian fleet]]. Admiral [[Isoroku Yamamoto]] dispatched a naval study delegation to Italy, which concluded a larger and better-supported version of Cunningham's strike could force the U.S. Pacific Fleet to retreat to bases in California, thus giving Japan the time and space she needed to erect a "barrier" defense to protect her control of the resources (especially oil) of Southeast Asia and the [[Dutch East Indies]]. Most important, the delegation returned to Japan with information about the shallow running torpedoes Cunningham's engineers had devised.
 
In 1940, [[Japanese invasion of French Indochina|Japan invaded French Indochina]], attempting to stymie the flow of supplies reaching China. The United States halted shipments of airplanes, parts, [[machine tool]]s, and [[Avgas|aviation gasoline]] to Japan, which the latter perceived as an unfriendly act.{{refn|After it was announced in September that iron and steel scrap export would also be prohibited, Japanese Ambassador Horinouchi protested to Secretary Hull on October 8, 1940, warning this might be considered an "unfriendly act".<ref name="PaW-96">{{Harvnb|Department of State|1943|p=96}}</ref>|group=nb}} The United States did not stop oil exports, however, partly because of the prevailing sentiment in Washington that given Japanese dependence on American oil, such an action was likely to be considered an extreme provocation.{{sfn|Worth|2014}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}<ref name="PaW-94">{{Harvnb|Department of State|1943|p=94}}</ref>
Some Japanese strategists may have been influenced by U.S. Admiral [[Harry Yarnell]]'s approach in the 1932 joint Army-Navy exercises, which assumed an invasion of Hawai{{okina}}i. Yarnell, as commander of the attacking force, placed his carriers northwest of O{{okina}}ahu in rough weather and launched "attack" planes on the morning of Sunday, [[February 7]], [[1932]]. The exercise's umpires noted Yarnell's aircraft were able to inflict serious "damage" on the defenders, who for 24 hours after the attack were unable to locate his fleet. Yarnell's tactic was dismissed as impractical, since ISN doctrine (like other navies') held any attacking force would be destroyed by the battleship force (the "battle line").
 
In mid-1940, President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] moved the Pacific Fleet from [[San Diego]] to Hawaii.<ref>{{cite news |mode=cs2 |last=Belair |first=Felix Jr. |date=June 23, 1940 |title=Shift of Our Fleet to Atlantic Studied |newspaper=The New York Times |url=https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1940/06/23/113094328.pdf |url-access=subscription |access-date=March 28, 2018 }}. "Except for the Atlantic Battle Squadron, the entire fleet is now in the Pacific, based at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii."</ref> He also ordered a military buildup in the [[Commonwealth of the Philippines|Philippines]], taking both actions in the hope of discouraging Japanese aggression in the Far East. Because the Japanese high command was mistakenly certain any attack on the [[List of former European colonies#Asia-Pacific|United Kingdom's Southeast Asian colonies]], including Singapore,<ref>{{Cite news |mode=cs2 |last=Harper |first=Tim |date=August 7, 2009 |title=Japan's Gigantic Second World War Gamble |newspaper=The Guardian |issn=0261-3077 |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/07/japan-imperialism-militarism |access-date=December 7, 2016 |url-status=live |archive-date=August 24, 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190824111258/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/07/japan-imperialism-militarism}}</ref> would bring the United States into the war, a devastating preventive strike appeared to be the only way to prevent American naval interference.{{sfn|Evans|Peattie|1997}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}} An [[Philippines campaign (1941–1942)|invasion of the Philippines]] was also considered necessary by Japanese war planners. The American [[War Plan Orange]] had envisioned defending the Philippines with an elite force of 40,000 men; this option was never implemented due to opposition from [[Douglas MacArthur#Field Marshal of the Philippine Army|Douglas MacArthur]], who felt he would need a force ten times that size.{{citation needed|date=August 2019}} By 1941, American planners expected to have to abandon the Philippines at the outbreak of war. Late that year, Admiral [[Thomas C. Hart]], commander of the [[United States Asiatic Fleet]], was given orders to that effect.{{sfn|Miller|2007|p=63}}
Primarily, Yamamoto’s idea for a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was inspired by his hero, Fleet Admiral Marquis [[Tōgō Heihachirō]], who in 1904 had, with no declaration of war, attacked the Second Russian Pacific Squadron at the [[Battle of Port Arthur]] in the [[Russo-Japanese War]]. The Russians lost two battleships and several cruisers, and never fully recovered. A year later, a young Ensign Yamamoto was injured in the [[Battle of Tsushima]], where the Japanese destroyed almost the entire Russian fleet.<ref>John Toland, ''The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire 1936-1945'', Random House, 1970, p. 150</ref>
 
The United States finally ceased oil exports to Japan in July 1941, following the seizure of French Indochina<ref>[https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-P-Strategy/Strategy-5.html Chapter V: The Decision for War] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130525064812/https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-P-Strategy/Strategy-5.html|date=May 25, 2013}} Morton, Louis. ''Strategy and Command: The First Two Years'' 1961</ref> after the [[Fall of France]], in part because of new American restrictions on domestic oil consumption.<ref name="PaW-125">{{Harvnb|Department of State|1943|p=125}}</ref> Because of this decision, Japan proceeded with [[Dutch East Indies campaign|plans to take the oil-rich Dutch East Indies]].{{refn|This was mainly a Japanese Navy preference; the Japanese Army would have chosen to attack the Soviet Union.{{sfn|Evans|Peattie|1997}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}{{sfn|Hayashi|1959}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}|group=nb}} On August 17, Roosevelt warned Japan that America was prepared to take opposing steps if "neighboring countries" were attacked.{{sfn|Matloff|Snell|1980|p=69}}
===Intelligence and reconnaissance===
On [[February 3]], [[1940]], Yamamoto briefed Captain Kanji Ogawa of Naval Intelligence on the attack plan, asking him to start intelligence gathering on [[Pearl Harbor]]. Ogawa already had spies in Hawaii, including Japanese Consular officials with an intelligence remit, and he arranged for help from a German (and perhaps family members) already living in Hawaii who were [[Abwehr]] agents. None had been providing much specifically militarily useful information. He planned to add 29-year-old Ensign [[Takeo Yoshikawa]]. By the spring of 1941, Yamamoto officially made a request for additional Hawaiian intelligence, and Yoshikawa boarded the liner ''Nitta-maru'' at [[Yokohama]]. He had grown his hair longer than military length, and assumed the cover name Tadashi Morimura.<ref>Toland, ''ibid'', p.152-53</ref>
 
Japan and the United States engaged in negotiations during 1941, attempting to improve relations. In the course of these negotiations, Japan offered to withdraw from most of China and Indochina after making peace with the Nationalist government. It also proposed to adopt an independent interpretation of the [[Tripartite Pact]] and to refrain from trade discrimination, provided all other nations reciprocated. Washington rejected these proposals. Japanese Prime Minister [[Fumimaro Konoe|Konoe]] then offered to meet with Roosevelt, but Roosevelt insisted on reaching an agreement before any meeting.{{sfn|Matloff|Snell|1980}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}<ref>{{Harvnb|Morton|1962|loc=[http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-P-Strategy/Strategy-4.html ch. IV: The Fatal Turn]}}</ref> The American ambassador to Japan repeatedly urged Roosevelt to accept the meeting, warning that it was the only way to preserve the conciliatory Konoe government and peace in the Pacific.{{sfn|Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack – "Review of the Diplomatic Conversations"|1946|p=[http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/congress/app-d.html#314 314]}} However, his recommendation was not acted upon. The Konoe government collapsed the following month when the Japanese military rejected a withdrawal of all troops from China.<ref name="Chapter V: The Decision for War">{{Harvnb|Morton|1962|loc=[http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-P-Strategy/Strategy-5.html ch. V: The Decision for War]}}</ref>
Yoshikawa began gathering intelligence in earnest by taking auto trips around the main islands, and toured [[Oahu]] in a small plane, posing as a tourist. He visited Pearl Harbor every day, sketching the harbor and ___location of ships from the crest of a hill. Once, he gained access to [[Hickam Air Force Base|Hickam Field]] in a taxi, memorizing the number of planes, pilots, hangars, barracks and soldiers. He was also able to discover Sunday was the day on which the largest number of ships were likely to be in the harbor, [[PBY Catalina|PBY]] patrol planes went out every morning and evening, and there was an antisubmarine net in the mouth of the harbor.<ref>Toland, ''ibid'', p. 167</ref> Information was returned to Japan in coded form in Consular communications and by direct delivery to intelligence officers aboard Japanese ships calling at Hawaii by consulate staff.
 
Japan's final proposal, delivered on November 20, offered to withdraw from southern Indochina and to refrain from attacks in Southeast Asia, so long as the United States, United Kingdom, and Netherlands supplied {{convert|1|e6USgal|e6L|abbr=off|sp=us|spell=in}} of aviation fuel, lifted their sanctions against Japan, and ceased aid to China.<ref>{{Cite web |website=www.cv6.org |title=Battle Order Number One: Nov. 28, 1941 |url=http://www.cv6.org/1941/btlord1/btlord1.htm |access-date=March 2, 2020 |archive-date=March 2, 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200302183032/http://www.cv6.org/1941/btlord1/btlord1.htm |url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Chapter V: The Decision for War"/> The American counter-proposal of November 26 (November 27 in Japan), the [[Hull note]], required Japan to completely evacuate China without conditions and conclude non-aggression pacts with Pacific powers. On November 26 in Japan, the day before the note's delivery, the Japanese task force left port for [[Pearl Harbor]].<ref>{{cite book | title=Beyond Pearl Harbor: A Pacific History | publisher=University Press of Kansas | author=Bailey, Beth L. | year=2019 | pages=74 | isbn=9780700628131}}</ref>
===Early planning===
[[Image:Minoru Genda.jpg|250px|thumb|[[Major General]] [[Minoru Genda]] planned the attack.]]
 
The Japanese intended the attack as a [[Preventive war|preventive action]] to keep the [[United States Pacific Fleet]] from interfering with their planned military actions in [[Southeast Asia]] against overseas territories of the [[United Kingdom]], the [[Netherlands]], and the United States. Over the course of seven hours, there were coordinated Japanese attacks on the American-held [[Philippines campaign (1941–1942)|Philippines]], [[Battle of Guam (1941)|Guam]], and [[Battle of Wake Island|Wake Island]] and on the [[British Empire]] in [[Japanese invasion of Malaya|Malaya]], [[Battle of Singapore#Outbreak of war|Singapore]], and [[Battle of Hong Kong|Hong Kong]].<ref name=Gill85/> From the Japanese point of view, it was seen as a preemptive strike "before the oil gauge ran empty."{{sfn|Worth|2014}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}
Minoru Genda said about the overall idea of the attack
{{cquote|In the event of outbreak of war with the United States, there would be little prospect of our operations succeeding unless, at the very outset, we can deal a crushing blow to the main force of the American Fleet in Hawaiian waters by using the full strength of the [[1st Air Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy|1st]] and 2nd Air Squadrons against it, and thus to preclude the possibility of the American Fleet advancing to take the offensive in the Western Pacific for some time...We must use the entire [[Combined Fleet|carrier strength]] that we have.}}
In early 1941, Combined Fleet Commander-in-Chief Yamamoto began considering an attack on Pearl Harbor as a [[preemptive war|preemptive]] attack in the event of war. After some conflict with Naval General Headquarters and threatening to [[resign]], he was authorized to create the [[Carrier Striking Task Force]], and assigned [[Minoru Genda]] to develop the plan. Genda's plan stressed that surprise would be essential, given the expected balance of forces. <!-- 1st and 2nd squadrons redacted: ~~ --> Yamamoto obtained permission to begin formal planning and training exercises for the proposed attack. <!-- timeline of approval redacted: ~~ --> By April 1941, the Pearl Harbor plan became known as ''Operation Z'',{{Fact|date=March 2007}} after the famous Z signal given by Admiral [[Tōgō Heihachirō]] at the [[Battle of Tsushima]]: ''On this one battle rests the fate of our nation. Let every man do his utmost''.<ref>John Toland, ''ibid'', p. 154</ref>
 
===Military planning===
Over the summer, pilots trained in earnest on the Japanese island of [[Kyūshū]]. Captain Genda chose [[Kagoshima City]] for a training area because its geography and infrastructure presented most of the same problems torpedo bombers would face at Pearl Harbor. In training, each crew would fly over the 5000-foot (1500m) mountain behind Kagoshima, dive down into the city, dodging buildings and smokestacks before dropping to an altitude of 25 feet (7m) at the piers. The bombardier would release a torpedo at a breakwater some 300 yards (270m) away.<ref>John Toland, ''ibid'', p. 160</ref>
[[File:Japanese attack plan at Pearl Harbor, Japan, 1941.jpg|thumb|The [[Empire of Japan]]'s 1941 attack plan on [[Pearl Harbor]]]]
Preliminary planning for an attack on Pearl Harbor to protect the move into the "Southern Resource Area", the Japanese term for the Dutch East Indies and Southeast Asia generally, began early in 1941 under the auspices of Admiral [[Isoroku Yamamoto]], then commanding Japan's [[Combined Fleet]].<ref name=Gailey1997p68>{{Harvnb|Gailey|1997|p=68}}</ref><ref>[https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-resources/spotlight-primary-source/japanese-announcement-attack-pearl-harbor-1941 ''Japanese announcement of the attack at Pearl Harbor, 1941.''], "History Resources", The Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History, New York (USA), retrieved 18. Dezember 2023.</ref> He won assent to formal planning and training for an attack from the [[Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff]] only after much contention with Naval Headquarters, including a threat to resign his command.<ref name=Gailey1997p70>{{Harvnb|Gailey|1997|p=70}}</ref> Full-scale planning was underway by early spring 1941, primarily by Rear Admiral [[Ryūnosuke Kusaka]], with assistance from Commander [[Minoru Genda]] and Yamamoto's Deputy Chief of Staff, Captain Kameto Kuroshima.<ref>{{Harvnb|Lord|1957|pp=12–14}}</ref> The planners studied the [[Battle of Taranto|1940 British air attack on the Italian fleet]] at [[Taranto]] intensively.{{refn|"The Dorn report did not state with certainty that Kimmel and Short knew about Taranto. There is, however, no doubt that they did know, as did the Japanese. Lieutenant Commander Takeshi Naito, the assistant [[Military attaché|naval attaché]] to Berlin, flew to Taranto to investigate the attack first hand, and Naito subsequently had a lengthy conversation with Commander [[Mitsuo Fuchida]] about his observations. Fuchida led the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941."<ref>{{Harvnb|Borch|Martinez|2005|pp=53–54}}.</ref>|group=nb}}{{refn|"A [[torpedo bomber]] needed a long, level flight, and when released, its conventional torpedo would plunge nearly a hundred feet deep before swerving upward to strike a hull. Pearl Harbor deep averages 42 feet. But the Japanese borrowed an idea from the British carrier-based torpedo raid on the Italian naval base of Taranto. They fashioned auxiliary wooden tail fins to keep the torpedoes horizontal, so they would dive to only 35 feet, and they added a breakaway "nosecone" of soft wood to cushion the impact with the surface of the water."<ref>{{Harvnb|Gannon|1996|p=49}}</ref>|group=nb}}
 
Over the next several months, pilots were trained, equipment was adapted, and intelligence was collected. Despite these preparations, Emperor [[Hirohito]] did not approve the attack plan until November 5, after the third of four [[Gozen Kaigi|Imperial Conferences]] called to consider the matter.<ref>{{Harvnb|Wetzler|1998|p=39}}.</ref> At first, he hesitated to engage in war but eventually authorized the Pearl Harbor strike despite dissent from certain advisors.<ref name = "nuclearm">{{cite web | url=https://ahf.nuclearmuseum.org/ahf/profile/emperor-hirohito/#:~:text=The%20emperor%27s%20office%20signed%20off,his%20ability%20to%20do%20so | title=Emperor Hirohito - Nuclear Museum }}</ref> Final authorization was not given by the emperor until December 1, after a majority of Japanese leaders advised him the Hull note would "destroy the fruits of the China incident, endanger Manchukuo and undermine Japanese control of Korea".<ref>{{Harvnb|Bix|2000|p=417}}, citing the Sugiyama memo</ref> Before the attack, he became more involved in military matters, even joining the Conference of Military Councillors, which was considered unusual for him.<ref name="nuclearm"/> Additionally, he actively sought more information about the war plans.<ref name="nuclearm"/> According to an aide, he openly displayed happiness upon hearing about the success of the surprise attacks.<ref name="nuclearm"/>
Yet even skimming the water would not solve the problem of torpedoes bottoming in the shallow waters of Pearl Harbor. Japan created and tested modifications allowing successful shallow water drops. The effort resulted in a heavily modified version of the [[Type 91 torpedo]] which would inflict most of the ship damage. Japanese weapons technicians also produced special [[armor-piercing bomb]]s by fitting fins and release shackles to 14 and 16 inch (356 and 406 mm) naval shells. These were able to penetrate the armored decks of battleships and cruisers.
 
By late 1941, many observers believed that hostilities between the United States and Japan were imminent. A [[Gallup poll]] just before the attack on Pearl Harbor found that 52% of Americans expected war with Japan, 27% did not, and 21% had no opinion.<ref name="cipo19411208">{{cite news |url=https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=RPcuAAAAIBAJ&pg=5721%2C1471377 |title=Gallup Poll Found 52 p.c. of Americans Expected War |work=Ottawa Citizen |date=December 8, 1941 |access-date=November 28, 2011 |author=The Canadian Institute of Public Opinion |page=1 |url-status=live |archive-date=August 12, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210812143117/https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=RPcuAAAAIBAJ&pg=5721%2C1471377}}</ref> While American Pacific bases and facilities had been placed on alert on many occasions, officials doubted Pearl Harbor would be the first target; instead, they expected the Philippines to be attacked first. This presumption was due to the threat that the air bases throughout the country and the naval base at Manila posed to sea lanes, as well as to the shipment of supplies to Japan from territory to the south.{{refn|Noted by [[Arthur MacArthur Jr.|Arthur MacArthur]] in the 1890s.{{sfn|Manchester|1978|p={{page needed|date=December 2021}}}}|group=nb}} They also incorrectly believed that Japan was not capable of mounting more than one major naval operation at a time.{{sfn|Evans|Peattie|1997}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}
On a beach in Kagoshima Bay, Lieutenant Heijiro Abe, commander of ten high-level bombers, used lime to draw an outline of a battleship in the sand. He ordered his men to drop dummy bombs on it. Only he knew it was the outline of the battleship [[USS California (BB-44)|''California'']].<ref>John Toland, ''ibid'', p. 163</ref>
 
===Objectives===
==Japanese navy orders, directives and organization==
[[File:PearlHarborCarrierChart.jpg|thumb|The route followed by the Japanese fleet to Pearl Harbor and back]]
[[Image:OsaNag.jpg|center|left|150px|thumb|[[Fleet Admiral]] and [[General Staff]] [[Osami Nagano]].]]
[[File:A6M2 on carrier Akagi 1941.jpeg|thumb|An Imperial Japanese Navy [[Mitsubishi A6M Zero]] fighter on the aircraft carrier ''[[Japanese aircraft carrier Akagi|Akagi]]'']]
On December 1, 1941 [[Fleet Admiral]] and [[General Staff]] [[Osami Nagano]] gave a verbal directive to Yamamoto, declaring:
The Japanese attack had several major aims. First, it intended to destroy important American fleet units, thereby preventing the Pacific Fleet from interfering with the Japanese conquest of the Dutch East Indies and Malaya and enabling Japan to conquer Southeast Asia without interference. The leaders of the [[Imperial Japanese Navy]] (IJN) subscribed to [[Alfred Thayer Mahan]]'s "[[decisive battle]]" doctrine, especially that of destroying the maximum number of battleships. Second, it was hoped to buy time for Japan to consolidate its position and increase its naval strength before shipbuilding authorized by the 1940 [[Two-Ocean Navy Act|Vinson-Walsh Act]] erased any chance of victory.<ref name=Willmott14>{{Harvnb|Willmott|1983|p=14}}.</ref><ref>{{Harvnb|Fukudome|1955|p=150}}</ref> Third, to deliver a blow to America's ability to mobilize its forces in the Pacific, battleships were chosen as the main targets, since they were the prestige ships of navies at the time.<ref name=Willmott14/> Finally, it was hoped that the attack would undermine American morale to such an extent that the American government would drop its demands contrary to Japanese interests and seek a peace compromise.{{sfn|Prange|Goldstein|Dillon|1981}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}{{sfn|Zimm|2011}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}
{{cquote|[[Japan]] has decided to open hostilities against the [[United States]], [[Great Britain]], and the [[Netherlands]] early in December...Should it appear certain that Japanese-American negotiations will reach an amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostilities, it is understood that all elements of the [[Combined Fleet]] are to be assembled and returned to their bases in accordance with separate orders.<ref name=phops/>}}
 
Striking the Pacific Fleet at anchor in Pearl Harbor had two distinct disadvantages: the targeted ships would be in very shallow water, so it would be relatively easy to salvage and possibly repair them, and most of the crews would survive the attack since many would be on [[shore leave]] or would be rescued from the harbor. A further important disadvantage was the absence of all three Pacific Fleet aircraft carriers ({{USS|Enterprise|CV-6|2}}, {{USS|Lexington|CV-2|2}}, and {{USS|Saratoga|CV-3|2}}). Despite these concerns, Yamamoto decided to press ahead.{{sfn|Evans|Peattie|1997}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}{{sfn|Willmott|1983}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}{{sfn|Blair|1975}}{{page needed|date=October 2015}}
<!-- This section of directives needs clean up and clarification. Can't do it alone: -->
The ''Kido Butai'''s (Striking Force) objective was to
{{cquote|proceed to the Hawaiian Area with utmost secrecy and, at the outbreak of the war, will launch a resolute surprise attack on and deal a fatal blow to the enemy fleet in the [[Hawaii]]an Area. The initial air attack is scheduled at 0330 hours, X Day.<ref name=phops>[[United States Army|US Army]]. [http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/monos Japanese monograph] #97''. [http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/monos/097/ Pearl Harbor Operations: General Outline of Orders and Plans, 5 November to 2 December 1941]''. Washington, DC: [[United States Department of the Army|US dept of the Army]].</ref>}}
 
Japanese confidence in their ability to win a short war meant that other targets in the harbor, especially the navy yard, oil tank farms and submarine base, were left unscathed<!--not exactly ignored: commanders debated another attack to get them, but it was seen as being too risky-->, since by their thinking the war would be over before the influence of these facilities would be felt.{{sfn|Willmott|1983}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}
Upon completion, the force was to return to Japan, re-equip, and re-deploy for "Second Period Operations".
 
==Approach and attack==
Finally, Order number 9, issued on [[1 December]] [[1941]] by Osami Nagano commanded Yamamoto to
{{See also|Order of battle of the Attack on Pearl Harbor}}
{{cquote|... smash the enemy fleets and air forces in the Orient and at the same time will intercept and annihilate enemy fleets should they come to attack us ... occupy immediately the key bases of the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands in East Asia ... [and] capture and secure the key areas of the southern regions.<ref name=phops/>}}
[[File:Kirishima Kaga and Hiei at Hitokappu.jpg|thumb|Part of the Japanese task force on November 22, 1941, prior to its departure]]
On November 26, 1941, a Japanese task force (the [[Kido Butai|Striking Force]]) of six aircraft carriers{{snd}}{{ship|Japanese aircraft carrier|Akagi||2}}, {{ship|Japanese aircraft carrier|Kaga||2}}, {{ship|Japanese aircraft carrier|Sōryū||2}}, {{ship|Japanese aircraft carrier|Hiryū||2}}, {{ship|Japanese aircraft carrier|Shōkaku||2}}, and {{ship|Japanese aircraft carrier|Zuikaku||2}}{{snd}}departed [[Kasatka Bay|Hittokapu Bay]] on [[Iturup|Etorofu]] (now Iterup) Island in the [[Kuril Islands]], ''en route'' to a position northwest of Hawaii, intending to launch its 408 aircraft to attack Pearl Harbor: 360 for the two attack waves and 48 on defensive [[combat air patrol]] (CAP), including nine fighters from the first wave.
 
The first wave was to be the primary attack, while the second wave was to attack carriers as its first objective and cruisers as its second, with battleships as the third target.<ref>{{Harvnb|Zimm|2011|p=132}}</ref> The first wave carried most of the weapons designed to attack capital ships, mainly specially adapted [[Type 91 torpedo|Type 91]] [[aerial torpedo]]es which were designed with an anti-roll mechanism and a rudder extension that let them operate in shallow water.<ref>{{Harvnb|Peattie|2001|p=145}}</ref> The aircrews were ordered to select the highest-value targets (battleships and [[aircraft carrier]]s) or, if these were not present, any other high-value ships (cruisers and destroyers). First-wave [[dive bomber]]s were to attack ground targets. Fighters were ordered to strafe and destroy as many parked aircraft as possible to ensure they did not intercept the bombers, especially in the first wave. When the fighters' fuel got low, they were to refuel aboard the aircraft carriers and return to combat. Fighters were to assume CAP duties where needed, especially over American airfields.{{citation needed|date = September 2014}}
===Carrier Strike Task Force (Kido Butai)===
{{main|Carrier Striking Task Force}}
[[Image:AkagiDeckApril42.jpg|200px|thumb|left|Akagi in April, 1942|Imperial Japanese Navy's aircraft carrier [[Akagi]]]]
On [[November 26]] [[1941]], the [[carrier battle group]] commanded by Vice Admiral [[Chuichi Nagumo]] (composed of six [[aircraft carrier]]s, two [[battleship]]s, three [[cruiser]]s, nine [[destroyer]]s, 23 fleet [[submarines]], five [[midget submarine]]s, 441 [[planes]], and eight [[Tanker (ship)|oiler]]s) left [[Etorofu|Hitokappu Wan]] in the [[Kuril Islands]] bound for Hawai{{okina}}i under strict [[radio]] silence. It was the most powerful carrier force with the greatest aerial striking power the world had seen to date [http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-ja1.htm].
 
Before the attack commenced, the Imperial Japanese Navy launched reconnaissance [[floatplanes]] from [[heavy cruiser]]s {{ship|Japanese cruiser|Chikuma|1938|2}} and {{ship|Japanese cruiser|Tone|1937|2}}, to scout Oahu and Lahaina Roads, Maui, respectively, with orders to report on American fleet composition and ___location.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/usar/scrs/scrs2t.htm | title=Japanese Naval Aircraft at Pearl Harbor | publisher=National Park Service | work=21 April 2001 | accessdate=13 April 2024}}</ref> Reconnaissance aircraft flights risked alerting the Americans,<ref>{{Harvnb|Zimm|2011|pp=173, 174}}</ref> and were not necessary. Fleet composition and preparedness information in Pearl Harbor were already known from the reports of the Japanese spy [[Takeo Yoshikawa]]. A report of the absence of the American fleet at Lahaina anchorage off Maui was received from the ''Tone''{{'}}s floatplane and the fleet submarine {{Nowrap|{{Jsub|I-72||2}}}}.<ref>{{Harvnb|Zimm|2011|p=153}}</ref> Another four scout planes patrolled the area between the Japanese carrier force (the [[Kidō Butai]]) and [[Niihau]], to detect any counterattack.<ref name="DiGiulian OOB">{{Harvnb|DiGiulian|2021}}</ref>
[[Image:Mitsubishi Zero-Yasukuni.jpg|right|thumb|200px|Mitsubishi A6M5 Type 0.]]
 
===Submarines===
The aircraft carriers were [[Japanese aircraft carrier Akagi|''Akagi'']] ([[flagship|flag]]), [[Japanese aircraft carrier Kaga|''Kaga'']], [[Japanese aircraft carrier Shōkaku|''Shōkaku'']], [[Japanese aircraft carrier Zuikaku|''Zuikaku'']], and the newest, [[Japanese aircraft carrier Sōryū|''Sōryū'']] and [[Japanese aircraft carrier Hiryū|''Hiryū'']]. Two fast [[battleship]]s, 2 [[heavy cruiser]]s, 1 [[light cruiser]], 9 [[destroyer]]s, and 3 fleet submarines provided escort for the task force. The carriers had a total of 423{{Fact|date=February 2007}} planes, including [[Mitsubishi Zero|Mitsubishi A6M Type 0]] [[Fighter aircraft|fighter]]s (Allied codename "Zeke", commonly called "Zero"), [[Nakajima B5N|Nakajima B5N Type 97]] [[torpedo bomber]]s (Allied codename "Kate"), and [[Aichi D3A|Aichi D3A Type 99]] [[dive bomber]]s (Allied codename "Val"). Japan's task force, and its air group, were larger than any prior aircraft carrier-based strike force. In addition, the Advanced Expeditionary Force included 20 [[fleet submarine]]s and five two-man [[Ko-hyoteki class submarine|''Ko-hyoteki'']]-class [[midget submarine]]s which were to gather intelligence and sink any U.S. vessels attempting to flee Pearl Harbor during or after the attack.
Fleet submarines {{Jsub|I-16||2}}, {{Jsub|I-18||2}}, {{Jsub|I-20||2}}, {{Jsub|I-22|1938|2}}, and {{Jsub|I-24|1939|2}} each embarked a [[Ko-hyoteki class submarine|Type A]] [[midget submarine]] for transport to the waters off Oahu.<ref name="Stewart1974p56">{{harvnb|Stewart|1974|p=56}}</ref> The five I-boats left [[Kure Naval District]] on November 25, 1941.<ref name="Stewart1974p56"/> On December 6, they came to within {{cvt|10|nmi|km mi}} of the mouth of Pearl Harbor<ref>{{Harvnb|Goldstein|Dillon|2000|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=q2pFnALHfykC&pg=PA146 146]}}</ref> and launched their midget subs at about 01:00 local time on December 7.<ref name="Stewart1974p57">{{harvnb|Stewart|1974|p=57}}</ref> At 03:42 Hawaiian time, the [[Minesweeper (ship)|minesweeper]] {{USS|Condor|AMc-14|2}} spotted a midget submarine periscope southwest of the Pearl Harbor entrance buoy and alerted the destroyer {{USS|Ward|DD-139|2}}.<ref>{{Harvnb|Smith|1999|p=36}}</ref><ref name="Stewart1974p58">{{harvnb|Stewart|1974|p=58}}</ref> The midget may have entered Pearl Harbor. However, ''Ward'' sank another midget submarine at 06:37<ref name="Stewart1974p58"/>{{refn|She was located by a [[University of Hawaiʻi]] research submersible on August 28, 2002, in {{cvt|400|m|ft}} of water, {{cvt|6|nmi|km}} outside the harbor.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.soest.hawaii.edu/HURL/gallery/archaeology/midget.html |title=Japanese Midget Submarine |access-date=January 20, 2014 |archive-url=https://archive.today/20121212152317/http://www.soest.hawaii.edu/HURL/gallery/archaeology/midget.html |archive-date=December 12, 2012 }}</ref>|group=nb}} in the first American shots in the Pacific Theater. A midget submarine on the north side of [[Ford Island]] missed the [[seaplane tender]] {{USS|Curtiss|AV-4|2}} with her first torpedo and missed the attacking destroyer {{USS|Monaghan|DD-354|2}} with her other one before being sunk by ''Monaghan'' at 08:43.<ref name="Stewart1974p58"/>
 
A third midget submarine, ''[[HA. 19 (Japanese Midget Submarine)|Ha-19]]'', grounded twice, once outside the harbor entrance and again on the east side of Oahu, where it was captured on December 8.<ref>{{harvnb|Stewart|1974|pp=59–61}}</ref> Ensign [[Kazuo Sakamaki]] swam ashore and was captured by [[Hawaii National Guard]] Corporal [[David Akui]], becoming the first Japanese [[prisoner of war]].{{refn|While the nine sailors who died in the attack were quickly lionized by the Japanese government as ''Kyūgunshin'' ("The Nine War Heroes"), the news of Sakamaki's capture, which had been publicized in American news broadcasts, was kept secret. Even after the war, however, he received recriminating correspondence from those who despised him for not sacrificing his own life.|group=nb}}<ref>{{Cite web |last=Goldstein |first=Richard |author-link=Richard Goldstein (writer, born 1942) |date=December 21, 1999 |title=Kazuo Sakamaki, 81, Pacific P.O.W. No. 1 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/21/world/kazuo-sakamaki-81-pacific-pow-no-1.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200911011213/https://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/21/world/kazuo-sakamaki-81-pacific-pow-no-1.html |archive-date=September 11, 2020 |access-date=March 5, 2020 |newspaper=The New York Times}}</ref> A fourth had been damaged by a [[depth charge]] attack and was abandoned by its crew before it could fire its torpedoes.<ref>{{harvnb|Stewart|1974|pp=61–62}}</ref> It was found outside the harbor in 1960. Japanese forces received a radio message from a midget submarine at 00:41 on December 8 claiming to have damaged one or more large warships inside Pearl Harbor.<ref name="USSBSp19">{{harvnb|United States Strategic Bombing Survey|1946|p=19}}</ref>
===Order of battle===
{{main|Attack on Pearl Harbor order of battle}}
[[image:Gunichi Mikawa.jpg|100px|thumb|right|Mikawa Gunichi]]
[[Image:TamonYamaguchi.jpg|100px|thumb|right|Tamon Yamaguchi]]
Below is the shortened Imperial Japanese Navy's [[order of battle]] and excluding the posthumous promotions:
* '''Imperial Japanese Navy''' - [[Admiral]] [[Osami Nagano]] (Tokyo)
** '''Combined Fleet''' - Admiral [[Isoroku Yamamoto]] (Tokyo)
*** '''First Air Fleet''' - [[Vice Admiral]] [[Chuichi Nagumo]] (''Akagi'' [[flagship|flag]])
**** 1st Carrier Division - Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo
**** 2nd Carrier Division - [[Rear Admiral]] [[Tamon Yamaguchi]]
**** 5th Carrier Division - Vice Admiral [[Chuichi Hara]]
**** 3rd Battleship Division - Vice Admiral [[Gunichi Mikawa]] ([[Japanese battleship Hiei|''Hiei'']] flag)
**** 8th Cruiser Division (Mikawa)
**** 1st Destroyer Squadron - Rear Admiral [[Sentaro Omori]]
***** 17th Destroyer Division
***** 18th Destroyer Division
**** 2nd Submarine Division - [[Captain]] [[Kijiro Imaizumi]]
**** 1st Supply Train
**** 2nd Supply Train
*** '''6th Submarine Fleet'''
**** 1st Submarine Squadron - Rear Admiral [[Tsutomu Sato]]
**** 2nd Submarine Squadron - Rear Admiral [[Shigeaki Yamazaki]]
**** 3rd Submarine Squadron - Rear Admiral [[Shigeyoski Miwa]]
**** Special Attack Unit
**** Submarine Reconaissance Unit - [[Commander]] [[Yasuchika Kashihara]]
 
In 1992, 2000, and 2001, [[Hawaii Undersea Research Laboratory]]'s submersibles found the wreck of the fifth midget submarine lying in three parts outside Pearl Harbor. The wreck was in the debris field where much surplus American equipment had been dumped after the war, including vehicles and landing craft. Both of its torpedoes were missing. This correlates with reports of two torpedoes fired at the [[light cruiser]] {{USS|St. Louis|CL-49|2}} at 10:04 at the entrance of Pearl Harbor, and a possible torpedo fired at destroyer {{USS|Helm|DD-388|2}} at 08:21.<ref>{{Harvnb|Zimm|2011|pp=330–341}}</ref> There is dispute over this official chain of events though. The "torpedo" that ''St. Louis'' saw was also reportedly a porpoising minesweeping float being towed by the destroyer {{USS|Boggs|DD-136|2}}.<ref>Owen, RAdm USN, Thomas B. (1989). Memories of the War Years. Vol. I. Washington: Unpublished memoir.</ref> Some historians and naval architects theorize that a photo of Battleship Row, taken by a Japanese naval aviator during the attack on Pearl Harbor, which was declassified in the 1990s and publicized in the 2000s,<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.okhistory.org/learn/ussok2|title=Pearl Harbor &#124; Oklahoma Historical Society|website=Oklahoma Historical Society &#124; OHS}}</ref> shows the fifth midget submarine firing a torpedo at ''West Virginia'' and another at ''Oklahoma''. These torpedoes were twice the size of the aerial torpedoes so it was possible that both torpedoes heavily contributed to the sinkings of both ships and especially helped to capsize ''Oklahoma'' as ''Oklahoma'' was the only battleship that day to suffer catastrophic damage to her [[belt armor]] at the waterline from a torpedo. Admiral Chester Nimitz, in a report to Congress, confirmed that one midget submarine's torpedo (possibly from the other midget submarine that fired torpedoes but failed to hit a target) which was fired but did not explode was recovered in Pearl Harbor and was much larger than the aerial torpedoes.<ref>[https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2004/december/pearl-harbor-midget-sub-picture Pearl Harbor: A Midget Sub in the Picture?] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230323042049/https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2004/december/pearl-harbor-midget-sub-picture |date=March 23, 2023 }}, Retrieved 22 March 2023</ref><ref>[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fCaTpn6F_Ik PBS Pearl Harbor USS Oklahoma The Final Story 2016 Documentary] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230323042048/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fCaTpn6F_Ik |date=March 23, 2023 }} (Timestamp: 25:10). Retrieved 22 March 2023.</ref>
==United States Preparedness==
<ref>[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5rhbN9NOSag Pearl Harbor midget sub attack: Photographic Evidence] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230323042109/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5rhbN9NOSag |date=March 23, 2023 }}. Retrieved 22 March 2023.</ref> Others dispute this theory.<ref>{{Harvard citation no brackets|Zimm|2011|pp=350}}</ref>
{{main|Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge debate}}
[[Image:Husband Kimmel.jpg|right|thumb|250px|[[Rear Admiral]] [[Husband E. Kimmel]], commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet.]]
 
===Japanese declaration of war===
[[Image:Battleship row.jpg|right|thumb|250px|[[Battleship Row]] presented an attractive concentration of targets.]]
{{See also|Japanese war crimes}}
 
The attack took place before any formal declaration of war was made by Japan, but this was not Admiral Yamamoto's intention. He originally stipulated that the attack should not commence until thirty minutes after Japan had informed the United States that peace negotiations were at an end.<ref>{{Cite news |url=https://www.historyonthenet.com/when-was-pearl-harbor/ |title=When was Pearl Harbor? |date=2014-11-26 |work=History |access-date=2018-08-17 |archive-date=August 17, 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180817161358/https://www.historyonthenet.com/when-was-pearl-harbor/ |url-status=live}}</ref> However, the attack began before the notice could be delivered. Tokyo transmitted the 5000-word notification (commonly called the "14-Part Message") in two blocks to the Japanese Embassy in Washington. Transcribing the message took too long for the Japanese ambassador to deliver it at 1:00{{spaces}}p.m. Washington time, as ordered, and consequently the message was not presented until more than one hour after the attack had {{nowrap|begun{{hsp}}{{mdash}}}}{{hsp}} but American code breakers had [[Purple cipher|already deciphered]] and translated most of the message hours before it was scheduled to be delivered.{{sfn|Toland|1983}}<ref name=codebreakers>{{cite book |last1=Kahn |first1=David |title=The Codebreakers: The Comprehensive History of Secret Communication from Ancient Times to the Internet |date=1996 |publisher=Simon and Schuster |isbn=978-1-4391-0355-5}}</ref>{{rp|pp.2ff}} The final part of the message is sometimes described as a declaration of war. While it was viewed by a number of senior American government and military officials as a very strong indicator negotiations were likely to be terminated{{sfn|Prange|Goldstein|Dillon|1981|pp=424, 475}} and that war might break out at any moment,{{sfn|Prange|Goldstein|Dillon|1981|pp=493–494}} it neither declared war nor severed diplomatic relations. [[Japanese declaration of war on the United States and the British Empire|A declaration of war]] was printed on the front page of Japan's newspapers in the evening edition of December 8 (late December 7 in the United States),<ref>{{cite web |mode=cs2 |author=Emperor of Japan Hirohito |date=December 8, 1941 |title=Declaration of War against the United States and Britain |url=https://www.gilderlehrman.org/sites/default/files/inline-pdfs/T-01415_0.pdf |access-date=December 10, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210715210137/https://www.gilderlehrman.org/sites/default/files/inline-pdfs/T-01415_0.pdf |archive-date=July 15, 2021 |url-status=live |via=[[Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History]]}}</ref> but not delivered to the American government until the day after the attack.
U.S. civil and military intelligence forces had, between them, good information suggesting additional Japanese aggression throughout the summer and fall before the attack. None of it specifically indicated an attack against Pearl Harbor. Public press reports during summer and fall, including Hawaiian newspapers, contained extensive reports on the growing tension and on developments in the Pacific. Late in November, all Pacific commands, including both the Navy and Army in Hawaii, were separately and explicitly warned war with Japan was expected in the very near future, probably in the Far East: the [[Philippines]], [[Việt Nam]], or [[Russia]]. The warnings were not specific to any area, noting only that war with Japan was considered likely in the immediate short term and that all commands should act accordingly. Had any of these warnings produced an active alert status in Hawaii, the attack would likely have been resisted more effectively, and perhaps might have caused less death and damage. Conversely, recall of men on shore leave to the ships in harbor might have led to still more being casualties from bombs and torpedoes, or trapped in capsized ships by shut watertight doors (as the attack alert status have required).<ref>Technically called "Condition Zed". Prange ''et al.'' ''op. cit.''</ref> When the attack arrived, Pearl Harbor was effectively unprepared: anti-aircraft weapons not manned, ammunition often locked down, anti-submarine measures not implemented (e.g., no torpedo nets), combat air patrols not flying, available scouting aircraft not in the air at first light, Air Corps aircraft parked wingtip to wingtip to reduce sabotage risks, and so on.
 
For decades, [[conventional wisdom]] held that Japan attacked without first formally breaking diplomatic relations only because of accidents and bumbling that delayed the delivery of a document hinting at war to Washington.<ref>{{Cite news |mode=cs2 |last=Sterngold |first=James |date=November 21, 1994 |title=Japan Admits It Bungled Notice of War in '41 (Published 1994) |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/21/world/japan-admits-it-bungled-notice-of-war-in-41.html |access-date=December 1, 2020 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=December 10, 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201210000317/https://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/21/world/japan-admits-it-bungled-notice-of-war-in-41.html |url-status=live}}</ref> In 1999, however, Takeo Iguchi, a professor of law and international relations at [[International Christian University]] in Tokyo, discovered documents that pointed to a vigorous debate inside the government over how, and indeed whether, to notify Washington of Japan's intention to break off negotiations and start a war, including a December 7 entry in the war diary saying, "[O]ur deceptive diplomacy is steadily proceeding toward success." Of this, Iguchi said, "The diary shows that the army and navy did not want to give any proper declaration of war, or indeed prior notice even of the termination of negotiations{{spaces}}... and they clearly prevailed."<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/09/world/pearl-harbor-truly-a-sneak-attack-papers-show.html |title=Pearl Harbor Truly a Sneak Attack, Papers Show |author=Howard W. French |newspaper=The New York Times |date=December 9, 1999 |access-date=February 14, 2017 |url-status=live |archive-date=December 5, 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161205202932/http://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/09/world/pearl-harbor-truly-a-sneak-attack-papers-show.html}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |mode=cs2 |last=Kawabata |first=Tai |date=December 9, 2014 |title=Historian seeks to clear embassy of Pearl Harbor 'sneak attack' infamy |newspaper=[[The Japan Times]] |url=https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/12/09/national/history/historian-seeks-to-clear-embassy-of-pearl-harbor-sneak-attack-infamy/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210516225555/https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/12/09/national/history/historian-seeks-to-clear-embassy-of-pearl-harbor-sneak-attack-infamy/ |archive-date=May 16, 2021}}</ref>
By 1941, U.S. [[signals intelligence]], through the Army's [[Signal Intelligence Service]] and the [[Office of Naval Intelligence]]'s [[OP-20-G]] unit, had intercepted and decrypted considerable Japanese diplomatic and naval [[cipher]] traffic, though none of those actually decrypted carried significant tactical military information about Japanese plans in 1940-41. Decryption and distribution of recent intelligence, including such decrypts as were available, was capricious and sporadic, and can be blamed in part on lack of manpower. At best, the information was fragmentary, contradictory, or insufficiently distributed, and was almost entirely raw, without supporting analysis. It was also incompletely understood by decision makers. Nothing in it pointed directly to an attack at Pearl Harbor, and a lack of awareness of Imperial Navy capabilities led to a widespread underlying belief Pearl Harbor was safely out of harm's way. Only one message from the Hawaiian Japanese consulate (sent on 6 December 1941), in a low level consular cipher, included mention of an attack at Pearl; it was not decrypted until 8 December 1941.<ref>John Costello, ''Days of Infamy'' (Pocket hardback, 1994)</ref>)
 
In any event, even if the Japanese had decoded and delivered the 14-Part Message before the beginning of the attack, it would not have constituted either a formal break of diplomatic relations or a declaration of war.<ref>{{harvnb|Prange|Goldstein|Dillon|1981|p=485}}. "[The] fourteenth part was not a formal declaration of war. It did not even rupture diplomatic relations. It merely broke off the discussions."</ref> The final two paragraphs of the message read:<ref>{{cite web |mode=cs2 |date=December 7, 1941 |title=Japanese 'Fourteen Part' Message of December 7, 1941 |type=Memorandum |via=HyperWar Foundation |url=https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/Dip/Fourteen.html |access-date=December 10, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170917001957/http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/Dip/Fourteen.html |archive-date=September 17, 2017 |url-status=live}}</ref>
[[Image:Walter Short.jpg|thumb|left|250px|[[Lieutenant General]] [[Walter Short|Walter C. Short]], commanding general of the Army post at Pearl Harbor.]]
 
{{blockquote| Thus the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.{{parabr}}The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.}}
In 1924, General [[Billy Mitchell|William L. Mitchell]] produced a 324 page report warning future wars (including with Japan) would include a new role for aircraft, against existing ships and facilities. He even discussed the possibility of an air attack on Pearl Harbor. He was essentially ignored. Navy Secretary [[Knox]] had also appreciated the possibility of an attack at Pearl in a written analysis shortly after taking office. American commanders had also been warned tests demonstrated shallow-water aerial torpedo launches were possible, but no one in charge in Hawaii fully appreciated the consequences. A war game surprise attack against Pearl Harbor a few years earlier had been judged a success and to have caused considerable damage.
 
United States naval intelligence officers were alarmed by the unusual timing for delivering the {{nowrap|message{{hsp}}{{mdash}}{{hsp}}}}1:00{{spaces}}p.m. on a Sunday, which was 7:30{{spaces}}a.m. in {{nowrap|Hawaii{{hsp}}{{mdash}}{{hsp}}}}and attempted to alert Pearl Harbor. But due to communication problems the warning was not delivered before the attack.<ref name=codebreakers/>{{rp|Ch. 1}}
Nevertheless, because it believed Pearl Harbor had natural defenses against torpedo attack (e.g., the shallow water), the Navy did not deploy torpedo nets or baffles, which were judged an interference with ordinary operations. And as a result of limited numbers of long-range aircraft (including Army Air Corps bombers, responsible for search by a prewar arrangement), reconnaissance patrols were not being made as often or as far out as required for adequate coverage against possible surprise attack. The Navy had only 16 operational [[PBY]]s long range aircraft.{{Fact|date=March 2007}} General Short was low on the priority list for the [[Boeing B-17|B-17]]s finally becoming available for the Pacific, since General MacArthur in the Philippines was successfully demanding as many as could be made available. At the time of the attack, Army and Navy air defense were both on training status rather than operational alert. There was also confusion about the Army's readiness as General Short had changed the alert level designations without clearly informing Washington. Most of the Army's mobile anti-aircraft guns were secured, with ammunition locked down in armories. To avoid upsetting property owners, and in keeping with Washington's admonition not to alarm civil populations (e.g., in the late November war warning messages from the Navy and War Departments), guns were not dispersed around Pearl Harbor (i.e., on private property). Additionally, aircraft were parked on airfields to lessen risk from [[sabotage]], not air attack, in keeping with Short's (uncontradicted) interpretation of the war warnings.
 
===First wave composition===
==Breaking off negotiations==
[[File:Pearlmap1.png|thumb|The Japanese attacked in two waves. The first wave was detected by [[United States Army]] [[radar]] at {{convert|136|nmi|km|0}}, but was misidentified as [[United States Army Air Forces]] [[bombers]] arriving from the American mainland.<br />'''Top:''' {{nowrap|A: Ford Island NAS.}} {{nowrap|B: Hickam Field.}} {{nowrap|C: Bellows Field.}} {{nowrap|D: Wheeler Field.}} {{nowrap|E: Kaneohe NAS.}} {{nowrap|F: Ewa MCAS.}} {{nowrap|R-1: Opana Radar Station.}} {{nowrap|R-2: Kawailoa RS.}} {{nowrap|R-3: Kaaawa RS.}} {{nowrap|G: Kahuku.}} {{nowrap|H: Haleiwa.}} {{nowrap|I: Wahiawa.}} {{nowrap|J: Kaneohe.}} {{nowrap|K: Honolulu.}} {{nowrap|0: B-17s from mainland.}} {{nowrap|1: First strike group.}} {{nowrap|1-1: Level bombers.}} {{nowrap|1–2: Torpedo bombers.}} {{nowrap|1–3: Dive bombers.}} {{nowrap|2: Second strike group.}} {{nowrap|2-1: Level bombers.}} {{nowrap|2-1F: Fighters.}} {{nowrap|2-2: Dive bombers.}}<br />'''Bottom:''' {{nowrap|A: Wake Island.}} {{nowrap|B: Midway Islands.}} {{nowrap|C: Johnston Island.}} {{nowrap|D: Hawaii.}} {{nowrap|D-1: Oahu.}} {{nowrap|1: {{USS|Lexington|CV-2|2}}.}} {{nowrap|2: {{USS|Enterprise|CV-6|2}}.}} {{nowrap|3: First Air Fleet.}}]]
[[Image:PearlHarborCarrierChart.jpg|right|thumbnail|250px|Carrier Striking Task Force two-way route.]] Part of the Japanese plan for the attack included breaking off negotiations with the United States 30 minutes before the attack began. Diplomats from the Japanese Embassy in [[Washington, D.C.|Washington]], including the Japanese Ambassador, Admiral [[Kichisaburo Nomura]], and special representative [[Saburo Kurusu]], had been conducting extended talks with the [[State Department]] regarding the U.S. reactions to the Japanese move into [[Việt Nam]] in the summer (see above).
[[File:Pearlmap2.png|thumb|{{legend inline|#E1E1E1|City}} {{legend inline|#4E583F|Army base}} {{legend inline|#808080|Navy base}}<br />'''Attacked targets:''' {{nowrap|1: {{USS|California|BB-44|6}}.}} {{nowrap|2: {{USS|Maryland|BB-46|6}}.}} {{nowrap|3: {{USS|Oklahoma|BB-37|6}}.}} {{nowrap|4: {{USS|Tennessee|BB-43|6}}.}} {{nowrap|5: {{USS|West Virginia|BB-48|6}}.}} {{nowrap|6: {{USS|Arizona|BB-39|6}}.}} {{nowrap|7: {{USS|Nevada|BB-36|6}}.}} {{nowrap|8: {{USS|Pennsylvania|BB-38|6}}.}} {{nowrap|9: [[Ford Island|Ford Island NAS]].}} {{nowrap|10: [[Hickam Air Force Base|Hickam field]].}}<br />'''Ignored infrastructure targets:''' {{nowrap|A: Oil storage tanks.}} {{nowrap|B: CINCPAC headquarters building.}} {{nowrap|C: Submarine base.}} {{nowrap|D: Navy Yard.}}]]
The first attack wave of 183 airplanes, led by Commander [[Mitsuo Fuchida]], was launched north of Oahu.<ref>{{Harvnb|Fuchida|2011|loc=chs. 19, 20}}</ref> Six airplanes failed to launch due to technical difficulties.<ref name="DiGiulian OOB" /> The first wave included three groups of airplanes:{{refn|The Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor, Planning and Execution. First wave: 189 planes, 50 Kates w/bombs, 40 Kates with torpedoes, 54 Vals, 45 Zekes Second wave: 171 planes, 54 Kates w/bombs, 81 Vals, 36 Zekes. The Combat Air Patrol over the carriers alternated 18 plane shifts every two hours, with 18 more ready for takeoff on the flight decks and an additional 18 ready on hangar decks.<ref name="IJN">{{cite web |title=Aircraft Attack Organization |url=http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/USSBS/PTO-Campaigns/USSBS-PTO-2.html#appendix3 |publisher=Ibiblio.org |access-date=July 17, 2011 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110623081726/http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/USSBS/PTO-Campaigns/USSBS-PTO-2.html |archive-date=June 23, 2011}}</ref>|group=nb}}
 
*'''1st Group''' (targets: battleships and aircraft carriers)<ref name="navsource-ijnaf">{{Harvnb|Yarnell|2003}}</ref>
In the days before the attack, a long 14-part message was sent to the Embassy from the Foreign Office in [[Tokyo]] (encrypted with the Type 97 cryptographic machine, in a cipher named <small>[[PURPLE]]</small> by U.S. cryptanalysts), with instructions to deliver it to [[United States Secretary of State|Secretary of State]] [[Cordell Hull]] at 1 p.m. Washington time. The last part arrived late Saturday night (Washington time) but, because of decryption and typing delays, and because Tokyo had neglected to stress the crucial necessity to deliver it on time, Embassy personnel failed to deliver the message at the specified time. The last part, breaking off negotiations, was delivered to Secretary Hull several hours after the Pearl Harbor attack:
**49 [[Nakajima B5N]] ''Kate'' bombers armed with 800{{nbh}}kg (1760{{spaces}}lb) [[armor-piercing bomb]]s, organized in four sections (one failed to launch)
<blockquote>''Obviously it is the intention of the [[Government of the United States|American Government]] to conspire with [[Great Britain]] and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a new order in [[East Asia]] ... Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.''</blockquote>
**40 B5N bombers armed with [[Type 91 torpedo]]es, also in four sections
*'''2nd Group''' – (targets: [[Ford Island]] and [[Wheeler Field]])
**51 [[Aichi D3A]] ''Val'' dive bombers armed with {{cvt|550|lb|kg|0}} [[general-purpose bomb]]s (3 failed to launch)
*'''3rd Group''' – (targets: aircraft at Ford Island, Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, Barber's Point, Kaneohe)
**43 [[Mitsubishi A6M Zero|Mitsubishi A6M "Zero"]] fighters for air control and [[strafe|strafing]]<ref name="IJN" /> (2 failed to launch)
 
As the first wave approached Oahu, it was [[Radar warning of Pearl Harbor attack|detected]] by United States Army [[SCR-270 radar]] positioned at [[Opana Radar Site|Opana Point]] near the island's northern tip. This post had been in training mode for months, but was not yet operational.<ref>{{harvnb|Prange|Goldstein|Dillon|1981|pp=730–731}}. "'Short mishandled radar{{spaces}}...' In his (Short's) words '...{{spaces}}more for training than any idea it would be real'".</ref> The operators, Privates George Elliot Jr. and [[Joseph Lockard]], reported a target to Private [[Joseph P. McDonald]], who was stationed at [[Fort Shafter]]'s Intercept Center near Pearl Harbor.<ref>{{Harvnb|Evans|1998|p=309}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |mode=cs2 |author=<!--Staff, no by-line--> |date=December 6, 2013 |title=Son recounts father's day during bombing of Pearl Harbor |newspaper=New Haven Register |url=https://www.nhregister.com/connecticut/article/Son-recounts-father-s-day-during-bombing-of-11416239.php |access-date=December 10, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210817215302/https://www.nhregister.com/connecticut/article/Son-recounts-father-s-day-during-bombing-of-11416239.php |archive-date=August 17, 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite report |mode=cs2 |title=Testimony of Joseph P. McDonald, Technician Fourth-Class; 580th Aircraft Warning |series=Proceedings of Army Pearl Harbor Board |pages=2121–2123 |url=http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/myths/radar/mcdonald_1.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210421035329/http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/myths/radar/mcdonald_1.html |archive-date=April 21, 2021 |url-status=live |via=iBiblio.org}}</ref> Lieutenant [[Kermit A. Tyler]], a newly assigned officer at the thinly manned Intercept Center, presumed it was the scheduled arrival of six [[Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress|B-17]] bombers from California. The Japanese planes were approaching from a direction very close (only a few degrees difference) to the bombers,<ref>{{Harvnb|Prange|Goldstein|Dillon|1988|p=98}}</ref> and while the operators had never seen a formation as large on radar, they neglected to tell Tyler of its size.<ref name="prange501">{{harvnb|Prange|Goldstein|Dillon|1981|pp=500–501}}</ref> Tyler, for security reasons, could not tell the operators of the six B-17s that were due (even though it was widely known).<ref name="prange501"/>
The [[United States]] had decrypted the 14th part of the final message well before the Japanese Embassy managed to, and long before a fair typed copy was finished. The final part, with its instruction for the time of delivery, prompted General [[George Marshall]] to send the morning's notorious warning message to Hawaii. Delay in sending it was due to an inability to locate General Marshall (he was out for a morning horseback ride), trouble with the Army's long distance communication system, a decision not to use parallel Navy facilities despite an offer to permit it, and various troubles during its travels over commercial cable facilities (somehow its "urgent" marking was misplaced, adding additional hours to its travel time). It was actually delivered to Gen. [[Walter Short]], by a young [[Japanese-American]] cycle messenger, several hours after the attack had ended.
 
As the first wave approached Oahu, they encountered and shot down several American aircraft. At least one of these radioed a somewhat incoherent warning. Other warnings from ships off the harbor entrance were still being processed or awaiting confirmation when the Japanese air assault began at 7:48{{spaces}}a.m. Hawaiian time<ref name="Prange 1941, p.174">{{harvnb|Prange|Goldstein|Dillon|1988|p=174}}</ref> (3:18{{spaces}}a.m. December 8 [[Japanese Standard Time]], as kept by ships of the ''Kido Butai''),<ref>{{Harvnb|Symonds|2011|p=218}}</ref> with the attack on Kaneohe. A total of 353<ref name="parillo288"/> Japanese planes reached Oahu in two waves. Slow, vulnerable torpedo bombers led the first wave, exploiting the first moments of surprise to attack the most important ships present (the battleships), while dive bombers attacked American [[Military airbase|air bases]] across Oahu, starting with [[Hickam Field]], the largest, and [[Wheeler Field]], the main United States Army Air Forces fighter base. The 171 planes in the second wave attacked the Army Air Forces' [[Bellows Field]], near Kaneohe on the windward side of the island, and Ford Island. The only aerial opposition came from a handful of [[P-36 Hawk]]s, [[P-40 Warhawk]]s and some [[SBD Dauntless]] dive bombers from the carrier {{USS|Enterprise|CV-6|2}}.{{citation needed|date=May 2019}}{{refn|In the twenty-five sorties flown, USAF Historical Study No.85 credits six pilots with ten planes destroyed: 1st Lieutenant Lewis M. Sanders (P-36) and 2nd Lieutenants Philip M Rasmussen (P-36), Gordon H. Sterling Jr. (P-36, [[killed in action]]), Harry W. Brown (P-36), [[Kenneth M. Taylor]] (P-40, 2), and [[George Welch (pilot)|George S. Welch]] (P-40, 4). Three of the P-36 kills were not verified by the Japanese and may have been shot down by naval [[Anti-aircraft warfare|anti-aircraft]] fire.<ref>{{cite report |author=Office of Air Force History |date=1978 |title=USAF Credits for the Destruction of Enemy Aircraft, World War II |series=USAF Historical Study |volume=85 |id={{DTIC|ADA542272}} |publisher=Alfred F. Simpson Historical Research Center |___location=Montgomery, AL}}
Japanese records, admitted into evidence during Congressional hearings on the attack after the War, established the Japanese government had not even written a declaration of war until after hearing of the successful attack. This two-line declaration of war was finally delivered to U.S. Ambassador [[Joseph Grew|Grew]] in [[Tokyo]] about 10 hours after the attack was over. He was allowed to transmit it to the [[United States]] where it was received late Monday afternoon (Washington time).
</ref>{{pages needed|date=January 2024}}|group=nb}}
 
In the first-wave attack, about eight of the forty-nine 800{{nbh}}kg (1760{{spaces}}lb) armor-piercing bombs dropped hit their intended battleship targets. At least two of those bombs broke up on impact, another detonated before penetrating an unarmored deck, and one was a dud. Thirteen of the forty torpedoes hit battleships, while four hit other ships.{{sfn|Hone|1977}} Men aboard the ships awoke to the sounds of alarms, bombs exploding, and gunfire, prompting them to dress as they ran to [[General quarters|General Quarters]] stations. (The famous message "Air raid Pearl Harbor. This is not<!--sic--> drill."{{refn|Odd though it may sound, "not" is correct, in keeping with standard Navy telegraphic practice. This was confirmed by Beloite and Beloite after years of research and debate.|group=nb}} was sent from the headquarters of Patrol Wing Two, the first senior Hawaiian command to respond.) American servicemen were caught unprepared by the attack. Ammunition lockers were locked, aircraft parked wingtip to wingtip in the open to prevent sabotage,<ref name="parillo293">{{Harvnb|Parillo|2006|p=293}}</ref> guns unmanned (none of the Navy's [[5"/38 caliber gun|5"/38s]], only a quarter of its machine guns, and only four of 31 Army batteries got in action).<ref name="parillo293" /> Despite this low [[Alert state|alert status]], many American military personnel responded effectively during the attack.{{refn|The gunners that did get in action scored most of the victories against Japanese aircraft that morning, including the first of the attack by {{USS|Tautog|SS-199|2}}, and [[Dorie Miller]]'s [[Navy Cross]]-worthy effort. Miller was an African-American cook aboard ''West Virginia'' who took over an unattended [[anti-aircraft gun]] on which he had no training. He was the first African-American sailor to be awarded the [[Navy Cross]].<ref name="navyfaq57">{{cite web |url=https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/biographies-list/bios-m/miller-doris.html |title=Miller, Doris |website=Naval History and Heritage Command |date=June 6, 2017 |access-date=February 8, 2018 |archive-date=May 11, 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190511152931/https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/biographies-list/bios-m/miller-doris.html |url-status=live }}</ref>|group=nb}} Ensign [[Joseph K. Taussig Jr.|Joseph Taussig Jr.]], aboard {{USS|Nevada|BB-36|2}}, commanded the ship's antiaircraft guns and was severely wounded but remained at his post. Lieutenant Commander F. J. Thomas commanded ''Nevada'' in the captain's absence and got her underway until the ship was grounded at 9:10{{spaces}}a.m.<ref>{{Harvnb|Bonner|1996|p=105}}</ref> One of the destroyers, {{USS|Aylwin|DD-355|2}}, got underway with only four officers aboard, all ensigns, none with more than a year's sea duty; she operated at sea for 36 hours before her commanding officer managed to get back aboard.<ref>{{Harvnb|DANFS ''Aylwin''}}</ref> Captain [[Mervyn Bennion]], commanding {{USS|West Virginia|BB-48|2}}, led his men until he was cut down by fragments from a bomb which hit {{USS|Tennessee|BB-43|2}}, moored alongside.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Biographical Sketch of Mervyn S. Bennion |url=https://www.usswestvirginia.org/stories/story.php?id=10 |access-date=August 30, 2021 |website=USSWestVirginia.org |archive-date=May 29, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210529125155/https://www.usswestvirginia.org/stories/story.php?id=10 |url-status=live}}</ref>
==Attack==
===Japanese tactics for attack===
[[Image:Chuichi Nagumo.jpg|thumbnail|right|250px|[[Vice Admiral]] [[Chuichi Nagumo]] commanded the [[Carrier Striking Task Force]] for the attack.]]
[[Image:Attack on Pearl Harbor Japanese planes prepare.jpg|right|thumb|250px|[[Aichi D3A]] "Val" dive bombers preparing to take off.]]
The task force was ordered (Order Number 7) to engage the enemy fleet if encountered[http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/monos/097/index.html].
The whole operation was obviously meant to be conducted in secret. In fact, a commercial freighter had scouted the proposed route earlier in the year. Yamamoto and senior Navy staff intended there be three waves of attack,{{Fact|date=March 2007}} but Vice Admiral [[Chuichi Nagumo]] decided to break off after the second. There were also supporting submarines and midget submarines assigned to engage U.S. ships should they succeed in leaving the harbor. The ___location of the attack force remained unknown to the U.S. until after the Japanese pilots were already on the return to the Eastern Pacific; they were not located after the attack, in part because such searches as were organized were conducted south of Oahu. (This was partially due to direction finding mistakenly placing searchers on a [[reciprocal]] bearing.<ref>Holmes, ''Double-Edged Secrets''.</ref>) The total number of planes involved in the attack was 350.{{Fact|date=February 2007}} Ninety-one{{Fact|date=March 2007}} were engaged in protection of [[aircraft carrier]]s and other ships during the attack.<ref>Prange ''et al.'', ''op.cit.'', p.86, says 39: 3 each ''Akagi'' & ''Kaga'', 6 ''Soryu'', 9 ea ''Shokaku'', ''Zuikaku'', & ''Hiryu''.</ref>
 
===Second wave composition===
The strike launched 200 nautical miles (370km) north of Oahu.[http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/monos/097/index.html] On the home leg, the task force was instructed to counter-attack should American forces locate and engage them, and re-routed south to the friendly base in the [[Marshall Islands]].[http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/monos/097/index.html]
[[File:B5N2 Bomber "Kate" Over Hickam Field full.jpg|thumb|Second wave B5N2 Bomber ''Kate'' Over Hickam Field]]
[[File:Message pertaining to the attack on Pearl Harbor. - NARA - 296806.jpg|thumb|This message, in response to the question "Is channel clear?" denotes the first U.S. ship, relates to orders for {{USS|St. Louis|CL-49|2}} to clear [[Pearl Harbor]]. It is now housed with the [[National Archives and Records Administration]]]]
The second planned wave consisted of 171 planes: 54 B5Ns, 81 D3As, and 36 A6Ms, commanded by [[Lieutenant-Commander]] [[Shigekazu Shimazaki]].<ref name="IJN"/> Four planes failed to launch because of technical difficulties.<ref name="DiGiulian OOB" /> This wave and its targets also comprised three groups of planes:<ref name="IJN"/>
*'''1st Group''' – 54 B5Ns armed with {{cvt|550|lb|kg|0}} and {{cvt|132|lb|kg}} general-purpose bombs<ref name="navsource-ijnaf" />
**27 B5Ns – aircraft and hangars on Kaneohe, Ford Island, and Barbers Point
**27 B5Ns – hangars and aircraft on Hickam Field
*'''2nd Group''' (targets: aircraft carriers and cruisers)
**78 D3As armed with {{cvt|550|lb|kg|0}} general-purpose bombs, in four sections (3 aborted)
*'''3rd Group''' – (targets: aircraft at Ford Island, Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, Barber's Point, Kaneohe)
**35 A6Ms for defense and strafing (1 aborted)
The second wave was divided into three groups. One was tasked to attack Kāne{{okina}}ohe, the rest Pearl Harbor proper. The separate sections arrived at the attack point almost simultaneously from several directions.
 
===American casualties and damage===
Here is general outline for the aerial attack:
{{multiple image
{{cquote|The force will be 700 nautical miles due north of point Z (set at the western extremity of the Island of Lanai) at 0600 hours X-1 Day and advance on a course of 180 degrees from 0700 hours X-1 Day at an increased speed of 24 knots.
| align = center
| total_width = 880
| image1 = The USS Arizona (BB-39) burning after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor - NARA 195617 - Edit.jpg
| alt1 =
| caption1 = ''Arizona'' during the attack
| image2 = USS Nevada passing seaplane ramp prior to first grounding NARA 80-G-32894.jpg
| alt2 =
| caption2 = ''Nevada'', on fire and down at the bow, attempting to leave the harbor before being deliberately beached
| image3 = USS West Virginia2.jpg
| alt3 =
| caption3 = ''West Virginia'' was sunk by six torpedoes and two bombs during the attack.
| image4 = SB2U-3 VMSB-231 Ewa 7Dec1941.jpg
| alt4 =
| caption4 = A destroyed [[Vought SB2U Vindicator|Vindicator]] at [[Marine Corps Air Station Ewa|Ewa field]], the victim of one of the smaller attacks on the approach to Pearl Harbor
}}
 
Ninety minutes after it began, the attack was over. 2,008 sailors were killed and 710 others wounded; 218 soldiers and airmen (who were part of the Army prior to the independent [[United States Air Force]] in 1947) were killed and 364 wounded; 109 Marines were killed and 69 wounded; and 68 civilians were killed and 35 wounded. In total, 2,403 Americans were killed, and 1,178 were wounded.<ref>{{Cite web |mode=cs2 |url=https://visitpearlharbor.org/faqs/how-many-people-died-at-pearl-harbor-during-the-attack/ |title=How many people died at Pearl Harbor during the attack? |website=Pearl Harbor Visitors Bureau |url-status=live |access-date=August 17, 2018 |archive-date=August 17, 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180817124953/https://visitpearlharbor.org/faqs/how-many-people-died-at-pearl-harbor-during-the-attack/}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last=Rosenberg |first=Jennifer |date=January 23, 2019 |title=Facts About the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor |url=https://www.thoughtco.com/pearl-harbor-facts-1779469 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211024020725/https://www.thoughtco.com/pearl-harbor-facts-1779469 |archive-date=October 24, 2021 |access-date=December 10, 2021 |website=ThoughtCo. Humanities > History & Culture |mode=cs2}}</ref> Eighteen ships were sunk or run aground, including five battleships.{{sfn|Conn|Engelman|Fairchild|2000|p=194}}<ref>{{Harvnb|Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack – "The Japanese Attack And Its Aftermath" |1946 |loc=Damage to United States Naval Forces and Installations as a Result of the Attack |pp=[http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/congress/part_2.html#64 64–65]}}</ref> All of the Americans killed or wounded during the attack were legally non-combatants, given that there was no state of war when the attack occurred.{{sfn|McCaffrey|2004|pp=210–229}}{{sfn|Shepherd|2004|p=57}}
Air attacks will be carried out by launching the first attack units 230 nautical miles due north of Z point at 0130 hours X Day, and the second attack unit at 200 nautical miles due north of Z point at 0245 hours.
 
Of the American fatalities, nearly half were due to the explosion of {{USS|Arizona|BB-39|2}}'s forward [[Gunpowder magazine|magazine]] after she was hit by a modified {{convert|16|in|mm|adj=on}} shell.{{refn|The wreck has become a [[USS Arizona Memorial|memorial]] to those lost that day, most of whom remain within the ship. She continues to leak small amounts of [[fuel oil]], decades after the attack.|group=nb}} Author Craig Nelson wrote that the vast majority of the U.S. sailors killed at Pearl Harbor were junior enlisted personnel. "The officers of the Navy all lived in houses and the junior people were the ones on the boats, so pretty much all of the people who died in the direct line of the attack were very junior people", Nelson said. "So everyone is about 17 or 18 whose story is told there."<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.uso.org/stories/1732-9-things-you-might-not-know-about-the-attack-on-pearl-harbor |title=9 Things You Might Not Know About the Attack on Pearl Harbor |author=Chad Stewart |date=December 1, 2018 |publisher=[[United Service Organizations]] |access-date=March 31, 2019 |archive-date=March 31, 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190331220410/https://www.uso.org/stories/1732-9-things-you-might-not-know-about-the-attack-on-pearl-harbor |url-status=live}}</ref>
After the launching of the second attack units is completed, the task force will withdraw northward at a speed of about 24 knots. The first attack units are scheduled to return between 0530 and 0600 hours and the second attack units are scheduled to return between 0645 and 0715 hours.
 
Among the notable [[civilian casualties]] were nine [[Honolulu Fire Department]] firefighters who responded to Hickam Field during the bombing in Honolulu, becoming the only fire department members on American soil to be attacked by a foreign power in history. Fireman Harry Tuck Lee Pang of Engine{{spaces}}6 was killed near the hangars by machine-gun fire from a Japanese plane. Captains Thomas Macy and John Carreira of Engine{{spaces}}4 and Engine{{spaces}}1, respectively, died while battling flames inside the hangar after a Japanese bomb crashed through the roof. An additional six firefighters were wounded by Japanese shrapnel. The wounded later received [[Purple Heart]]s (originally reserved for service members [[Wounded in action|wounded]] by enemy action while partaking in armed conflicts) for their peacetime actions that day on June 13, 1944; the three firefighters killed did not receive theirs until December 7, 1984, on the 43rd anniversary of the attack. This made the nine men the only non-military firefighters to receive such an award in American history.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.firehouse.com/home/article/10447100/fire-service-history-firefighters-at-dec-7-pearl-harbor-attack-firefighter-history |title=Fire History: Dec. 7, 1941: A Day of Infamy And Fire |author=Paul Hashgen |date=November 1, 2011 |publisher=Firehouse |access-date=April 1, 2019 |archive-date=April 1, 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190401085357/https://www.firehouse.com/home/article/10447100/fire-service-history-firefighters-at-dec-7-pearl-harbor-attack-firefighter-history |url-status=live}}</ref>
Immediately after the return of the first and second attack units, preparations for the next attack will be completed. At this time, carrier attack planes capable of carrying torpedoes will be armed with such as long as the supply lasts.
 
Already damaged by a torpedo and on fire amidships, ''Nevada'' attempted to exit the harbor. She was targeted by many Japanese bombers as she got underway and sustained more hits from {{cvt|250|lb|kg|0}} bombs, which started further fires. She was deliberately beached to avoid risking blocking the harbor entrance if she sank there. {{USS|California|BB-44|2}} was hit by two bombs and two torpedoes. The crew might have kept her afloat, but were ordered to abandon ship just as they were raising power for the pumps. Burning oil from ''Arizona'' and {{USS|West Virginia|BB-48|2}} was drifted down toward her and probably made the situation look worse than it was. The disarmed [[target ship]] {{USS|Utah|BB-31|2}} was holed twice by torpedoes. ''West Virginia'' was hit by seven torpedoes, the seventh tearing away her rudder. {{USS|Oklahoma|BB-37|2}} was hit by four torpedoes, the last two above her [[belt armor]], which caused her to capsize. {{USS|Maryland|BB-46|2}} was hit by two of the converted 16" shells, but neither caused serious damage.
If the destruction of enemy land-based air strength progresses favorably, repeated attacks will be made immediately and thus decisive results will be achieved.
 
Although the Japanese concentrated on battleships (the largest vessels present), they did not ignore other targets. The light cruiser {{USS|Helena|CL-50|2}} was torpedoed, and the concussion from the blast capsized the neighboring minelayer {{USS|Oglala|CM-4|2}}. Two destroyers in [[dry dock]], {{USS|Cassin|DD-372|2}} and {{USS|Downes|DD-375|2}}, were destroyed when bombs penetrated their fuel [[Bunker fuel|bunkers]]. The leaking fuel caught fire; flooding the dry dock in an effort to fight fire made the burning oil rise, and both were burned out. ''Cassin'' slipped from her keel blocks and rolled against ''Downes''. The light cruiser {{USS|Raleigh|CL-7|2}} was holed by a torpedo. The light cruiser {{USS|Honolulu|CL-48|2}} was damaged but remained in service. The repair vessel {{USS|Vestal|AR-4|2}}, moored alongside ''Arizona'', was heavily damaged and beached. The seaplane tender ''Curtiss'' was also damaged. The destroyer {{USS|Shaw|DD-373|2}} was badly damaged when two bombs penetrated her forward magazine.<ref>{{Harvnb|DANFS ''Shaw''}}</ref>
In the event that a powerful enemy surface fleet appears, it will be attacked.}}
 
Of the 402 American aircraft in Hawaii, 188 were destroyed and 159 damaged, 155 of them on the ground.<ref name="parillo288" /> Almost none were actually ready to take off to defend the base. Eight Army Air Forces pilots managed to get airborne during the attack,{{sfn|Dorr|Borch|2008}} and six were credited with downing at least one Japanese aircraft during the attack: 1st Lieutenant Lewis M. Sanders and 2nd Lieutenants [[Phil Rasmussen|Philip M. Rasmussen]], [[Kenneth M. Taylor]], [[George Welch (pilot)|George S. Welch]], [[Harry W. Brown (pilot)|Harry W. Brown]], and Gordon H. Sterling Jr.{{sfn|Arakaki|1991|loc=ch. IV}}{{sfn|Potter|1982}} Of 33 [[Consolidated PBY Catalina]]s in Hawaii, 30 were destroyed, while three on patrol at the time of the attack returned undamaged. Friendly fire brought down some American planes on top of that, including four from an inbound flight from {{USS|Enterprise|CV-6|2}}.{{sfn|Toland|1970|p=235}}
====Pre-attack reconnaissance====
On December 5, in Yoshikawa went on his final “sightseeing” flight over Pearl Harbor in a small [[Piper J-3|Piper Cub]].{{Fact|date=February 2007}} He cabled Tokyo there were 8 battleships,<ref>Prange ''et al.'', ''op.cit.'', p.41, says 9. Blair, ''Silent Victory'', says 7.</ref> 3 light cruisers, and 16 destroyers in the harbor.<ref>John Toland, ''ibid.'', p.189.</ref> Also, two [[Aichi]] [[Aichi E12A|E12A]] Type 0 float scouts (Allied codename "Jake"), one each from [[Japanese cruiser Tone|''Tone'']] and [[Japanese cruiser Chikuma|''Chikuma'']] (Mikuma's Cruiser Division 8) secretly scouted [[Lahaina Road]] and Pearl Harbor<ref>Prange ''et al.'', ''op. cit.'', p.82, and Fitzsimons, Bernard, ed. ''Twentieth Century Weapons and Warfare'' (London: Phoebus, 1978), Volume 8, p.819.</ref> for the Pacific Fleet.
 
At the time of the attack, nine civilian aircraft were flying in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor. Of these, three were shot down.<ref name="ALA">{{Harvnb|Watson|2007|p=[{{Google books|IHb_geGUpFcC|p=592|plainurl=yes}} 592]}}</ref>
====First wave attack units====
[[Image:Jap_plane_leaves_Shokaku-Pearl_Harbor.jpg|thumb|250px|right|Nakajima "Kate" taking off from aircraft carrier [[Shokaku]] as crewman with [[hachimaki]] looks on.]]
The first wave of attack consisted of 49 "Kate" [[level bomber]]s, 51 "Val" [[dive bomber]]s, 40 "Kate" [[torpedo bomber]]s and 43 "Zeke" [[fighter]]s (a total of 183), launched north of Oahu, commanded by [[Captain]] [[Mitsuo Fuchida]]. This wave included
* '''1st Group''' (''Captain [[Mitsuo Fuchida]]'')
** 1st-4th Attack Units - ''(Cpt. Fuchida, [[Lieutenant-Commander|Lt. Cmdr.]] Hashiguchi, [[Lieutenant|Lt.]] Abe and Lt. Cmdr. Kusmi)'' - 50 [[Nakajima B5N]]s armed with 800 [[kg]] (1760 [[lb]]) [[Armor piercing bomb|armor piercing high altitude bombs.]]
** 1st-4th Torpedo Attack Units - ''(Lt. Cmdr. Murata, Lt. Kitajima, Nagai and Matsumaru)'' - 40 Nakajima B5Ns armed with [[Type 91 torpedo]]es
* '''2nd Group''' (''Lt. Cmdr. Takahashi'') - 55 [[Aichi D3A]]s armed with 550 lb anti-ground bombs
** 15th Attack Unit (27 "Val") - ''(Lt. Cmdr. Takahashi)'' - Hangars and aircraft on [[Ford Island]]
** 16th Attack Unit (27 "Val") - ''(Lt. Sakamoto)'' - Hangars and aircraft on [[Wheeler Field]]
* '''3rd Group''' (''Lt. Cmdr. Itaya'') - 45 [[Mitsubishi Zero|Mitsubishi A6M]]s for air control and [[strafe|strafing]]
** 1st and 2nd Fighter Combat Units (18 "Zeke") - ''(Lt. Cmdr. Itaya and Lt. Shiga)'' - Ford Island and Hickam Field
** 3rd and 4th Fighter Combat Units (15 "Zeke") - ''(Lt. Suganami and Okajima)'' - Wheeler Field and Barbers Point
** 5th and 6th Figher Combat Units (12 "Zeke') - ''(Lt. Sato and Kaneko)'' - Kaneohe
 
===Japanese losses===
The first attack wave was divided into six [[formation]]s with one directed to [[Wheeler Field]]. Each of the aerial waves started with the [[bomber]]s and ended with the fighters to deter pursuit.
Fifty-five Japanese airmen and nine submariners were killed in the attack, and one, [[Kazuo Sakamaki]], was captured. Of Japan's 414<ref name="IJN"/> available planes, 350 took part in the raid. Twenty-nine were lost, nine in the first wave (three fighters, one dive bomber, and five torpedo bombers) and twenty in the second (six fighters and fourteen dive bombers),<ref name="USSBSp18">{{harvnb|United States Strategic Bombing Survey|1946|p=18}}</ref>{{refn|[[USAAF]] pilots of the 46th and 47th Pursuit Squadrons, 15th Pursuit Group, claim to have destroyed ten. Overall, the Americans claimed to have shot down 41 Japanese aircraft.|group=nb}} with another 74 damaged by anti-aircraft fire from the ground.{{citation needed|date=May 2019}}
 
===Possible third wave===
[[Image:Japanesecrewmen.jpg|thumb|250px|right|Crewmen aboard ''[[Shokaku]]'' farewelling to the planes taking off.]]
According to some accounts, several Japanese junior officers, including Fuchida and Genda, urged Nagumo to carry out a third strike in order to sink more of the Pearl Harbor's remaining warships, and damage the base's maintenance shops, drydock facilities and oil tank yards.<ref name=Gailey1997p68 /> Most notably, Fuchida gave a firsthand account of this meeting several times after the war. However, some historians have [[Mitsuo Fuchida#Historical controversy|cast doubt]] on this and many other of Fuchida's later claims, which sometimes conflict with documented historic records.{{sfn|Parshall|2010}} Genda, who opined during the planning for the attack that [[Events leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor#Concept of Japanese invasion of Hawaii|without an invasion]] three strikes were necessary to fully disable the Pacific Fleet,{{sfn|Caravaggio|2014}} denied requesting an additional attack.{{sfn|Willmott|2001|p=156–157}} Regardless, it is undisputed that the captains of the other five carriers in the task force reported they were willing and ready to carry out a third strike soon after the second returned,{{sfn|Horn|2005|p=16}} but Nagumo decided to withdraw for several reasons:
*American anti-aircraft performance had improved considerably during the second strike, and two-thirds of Japan's losses were incurred during the second wave.{{sfn|Hoyt|2000|p=190}}
*Nagumo felt if he launched a third strike, he would be risking three-quarters of the Combined Fleet's strength to wipe out the remaining targets (which included the facilities) while suffering higher aircraft losses.{{sfn|Hoyt|2000|p=190}}
*The ___location of the American carriers remained unknown. In addition, the admiral was concerned his force was now within range of American land-based bombers.{{sfn|Hoyt|2000|p=190}} Nagumo was uncertain whether the United States had enough surviving planes remaining on Hawaii to launch an attack against his carriers.{{sfn|Hoyt|2000|p=191}}
*A third wave would have required substantial preparation and turnaround time, and would have meant returning planes would have had to land at night. At the time, only the [[Royal Navy]] had developed night carrier techniques, so this was a substantial risk.{{sfn|Stephen|1988|pp=34–38}} The first two waves had launched the entirety of the Combined Fleet's air strength. A third wave would have required landing both the first and second wave before launching the first wave again. Compare Nagumo's situation in the [[Battle of Midway]], where an attack returning from Midway kept Nagumo from launching an immediate strike on American carriers.
*The task force's fuel situation did not permit him to remain in waters north of Pearl Harbor much longer, since he was at the very limit of logistical support. To do so risked running unacceptably low on fuel, perhaps even having to abandon destroyers en route home.{{sfn|Prange|Goldstein|Dillon|1988|p={{Page needed|date=August 2021}}}}
*He believed the second strike had essentially accomplished the mission's main objective (neutralizing the United States Pacific Fleet) and did not wish to risk further losses.{{sfn|Gailey|1997|p=97}} Moreover, it was IJN practice to prefer the conservation of strength over the total destruction of the enemy.{{sfn|Willmott|1983|p=16}}
 
Although a hypothetical third strike would have likely focused on the base's remaining warships,{{refn|Fuchida would later claim he had designated Pearl Harbor's oil storage facilities as the primary target, although this contradicted Japanese military doctrine and even several interviews on the subject he had given earlier in life{{sfn|Parshall|2010}}}} military historians have suggested any potential damage to the shore facilities would have hampered the Pacific Fleet far more seriously.{{sfn|Willmott|1983}}{{page needed|date=December 2015}}{{sfn|Blair|1975}}{{page needed|date=December 2015}} If they had been wiped out, "serious [American] operations in the Pacific would have been postponed for more than a year";{{sfn|Gailey|1997|pp=97–98}} according to Admiral [[Chester W. Nimitz]], later Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, "it would have prolonged the war another two years".{{sfn|Yergin|1991|p=327}}
====Second wave attack units====
The second wave consisted of 54 level bombers, 78 dive bombers, and 35 fighters (a total of 167), launched from much the same ___location, commanded by [[Lieutenant-Commander]] [[Shigekazu Shimazaki]]. This wave was composed of
* '''1st Group''' (''Lt. Cmdr. Shigekazu Shimazaki'') - 54 Nakajima B5Ns armed with 550 lb anti-ground bombs and 120 lb general purpose bombs
** 5th Attack Unit (27 "Kate") - ''(Lt. Ichihira)'' - Aircraft and hangars on Kaneohe, Ford Island and Barbers Point
** 6th Attack Unit (27 "Kate") - ''(Lt. Cmdr. Shimazaki)'' - Hangars and aircraft on [[Hickam Field]]
* '''2nd Group''' (''Lt. Cmdr. Egusa'')
** 11th-14th Attack Units - ''(Lt. Egusa, Kobayashi, Chihaya, and Makino)'' - 78 Aichi D3As armed with 550 lb ordinary dive bombs
* '''3rd Group''' (''Lt. Cmdr. Shindo'') - 36 Mitsubishi A6Ms for air control and strafing
** 1st and 2nd Fighter Combat Units (18 "Zeke") - ''(Lt. Shindo and Nikaido)'' - Ford Island and Hickam Field
** 3rd and 4th Figher Combat Units (18 "Zeke') - ''(Lt. Iida and Kumano)'' - Wheeler Field and Kaneohe
The second wave was divided into four formations with one formation tasked to [[Marine Corps Base Hawaii|Kāne{{okina}}ohe Naval Air Station]]<ref>Prange ''et al.'', ''December 7th 1941''.</ref> away from Pearl Harbor proper and the rest sent against the main naval base. The separate sections arrived at the attack point almost simultaneously, from several directions.
 
At a conference aboard his flagship the following morning, Yamamoto supported Nagumo's withdrawal without launching a third wave.{{sfn|Gailey|1997|p=97}} In retrospect, sparing the vital dockyards, maintenance shops, and the oil tank farm meant the United States could respond relatively quickly in the Pacific. Yamamoto later regretted Nagumo's decision to withdraw and categorically stated it had been a great mistake not to order a third strike.{{sfn|Gailey|1997|p=98}}
====Post attack====
For post attack survey, some fighters were scheduled to fly as low and fast as possible to study the damage inflicted to the targets. <!-- citation? -->
 
==Ships lost or damaged==
===Battle===
{{Further|List of United States Navy ships present at Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941}}
Even before Nagumo began launching, at 03.42<ref>''ibid.'', p.72.</ref> [[Hawaii-Aleutian Standard Time Zone|Hawaiian Time]], the [[minesweeper]] [[USS Condor]] spotted a [[midget submarine]] outside the harbor entrance and alerted USN [[destroyer]] [[USS Ward (DD-139)|''Ward'']] (DD-139). ''Ward'' carried out an unsuccessful search. The [[First American shots fired in World War II|first shots fired]], and the first casualties in the attack, occurred when ''Ward'' eventually attacked and sank a midget submarine, possibly the same one, at 06:37. Five [[Ko-hyoteki class submarine|''Ko-hyoteki'']]-class midget submarines had been assigned to [[torpedo]] U.S. ships after the bombing started. None of these made it back safely, and only four have since been found. Of the ten sailors aboard, nine died; the only survivor, [[Kazuo Sakamaki]], was captured, becoming the first [[prisoner of war]] taken by the Americans in World War II. Sakamaki's survival was considered traitorous by many Japanese, who referred to his dead companions as "The Nine Young Gods." [[United States Naval Institute]] analysis of photographs from the attack, conducted in 1999, indicates one of these mini-subs entered the harbor and successfully fired a torpedo into the [[USS West Virginia (BB-48)|''West Virginia'']], what may have been the first shot by the attacking Japanese. Her final disposition is unknown.<ref>John Rodgaard ''et al.'', "[http://www.usni.org/navalhistory/Articles99/Nhrodgaard.htm Pearl Harbor—Attack from Below]," ''Naval History'', December 1999 (accessed [[June 10]] [[2005]]).</ref>
[[File:NH64486 Wallin aboard BB-44.jpg|thumb|Captain [[Homer N. Wallin]] (center) supervises salvage operations aboard {{USS|California|BB-44|6}} in early 1942]]
The first wave of [[1st Air Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy]] attack was coordinated by Captain Fuchida, the [[Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service]]. He led the first strike formation, followed by second wave led by Lieutenant-Commander [[Shigekazu Shimazaki]]. [[Image:M Fuchida.jpg|thumb|right|[[Captain]] [[Mitsuo Fuchida]].]]
Twenty-one American ships were damaged or lost in the attack, of which all but three were repaired and returned to service.{{sfn|Wallin|1968|pp=203–269}}
On the morning of the attack, the Army's [[Opana Radar Site|Opana Point]] station (an [[SCR-270 radar]], located near the northern tip of Oahu, which had not entered official service, having been in training mode for months), detected the first wave of Japanese planes and called in a warning. Although the operators at Opana Point reported an aircraft echo larger than anything they had ever seen, an untrained new officer at the new and only partially activated Intercept Center, Lieutenant Kermit A. Tyler,<!-- he retired as an Air Force Colonel assigned to NORAD at Cheyenne Mountain --> presumed the scheduled arrival of six B-17 bombers was the cause because of the direction from which the aircraft were coming (only a few degrees separated their inbound courses);<ref>Prange ''et al.'', ''op.cit.'', p.98.</ref> because he presumed the operators had never seen a formation as large as the U.S. bombers' on radar;<ref>''ibid.'', p.97.</ref> and possibly because the operators had only seen the first element of incoming attackers.
 
===Battleships===
Several U.S. aircraft were shot down as the first attack wave approached land; one at least radioed a somewhat incoherent warning. Other warnings were still being processed, or awaiting confirmation, when the shooting began. It is not clear any warnings would have had much effect even had they been interpreted correctly and much more promptly. For instance, the results the Japanese achieved in the [[Philippines]] were essentially the same as at Pearl Harbor, though [[Douglas MacArthur|MacArthur]] had nine hours of warning the Japanese had attacked at Pearl (and specific orders to commence operations) before they actually struck his command.
*{{USS|Arizona|BB-39|2}} (Rear Admiral [[Isaac C. Kidd]]'s flagship of [[ComBatPac|Battleship Division One]]): hit by four armor-piercing bombs, exploded; total loss, not salvaged. 1,177 dead. Later [[USS Arizona Memorial|memorialized]].
*{{USS|Oklahoma|BB-37|2}}: hit by five torpedoes, capsized; total loss, salvaged, sank en route to scrapping May 1947. 429 dead.
*{{USS|West Virginia|BB-48|2}}: hit by two bombs, seven torpedoes, sunk; returned to service July 1944. 106 dead.
*{{USS|California|BB-44|2}}: hit by two bombs, two torpedoes, sunk; returned to service January 1944. 104 dead.<ref>[https://www.dpaa.mil/News-Stories/News-Releases/PressReleaseArticleView/Article/2874015/uss-california-sailor-accounted-for-from-world-war-ii-simmons-t/ USS California Sailor Accounted For From World War II (Simmons, T.)] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230325053444/https://www.dpaa.mil/News-Stories/News-Releases/PressReleaseArticleView/Article/2874015/uss-california-sailor-accounted-for-from-world-war-ii-simmons-t/ |date=March 25, 2023 }}. Retrieved 25 March 2023</ref>
*{{USS|Nevada|BB-36|2}}: hit by six bombs, one torpedo, beached; returned to service October 1942. 60 dead.
*{{USS|Pennsylvania|BB-38|2}} (Admiral [[Husband E. Kimmel]]'s flagship of the [[United States Pacific Fleet]]):{{sfn|Prange|Goldstein|Dillon|1981|p=49}} in [[dry dock]] with ''Cassin'' and ''Downes'', hit by one bomb and debris from USS ''Cassin''; remained in service. 9 dead.
*{{USS|Tennessee|BB-43|2}}: hit by two bombs; returned to service February 1942. 5 dead.
*{{USS|Maryland|BB-46|2}}: hit by two bombs; returned to service February 1942. 4 dead (including floatplane pilot shot down).
 
===Ex-battleship (target/AA training ship)===
The air portion of the attack on Pearl Harbor began at 7:48 a.m. [[December 7]] [[Hawaii-Aleutian Standard Time Zone|Hawaiian Time]], or 3:18 a.m. [[December 8]] [[Japanese Standard Time]] (as used by the ''Kido Butai''), with the attack on Kaneohe.<ref>''ibid.'', p.174.</ref> Japanese planes attacked in two waves; a total of 353 planes reached O{{okina}}ahu. Slow, vulnerable torpedo bombers led the first wave of 183 planes, exploiting the first moments of surprise to attack the most important ships present (the battleships), while dive bombers attacked U.S. air bases across O{{okina}}ahu, starting with [[Hickam Air Force Base|Hickam Field]], the largest, and Wheeler Field, the principal fighter base. The 170 planes in the second wave attacked [[Bellows Field]] and [[Ford Island]], a Marine and Naval air station in the middle of Pearl Harbor. The only significant air opposition came from a handful of [[P-36 Hawk]]s and [[P-40 Warhawk]]s that flew 25 [[sortie]]s,<ref>USAF Historical Study No.85 credits 6 pilots with 10 planes destroyed: 1stLt Lewis M. Sanders (P-36) and 2nd Lts Philip M Rasmussen (P-36), Gordon H. Sterling Jr. (P-36, [[killed in action]]), Harry W. Brown (P-36), Kenneth M. Taylor (P-40, 2), and [[George Welch|George S. Welch]] (P-40, 4). Three of the P-36 kills were not verified by the Japanese</ref> and may have been shot down by naval [[Anti-aircraft warfare|anti-aircraft]] fire.
*{{USS|Utah|BB-31|2}}: hit by two torpedoes, capsized; total loss, salvage stopped. 64 dead. Later [[USS Utah (BB-31)#Memorial|memorialized]].
 
===Cruisers===
[[Image:USS California sinking-Pearl Harbor.jpg|thumb|250px|right|USS [[USS California (BB-44)|''California'']] sinking.]]
*{{USS|Helena|CL-50|2}}: hit by one torpedo; returned to service January 1942. 20 dead.
*{{USS|Raleigh|CL-7|2}}: hit by one torpedo; returned to service February 1942.<ref>{{cite DANFS| url= https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/r/raleigh-iii.html| title= Raleigh III (CL-7) | publisher= [[Naval History and Heritage Command]]| date= 26 August 2015 | access-date= 30 January 2024| ref= {{sfnRef|DANFS|2015}} }}</ref>
*{{USS|Honolulu|CL-48|2}}: near miss, light damage; remained in service.
 
===Destroyers===
Men aboard U.S. ships awoke to the sounds of bombs exploding and cries of "Away fire and rescue party" and "All hands on deck, we're being bombed" and other various calls to General Quarters. (The famous message, "Air raid Pearl Harbor. This is not drill." was broadcast by Commander Logan Ramsey from the headquarters of Admiral [[Patrick Bellinger]], commander of Patrol Wing Two.) Despite the lack of preparation, which included locked ammunition lockers, aircraft parked wing to wing to prevent sabotage, and no heightened alert status, many American military personnel served with distinction during the battle. Rear Admiral [[Isaac C. Kidd]], and Captain [[Franklin Van Valkenburgh]], commander of [[USS Arizona (BB-39)|''Arizona'']], both rushed to the bridge to direct her defense, until both were killed by an explosion in the forward ammunition magazine from an armor piercing bomb that hit next to turret two. Both were posthumously awarded the [[Medal of Honor]]. Ensign [[Joe Taussig]] got his ship, [[USS Nevada (BB-36)|''Nevada'']], under way from a dead cold start during the attack. One of the destroyers, [[USS Aylwin (DD-355)|''Aylwin'']], got underway with only four officers aboard, all Ensigns, none with more than a year's sea duty. That ship operated for four days at sea before her commanding officer caught up with her. Captain [[Mervyn Bennion]],<!--some sources say it was Charles "Savvy" Cooke--> commanding [[USS West Virginia (BB-48)|''West Virginia'']] (Kimmel's flagship), led his men until he was cut down by fragments from a bomb hit in [[USS Tennessee (BB-43)|''Tennessee'']], moored alongside. The earliest aircraft kill credit went to submarine [[USS Tautog (SS-199)|''Tautog'']]. Probably the most famous single defender is [[Doris Miller|Doris "Dorie" Miller]], an [[African-American]] cook aboard ''West Virginia'', who went beyond his duty assignment and training when he took control of an unattended [[anti-aircraft gun]], on which he had no training, and used it to fire on attacking planes, even while bombs were hitting his ship. He was awarded the [[Navy Cross]]. In all, 14 sailors and officers were awarded the [[Medal of Honor]]. A special [[Awards and decorations of the United States military|military award]], the [[Pearl Harbor Commemorative Medal]], was later authorized to all military veterans of the attack.
*{{USS|Cassin|DD-372|2}}: in drydock with ''Downes'' and ''Pennsylvania'', hit by one bomb, burned; reconstructed and returned to service February 1944.
*{{USS|Downes|DD-375|2}}: in drydock with ''Cassin'' and ''Pennsylvania'', caught fire from ''Cassin'', burned; reconstructed and returned to service November 1943.
*{{USS|Helm|DD-388|2}}: underway to West Loch, damaged by two near-miss bombs;{{sfn|Wallin|1968|p=198}} continued patrol; dry-docked January 15, 1942, and sailed January 20, 1942.
*{{USS|Shaw|DD-373|2}}: hit by three bombs; returned to service June 1942.
 
===Auxiliaries===
[[Image:NARA_28-1277a.gif |thumb|250px|left| [[Boeing B-17 |B-17 Bomber]] after the attack on [[Hickam Air Force Base|Hickam Field]].]]
*{{USS|Oglala|CM-4|2}} (minelayer): damaged by torpedo hit on ''Helena'', capsized; returned to service (as engine-repair ship) February 1944.
*{{USS|Vestal|AR-4|2}} (repair ship): hit by two bombs, blast and fire from ''Arizona'', beached; returned to service by August 1942.
*{{USS|Curtiss|AV-4|2}} (seaplane tender): hit by one bomb, one crashed Japanese aircraft; returned to service January 1942. 19 dead.
*{{USS|Sotoyomo|YTM-9|2}} (harbor tug): damaged by explosion and fires in ''Shaw''; sunk; returned to service August 1942.
*{{USS|YFD-2|YFD-2|2}} ([[Auxiliary floating drydock|yard floating dock]]): damaged by bombs; sunk; returned to service January 25, 1942, servicing ''Shaw''.
 
==Salvage==
Ninety minutes after it began, the attack was over. 2403 Americans died (68 were civilians, most killed by American anti-aircraft shrapnel and shells landing in civilian areas, including Honolulu), a further 1178 wounded. Eighteen ships were sunk, including five battleships.<ref>Stetson Conn et al, "[http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/Guard-US/ch7.htm Chapter 7 - The Attack on Pearl Harbor]" ''Guarding the United States and Its Outposts'', Center of Military History United States Army, Washington, D.C., 2000</ref>
After a systematic search for survivors, Captain [[Homer N. Wallin]] was ordered to lead a formal salvage operation.{{sfn|Wallin|1968|p=v}}{{refn| Wallin had been assigned to go to [[Massawa]] in East Africa. The harbor there was blocked by scuttled Italian and German ships, which prevented British use of the port. Commander [[Edward Ellsberg]] was sent instead.{{sfn|Ellsberg|1946}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}} |group=nb}}
[[Image:Pennsylvania-cassin-downes.jpg|thumb|250px|right|USS [[USS Pennsylvania (BB-38)|''Pennsylvania'']], behind the wreckage of the USS [[USS Downes (DD-375)|''Downes'']] and [[USS Cassin (DD-372)|''Cassin'']].]]
 
Around Pearl Harbor, divers from the Navy (shore and tenders), the [[Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard]], and civilian contractors ([[Pacific Bridge Company]] and others) began work on the ships that could be refloated. They patched holes, cleared debris, and pumped water out of ships. [[Melvin Storer]] and other Navy divers worked inside the damaged ships.<ref name=":3">{{Cite journal |last=Gribble |first=Joanne |date=1975-12-07 |title=Telegram was wrong: 'Dead' man tells tale about Pearl Harbor Day |url=https://www.newspapers.com/article/imperial-beach-star-news-telegram-was-wr/126665399/ |journal=[[The Star-News (Chula Vista, California)|The Star-News]] |volume=45 |issue=80 |pages=17 |via=[[Newspapers.com]]}}</ref> Within six months, five battleships and two cruisers were patched or refloated so they could be sent to shipyards in Pearl Harbor and on the mainland for extensive repair.<ref name="GrierCSM">{{cite web |last=Grier |first=Peter |date=December 7, 2021 |title=Pearl Harbor resurrection: the warships that rose to fight again |publisher=The Christian Science Monitor |url=https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/Decoder/2012/1207/Pearl-Harbor-resurrection-the-warships-that-rose-to-fight-again |access-date=December 10, 2021 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211008202956/https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/Decoder/2012/1207/Pearl-Harbor-resurrection-the-warships-that-rose-to-fight-again |archive-date=October 8, 2021}}</ref>
Nearly half of the American fatalities &mdash; 1,102 men &mdash; were caused by the explosion and sinking of [[USS Arizona (BB-39)|''Arizona'']]. She was destroyed when the forward magazine exploded after it was hit by a bomb (a modified 40cm {16in} naval gun shell) dropped by Tadashi Kusumi. The wreck of ''Arizona'' has become a [[USS Arizona Memorial|memorial]] to those lost that day, most of whom remain within the ship. She continues to leak small amounts of fuel oil, 65 years after the attack.
 
Intensive salvage operations continued for another year, a total of some 20,000 man-hours under water.{{sfn|Raymer|1996}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}{{sfn|Wallin|1968|pp=277}} ''Arizona'' and the target ship ''Utah'' were too heavily damaged for salvage and remain where they were sunk,<ref name="usnp-pearl-battleship">{{cite web |title=Battleship Row |url=https://www.nps.gov/perl/learn/historyculture/battleship-row.htm |website=US National Park Service |access-date=4 March 2020 |date=July 2, 2019 |archive-date=March 12, 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200312072705/https://www.nps.gov/valr/learn/historyculture/battleship-row.htm |url-status=live}}</ref> with ''Arizona'' becoming a [[USS Arizona Memorial|war memorial]]. ''Oklahoma'', while successfully raised, was never repaired and capsized while under tow to the mainland in 1947. The ''Nevada'' proved particularly difficult to raise and repair; two men involved in the operation died after inhaling poisonous gases that had accumulated in the ship's interior.<ref name="GrierCSM"/> When feasible, armament and equipment were removed from vessels too damaged to repair and put to use to improve the anti-aircraft defense of the harbor or installed aboard other craft.{{sfn|Wallin|1968|pp=274f}}
''Nevada'' attempted to exit the harbor, but was deliberately beached to avoid blocking the harbor entrance. Already damaged by a torpedo and on fire forward, ''Nevada'' was targeted by many Japanese bombers as she got underway, sustaining more hits from 250 lb (113 kg) bombs as she beached.
 
==News coverage==
[[USS California (BB-44)|''California'']] was hit by two bombs and two torpedoes. The crew might have kept her afloat, but were ordered to abandon ship just as they were raising power for the pumps. Burning oil from ''Arizona'' and ''West Virginia'' drifted down on her, and probably made the situation look worse than it was.<ref> Their ship having been laid up, her band was assigned to assist the cryptanalysts at [[station Hypo|<small>HYPO</small>]] and its commander (the famous Commander [[Joseph P. Rochefort]], played by Hal Holbrook in the film "Midway", which mistakenly promotes him to Fleet Intelligence Officer) thought they did well there. (Musicians seemed to make good crypto men. Holmes, ''op.cit.'')</ref> The disarmed target ship [[USS Utah (BB-31)|''Utah'']] was holed twice by torpedoes. [[USS West Virginia (BB-48)|''West Virginia'']] was hit by seven torpedoes, the seventh tearing away the ship's rudder. [[USS Oklahoma (BB-37)|''Oklahoma'']] was hit by four torpedoes, the last two above her side armor belt which caused her to [[capsize]]. [[USS Maryland (BB-46)|''Maryland'']] was hit by two of the converted 40cm shells, but neither caused serious damage.
=== Coverage in the United States ===
[[File:USS Downes (DD-375), USS Cassin (DD-372) and USS Pennsylvania (BB-38) in Dry Dock No. 1 at the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, 7 December 1941 (306533).jpg|thumb|The {{USS|Pennsylvania|BB-38|2}} behind the wreckage of ''Downes'' and ''Cassin'']]
The initial announcement of the attack on Pearl Harbor was made by the White House Press Secretary, [[Stephen Early]], at 2:22{{spaces}}p.m. Eastern time (8:52{{spaces}}a.m. Hawaiian time): "The Japanese have attacked Pearl Harbor from the air and all naval and military activities on the island of Oahu, principal American base in the Hawaiian islands."<ref>"Planes Blast U.S. Naval Bases; No Warning Is Given", ''Lawton Constitution'', December 7, 1941, Extra Edition, at 1.</ref> As information developed, Early made a number of additional announcements to approximately 150 White House reporters over the course of the afternoon.<ref>"War Brings a Tense Day to White House Press Room", ''Washington Post'', December 8, 1941, at 4.</ref>
 
Initial reports of the attack moved on news wires at approximately 2:25{{spaces}}p.m. Eastern time. The first radio coverage (which, at the time, represented the earliest opportunity for ordinary people to learn of the attack) was on the CBS radio network's scheduled news program, ''World News Today'', at 2:30{{spaces}}p.m. Eastern time. [[John Charles Daly]] read the initial report, then switched to London, where [[Robert Trout]] ad-libbed on the possible London reaction. The first report on NBC cut into a play, a dramatization of ''The Inspector-General'', at 2:33{{spaces}}p.m. Eastern time and lasted only 21 seconds. Unlike the later practice with major news stories, there were only brief interruptions of scheduled commercial programming.<ref>{{cite news |mode=cs2 |last=McDonough |first=John |date=December 6, 1991 |title=Hear It Now: Pearl Harbor Day Radio |newspaper=Wall Street Journal |page=A13}}</ref>
Although the Japanese concentrated on battleships (the largest vessels present), they did not ignore other targets. The light cruiser [[USS Helena (CL-50)|''Helena'']] was torpedoed, and the concussion from the blast capsized the neighboring minelayer [[USS Oglala (CM-4)|''Oglala'']]. Two destroyers in dry dock were destroyed when bombs penetrated their fuel [[bunker]]s. The leaking fuel caught fire; flooding the dry dock in an effort to fight fire made the burning oil and so the fire damage, rise which burned out the ships. The light cruiser [[USS Raleigh (CL-7)|''Raleigh'']] was hit by a torpedo and holed. The light cruiser [[USS Honolulu (CL-48)|''Honolulu'']] was damaged but remained in service. The destroyer [[USS Cassin (DD-372)|''Cassin'']] capsized, and destroyer [[USS Downes (DD-375)|''Downes'']] was heavily damaged. The repair vessel [[USS Vestal (AR-4)|''Vestal'']], moored alongside ''Arizona'', was heavily damaged and beached. The seaplane tender [[USS Curtiss (AV-4)|''Curtiss'']] was also damaged.
 
The attacks were covered on television but the extent of it was limited; as commercial television had started just six months earlier, "a few thousand TV sets existed" in the United States, with most being in the [[New York metropolitan area|Greater New York City area]], and only a handful of stations existed which were all in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles and Philadelphia. [[WNBC|WNBT]] from New York was the only TV station that was regularly airing that day in the country, with the comedy movie ''[[Millionaire Playboy]]'', which was scheduled for 3:30-4:30 PM, being interrupted with the news of the attack. The other station known to cover the attacks was WCBW, also out of New York, where a special report on the attack was broadcast that evening. There are no recordings of either station's coverage, either visual or audio.<ref>{{Cite web |date=December 7, 2016 |title=A FORGOTTEN MILESTONE: TELEVISION AND PEARL HARBOR |url=https://www.tvobscurities.com/lost/forgotten-milestone-television-pearl-harbor/ |access-date=February 16, 2024 |website=Television Obscurities: Exploring forgotten TV from the 1920s to today.}}</ref>
Almost all of the 188 American aircraft in Hawaii were destroyed or damaged, and 155 of those were hit on the ground. Almost none were actually ready to take off in defense of the base. Attacks on barracks killed additional pilots and other personnel. Friendly fire brought down several U.S. planes (including at least one inbound from [[USS Enterprise (CV-6)|''Enterprise'']]) which was heading for Pearl at the time of the attack.
 
A contemporaneous newspaper report compared the attack to the [[Battle of Port Arthur]] in which the Imperial Japanese Navy attacked the Imperial Russian Navy, triggering the [[Russo-Japanese War]], 37 years prior.<ref>{{Cite web |mode=cs2 |last=Butcher |first=Clifford F. |date=January 19, 1942 |title=Port Arthur Was 'the Pearl Harbor of 1904' |newspaper=The Milwaukee Journal |url=https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1499&dat=19420119&id=-e4ZAAAAIBAJ&pg=4412,1516787 |access-date=June 27, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160515202140/https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1499&dat=19420119&id=-e4ZAAAAIBAJ&sjid=8SIEAAAAIBAJ&pg=4412,1516787 |archive-date=May 15, 2016 }}</ref> Modern writers have continued to note parallels between the attacks, albeit more dispassionately.{{sfn|Peck|2016}}
Fifty-five Japanese airmen and nine submariners were killed in the action. Of Japan's 441 available planes (350 took part in the attack), 29 were lost during the battle (nine in the first attack wave, 20 in the second),<ref>[[USAAF]] pilots of the 46th and 47th Pursuit Squadrons, 15th Pursuit Group, claim to have destroyed 10</ref> with another 74 damaged by antiaircraft fire from the ground. Over 20 of the aircraft that safely landed on their carriers could not be salvaged.{{Fact|date=March 2007}}
 
===The ThirdCoverage in Japan Wave===
News of the attack was first broadcast at 11:30 AM ([[Japan Standard Time|Japanese Standard Time]]), however it had already been announced "shortly after" 7 AM (Japanese Standard Time) that Japan had "entered into a situation of war with the United States and Britain in the Western Pacific before dawn". There was no further elaboration or explanation, and the attacks were already finished by that time.<ref name=":1">{{Cite book |last=Hotta |first=Eri |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=pOS_5EfYtEEC |title=Japan 1941: Countdown to Infamy |publisher=Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group |year=2013 |chapter=Prologue: What A Difference a Day Makes |isbn=978-0-385-35051-8 |access-date=February 22, 2024 |via=Google Books}}</ref> The attack on Pearl Harbor was eventually covered in the Japanese press, but press in wartime Japan was heavily censored.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book |last=Kunii |first=Maiko |url=https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=7744&context=etd_theses |title=Asahi Shimbun and The New York Times: Framing Pearl Harbor and the 9/11 Attacks |publisher=San Jose State University |year=2012 |access-date=February 16, 2024}}</ref> One Japanese newspaper, [[The Asahi Shimbun|''The'' ''Asahi Shimbun'']] did report on the attack the day it occurred, and from that point onward their editorials began to back governmental decisions regardless of what they were.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Yoshimoto |first=Hideko |url=https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1813&context=etd_theses |title=Media treatment of World War II in Japan and the United States, 1931-1945: a propaganda theory approach (unpublished) |publisher=San Jose State University |year=1994 |pages=81–83 |access-date=February 16, 2024}}</ref> The ''Asahi Shimbun'' also reported the declaration of war on the United States after the attacks, framing it as an Imperial Order, with most Japanese people taking it that way. In contrast, coverage in the ''New York Times'' focused on "the danger to democracy and to the nation" brought on by the Japanese attack.<ref name=":0" /> [[NHK]] broadcast twelve special news reports along with its six regularly scheduled ones that day.<ref name=":1" /> NHK covered the news of Pearl Harbor and other attacks positively throughout the rest of the month.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Robbins |first=Jane M. J. |url=https://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/14444/1/268276.pdf |title=Tokyo Calling: Japanese Overseas Radio Broadcasting 1937-1945 |year=1997 |pages=82 |type=Doctoral thesis|publisher=University of Sheffield}}</ref>
<!--[[Image:Pearlharborcolork13513.jpg|thumb|right|250px|The forward magazines of the [[USS Arizona (BB-39)|USS ''Arizona'']] exploded after it was hit by a bomb dropped by [[Tadashi Kusumi]].]] -->
Some senior officers and flight leaders urged Nagumo to make a third strike to destroy as much more of Pearl Harbor (eg, oil storage depots, machine shops, dry docks, etc). The US Navy had considered the vulnerability of the fuel oil storage before the war and secretly started construction of the bomb resistant Red Hill installation before the attack. Destruction of the oil still in vulnerable tanks would have greatly increased the U.S. Navy's difficulties, as the nearest immediately usable fleet facilities were several thousand miles away, on America's West Coast. Some military historians have suggested destruction of those oil tanks and repair facilities would have crippled the Pacific Fleet more seriously than loss of battleships. Nagumo decided to forgo a third attack in favor of withdrawing for several reasons.
*Anti-aircraft performance during the second strike was much improved over the first, and two-thirds of Japan's losses were during the second wave, because the Americans had been alerted. A third strike would have suffered still worse losses.
*The first two strikes had essentially used all the previously prepared aircraft available, so a third strike would have taken time to make ready, perhaps allowing the Americans time to find and attack Nagumo's force. The ___location of the American carriers was and remained unknown to Nagumo.
*The Japanese had not practiced an attack against shore facilities and organizing such an attack would have taken still more time, though several of the strike leaders urged a third strike anyway.
<!--[[Image:Pearl Harbor submarine base and adjacent fuel tank farms.jpg|thumb|right|250px|Fuel farm at left, Submarine Base (right center). October 1941.]] -->
*The bunker fuel situation did not permit remaining on station north much longer. The Japanese force was at the limit of its logistics support. To remain in those waters for much longer would have risked running unacceptably low on fuel.
*The timing of a third strike meant aircraft would probably have to recover after dark. Night operations from aircraft carriers were in their infancy in 1941, and neither Japan nor anyone else had developed reliable techniques and doctrine.
*The second strike had essentially completed the entire mission: neutralization of the Pacific Fleet.
*There was the danger of remaining in one ___location too long. The attack force was very fortunate to have escaped detection during its voyage from the Inland Sea to Hawaii. The longer they remained near Hawaii, the more danger they were in from American carriers.
*The carriers were needed to support the main Japanese attack toward the "Southern Resources Area" (i.e., the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, and Burma) which was intended to capture control of oil and other resources. Japanese leaders (especially the Army) had been reluctant to allow the attack at all as it used air cover which might be needed for the southern thrust; and Nagumo was under orders not to risk his command any more than necessary.{{Fact|date=February 2007}} War games during planning for the attack had predicted from two to four carriers might be lost in the attack; that none had been even attacked was a major bonus.
 
=== Coverage elsewhere ===
Yamamoto was not happy with Nagumo after the attack for not launching a third attack, and for not destroying the US aircraft carriers and the Pearl Harbor oil supply.
The United Kingdom's [[BBC]] broadcast news of the attack and that [[Manila]] was also under attack.<ref>{{Cite web |date=December 7, 2016 |title=How the BBC covered Pearl Harbor |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-38243881 |access-date=December 8, 2024 |website=BBC}}</ref>
 
==Aftermath==
===Additional U.S. losses on 23 December 1941===
{{Main|Consequences of the attack on Pearl Harbor|Day of Infamy speech}}
[[Japanese submarine I-26|''I-26'']] sank the ''Cynthia Olson'', a U.S. Army chartered [[schooner]], off the coast of San Francisco with a loss of 35 lives.[http://usmmv.com/cynthiaolson.htm]
[[File:Remember december 7th.jpg|thumb|A 1942 poster by [[Allen Saalburg]] issued by the [[United States Office of War Information]]]]
The day after the attack, U.S. President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] delivered his famous [[Day of Infamy speech]] to a [[Joint Session of Congress]], calling for a [[United States declaration of war on Japan|formal declaration of war on the Empire of Japan]]. Congress obliged his request less than an hour later. On December 11, Germany and Italy declared war on the United States, even though the Tripartite Pact did not require it.{{refn|One of the pact's objectives was to limit US intervention in conflicts involving the three nations.<ref>{{Harvnb|Liddell Hart|1971|p=[https://archive.org/details/historyofsecondw00lidd/page/n225/206 206]}}</ref><ref>{{Harvnb|Shirer|1960|p=[https://archive.org/details/risefallthirdreich00shir/page/873/ 873]}}</ref><ref>{{Harvnb|Keegan|1990|p=[https://archive.org/details/secondworldwar00john/page/130/ 130]}}</ref>|group=nb}} Congress issued a declaration of war against Germany and Italy later that same day.
 
The United Kingdom had already been at war with Germany since September 1939 and with Italy since June 1940, and British Prime Minister [[Winston Churchill]] had promised to declare war "within the hour" of a Japanese attack on the United States.<ref>{{cite magazine |mode=cs2 |url=http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,772812,00.html |magazine=Time |title=The U.S. At War, The Last Stage |date=December 15, 1941 |access-date=August 12, 2014 |archive-date=August 10, 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140810134435/http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,772812,00.html |url-status=live}}</ref> Upon learning of the Japanese attacks on [[British Malaya|Malaya]], [[Colony of Singapore|Singapore]], and [[British Hong Kong|Hong Kong]], Churchill promptly determined there was no need to either wait or further consult the US government and immediately summoned the Japanese ambassador. As a result, [[United Kingdom declaration of war on Japan|the United Kingdom declared war on Japan]] nine hours before the United States did.
===Subsequent Japanese attacks on Hawaii===
Later during the war another small-scale attack was also made on Pearl Harbor.
 
The attack was an initial shock to all the Allies in the Pacific Theater. Further losses compounded the alarming setback. Japan [[Philippines campaign (1941–1942)|attacked the Philippines]] hours later (because of the time difference, it was December 8 in the Philippines). Only three days after the attack on Pearl Harbor, [[sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse|the battleship ''Prince of Wales'' and battlecruiser ''Repulse'' were sunk]] off the coast of Malaya, causing Churchill later to recollect "In all the war I never received a more direct shock. As I turned and twisted in bed the full horror of the news sank in upon me. There were no British or American capital ships in the Indian Ocean or the Pacific except the American survivors of Pearl Harbor who were hastening back to California. Over this vast expanse of waters, Japan was supreme and we everywhere were weak and naked."<ref>{{Harvnb|Churchill|Gilbert|2001|pp=1593–1594}}</ref>
In March, 1942, in Operation K-1, a preparation for the [[Battle of Midway|Midway invasion]], two [[Japan]]ese [[Kawanishi H8K|H8K flying-boats]], based at Wotje in the [[Marshall Islands]], were tasked with [[reconnaissance]] to see how repairs were progressing, and to bomb the important "Ten-ten" repair dock. The distance involved required refueling ''en route'', and was done from submarines at [[French Frigate Shoals]], 500&nbsp;miles <!-- nautical or statute miles? --> (800&nbsp;km) north-west of Pearl Harbor. Poor visibility hampered the mission, and the bombs were dropped some miles from their target.
 
Throughout the war, Pearl Harbor was frequently used in [[American propaganda during World War II|American propaganda]].<ref>{{Harvnb|Rhodes|1987|p=257}}</ref>
Five Japanese submarines supported the operation: ''I-9'' as a radio beacon; [[Japanese submarine I-19|''I-19'']], [[Japanese submarine I-15|''I-15'']] and ''I-26'' to refuel the flying boats and [[Japanese submarine I-23|''I-23'']] to provide weather reports. However, ''I-23'' was lost without trace.
 
One further consequence of the attack on Pearl Harbor and its aftermath (notably the [[Niihau incident]]) was that Japanese-American residents and citizens were relocated to nearby [[Japanese-American internment]] camps. Within hours of the attack, hundreds of Japanese-American leaders were rounded up and taken to high-security camps such as [[Sand Island (Hawaii)|Sand Island]] at the mouth of Honolulu harbor and [[Kilauea Military Camp]] on the [[Hawaii (island)|island of Hawaii]].{{sfn|Levine|1995}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}<ref>{{cite web |mode=cs2 |title=The Untold Story |publisher=Japanese Cultural Center of Hawaiʻi |website=The Untold Story: Internment of Japanese Americans in Hawaiʻi |url=https://www.hawaiiinternment.org/untold-story/untold-story |access-date=December 10, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210813150853/https://www.hawaiiinternment.org/untold-story/untold-story |archive-date=August 13, 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref> Eventually, more than 110,000 Japanese Americans, nearly all who lived on the West Coast, were forced into interior camps, but in [[Territory of Hawaii|Hawaii]], where the 150,000-plus Japanese Americans composed over one-third of the population, only 1,200 to 1,800 were interned.{{sfn|Daniels|1972}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.pearlharboroahu.com/after.htm |title=What Happened After the Attack? |access-date=2011-11-13 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111201005141/http://www.pearlharboroahu.com/after.htm |archive-date=December 1, 2011 |website=The Official Pearl Harbor Tour Site}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |url=https://newmexicohistory.org/2014/01/17/japanese-american-internment-camps-in-new-mexico-1942-1946/ |title=Japanese-American Internment Camps in New Mexico 1942-1946 |website=New Mexico History.org |access-date=December 7, 2021 |archive-date=October 17, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211017223234/https://newmexicohistory.org/2014/01/17/japanese-american-internment-camps-in-new-mexico-1942-1946/ |url-status=live}}</ref>
American ships were posted to the Shoals thereafter, which precluded another attempt using the same approach. As a result, flying boats were unable to conduct reconnaissance prior to [[Battle of Midway|Midway]], allowing [[Frank Jack Fletcher|Fletcher]] to [[sortie]] undetected.
 
The attack also had international consequences. The Canadian province of [[British Columbia]], bordering the Pacific Ocean, had long had a large population of Japanese immigrants and their [[Japanese Canadians|Japanese-Canadian]] descendants. Pre-war tensions were exacerbated by the Pearl Harbor attack, leading to a reaction from the [[government of Canada]]. On February 24, 1942, Order-in-Council P.C. no. 1486 was passed under the [[War Measures Act]], allowing for the forced removal of any and all Canadians of Japanese descent from British Columbia, as well as prohibiting them from returning to the province. On March 4, regulations under the act were adopted to evacuate Japanese Canadians.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/databases/canada-gazette/093/001060-119.01-e.php?image_id_nbr=335121&document_id_nbr=8985&f=g&PHPSESSID=t6i5g5h5dhq1c9qvlkttga2l80 |title=Regulations made 4 March 1942 |access-date=November 23, 2016 |archive-date=November 24, 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161124025400/http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/databases/canada-gazette/093/001060-119.01-e.php?image_id_nbr=335121&document_id_nbr=8985&f=g&PHPSESSID=t6i5g5h5dhq1c9qvlkttga2l80 |url-status=live}}</ref> As a result, 12,000 were [[interned]] in interior camps, 2,000 were sent to road camps, and another 2,000 were forced to work in the [[Canadian Prairies|prairies]] on sugar beet farms.<ref>{{Cite conference |mode=cs2 |ref={{harvid|War Measures Act Conference|1978}} |date=1978 |title=The Japanese Canadian Experience: The October Crisis |conference=War Measures Act Conference (1977, McMaster University) |publisher=P. Anas Pub. |___location=London, Ontario |pages=12–14}}</ref>
==Immediate aftermath==
Ninety minutes before the attack on Pearl Harbor began ([[December 8]], [[1941]] Japan time, on the other side of the [[International Date Line]]), Japan invaded British [[Battle of Malaya|Malaya]]. This was followed by an early morning attack on the New Territories of [[Battle of Hong Kong|Hong Kong]] and within hours or days by attacks on the [[Battle of the Philippines (1941-42)|Philippines]], [[Battle of Wake Island|Wake Island]], and [[Battle of Prachuab Khirikhan|Thailand]] and by the [[sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse|sinking of HMS ''Prince of Wales'' and ''Repulse'']].<ref>Kelley L. Ross, "[http://www.friesian.com/pearl.htm The Pearl Harbor Strike Force]" (accessed June 10, 2005).</ref>
 
In the wake of the attack, fifteen [[Medal of Honor|Medals of Honor]], fifty-one [[Navy Cross]]es, fifty-three [[Silver Star]]s, four [[Navy and Marine Corps Medal]]s, one [[Distinguished Flying Cross (United States)|Distinguished Flying Cross]], four [[Distinguished Service Cross (United States)|Distinguished Service Crosses]], one [[Navy Distinguished Service Medal|Distinguished Service Medal]], and three [[Bronze Star Medal]]s were awarded to the American servicemen who distinguished themselves in combat at Pearl Harbor.<ref>{{Harvnb|Smith|1999}}{{page needed|date=September 2010}}.</ref> Additionally, a special [[Awards and decorations of the United States military|military award]], the [[Pearl Harbor Commemorative Medal]], was later authorized for all military veterans of the attack.
===American Response===
[[Image:Franklin Roosevelt signing declaration of war against Japan December 1941.jpg|thumb|left|200px|President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] signed the Declaration of War against Japan on the day following the attack.]]
 
===Niihau Incident===
On [[December 8]], [[1941]], Roosevelt addressed a joint session of [[United States Congress|Congress]], calling [[7 December]] [[1941]] [[Infamy Speech|"a date which will live in infamy"]]. Amid outrage at the attack and the late delivery of the note breaking off relations, actions considered treacherous, Congress [[declaration of war by the United States|declared war on Japan]] with [[Jeannette Rankin]] ([[Republican Party (United States)|Republican]] of [[Montana]]) casting the only dissenting vote. Roosevelt signed the declaration the same day. Continuing to intensify its military mobilization, the [[Government of the United States|U.S. government]] finished converting to a [[war economy]], a process begun by [[Lend Lease|provision of weapons]] to the [[Soviet Union]] and [[United Kingdom|Great Britain]].
{{Main|Niihau incident}}
[[File:Nishikaichi's Zero BII-120.jpg|thumb|Petty Officer Shigenori Nishikaichi's aircraft ten days after it crashed]]
Japanese planners of the Pearl Harbor attack had determined that some means were required for rescuing fliers whose aircraft were damaged too badly to return to the carriers. The island of [[Niihau]], only thirty minutes by air from Pearl Harbor, was designated as the rescue point.{{citation needed|date=May 2019}}
 
During the second wave, a Zero fighter flown by Petty Officer Shigenori Nishikaichi of ''Hiryu'' was damaged in the attack on Wheeler, so he flew to the rescue point. The aircraft was further damaged on his crash landing. Nishikaichi was helped from the wreckage by one of the Native Hawaiians, who, aware of the tension between the United States and Japan, took the pilot's pistol, maps, codes and other documents. The island's residents had no telephones or radios and were completely unaware of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Nishikaichi enlisted the support of three Japanese-American residents in an attempt to recover the documents. During the ensuing struggles, Nishikaichi was killed, and a Hawaiian civilian was wounded; one collaborator committed suicide, and his wife and the third collaborator were sent to prison.{{citation needed|date=May 2019}}
The Pearl Harbor attack immediately galvanized a divided nation into action. Public opinion had been moving towards support for entering the war during 1941, but considerable opposition remained until the Pearl Harbor attack. Overnight, Americans united against Japan, and that response probably made possible the [[unconditional surrender]] position later taken by the [[Allies|Allied Powers]]. Some historians believe the attack on Pearl Harbor doomed Japan to defeat simply because it awakened the "sleeping beast", regardless of whether the fuel depots or machine shops had been destroyed or even if the carriers had been caught in port and sunk. U.S. industrial and military capacity, once mobilized, was able to pour overwhelming resources into both the Pacific and Atlantic theaters. Others believe Japanese [[convoy|trade protection]] was so incompetent, U.S. submarines could have strangled Japan into defeat alone.
 
The ease with which the local ethnic Japanese residents had apparently gone to Nishikaichi's assistance was a source of concern for many and tended to support those who believed that local Japanese could not be trusted.<ref>{{Harvnb|Fuchida|2011|pp=293–294}}</ref>
Perceptions of treachery in the attack before a declaration of war sparked fears of sabotage or espionage by Japanese sympathizers residing in the U.S., including [[Japanese Americans|citizens of Japanese descent]] and was a factor in the subsequent [[Japanese internment in the United States|Japanese internment]] in the western United States. Other factors included misrepresentations of intelligence information (none) suggesting sabotage, notably by [[John L. DeWitt|General John DeWitt]], commanding Coast Defense on the Pacific Coast, who had personal feelings against Japanese Americans, <!-- let's get a citation for this -- -->, as a cover for information obtained from Ultra.<ref>Malkin, Michelle. ''In Defense of Internment''.</ref> In February 1942, Roosevelt signed [[United States Executive Order 9066]], requiring all [[Japanese American]]s to submit themselves for [[arrest]] and [[internment]].
 
===Japan'sStrategic Allies' Responseimplications===
Rear Admiral [[Chūichi Hara]] summed up the Japanese result by saying, "We won a great tactical victory at Pearl Harbor and thereby lost the war."<ref>{{Harvnb|Haufler|2003|p=127}}</ref>
<!-- Unsourced image removed: [[Image:Adolf Hitler sitting.JPG|thumb|170px|right|[[Nazi Germany]] under [[Adolf Hitler]] declares war on the United States.]] -->
[[Nazi Germany]] and [[Fascist]] [[Italy]] declared war on the [[United States]] on [[December 11]], four days after the Japanese attack. [[Hitler]] and [[Mussolini]] were under no obligation to declare war under the mutual defense terms of the [[Tripartite Pact]]. However, relations between the European Axis Powers and the American leadership had deteriorated since 1937. Earlier in 1941, the Nazis learned of the U.S. military's contingency planning to get troops in Continental Europe by 1943; this was [[Rainbow Five]], made public by sources unsympathetic to Roosevelt's [[New Deal]], and published by the ''[[Chicago Tribune]]''. Hitler seems to have decided war with the United States was unavoidable, and the Pearl Harbor attack, the publication of the [[Rainbow Five]] plan, and Roosevelt's post-Pearl Harbor address, which focused on European affairs as well as the situation with Japan, probably contributed. Hitler also underestimated American military production capacity beyond [[Lend Lease]], the nation's ability to fight on two fronts, and the time his own [[Operation Barbarossa|Operation <small>BARBAROSSA</small>]] would require. Similarly, the Nazis may have hoped the declaration of war, a showing of solidarity with Japan, would result in closer collaboration with the Japanese in [[Eurasia]], particularly against the Soviet Union.
 
While the attack accomplished its intended objective, it turned out to be largely unnecessary. Unknown to Yamamoto, who conceived the original plan, the United States Navy had decided as far back as 1935 to abandon "charging" across the Pacific towards the Philippines in response to an outbreak of war (in keeping with the evolution of [[War Plan Orange|Plan Orange]]).{{sfn|Evans|Peattie|1997}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}} The United States instead adopted "[[Plan Dog]]" in 1940, which emphasized keeping the IJN out of the eastern Pacific and away from the shipping lanes to Australia, while the United States concentrated on defeating Nazi Germany.<ref>{{harvnb|Hakim|1995}}</ref>{{Better source needed|reason=Source is a textbook written for middle-school kids or younger, which does not meet the requirements of reliable tertiary sources for this type of article.|date=December 2021}}
Regardless of Hitler's reasons, the decision was an enormous strategic blunder and it further enraged the American public. It allowed the United States to immediately enter the European war in support of the [[United Kingdom]] and the Allies without much public opposition.
 
Fortunately for the United States, the American aircraft carriers were untouched; otherwise, the Pacific Fleet's ability to conduct offensive operations would have been crippled for a year or more (given no diversions from the Atlantic Fleet). As it was, the Navy was left with no choice but to rely on carriers and submarines. While six of the eight battleships were repaired and returned to service, their relatively low speed and high fuel consumption limited their deployment, and they served mainly in shore bombardment roles (their only major action being the [[Battle of Surigao Strait]] in October 1944). A major flaw in Japanese strategic thinking was a belief that the ultimate Pacific battle would be fought by battleships, in keeping with the doctrine of Captain [[Alfred Thayer Mahan]]. As a result, Yamamoto (and his successors) hoarded battleships for a "decisive battle" that never happened.{{sfn|Willmott|1983}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}{{sfn|Miller|2007}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}
===Logistical and Strategic Analysis===
The attack on Pearl Harbor failed to destroy the three aircraft carriers assigned to the Pacific Fleet ([[USS Enterprise (CV-6)|''Enterprise'']], [[USS Lexington (CV-2)|''Lexington'']], and [[USS Saratoga (CV-3)|''Saratoga'']]). The attack did result in the loss of ''Arizona'' and ''Oklahoma'', and it removed several other battleships from the [[order of battle]] (including ''Nevada'', ''West Virginia'', and ''California''). However, all of these were obsolete, incapable of operating with carrier [[task forces]]. Probably more important in the short run was the destruction of over 155 aircraft, damage to the principal forward naval base in the Pacific, and to American pride. In terms of shock, Pearl Harbor may be compared to [[Gunther Prien]]'s attack on the [[HMS Royal Oak (1914)|HMS ''Royal Oak'']] inside [[Scapa Flow]], or the [[September 11 attack|11 September 2001]] attack on the [[World Trade Center]].
 
The Japanese confidence in their ability to win a quick victory meant that they neglected Pearl Harbor's navy repair yards, oil tank farms, submarine base, and old headquarters building.{{sfn|Willmott|1983}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}} All of these targets were omitted from Genda's list, yet they proved more important than any battleship to the American war effort in the Pacific. The survival of the repair shops and fuel depots allowed Pearl Harbor to maintain logistical support of the Navy,<ref>{{cite web |url=http://combinedfleet.com/battles/Attack_on_Pearl_Harbor |title=Attack on Pearl Harbor &#124; Nihon Kaigun |publisher=Combinedfleet.com |access-date=March 6, 2014 |archive-date=March 19, 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140319100939/http://combinedfleet.com/battles/Attack_on_Pearl_Harbor |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.kalonanews.com/articles/2013/04/17/community/doc516eb7c9cbba1744569185.txt |title=Pearl Harbor vet remembers Dec. 7, 1941, sneak attack |work=The [[Kalona, Iowa|Kalona]] News |date=April 17, 2013 |access-date=March 6, 2014 |archive-date=August 1, 2013 |archive-url=https://archive.today/20130801200017/http://www.kalonanews.com/articles/2013/04/17/community/doc516eb7c9cbba1744569185.txt }}</ref> such as the [[Doolittle Raid]] and the [[Battle of the Coral Sea|Battles of the Coral Sea]] and [[Battle of Midway|Midway]]. It was submarines that immobilized the Imperial Japanese Navy's heavy ships and brought Japan's economy to a virtual standstill by crippling the importation of oil and raw materials: By the end of 1942, the amount of imported raw materials was cut in half "to a disastrous ten million tons", while oil "was almost completely stopped".{{refn|In less than eleven months, most of Japan's elite naval aviators who had been at Pearl Harbor were lost in subsequent battles. Lack of fuel and an inflexible training policy meant that they could not be readily replaced.{{sfn|Evans|Peattie|1997}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}|group=nb}} Lastly, the basement of the Old Administration Building was the home of the [[Station HYPO|cryptanalytic unit]] that contributed significantly to the Midway ambush and the submarine force's success.<ref>{{harvnb|Blair|1975|pp=360, 816}}</ref>
Genda's plan, and Nagumo's desultory execution, left every major target in the harbor except battleships virtually untouched. [[Cruisers]], essential to escort carrier task forces, suffered almost no damage, and [[destroyers]], another critical element, took only three losses: ''Shaw'', ''Cassin'', and ''Downes''. (Both the latter two had their machinery salvaged and installed in new [[hull (ship)|hull]]s under the same names.) The tank farms, contining 530 million liters of fuel oil, were unscathed. The Navy Yard, which made important repairs to all ships, especially submarines, and famously to ''Yorktown'' prior to Midway, was undamaged. The engineering and repair shops were intact. The torpedo store was, as well. (Many submariners may have wished the Japanese had destroyed it.) The power station, without which the base could not function, continued to operate. The Submarine Base, which was the core of the major (and mostly unrecognized) contribution to the war, was unaffected. And the cryptanalysis unit, <small>HYPO</small>, located in the basement of the old Administration Building, actually benefitted, being provided with bandmen from sunken battlewagons who proved surprisngly adept crypto men.<ref>Willmott, ''op. cit.''; Blair, ''op. cit.''; Beach, ''Submarine!''; Holmes, ''Double-Edged Secrets'' and ''Undersea Victory''.</ref>
 
===Debate on the failure of American intelligence===
The Army Air Force loss of P-40s and (obsolete) P-36s must be balanced against the P-40's obsolesence (it was no match for the Me-109) and short range (a major handicap in the Pacific), as well as the advent of the [[Lockheed]] [[P-38 Lightning|P-38]], which was far superior as well as adding a margin of safety with the second engine, and the [[Republic Aircraft]] [[Republic P-47|P-47]], mythical for its ruggedness. (The long-distance champ, [[North American Aviation|NAA]]'s [[P-51 Mustang|P-51]], did not appear until late in the war, a function of the "Europe First" policy.) Japan achieved surprisingly little for all her daring.<ref>Caidin, ''op. cit.'' and ''Fork-Tailed Devil'' (Ballantine, 1968).</ref>
{{Main|Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge conspiracy theory}}
[[File:Arizona Memorial Wall.jpg|thumb|The [[USS Arizona Memorial|USS ''Arizona'' Memorial]]]]
There has been debate as to how and why the United States had been caught unawares, and how much and when American officials knew of Japanese plans and related topics. As early as 1924, Chief of United States Air Service [[Mason Patrick]] showed concern for military vulnerabilities in the Pacific, having sent General [[Billy Mitchell]] on a survey of the Pacific and the East. Patrick called Mitchell's subsequent report, which identified vulnerabilities in Hawaii, a "theoretical treatise on employment of airpower in the Pacific, which, in all probability undoubtedly will be of extreme value some 10 or 15 years hence".{{sfn|Wolk|2007}}
 
At least two naval war games, one in 1932 and another in 1936, proved that Pearl was vulnerable to such an attack. Admiral [[James O. Richardson|James Richardson]] was removed from command shortly after protesting President Roosevelt's decision to move the bulk of the Pacific fleet to Pearl Harbor.{{sfn|Wallin|1968|p=41-42}}<ref>{{cite web |mode=cs2 |date=December 15, 2020 |title=Commander at Pearl Harbor relieved of his duties |url=https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/commander-at-pearl-harbor-canned |access-date=December 8, 2021 |website=History.com |archive-date=April 25, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210425072542/https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/commander-at-pearl-harbor-canned |url-status=live}}</ref>{{Unreliable source?|date=November 2024|certain=y|reason=The History Channel is generally unreliable}} The decisions of military and political leadership to ignore these warnings have contributed to conspiracy theories. Several writers, including decorated World War{{spaces}}II veteran and journalist [[Robert Stinnett]], author of ''[[Day of Deceit]]'', and former United States Rear Admiral [[Robert Alfred Theobald]], author of ''The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor: The Washington Background of the Pearl Harbor Attack'', have argued that various parties high in the American and British governments knew of the attack in advance and may even have let it happen or encouraged it in order to force the United States into the war via the so-called "back door". However, this [[Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge conspiracy theory|conspiracy theory]] is rejected by mainstream historians.{{sfn|Prange|Goldstein|Dillon|1986}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}{{sfn|Prados|1995|pp=[https://archive.org/details/combinedfleetdec00prad/page/161 161–177]}}{{sfn|Budiansky|2002}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}<ref>{{cite news |mode=cs2 |last=Stevenson |first=Richard W. |date=August 3, 1994 |title=New Light Shed on Churchill and Pearl Harbor |newspaper=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1994/08/03/world/new-light-shed-on-churchill-and-pearl-harbor.html |access-date=March 4, 2014 |archive-date=July 15, 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140715175819/http://www.nytimes.com/1994/08/03/world/new-light-shed-on-churchill-and-pearl-harbor.html |url-status=live}}</ref>{{refn|[[Gordon Prange]] specifically addresses some revisionist works, including [[Charles A. Beard]], ''President Roosevelt and the Coming War 1941''; [[William Henry Chamberlin]], ''America's Second Crusade''; [[John T. Flynn]], ''The Roosevelt Myth''; George Morgenstern, ''Pearl Harbor''; Frederic R. Sanborn, ''Design for War''; [[Robert Alfred Theobald]], ''The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor''; Harry E. Barnes, ed., ''Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace'' and ''The Court Historians versus Revisionism''; [[Husband E. Kimmel]], ''Admiral Kimmel's Story''.{{sfn|Prange|Goldstein|Dillon|1991|p=867}}|group=nb}}
 
The theory that the Americans were warned in advance, however, is supported by statements made by [[Dick Ellis]], a British-Australian intelligence officer for MI6 who helped [[William J. Donovan]] set up the [[Office of Strategic Services]]. Ellis was deputy to [[William Stephenson]] at [[British Security Co-ordination]]. In [[Jesse Fink]]'s 2023 biography of Ellis, ''The Eagle in the Mirror'', Ellis is quoted as saying: "[Stephenson] was convinced from the information that was reaching him that this attack was imminent, and through [[James Roosevelt|Jimmy Roosevelt]], President Roosevelt's son, he passed this information to the President. Now whether the President at that time had other information which corroborated this... it's impossible to say."<ref>{{cite book |last1=Fink |first1=Jesse |title=The Eagle in the Mirror |date=2023 |publisher=Black & White Publishing |___location=Edinburgh |isbn=9781785305108 |page=101}}</ref>
Nagumo's disobedience of Yamamoto's insruction, to find and destroy the American carriers, may have been a product of his lack of faith in the plan, and the fact he was a gun line officer, not an aviator. In addition, Yamamoto's targeting Yamamoto's targeting priorities, placing obsolete battleships first in importance, reflect a faulty [[Alfred Mahan|Mahan]]ian [[doctrine]] as well as a poor grasp of history, considering the damage German submarines did to British trade in two World Wars. In the end, Japan achieved surprisingly little for all her daring.<ref>Willmott, ''op. cit.''; Peattie and Evans, ''op. cit.''.</ref>
 
==See also==
The politics of a Europe First strategy, loss of air cover over Pearl Harbor, and subsequent losses through the Japanese invasion of the Philippines, meant the U.S. Navy and Army Air Force were unable to play a significant role in the [[Pacific War]] for several months. Japan was temporarily free of worries about the rival Pacific naval power. She conquered Southeast Asia, the Southwest Pacific, and extended her reach far into the [[Indian Ocean]], albeit without occupying territory.
{{Div col}}
*[[Attack on Pearl Harbor in popular culture]]
*[[List of Medal of Honor recipients for the Attack on Pearl Harbor]]
*[[National Pearl Harbor Remembrance Day]]
*[[Operation K]] (1942 raid on Pearl Harbor)
*[[Pearl Harbor National Memorial]]
*[[Pearl Harbor Survivors Association]]
*[[Winds Code]]
*[[Tondern raid]] (a 1918 raid on a Zeppelin base)
*[[Attacks on the United States]]
{{Div col end}}
 
==References==
However, in the end, the attack was a strategic disaster. It spurred the United States into a determination to fight to complete victory. It resulted in the destruction of the Japanese armed forces.
===Notes===
{{Reflist|30em|group=nb}}
 
===Citations===
===Investigations and Blame===
{{Reflist}}
President Roosevelt appointed an investigating [[Roberts Commission|commission]], headed by U.S. Supreme Court Justice [[Owen Josephus Roberts|Owen Roberts]] to report facts and findings with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor. It was the first of many (nine total) official investigations. Both the Fleet commander, Rear Admiral [[Husband E. Kimmel]], and the Army commander, Lieutenant General [[Walter Short]] (the Army had been responsible for air defense of Hawaii, including Pearl Harbor, and for general defense of the islands against hostile attack), were relieved of their commands shortly thereafter. They were accused of "dereliction of duty" by the Roberts Commission for not making reasonable defensive preparations. The decisions of the Navy Department and the War Department to relieve both was controversial at the time and has remained so ever since. However, neither was court-martialed as would normally have been the result of dereliction of duty. On [[May 25]], [[1999]], the US Senate voted to recommend both officers be exonerated on all charges of dereliction of duty, citing denial to Hawaii commanders of vital intelligence available in Washington.
 
==Rumors=Bibliography===
====Books====
During the first days following the attack, various rumors began to circulate.
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*{{Citation |last=Thomas |first=Evan |title=Sea of Thunder: Four Commanders and the Last Great Naval Campaign 1941–1945 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=G-bOZnz2At0C |date=2007 |publisher=Simon and Schuster |isbn=978-0-7432-5222-5 |access-date=June 27, 2015 |archive-date=September 6, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150906075842/https://books.google.com/books?id=G-bOZnz2At0C |url-status=live }}
*{{Citation |last=Toland |first=John |year=1970 |title=The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945 |url=https://archive.org/details/risingsundecline00tola |url-access=registration |publisher=Random House |isbn=0-394-44311-X |author-link=John Toland (historian) }}
*{{Citation |last=Toland |first=John |date=1983 |title=Infamy: Pearl Harbor and its Aftermath |publisher=Berkley |isbn=0-425-05991-X |___location=New York |oclc=9331838}}
*{{Citation |last=Wallin |first=Homer N. |date=1968 |title=Pearl Harbor: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal |chapter-url=https://www.history.navy.mil/content/dam/nhhc/research/library/online-reading-room/war-and-conflict/wwii/pearl-harbor/pearlharborwallin/d767_92_w3.pdf |publisher=Naval History Division |pages=203–269 |chapter=Ships Sunk at Pearl Harbor |access-date=July 30, 2018 |archive-date=July 30, 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180730202728/https://www.history.navy.mil/content/dam/nhhc/research/library/online-reading-room/war-and-conflict/wwii/pearl-harbor/pearlharborwallin/d767_92_w3.pdf |url-status=live }}
*{{Citation |last=Watson |first=Patrick |date=December 1, 2007 |title=Watson's Really Big WWII Almanac, Volume 2: July to December |publisher=[[Xlibris Corporation|Xlibris]] |isbn=978-1-4257-8993-0 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=IHb_geGUpFcC |access-date=December 9, 2021 |archive-date=August 1, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230801205402/https://books.google.com/books?id=IHb_geGUpFcC |url-status=live }}
*{{Citation |last=Wetzler |first=Peter |title=Hirohito and war: imperial tradition and military decision making in prewar Japan |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=BWqEkwH1KRMC |date=1998 |publisher=University of Hawaii Press |isbn=978-0-8248-1925-5 |access-date=June 27, 2015 |archive-date=August 1, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230801205337/https://books.google.com/books?id=BWqEkwH1KRMC |url-status=live }}
*{{Citation |last=Willmott |first=H. P. |date=1983 |title=The Barrier and the Javelin: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies, February to June 1942 |publisher=Naval Institute Press |isbn=0-87021-092-0 |url=https://archive.org/details/barrierjavelin00hpwi/ |url-access=registration |access-date=December 8, 2021 }}
*{{cite book |last=Willmott |first=H.P. |title=Pearl Harbor |year=2001 |publisher=Cassell & Co. |___location=London, England |isbn=978-0-304-35884-7}}
*{{Citation |last1=Worth |first1=Roland H. Jr. |date=2014 |title=No Choice but War: The United States Embargo Against Japan and the Eruption of War in the Pacific |publisher=[[McFarland & Company|McFarland, Incorporated]] |___location=Jefferson, North Carolina |isbn=978-0-7864-7752-4}}
*{{Citation |last=Yergin |first=Daniel |date=1991 |title=The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power |publisher=Simon & Schuster |___location=New York |isbn=0-671-79932-0 |url=https://archive.org/details/prizeepicques00yerg }}
*{{Citation |last=Zimm |first=Alan D. |title=Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LgkaTwEACAAJ |date=2011 |___location=Havertown, Pennsylvania |publisher=Casemate Publishers |isbn=978-1-61200-010-7 |access-date=June 27, 2015 |archive-date=September 6, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150906070947/https://books.google.com/books?id=LgkaTwEACAAJ |url-status=live }}
{{refend}}
 
====US government documents====
One of the most damaging was the claim that Japanese workers had cut arrows into the cane fields, thus pointing the way to Pearl Harbor for the Imperial pilots. This rumor's influence was due perhaps to its implication the enemy (Japan) was inept and would be easily defeated. However, there was no truth to the rumor. It was considered ludicrous by military officers (especially pilots), who knew any force which could fly hundreds of miles to find O'ahu would have no difficulty finding the largest harbor in the Central Pacific. The rumor also ignored the larger evidence of Japanese navigational skills.
{{refbegin|30em|indent=yes}}
*{{Citation |author=Department of State |title=Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy 1931–1941 |url=http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Dip/PaW/ |date=1943 |place=Washington D.C. |publisher=United States Government Printing Office |access-date=December 8, 2007 |archive-date=May 12, 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080512150939/http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/paw/ |url-status=live}}
*{{Citation |last1=Matloff |first1=Maurice |last2=Snell |first2=Edwin M. |date=1980 |title=Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942 |orig-date=1952 |chapter=IV: The Showdown with Japan: August–December 1941 |series=[[United States Army in World War II]] |publisher=[[US Army Center of Military History]] |___location=Washington, D.C. |id=CMH Pub 1-3 |url=https://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/SP1941-42/ |access-date=December 10, 2021 |chapter-url=https://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/SP1941-42/chapter4.htm |archive-date=December 10, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211210084845/https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/Sp1941-42/index.htm |url-status=dead}}
*{{Citation |last=Morton |first=Louis |date=1962 |title=Strategy and Command: The First Two Years |series=[[United States Army in World War II]] |publisher=[[US Army Center of Military History]] |___location=Washington, D.C. |id=CMD Pub 5-1 |url=https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-P-Strategy/ |via=HyperWar Foundation |access-date=December 10, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210211231320/https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-P-Strategy/ |archive-date=February 11, 2021 |url-status=live}}
*{{Cite report |mode=cs2 |last=Nimitz |first=Chester |date=February 15, 1942 |title=CINCPAC Report of Japanese Raid on Pearl Harbor, 7 December, 1941 |at=Enclosure (C) Damages Sustained by Ships as a Results of the Japanese Raid, December 7, 1941 |url=http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/Pearl/CinCPac-Damage.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120111235255/http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/Pearl/CinCPac-Damage.html |archive-date=January 11, 2012 |url-status=live |via=HyperWar Foundation |id=Cincpac File No. A16-3/Serial 0479}}
*{{Citation |ref={{harvid|United States Strategic Bombing Survey|1946}} |author=United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific), Naval Analysis Division |editor-last=Daniels |editor-first=Gordon |title=The Campaigns of the Pacific War |date=1946 |publisher=United States Government Printing Office |___location=Washington, D.C. |url=https://archive.org/details/campaignsofpacif46unit/ |access-date=December 7, 2021}}
*{{Citation |title=U.S. Navy Report of Japanese Raid on Pearl Harbor |url=http://ww2db.com/doc.php?q=45 |date=1942 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080113234417/http://ww2db.com/doc.php?q=45 |url-status=live |publisher=United States National Archives, Modern Military Branch |access-date=December 25, 2007 |archive-date=January 13, 2008}}
*{{Citation |title=Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack |url=http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/congress/part_0.html |date=1946 |ref={{harvid|Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack – "The Japanese Attack And Its Aftermath"|1946}} |chapter=Part II: The Japanese Attack And Its Aftermath |chapter-url=http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/congress/part_2.html |place=Washington D.C. |publisher=United States Government Printing Office |access-date=December 8, 2007 |archive-date=May 1, 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190501061754/http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/congress/part_0.html |url-status=live}}
*{{Citation |title=Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack |date=1946 |ref={{harvid|Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack – "Review of the Diplomatic Conversations"|1946}} |chapter=Appendix D: Review of the Diplomatic Conversations |place=Washington D.C. |publisher=United States Government Printing Office |url-status=live |chapter-url=http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/congress/app-d.html#314 |archive-date=April 29, 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130429222741/http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/congress/app-d.html#314}}
*{{Cite DANFS |ref={{Harvid|DANFS ''Aylwin''}} |title=USS ''Aylwin'' III (DD-355) |url=https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/a/aylwin-iii.html |access-date=December 10, 2021}}
*{{Cite DANFS |ref={{Harvid|DANFS ''Shaw''}} |title=USS ''Shaw'' II (DD-373) |url=https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/s/shaw-ii.html |access-date=December 11, 2021}}
{{refend}}
 
====Journal articles====
Another rumor was Roosevelt (or Marshall, or some other senior official) had known the attack was coming, but had allowed it to proceed for any of several reasons depending on the purveyor of the rumor. This began as early as the morning of the 8th, perhaps first by then Senator [[Guy Gillette]].
{{refbegin|30em|indent=yes}}
*{{cite journal |mode=cs2 |last=Caravaggio |first=Angelo N. |title='Winning' the Pacific War: The Masterful Strategy of Commander Minoru Genda |journal=Naval War College Review |date=Winter 2014 |volume=67 |issue=1 |pages=85–118 |url=https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/59d3fa3c-3a53-49f6-9f28-6f0358389db8/-Winning--the-Pacific-War--The-Masterful-Strategy-.aspx |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140714190848/https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/59d3fa3c-3a53-49f6-9f28-6f0358389db8/-Winning--the-Pacific-War--The-Masterful-Strategy-.aspx |archive-date=July 14, 2014 }}
*{{Cite journal |mode=cs2 |last=Lauren |first=Paul Gordon |date=1978 |title=Human Rights in History: Diplomacy and Racial Equality at the Paris Peace Conference |journal=Diplomatic History |volume=2 |issue=3 |pages=257–278 |doi=10.1111/j.1467-7709.1978.tb00435.x |jstor=24909920 |s2cid=154765654 |issn=0145-2096}}
*{{Cite journal |mode=cs2 |last=Wilford |first=Timothy |title=Decoding Pearl Harbor: USN Cryptanalysis and the Challenge of JN-25B in 1941 |journal=[[The Northern Mariner]] |volume=XII |number=1 |pages=17–37 |date=January 2002 |doi=10.25071/2561-5467.571 |s2cid=247550000 |url=https://www.cnrs-scrn.org/northern_mariner/vol12/nm_12_1_17to37.pdf |access-date=December 8, 2021 |archive-date=July 5, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220705080832/https://www.cnrs-scrn.org/northern_mariner/vol12/nm_12_1_17to37.pdf |url-status=live | issn = 1183-112X}}
*{{cite journal |publisher=Naval History and Heritage Command/[[United States Naval War College]] ([[United States Department of the Navy]]) |publication-place=[[Newport, Rhode Island|Newport]], [[Rhode Island]], United States of America |issn=0028-1484 |lccn=75617787 |oclc=01779130 |date=21 March 2010 |title=Reflecting on Fuchida or "A Tale of Three Whoppers" |jstor=26397106 |volume=63 |issue=2 |pages=127–138 |access-date=15 August 2021 |first=Jonathan |last=Parshall |journal=Naval War College Review |url=http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/612aa0c4-47a1-4107-afbb-17fa992adf59/Reflecting-on-Fuchida,-or--A-Tale-of-Three-Whopper |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111127070529/http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/612aa0c4-47a1-4107-afbb-17fa992adf59/Reflecting-on-Fuchida,-or--A-Tale-of-Three-Whopper |archive-date=27 November 2011 }}
*{{cite journal |mode=cs2 |last=Potter |first=Joseph V. |date=Winter 1982 |title=A Handful of Pilots |journal=Journal of American Aviation Historical Society |pages=282–285 |url=http://aviation.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/A-Handful-of-Pilots.pdf |access-date=December 10, 2021 |archive-date=April 17, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210417093542/http://aviation.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/A-Handful-of-Pilots.pdf |url-status=live }}
{{refend}}
 
====Magazine articles====
==Japanese views of the attack==
{{refbegin|30em|indent=yes}}
[[image: JapanPropaganda.jpg|300 px|thumb|right|Japanese propaganda caricature map from around 1941, depicting a U.S. blockade of Japan from the [[Philippines]] (then a U.S. possession).]]Although the Imperial Japanese government had made some effort to prepare the general Japanese civilian population for war ''via'' anti-U.S. propaganda, it appears most Japanese were surprised, apprehensive, and dismayed by the news they were now at war with the U.S., a country many Japanese admired. Nevertheless, the Japanese people at home and her territories thereafter generally accepted their government's account of the attack and supported the war effort until their nation's surrender in 1945.<ref>Robert Guillain, ''I saw Tokyo burning: An eyewitness narrative from Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima'' (J. Murray, 1981). ISBN 0-7195-3862-9</ref>
*{{Citation |last1=Dorr |first1=Robert F. |author1-link=Robert F. Dorr |last2=Borch |first2=Fred L. |title=Pajama-clad pilot took on Japanese at Pearl Harbor |magazine=[[Army Times]] |date=December 8, 2008 |url=http://www.armytimes.com/offduty/travel/airforce_history_120808w/ |access-date=October 27, 2022 |archive-url=https://archive.today/20130102094911/http://www.armytimes.com/offduty/travel/airforce_history_120808w/ |archive-date=January 2, 2013 }}
*{{Citation |last=Fukudome |first=Shigeru |author-link=Shigeru Fukudome |date=December 1955b |volume=81 |issue=12 |pages=13, 15–31 |title=Hawaii Operation |magazine=[[Proceedings (magazine)|Proceedings]] |publisher=[[United States Naval Institute]] |url=https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1955/december/hawaii-operation |url-access=subscription |access-date=December 10, 2021 |archive-date=December 10, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211210054032/https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1955/december/hawaii-operation |url-status=live }}
*{{Citation |last=Hone |first=Thomas C. |date=December 1977 |title=The Destruction of the Battle Line at Pearl Harbor |magazine=[[Proceedings (magazine)|Proceedings]] |volume=103 |issue=12 |pages=56–57 |publisher=[[United States Naval Institute]] |url=https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1977/december/destruction-battle-line-pearl-harbor |url-access=subscription |access-date=December 10, 2021 |archive-date=December 10, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211210205857/https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1977/december/destruction-battle-line-pearl-harbor |url-status=live }}
*{{Citation |last=Peck |first=Michael |date=August 5, 2016 |title=Russia's Pearl Harbor: The Battle of Port Arthur |magazine=[[The National Interest]] |url=https://nationalinterest.org/feature/russias-pearl-harbor-the-battle-port-arthur-17260 |access-date=June 26, 2019 |archive-date=August 14, 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200814234939/https://nationalinterest.org/feature/russias-pearl-harbor-the-battle-port-arthur-17260 |url-status=live }}
*{{Citation |last=Stewart |first=A. J. |date=December 1974 |title=Those Mysterious Midgets |magazine=[[Proceedings (magazine)|Proceedings]] |publisher=[[United States Naval Institute]]}}
*{{Citation |last=Wolk |first=Herman S. |date=July 2007 |title=Mason Patrick's Inside Game |magazine=Air Force Magazine |publisher=Air Force Association |url=http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2007/July%202007/0707mason.aspx |access-date=July 13, 2019 |archive-date=July 15, 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190715002734/http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2007/July%25202007/0707mason.aspx |url-status=live }}
{{refend}}
 
====Online sources====
Japan's national leadership at the time appeared to have believed war between the U.S. and Japan had long been inevitable. In any case, Japanese-American relationships had already significantly deteriorated since Japan's invasion of China beginning in the early 30s, of which the United States strongly disapproved. In 1942, [[Saburo Kurusu]], former Japanese ambassador to the United States, gave an address in which he talked about the "historical inevitability of the war of Greater East Asia."<ref>[[Saburo Kurusu]],
{{refbegin|30em|indent=yes}}
*{{cite web |mode=cs2 |last=Bjorkman |first=James |date=March 2, 2019 |title=December 7, 1941: Japanese Attack Pearl Harbor |publisher=Filminspector.com |url=https://worldwartwodaily.filminspector.com/2019/03/december-7-1941-japan-attacks-pearl.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190306111526/https://worldwartwodaily.filminspector.com/2019/03/december-7-1941-japan-attacks-pearl.html |archive-date=March 6, 2019 |url-status=live |access-date=March 3, 2019}}
*{{cite web |mode=cs2 |last=DiGiulian |first=Tony |date=March 7, 2021 |title=Order of Battle: Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941 |publisher=Navweaps.com |url=http://www.navweaps.com/index_oob/OOB_WWII_Pacific/OOB_WWII_Pearl_Harbor.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110630214745/http://navweaps.com/index_oob/OOB_WWII_Pacific/OOB_WWII_Pearl_Harbor.htm |archive-date=June 30, 2011 |url-status=live |access-date=December 10, 2021}}
*{{cite web |mode=cs2 |last=Yarnell |first=Paul R. |date=November 2003 |title=Organization of the Japanese Air Attack Units December 7, 1941 |url=http://www.navsource.net/Naval/ijnaf.htm |publisher=NavSource Naval History |access-date=December 8, 2007}}
{{refend}}
 
===Further reading===
[http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1942/421126a.html Historical inevitability of the war of Greater East Asia], Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, Tokyo, November 26, 1942 (accessed June 10, 2005).</ref> He said war had been a response to Washington's longstanding aggression toward Japan. For example, provocations against Japan included the [[Gentlemen's Agreement|San Francisco School incident]], (the United States' [[racism|racist]] policies on [[Japanese American|Japanese immigrants]]), [[Naval Limitations Treaty]], other [[Unequal treaties]], the [[Nine Power Pact]], constant economic pressure against Japan, culminating in the "belligerent" [[scrap metal]] and oil boycott in 1941 by the United States and [[Allies of World War II|Allied]] countries to contain and/or reverse the actions of the [[Empire of Japan]] especially in IndoChina during her expansion of influence and interests throughout Asia. (In light of Japan's dependence on imported oil, there is some truth in this.) These pressures directly influenced Japan to go into alliance with Germany and Italy through the [[Tripartite Pact]]. According to Kurusu, because of these reasons, the Allies had already provoked war with Japan long before the attack at Pearl Harbor, and the United States was already preparing for war with Japan. Suburu also states the United States was also looking for world domination, beyond just Asia, with "sinister designs" [http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1942/421126a.html]. Some of this view seems to have been shared by [[Adolf Hitler]], when [[Tripartite Pact|he called it]] one of the reasons Germany declared war on the United States. He also had mentioned [[European]] imperialism toward Japan many years before. Therefore, according to Kurusu, Japan had no choice but to defend herself and so should rapidly continue to militarize, bring [[Nazi Germany|Germany]] and [[Italian fascism|Italy]] closer as allies and militarily combat the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands. Japanese leadership also saw itself as justified in its conduct in view of the Japanese leadership role in Asia in which they believed. They also took pains to explain their actions in public by claiming to have done everything possible to alleviate tension between the two nations. The decision to attack, at least for public presentation, was reluctant and forced on Japan. Of the Pearl Harbor attack itself, Kurusu said it came in direct response to a virtual ultimatum from the U.S. government, the November [[Hull note]], and so the surprise attack was not treacherous. Since Japanese-American relationship already had hit their lowest point, there were no alternative choices; in any case, had an acceptable settlement of differences been reached, the [[Carrier Striking Task Force]] could have been called back.
{{refbegin|30em|indent=yes}}
*{{Citation |last=Beach |first=Edward L. Jr. |date=1995 |title=Scapegoats: A Defense of Kimmel and Short at Pearl Harbor |publisher=Naval Institute Press |isbn=1-55750-059-2 |author-link=Edward L. Beach, Jr.}}
*{{Citation |ref=none |last1=Clausen |first1=Henry C. |last2=Lee |first2=Bruce |date=2001 |title=Pearl Harbor: Final Judgment |publisher=HarperCollins}}. An account of the secret "[[Clausen Inquiry]]" undertaken late in the war by order of Congress to Secretary of War [[Henry L. Stimson]]. Clausen was given the authority to go anywhere and question anyone under oath. Ultimately, he traveled more than 55,000 miles and interviewed over a hundred US and British Army, Navy, and civilian personnel, in addition to being given access to all relevant Magic intercepts.
*{{cite journal |mode=cs2 |last1=Condon-Rall |first1=M. E. |date=1989 |title=The U.S. Army medical department and the attack on Pearl Harbor |journal=J Mil Hist |volume=53 |pages=65–78 |issue=1 |pmid=11617401 |doi=10.2307/1986020 |jstor=1986020}}. This article discusses the state of medical readiness prior to the attack, and the post-attack response by medical personnel.
*{{Citation |ref=none |last=Dorsey |first=James |date=2009 |contribution=Literary Tropes, Rhetorical Looping, and the Nine Gods of War: 'Fascist Proclivities' Made Real |editor-last=Tansman |editor-first=Alan |title=The Culture of Japanese Fascism |publisher=Duke University Press |___location=Durham, North Carolina / London |pages=409–431}}. A study of Japanese wartime media representations of the submarine component of the attack on Pearl Harbor.
*{{Citation |ref=none |last=Fish |first=Hamilton III |date=1983 |title=Tragic Deception: FDR and America's Involvement in World War II |publisher=Devin-Adair |isbn=0-8159-6917-1 |author-link=Hamilton Fish III}}
*{{Citation |ref=none |last=Gannon |first=Michael V. |date=2001 |title=Pearl Harbor Betrayed |publisher=Henry Holt and Company}}. A recent examination of the issues surrounding the surprise of the attack.
*{{Cite magazine |mode=cs2 |ref=none |last=Haynok |first=Robert J. |date=2009 |title=How the Japanese Did It |publisher=United States Naval Institute |volume=23 |issue=6 |journal=Naval History Magazine |url=http://www.usni.org/magazines/navalhistory/2009-12/how-japanese-did-it |access-date=February 6, 2013 |archive-date=June 7, 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130607195401/http://www.usni.org/magazines/navalhistory/2009-12/how-japanese-did-it |url-status=live}}
*{{Citation |editor-last=Hixson |editor-first=Walter L. |date=2003 |title=The United States and the Road to War in the Pacific |volume=3 |series=The American Experience in World War II |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5mJWrEeqMfgC |publisher=Routledge |isbn=0-415-94031-1 |access-date=March 21, 2023 |archive-date=April 4, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230404221251/https://books.google.com/books?id=5mJWrEeqMfgC |url-status=live }}. Part of a twelve-volume series.
*{{Citation |ref=none |last=Holmes |first=W. J. |date=1979 |title=Double-Edged Secrets: U.S. Naval Intelligence Operations in the Pacific During World War II |publisher=United States Naval Institute}}. Contains some important material, such as Holmes's argument that, had the US Navy been warned of the attack and put to sea, it would have likely resulted in an even greater disaster.
*{{Citation |ref=none |last=Hughes-Wilson |first=John |date=2004 |title=Military Intelligence Blunders and Cover-Ups |edition=revised |orig-date=1999 |publisher=Robinson}}. Contains a brief but insightful chapter on the particular intelligence failures, and a broader overview of what causes them.
*{{Citation |ref=none |last1=Kimmett |first1=Larry |last2=Regis |first2=Margaret |date=2004 |title=The Attack on Pearl Harbor: An Illustrated History |publisher=NavPublishing}}. Using maps, photos, unique illustrations, and an animated CD, this book provides a detailed overview of the surprise attack that brought the United States into World War{{spaces}}II.
*{{cite report |mode=cs2 |last=Krepinevich |first=Andrew F. |date=February 25, 2002 |title=Lighting the Path Ahead: Field Exercises and Transformation |publisher=Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments |url=https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/2002.02.25-Field-Exercises-and-Military-Transformation.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210924003422/https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/2002.02.25-Field-Exercises-and-Military-Transformation.pdf |archive-date=September 24, 2021 |access-date=December 11, 2021 |url-status=live }}. Contains a passage regarding the Yarnell attack, as well as reference citations.
*{{Citation |ref=none |last1=Layton |first1=Edwin T. |last2=Pineau |first2=Roger |last3=Costello |first3=John |date=1985 |title=And I Was There: Pearl Harbor and Midway – Breaking the Secrets |___location=New York |publisher=W. Morrow |isbn=978-0-688-06968-1 |author1-link=Edwin T. Layton}}. Layton, Kimmel's Combat Intelligence Officer, says that [[Douglas MacArthur]] was the only field commander who had received any substantial amount of [[Purple (cipher machine)|Purple]] intelligence.
*{{Citation |ref=none |last=Madsen |first=Daniel |date=2003 |title=Resurrection-Salvaging the Battle Fleet at Pearl Harbor |publisher=[[Naval Institute Press]]}}
*{{cite report |ref=none |mode=cs2 |last=McCollum |first=Arthur H. |date=October 7, 1940 |title=Memorandum for the Director: Estimate of the Situation in the Pacific and Recommendations for Action by the United States |type=Memorandum |publisher=Office of Naval Intelligence |url=https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/McCollum_memorandum |access-date=December 9, 2021 |archive-date=January 24, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220124120956/https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/McCollum_memorandum |url-status=live }}. The [[McCollum memo]] is a 1940 memo from a Naval headquarters staff officer to his superiors outlining possible provocations to Japan, which might lead to war (declassified in 1994).
*{{Citation |ref=none |last=Melber |first=Takuma |date=2016 |title=Pearl Harbor: Japans Angriff und der Kriegseintritt der USA |language=de |trans-title=Pearl Harbor: Japan's Attack and the US Entry into the War |publisher=C.H. Beck |___location=München |isbn=978-3-406-69818-7}}.
*{{Cite journal |ref=none |mode=cs2 |last=Moorhead |first=John J. |date=1942 |title=Surgical Experience at Pearl Harbor |journal=The Journal of the American Medical Association |volume=118 |issue=9 |page=712 |doi=10.1001/jama.1942.62830090002009}}. An overview of different surgical procedures at the hospital at the scene of the event.
*{{Citation |ref=none |last=Morgenstern |first=George Edward |date=1947 |title=Pearl Harbor: The Story of the Secret War |publisher=The Devin-Adair Company |url=https://archive.org/details/pearlharborthestoryofthesecretwar/ }}. Conspiracy theory.
*{{Citation |ref=none |last=Parker |first=Frederick D. |date=1994 |title=Pearl Harbor Revisited: United States Navy Communications Intelligence 1924–1941 |publisher=National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History |url=https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/p/pearl-harbor-revisited-usn-communications-intelligence.html |via=[[Naval History and Heritage Command]] |access-date=December 9, 2021 |archive-date=December 9, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211209030151/https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/p/pearl-harbor-revisited-usn-communications-intelligence.html |url-status=live }}. Contains a detailed description of what the Navy knew from intercepted and decrypted Japan's communications prior to Pearl.
*{{Citation |ref=none |last1=Rodgaard |first1=John |last2=Hsu |first2=Peter K. |last3=Lucas |first3=Carroll L. |last4=Biache |first4=Andrew Jr. |date=December 1999 |title=Pearl Harbor – Attack from Below |work=[[Naval History (magazine)|Naval History]] |url=https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/1999/december/pearl-harbor-attack-below |url-access=subscription |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060930030611/http://www.usni.org/navalhistory/Articles99/Nhrodgaard.htm |url-status=live |volume=13 |issue=6 |publisher=[[United States Naval Institute]] |archive-date=September 30, 2006 |name-list-style=amp }}
*{{Citation |ref=none |last=Seki |first=Eiji |date=2006 |title=Mrs. Ferguson's Tea-Set, Japan and the Second World War: The Global Consequences Following Germany's Sinking of the SS Automedon in 1940 |___location=London |publisher=Brill/[[Global Oriental]] |isbn=978-1-905246-28-1}}.
*{{Citation |ref=none |last=Stille |first=Mark E. |date=2011 |title=Tora! Tora! Tora!: Pearl Harbor 1941 |series=Raid Series |volume=26 |publisher=Osprey Publishing |isbn=978-1-84908-509-0}}
*{{Citation |ref=none |last=Stinnett |first=Robert |date=1999 |title=Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor |publisher=Free Press |isbn=0-7432-0129-9 |author-link=Robert Stinnett |url=http://www.pearlharbor41.com/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050616074335/http://www.pearlharbor41.com/ |archive-date=June 16, 2005 }}. A study of the Freedom of Information Act documents that led Congress to direct clearance of Kimmel and Short.
*{{Citation |ref=none |last=Takeo |first=Iguchi |date=2010 |title=Demystifying Pearl Harbor: A New Perspective From Japan |publisher=I-House Press}}
*{{Citation |ref=none |last=Theobald |first=Robert A. |date=1954 |title=Final Secret of Pearl Harbor |publisher=Devin-Adair |isbn=0-8159-5503-0 |author-link=Robert A. Theobald}}. Foreword by Fleet Admiral [[William F. Halsey, Jr.]]
*{{Citation |ref=none |last=Toll |first=Ian W. |date=2011 |author-link=Ian W. Toll |title=[[Pacific Crucible: War at Sea in the Pacific, 1941–1942]] |___location=New York |publisher=W. W. Norton}}
*{{Citation |ref=none |last=Wedemeyer |first=Albert C. |date=1958 |title=Wedemeyer Reports! |publisher=Henry Holt Co. |isbn=0-89275-011-1 |author-link=Albert Coady Wedemeyer}}
*{{Citation |ref=none |last=Wohlstetter |first=Roberta |date=1962 |title=Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision |publisher=Stanford University Press}}. The most cited scholarly work on the intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor. Her introduction and analysis of the concept of "noise" persist in understanding intelligence failures.
*{{Citation |ref=none |last=Wohlstetter |first=Roberta |date=1965 |title=Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight |journal=Foreign Affairs |publisher=Council on Foreign Relations |volume=43 |number=4 |pages=691–707 |doi=10.2307/20039133 |jstor=20039133 |url=http://ias.wustl.edu/files/ias/imce/wohlstetter_cuba_and_pearl_harbor.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171210231934/http://ias.wustl.edu/files/ias/imce/wohlstetter_cuba_and_pearl_harbor.pdf |archive-date=December 10, 2017 }}
{{refend}}
 
==External links==
[[Image:Japanpilotdrawing.jpg|thumb|left|250px|Drawing found in the wreckage of one of the Japanese planes. It reads, "'''Hear! The voice of the moment of [[death]]. Wake up, you fools!'''" and "'''You damned! Go to the [[devil]]!'''".]]
{{Commons category|Pearl Harbor attack}}
{{Library resources box|onlinebooks=yes}}
*[https://web.archive.org/web/20100818203925/http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq66-1.htm Overview] (archived) from [[Naval History and Heritage Command]]
*[http://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/pearl-harbor Account (with Video)] on History.com
*[http://history1900s.about.com/od/worldwarii/a/Attack-Pearl-Harbor.htm The Attack on Pearl Harbor] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170203013415/http://history1900s.about.com/od/worldwarii/a/Attack-Pearl-Harbor.htm |date=February 3, 2017 }} on ThoughtCo.
*[https://web.archive.org/web/20190614081536/https://www.nps.gov/nr/twhp/wwwlps/lessons/18arizona/18arizona.htm ''"Remembering Pearl Harbor:The USS Arizona Memorial"'' — Teaching with Historic Places (TwHP) lesson plan] (archived) from National Park Service
*[https://manoa.hawaii.edu/library/research/collections/archives/manuscript-collections/hawaii-war-records-depository/ Hawaii War Records Depository], Archives & Manuscripts Department, University of Hawaii at Manoa Library
*[http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/7Dec41/index.html 7 December 1941, The Air Force Story] on ibiblio.org
*[http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/magic/ The "Magic" Background] (PDFs or readable online) on ibiblio.org
*[http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/ The Congressional investigation] on ibiblio.org
*{{cite report |author1=LTC Jeffrey J. Gudmens |author2=COL Timothy R. Reese |date=2009 |title=Staff Ride Handbook for the Attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941: A Study of Defending America |url=https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/educational-services/staff-rides/StaffRideHB_PearlHarbor.pdf |publisher=Combat Studies Institute}}
*{{NYTtopic|subjects/w/world_war_ii_/pearl_harbor|Pearl Harbor}}
 
===ViewArchival todaydocuments===
* [https://catalog.archives.gov/id/10046453 Records related to the Pearl Harbor (Hawaii)] in [[National Archives and Records Administration|National Archives]] Catalog
Many Japanese today still feel they were "pushed", or compelled, to fight because of threats to their national security and national interests by the U.S. and certain European powers, and because of embargoes and lack of cooperation, particularly the United States, the [[United Kingdom]] and the [[Netherlands]]. This embargo was most importantly on oil on which much of Japan's economy and its navy entirely depended.<ref>Haruko Taya & Theodore F. Cook, ''Japan at War: An Oral History'' (New Press; Reprint edition, 1993). ISBN 1-56584-039-9</ref> For example, the ''[[Japan Times]]'', an English-language newspaper owned by one of the major news organizations in Japan (Asahi Shimbun), ran numerous columns in the early 2000s echoing Kurusu's comments in reference to the Pearl Harbor attack.<ref>Charles Burress, "[http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?eo20010719a2.htm Biased history helps feed U.S. fascination with Pearl Harbor]," ''Japan Times'', July 19, 2001 (accessed June 10, 2005);</ref> [[Image:nagasakibomb.jpg|200px|thumb|The US "[[Fat Man]]" nuclear bomb [[mushroom cloud]] (second bomb) resulting from the [[nuclear explosion]] over [[Nagasaki]] on [[August 9]], [[1945]] rises 18 km (11 mi, 60,000 ft) into the air from the [[hypocenter]].]]
::116 moving images, 13 photographs and 9 textual records are available online
In putting the Pearl Harbor attack into context, Japanese writers repeatedly contrast the thousands of U.S. servicemen killed there with the hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians killed in U.S. air attacks later in the War,<ref>Hiroaki Sato, "[http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/geted.pl5?eo20010625hs.htm The View From New York: Debunking America's 'Good War' myth]," ''Japan Times'', June 25, 2001 (accessed June 10, 2005);</ref> even without mentioning the 1945 [[atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki]] by the United States.
 
===Accounts===
However, in spite of the perceived inevitability of the war by many Japanese, many also believe the Pearl Harbor attack, although a tactical victory, was actually part of a seriously flawed strategy for engaging in war with the U.S. As one columnist eulogizes the attack:
*[https://web.archive.org/web/20080101233716/http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/Guard-US/ch7.htm Guarding The United States And Its Outposts], in ''[http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/Guard-US/index.htm#contents Guarding the United States and Its Outposts] {{Webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071225041653/http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/Guard-US/index.htm#contents |date=December 25, 2007 }}'' Official US Army history of Pearl Harbor by the [[United States Army Center of Military History]]
<blockquote>The Pearl Harbor attack was a brilliant tactic, but part of a strategy based on the belief that a spirit as firm as iron and as beautiful as cherry blossoms could overcome the materially wealthy United States. That strategy was flawed, and Japan's total defeat would follow.<ref>Burritt Sabin, "[http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?fl20040208x3.htm The War's Leagacy: Dawn of a tragic era]," ''Japan Times'', February 8, 2004 (accessed June 10, 2005).</ref></blockquote>
*[http://archives.starbulletin.com/1999/09/13/special/index.html War comes to Hawaii] ''Honolulu Star-Bulletin'', Monday, September 13, 1999
In 1991, the Japanese Foreign Ministry released a statement saying Japan had intended to make a formal [[declaration of war]] to the United States at 1 p.m. Washington time, 25 minutes before the attack at Pearl Harbor was scheduled to begin. This officially acknowledged something which had been publicly known for years, that diplomatic communications had been coordinated well in advance with the attack, but had failed delivery at the intended time.
 
===Media===
It appears the Japanese government was referring to the "14-part message", which did not actually break off negotiations, let alone declare war, but which did officially raise the possibility of a break in relations. However, because of various delays, the Japanese ambassador was unable to make the declaration until well after the attack had begun. The Japanese government apologized for the delay. Imperial Japanese military leaders appear to have had mixed feelings about the attack. Yamamoto was unhappy about the botched timing of the breaking off of negotiations. He is rumored to have said, "[[Isoroku Yamamoto's sleeping giant quote|I fear all we have done is awakened a sleeping giant and filled him with terrible resolve]]". Even though this quote is unsubstantiated, the phrase seems to describe his feelings about the situation. He is on record as having said, in the previous year, that "I can run wild for six months ... after that, I have no expectation of success."<ref>Isoroku Yamamoto to Shigeharu Matsumoto (Japanese cabinet minister) and Fumimaro Kondoye (Japanese prime minister), quoted in ''Eagle Against the Sun: The American War With Japan'' by Ronald Spector (Vintage, 1985).</ref>
*[http://www.britishpathe.com/video/pearl-harbour-first-pictures Video of first Newsreel from December 23, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor] from [[British-Pathe]]
*[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8H-BTblzqO0&list=PLNxwX7r4A557deayljDNLqVA7Pl9Y8K9Z&index=1 ''Pearl Harbour'' – British Movietone News, 1942] from the [[Associated Press|AP]] Archive
*[http://www.criticalpast.com/video/65675029979_attack-on-Pearl-Harbor_Harbor-installations_USS-Arizona-burns_black-smoke-rises Historic footage of Pearl Harbor during and immediately following attack on December 7, 1941] on CriticalPast
* [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gb7XUDlhz6k December 7th (long version)] from [[National Archives and Records Administration|U.S. National Archives]] {{--}} A documentary made by the [[Office of Strategic Services]] several years after the attack, which shows (mostly by dramatization) life in Hawaii before, during, and after the attack on Pearl Harbor.
 
===Historical documents===
The first [[Prime Minister of Japan]] during World War II [[Hideki Tojo]] later wrote
*[http://ww2db.com/doc.php?q=45 US Navy Report of Japanese Raid on Pearl Harbor] from World War II Database
<blockquote>When reflecting upon it today, that the Pearl Harbor attack should have succeeded in achieving surprise seems a blessing from Heaven.</blockquote>
*[http://www.worldwar-two.net/events/usa_declaration_of_war_on_japan/ Second World War – USA Declaration of War on Japan] from WorldWar-Two.net
 
*[http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/monos/097/index.html Collection of extensive Japanese preparation military documents] on ibiblio.org
[[Fleet Admiral]] [[Isoroku Yamamoto]] had said, regarding the imminent war with the United States,
<blockquote>Should hostilities once break out between [[Japan]] and the [[United States]], it is not enough that we take [[Guam]] and the [[Philippines]], nor even [[Hawaii]] and [[San Francisco]]. We would have to march into [[Washington DC|Washington]] and sign the treaty in the [[White House]]. I wonder if our politicians (who speak so lightly of a Japanese-American war) have confidence as to the outcome and are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices?" [http://plasma.nationalgeographic.com/pearlharbor/ngbeyond/people/people11.html]</blockquote>
 
==Long term effects==
[[Image:Memorial Service PH.jpg|thumb|175px|Memorial Service for men killed during the Japanese attack on NAS Kaneohe.]]
[[Image:Attack on Pearl Harbor US Propaganda.jpg|thumb|175px|The attack inflamed U.S. sentiments against Japan as shown in US propaganda.]]
A common view is the Japanese fell victim to [[victory disease]] because of the perceived ease of their first victories. It has also been stated by the Japanese military commanders and politicians who visited and lived in the United States their leadership (mostly military personnel) took the war relatively lightly with the United States compared to them. For instance, [[Isoroku Yamamoto]]'s quote and [[Battle of Iwo Jima]] commander [[Tadamichi Kuribayashi]] expressed the views and concerns of the greater industrial power of the United States in comparison to Japan.
 
Despite the perception of this battle as a devastating blow to America, only three ships were permanently lost to the U.S. Navy. These were the battleships [[USS Arizona (BB-39)|''Arizona'']], [[USS Oklahoma (BB-37)|''Oklahoma'']], and the old battleship [[USS Utah (BB-31)|''Utah'']] (then used as a target ship); nevertheless, much usable material was salvaged from them, including the two aft main turrets from ''Arizona''. Heavy casualties resulted from ''Arizona'''s magazine exploding and the ''Oklahoma'' capsizing. Four ships sunk during the attack were later raised and returned to duty, including the battleships [[USS California (BB-44)|''California'']], [[USS West Virginia (BB-48)|''West Virginia'']] and [[USS Nevada (BB-36)|''Nevada'']]. ''California'' and ''West Virginia'' had an effective torpedo-defense system which held up remarkably well, despite the weight of fire they had to endure, enabling most of their crews to be saved. Many of the surviving battleships were heavily refitted, including the replacement of their outdated secondary battery of anti-surface 5" (127mm) guns with more useful turreted dual-purpose (antiaircraft and antiship) guns, allowing them to better cope with the new tactical reality.<ref>In fact, their rate of fire was too slow to deal with aircraft, as experience with ''[[kamikaze]]'' would demonstrate. Not until the introduction of a fully automatic 3" {76mm} postwar was a suitable solution found.</ref> Destroyers [[USS Cassin (DD-372)|''Cassin'']] and [[USS Downes (DD-375)|''Downes'']] were total losses as ships, but their machinery was salvaged and fitted into new hulls, retaining their original names, while ''Shaw'' was raised and returned to service.
 
Of the 22 Japanese ships that took part in the attack, only one survived the war. As of 2006, the only U.S. ships in Pearl Harbor during the attack still remaining afloat are the [[USCGC Taney (WHEC-37)|Coast Guard Cutter ''Taney'']] and the yard tug [[USS Hoga (YT-146)|USS Hoga]]. Both remained active over 50 years after the attack and have been designated museum ships.
 
In the long term, the attack on Pearl Harbor was a strategic [[blunder]] for Japan. Indeed, Admiral Yamamoto, who conceived it, predicted even success could not win a war with the United States, because American productive capacity was too large. One of the main Japanese objectives was to destroy the three American [[aircraft carrier]]s stationed in the Pacific, but they were not present: ''[[USS Enterprise (CV-6)|Enterprise]]'' was returning from Wake Island, ''[[USS Lexington (CV-2)|Lexington]]'' was near Midway Island, and ''[[USS Saratoga (CV-3)|Saratoga]]'' was in San Diego following a refit at [[Puget Sound Naval Shipyard]]. Putting most of the U.S. battleships out of commission was regarded&mdash;in both Navies and by most observers worldwide&mdash;as a tremendous success for Japan.
 
Though the attack was notable for large-scale destruction, the attack was not significant in terms of long-term loss of life and equipment. Had Japan destroyed the American carriers, the U.S. might have sustained significant damage to its Pacific Fleet for a year or so. As it was, the elimination of the battleships left the U.S. Navy with no choice but to put its faith in aircraft carriers and submarines&mdash;the very weapons with which the U.S. Navy halted and eventually reversed the Japanese advance. A particular flaw of Japanese strategic thinking was a belief the ultimate Pacific battle would be between battleships of both sides, in keeping with the doctrine of Captain [[Alfred Mahan]]. As a result, Yamamoto hoarded his battleships for a decisive battle that never happened.
 
Ultimately, targets that never made the attackers' list, the [[Submarine Base]] and the old Headquarters Building, were more important than any of them. It was submarines that brought Japan's economy to a standstill and crippled its transportation of oil, immobilizing heavy ships. And in the basement of the old Administration Building was the cryptanalytic unit, [[Station Hypo|<small>HYPO</small>]], which contributed significantly to the Midway ambush and the Submarne Force's success.
 
==Historical significance==
This battle has had history-altering consequences. It only had a small strategic military effect because the Japanese Navy failed to sink U.S. aircraft carriers or destroy the Submarine Base, but even if this had been achieved, it would not have helped Japan in the long term. The attack firmly drew the [[United States]] and its massive industrial and service economy into [[World War II]], and the U.S. sent huge numbers of soldiers, weapons, and supplies to help the Allies fight Germany, Italy, and Japan, contributing to the utter defeat of the Axis powers by 1945. This attack opened the [[Pacific War]], which ended with two [[atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki|nuclear strikes]].
 
[[Image:Bullet holes at headquarters building of Hickam Air Force Base.jpg|thumb|left|Damage to the headquarters building at Hickam Air Force Base, still visible.]]
[[Image:Pearl_az.jpg|thumb|right|Sunken battleship USS ''Arizona'''s gun turret, 2005.]]
 
The United Kingdom's Prime Minister [[Winston Churchill]], on hearing the attack on Pearl Harbor had finally drawn the United States into the war, wrote, "Being saturated and satiated with emotion and sensation, I went to bed and slept the sleep of the saved and thankful."<ref>{{cite book| first=Winston| last=Churchill| title=The Second World War, Vol. 3| pages=539}}</ref> The Allied victory in this war and the subsequent U.S. emergence as a dominant world power have shaped international politics ever since.
 
In terms of military history, the attack on Pearl Harbor marked the emergence of the [[aircraft carrier]] as [[capital ship]], replacing the [[battleship]] as the striking arm of the fleet. However, not until later battles, notably [[Battle of the Coral Sea|Coral Sea]] and [[Battle of Midway|Midway]], did this breakthrough became apparent to the world's naval powers.
 
==Monumental status==
Pearl Harbor is generally regarded as an extraordinary event in American history, marking the first time since the [[War of 1812]] America was attacked on its [[homeland|home soil]] by another country. The event has assumed mythical status, and its prominence was vividly demonstrated sixty years later when the [[September 11, 2001 attacks]] took place: the [[World Trade Center]] and [[The Pentagon|Pentagon]] attacks were almost instantly compared to Pearl Harbor. The lessons of intelligence analysis and sharing had not been learned.
 
== Cultural impact ==
{{main article|Anti-Japanese sentiment}}
 
[[Image:PropagandaHitlerTojo.jpg|thumb|140px|right|Anti-Japanese sentiment in the U.S. peaked during World War II. The government subsidized the production of [[propaganda]] posters using racial [[stereotype]]s. Shown here [[Adolf Hitler]] and [[Hideki Tojo]] of the [[Axis Powers|Axis alliance]].]]
 
The attack on Pearl Harbor, [[anti-Japanese propaganda]], Japanese alliance with the [[Nazi]]s and the ensuing war in the Pacific along with [[racism]] and [[xenophobia]], fueled [[anti-Japanese sentiment]] greatly. [[Japanese people|Japanese]], [[Japanese-Americans]] and [[Asia]]ns having a similar [[human physical appearance|physical appearance]] were regarded with deep seated suspicion, distrust and hostility. The attack was viewed as having been conducted in an extremely underhanded way and also as a very "treacherous" or "sneaky attack" fueled by extensive [[anti-Japanese propaganda]] to later sell [[war bond]]s among other things. Fear of a Japanese ethnic [[fifth column]] led to an order for massive detention of ethnic Japanese, mostly on the West Coast of the U.S. <--citation? ue to General John DeWitt's racist views--> signed by the President on [[February 19]], [[1942]]. The [[Japanese American internment]], in both the [[Japanese American internment|United States]] and [[Japanese Canadian internment|Canada]] has reverberated ever since.
 
Postwar, Japan's overthrow of colonial powers gave credence and encouragement to resistance movements in India, Burma, Indonesia, and Vietnam.
 
The attacks on Pearl Harbor were depicted in the joint American-Japanese film [[Tora! Tora! Tora!|''Tora! Tora! Tora!'']] (1970), the American film [[Pearl Harbor (film)|''Pearl Harbor'']] (2001) and in several Japanese productions.
 
==Recipients of the Medal of Honor==
<nowiki>*</nowiki> Awarded posthumously.<ref>[http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/moh1.htm Medal of Honor Citations], U.S. Army Center of Military History.</ref>
*[[Mervyn S. Bennion]] *
*[[John William Finn]]
*[[Francis C. Flaherty]] *
*[[Samuel G. Fuqua]]
*[[Edwin J. Hill]] *
*[[Herbert C. Jones]] *
*[[Isaac C. Kidd]] *
*[[Jackson C. Pharris]]
*[[Thomas J. Reeves]] *
*[[Donald K. Ross]]
*[[Robert R. Scott]] *
*[[Peter Tomich]] *
*[[Franklin van Valkenburgh]] *
*[[James R. Ward]] *
*[[Cassin Young]]
 
== See also ==
{{portalpar|Military of the United States|Naval Jack of the United States.svg|65}}
* [[Attacks on North America during World War II]]
* [[Day of Deceit|''Day of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor'']]
* [[List of United States Navy losses in World War II]]
* [[Pearl Harbor]]
* [[Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge debate]]
* [[Pearl Harbor Survivors Association]]
* [[USS Arizona Memorial]]
{{Commons|Pearl Harbor}}
 
==Notes==
<div class="references-small">
<references />
#Kiroku Hanai "[http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/geted.pl5?eo20040928kh.htm U.S. War Conduct: No sense of proportionality]," ''Japan Times'', [[September 28]], [[2004]] (accessed [[June 10]], [[2005]]);
#Gregory Clark, "[http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/geted.pl5?eo20050415gc.htm Shedding imposed war guilt]," ''Japan Times'', [[April 15]], [[2005]] (accessed [[June 10]], [[2005]]).
#[[McCollum memo]] A 1940 meno from a Naval headquarters staff officer to his superiors outlining how Japan could be led to war, ending the building tension. (declassified in 1994).
</div>
 
==Further reading==
<div class="references-small">
* [[Gordon W. Prange]], ''At Dawn We Slept'' (McGraw-Hill, 1981), ''Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History'' (McGraw-Hill, 1986), and ''[[December 7]], [[1941]]: The Day the Japanese Attacked Pearl Harbor'' (McGraw-Hill, 1988). This monumental trilogy, written with collaborators Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, is considered the authoritative work on the subject.
* Larry Kimmett and Margaret Regis, ''[http://www.navpublishing.com/index.htm The Attack on Pearl Harbor: An Illustrated History]'' (NavPublishing, 2004). Using maps, photos, unique illustrations, and an animated CD, this book provides a detailed overview of the surprise attack that brought the United States into World War II.
* [[Walter Lord]], ''Day of Infamy'' (Henry Holt, 1957) is a very readable, and entirely anecdotal, re-telling of the day's events.
* W. J. Holmes, ''Double-Edged Secrets: U.S. Naval Intelligence Operations in the Pacific During World War II'' (Naval Institute, 1979) contains some important material, such as Holmes' argument that, had the U.S. Navy been warned of the attack and put to sea, it would have likely resulted in an even greater disaster.
* Michael V. Gannon, ''Pearl Harbor Betrayed'' (Henry Holt, 2001) is a recent examination of the issues surrounding the surprise of the attack.
* Frederick D. Parker, ''[http://www.history.navy.mil/books/comint/ Pearl Harbor Revisited: United States Navy Communications Intelligence 1924–1941]'' (Center for Cryptologic History, 1994) contains a detailed description of what the Navy knew from intercepted and decrypted Japan's communications prior to Pearl.
* Henry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee, ''Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement'', (HarperCollins, 2001), an account of the secret "[[Clausen Inquiry]]" undertaken late in the war by order of Congress to Secretary of War [[Stimson]].
* [[Robert A. Theobald]], ''Final Secret of Pearl Harbor'' (Devin-Adair Pub, 1954) ISBN 0-8159-5503-0 ISBN 0-317-65928-6 Foreword by Fleet Admiral [[William F. Halsey, Jr.]]
* [[Albert Coady Wedemeyer|Albert C. Wedemeyer]], ''Wedemeyer Reports!'' (Henry Holt Co, 1958) ISBN 0-89275-011-1 ISBN 0-8159-7216-4
* [[Hamilton Fish]], ''Tragic Deception: FDR and America's Involvement in World War II'' (Devin-Adair Pub, 1983) ISBN 0-8159-6917-1
* John Toland, ''Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath'' (Berkley Reissue edition, 1986 ISBN 0-425-09040-X) is an excellent account by a Pulitzer Prize winning author, though thought by some not to back up his claims as thoroughly as expected by academic conventions.
* [[Robert Stinnett]], ''[http://www.pearlharbor41.com/ Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor]'' (Free Press, 1999) A study of the Freedom of Information Act documents that led Congress to direct clearance of Kimmel and Short. ISBN 0-7432-0129-9
* [[Edward L. Beach]], ''Scapegoats: A Defense of Kimmel and Short at Pearl Harbor''ISBN 1-55750-059-2
*Andrew Krepinevich, {{PDFlink|[http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/Archive/R.20020225.Lighting_the_Path_/R.20020225.Lighting_the_Path_.pdf]|0.0&nbsp;bytes<!-- text/html, 0 bytes -->}} ''(Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments)'' contains a passage regarding the Yarnell attack, as well as reference citations.
* Roberta Wohlstetter, ''Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision'', (Stanford University Press: 1962). Regarded by many as the most important work in the attempt to understand the intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor. Her introduction and analysis of the concept of "noise" persists in understanding intelligence failures.
* John Hughes-Wilson, ''Military Intelligence Blunders and Cover-Ups''. Robinson, 1999 (revised 2004). Contains a brief but insightful chapter on the particular intelligence failures, and broader overview of what causes them.
*{{cite book
| last = Horn
| first = Steve
| authorlink =
| coauthors =
| year = 2005
| chapter =
| title = The Second Attack on Pearl Harbor: Operation K And Other Japanese Attempts to Bomb America in World War II
| publisher = Naval Institute Press
| ___location =
| id = ISBN 1-59114-388-8
}}
</div>
* {{cite book
| last = Seki
| first = Eiji
| coauthors =
| year = 2007
| title = Sinking of the SS Automedon And the Role of the Japanese Navy: A New Interpretation
| publisher = University of Hawaii Press
| ___location =
| id = ISBN 1905246285
 
}}
 
* Daniel Madsen, ''Resurrection-Salvaging the Battle Fleet at Pearl Harbor''. U.S. Naval Institute Press. 2003. Highly readable and thoroughly researched account of the aftermath of the attack and the salvage efforts from December 8, 1941 through early 1944.
 
==External links==
{{Spoken Wikipedia-2|2006-01-12|Pearl_Harbor(part1of2).ogg|Pearl_Harbor(part2of2).ogg|}}
===Accounts===
* [http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/Guard-US/ch7.htm Guarding The United States And Its Outposts] Official U.S. Army history of Pearl Harbor
* [http://starbulletin.com/1999/09/13/special/index.html War comes to Hawaii] ''Honolulu Star-Bulletin'', Monday, Sept. 13, 1999
===Media===
* [http://www.archive.org/download/NewsPara1942/NewsPara1942.avi Video of first Newsreel from December 23 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor]
* [http://www.umkc.edu/lib/spec-col/ww2/PearlHarbor/fdr-speech.htm Roosevelt's Day Of Infamy Speech] Audio of speech given by President Roosevelt shortly after Pearl Harbor Attack
* [http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/pearlhbr.htm U.S. Naval Historical Center] "Pearl Harbor Raid: Overview and Special Image Selection"
* [http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/afcphhtml/afcphhome.html Library of Congress: The day after]
===Historic Documents===
* [http://www.worldwar-two.net/acontecimentos/130/ Second World War - USA Declaration of War on Japan.]
* [http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/monos/097/index.html Collection of extensive Japanese preparation military documents]
* [http://www.usni.org/resources/pearlharbor/pearlharbor.htm Naval Institute Special Collections: Pearl Harbor] — Articles, books, and pictures.
* [http://ibiblio.org/pha/pha Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings] Detailed reports from various investigations.
* [http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/EastWind/index.html Pearl Harbor Attack at HyperWar]
===Miscellaneous===
* [http://www.pearlharborattacked.com/cgi-bin/ikonboard4/ikonboard.cgi "Pearl Harbor Attacked" Message Board] — A website featuring personal recollections.
* {{dmoz|Society/History/By_Time_Period/Twentieth_Century/Wars_and_Conflicts/World_War_II/Theaters_of_Operations/Pacific/Pearl_Harbor/|Pearl Harbor}}
 
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[[Category:Attacks on naval bases in the United States]]
 
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