Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act: Difference between revisions

Revision as of 12:35, 4 April 2005

Latest revision as of 20:33, 20 August 2025

Line 1:

{{Short description|1930 U.S. law which raised import duties}}

The '''Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act''' raised [[United States|US]] [[tariff]]s on over 20,000 dutiable items to record levels, and, in the opinion of many economists, protracted the [[Great Depression]]. U.S. President [[Herbert Hoover]] signed the act into law on [[June 17]], [[1930]].

{{Use mdy dates|date=June 2020}}

{{Infobox U.S. legislation

| shorttitle = Tariff Act of 1930

| longtitle = An Act To provide revenue, to regulate commerce with foreign countries, to encourage the industries of the United States, to protect American labor, and for other purposes

| colloquialacronym =

| nickname = Hawley–Smoot Tariff, Smoot–Hawley Tariff

| enacted by = 71st

| effective date =

| public law url =

| cite public law = {{USPL|71|361}}

| cite statutes at large = ch. 497, {{USStat|46|590}}

| acts amended =

| title amended =

| sections created = 589

| sections amended =

| leghisturl =

| introducedin = House of Representatives

| introducedbill = H.R. 2667

| introducedby = [[Willis C. Hawley]] ([[Republican Party (United States)|R]]-[[Oregon|OR]])

| introduceddate = April or May 1929

| committees = [[United States House Committee on Ways and Means|House Ways and Means]], [[United States Senate Committee on Finance|Senate Finance]]

| passedbody1 = House

| passeddate1 = May 28, 1929

| passedvote1 = [https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/71-1/h7 264–147]

| passedbody2 = Senate

| passeddate2 = March 24, 1930

| passedvote2 = [https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/71-2/s295 53–31]

| conferencedate = June 9, 1930

| passedbody3 = Senate

| passeddate3 = June 13, 1930

| passedvote3 = without [[Division of the assembly|division]], after motion to [[Commit (motion)|recommit]] failed [https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/71-2/s345 42–44]

| passedbody4 = House

| passeddate4 = June 14, 1930

| passedvote4 = [https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/71-2/h60 222–153]

| signedpresident = [[Herbert Hoover]]

| signeddate = June 17, 1930

| amendments = Moving Americans Privacy Protection Act

| SCOTUS cases =

}}

The '''Tariff Act of 1930''', also known as the '''Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act''', was a [[Protectionism|protectionist]] trade measure signed into law in the [[United States]] by President [[Herbert Hoover]] on June 17, 1930. Named after its chief congressional sponsors, Senator [[Reed Smoot]] and Representative [[Willis C. Hawley]], the act raised [[Tariff|tariffs]] on over 20,000 imported goods in an effort to shield American industries from foreign competition during the onset of the [[Great Depression]], which had started in October 1929.{{sfn|Taussig|1931}}

The act was championed by Senator [[Reed Smoot]], a [[United States Republican Party|Republican]] from [[Utah]], and Congressman [[Willis C. Hawley]], a [[United States Republican Party|Republican]] from [[Oregon]]. President [[Herbert Hoover]] had asked Congress for a downward revision in rates, but [[Congress of the United States|U.S. Congress]] raised rates instead. While many [[economist]]s urged a veto, Hoover thought he could finesse the law through the [[U. S. Tariff Commission]], and signed the bill.

Hoover signed the bill against the advice of many senior economists, yielding to pressure from his party and business leaders. Intended to bolster domestic employment and manufacturing, the tariffs instead deepened the Depression because the U.S.'s trading partners retaliated with tariffs of their own, leading to U.S. exports and global trade plummeting. Economists and historians widely regard the act as a policy misstep, and it remains a cautionary example of protectionist policy in modern economic debates.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Whaples |first=Robert |author-link=Robert Whaples |journal=[[The Journal of Economic History]] |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |___location=Cambridge, England|volume=55 |issue=1 |page=144 |jstor=2123771 |title=Where Is There Consensus Among American Economic Historians? The Results of a Survey on Forty Propositions |date=March 1995 |doi=10.1017/S0022050700040602|citeseerx=10.1.1.482.4975 |s2cid=145691938 |url=http://www.employees.csbsju.edu/jolson/econ315/whaples2123771.pdf }}</ref> It was followed by more liberal trade agreements, such as the [[Reciprocal Tariff Act|Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act]] of 1934.

Opponents of the measure organized a petition signed by 1,000 economists who expressed concern about anticipated tariff reprisals from other nations.

== Sponsors and legislative history ==

Although the tariff act was passed after the [[Stock Market Crash of 1929]], many [[economic history|economic historians]] consider it a factor in deepening the [[Great Depression]]. Some economists also view the stock market crash as being a pre-emptive revaluation of stocks based on the news that the tariff act would most likely pass into law. This view is based on the concept that stock markets respond primarily to news about the future.

[[File:Smoot and Hawley standing together, April 11, 1929.jpg|thumb|[[Willis C. Hawley]] (left) and [[Reed Smoot]] in April 1929, shortly before the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act passed the House of Representatives]]

In 1927, the [[League of Nations]] held a [[Geneva World Economic Conference (1927)|World Economic Conference in Geneva]]. Their final report concluded that "the time has come to put an end to [[tariff]]s, and to move in the opposite direction". Vast debts and reparations from World War I could be repaid only through gold, services, or goods, but the only items available on that scale were goods. Many of the governments represented by the delegates to the conference did the opposite. In 1928, France was the first, enacting a new tariff law and quota system.<ref name="Peel">{{cite book |title=The War: the root and remedy |author-link=Arthur George Villiers Peel |first=George |last=Peel |date=1941}}</ref>

As nations resorted to [[protectionism]], the general amount of international trade decreased, causing the world economy to slow.

By the late 1920s, the U.S. economy had made exceptional gains in productivity because of [[electrification]], which was a critical factor in [[mass production]]. Further factors in economic growth were [[Oil refinery#United States|US oil refineries]], replacing horses and mules with [[Motor vehicle|motor vehicles]]. One-sixth to one-quarter of farmland that had been devoted to feeding horses and mules was freed up, contributing to a surplus in farm produce. Nominal and real wages increased, but did not keep up with the [[productivity]] gains.

In part as a result of the Hawley-Smoot Tariff and other countries' responses to it, the post-World War II world saw a push towards multilateral trading agreements that would prevent a similar situation from unfolding. This led in part to the [[Bretton Woods Agreement]] in [[1944]] and the [[General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]] (GATT) in the [[1950s]].

Senator Smoot contended that raising the tariff on imports would alleviate the overproduction problem, but the market reality was that the United States had been running a [[balance of trade|trade account surplus]]. Although manufactured goods imports were rising, manufactured exports were rising even faster. Food exports had been falling and were in a trade account deficit, but the approximate values of food imports only amounted to half the value of manufactured imports.<ref name="Beaudreau 1996">{{cite book |title=Mass Production, the Stock Market Crash and the Great Depression |last=Beaudreau |first=Bernard C. |year=1996 |publisher=Authors Choice Press|___location=New York, Lincoln, Shanghai }}</ref>

There is still some historical debate as to whether the tariff was harmful or not. A [[revenue]]-generating tariff can be beneficial to an economy, if other countries do not respond with tariffs of their own. There has been debate as to whether other countries raised their own tariffs as a result of the Hawley-Smoot Tariff , or if they were simply attempting to accomplish the same goal as the United States. Much of this debate has been centered upon [[Canada]], the United States' largest trading partner, which raised their tariffs substantially in recent years. The cause of the Canadian decision is still disputed, however.

[[File:Smoot Hawley Senate Vote.svg|thumb|Senate vote by state

==See also==

{{legend|#00FF00|Two ''yeas''}}

*[[International trade]]

{{legend|#FF0000|Two ''nays''}}

*[[Protectionism]]

{{legend|#FFFF00|One ''yea'' and one ''nay''}}

{{legend|#ACFFA1|One ''yea'' and one ''abstention''}}

{{legend|#FFADAD|One ''nay'' and one ''abstention''}}

{{legend|#B8B8B8|Two ''abstentions''}}

]]

In late 1929, as the global economy entered the first stages of the [[Great Depression]], the main policy goal of the United States federal government was to protect its jobs and farmers from foreign competition. In 1929, Smoot championed another tariff increase within the United States, which became the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Bill. In his memoirs, Smoot made it abundantly clear: "The world is paying for its ruthless destruction of life and property in the [[World War I|World War]] and for its failure to adjust purchasing power to productive capacity during the [[Industrial Revolution]] of the [[Roaring Twenties|decade following the war]]."<ref name="Meril1990">{{cite book|last=Merill|first=Milton|year=1990|title=Reed Smoot: Apostle in Politics|___location=Logan, UT|publisher=Utah State Press|page=340|isbn=0-87421-127-1}}</ref>

Smoot was a [[History of the United States Republican Party|Republican]] from [[Utah]] and chairman of the [[Senate Finance Committee]]. [[Willis C. Hawley]], a Republican from [[Oregon]], was chairman of the [[House Committee on Ways and Means]]. During the [[1928 United States presidential election]], one of [[Herbert Hoover]]'s campaign promises was to help beleaguered farmers by increasing tariffs on agricultural products. Hoover won, and Republicans maintained comfortable majorities [[1928 United States House of Representatives elections|in the House]] and [[1928 United States Senate elections|the Senate]] in 1928.<ref name="Irwin 1996"/>

The House passed a version of the act in May 1929, increasing tariffs on agricultural and industrial goods. The House bill passed on a vote of 264 to 147, with 244 Republicans and 20 Democrats voting in favor of the bill.<ref name="Irwin 1996">{{cite journal|last=Irwin|first=Douglas A.|author2=Randall S. Kroszner|title=Log-Rolling and Economic Interests in the Passage of the Smoot–Hawley Tariff|journal=Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy|date=December 1996|volume=45|page=6|url=http://research.chicagobooth.edu/economy/research/articles/124.pdf|access-date=January 17, 2011|doi=10.1016/s0167-2231(96)00023-1|s2cid=154857884|archive-date=July 18, 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110718215424/http://research.chicagobooth.edu/economy/research/articles/124.pdf}}</ref> The Senate debated its bill until March 1930, with many members trading votes based on industries in their states. The Senate bill passed on a vote of 44 to 42, with 39 Republicans and 5 Democrats voting in favor of the bill.<ref name="Irwin 1996" /> The [[United States congressional conference committee|conference committee]] then unified the two versions, largely by raising tariffs to the higher levels passed by the House.<ref name="economist">{{cite magazine|url=http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12798595|title=The Battle of Smoot–Hawley|magazine=[[The Economist]]|date =December 18, 2008}}</ref> The House passed the conference bill on a vote of 222 to 153, with the support of 208 Republicans and 14 Democrats.<ref name="Irwin 1996" />

== Opponents ==

In May 1930, a petition was signed by 1,028 economists in the United States asking President Hoover to veto the legislation. The petition was organized by [[Paul Douglas (Illinois politician)|Paul Douglas]], [[Irving Fisher]], James T. F. G. Wood, [[Frank Dunstone Graham|Frank Graham]], Ernest Patterson, [[Henry Seager]], [[Frank Taussig]], and [[Clair Wilcox]].<ref>{{cite news|work=[[The New York Times]]|date=May 5, 1930|url=http://www.clubforgrowth.org/media/uploads/smooth%20hawley%20ny%20times%2005%2005%2030.pdf|title=1,028 Economists Ask Hoover To Veto Pending Tariff Bill: Professors in 179 Colleges and Other Leaders Assail Rise in Rates as Harmful to Country and Sure to Bring Reprisals|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080227204101/http://www.clubforgrowth.org/media/uploads/smooth%20hawley%20ny%20times%2005%2005%2030.pdf|archive-date=February 27, 2008}}.</ref><ref>{{cite magazine|url=http://econjwatch.org/issues/volume-4-issue-3-september-2007|title=Economists Against Smoot–Hawley|date=September 2007|magazine=Econ Journal Watch}}</ref> Automobile executive [[Henry Ford]] also spent an evening at the [[White House]] trying to convince Hoover to veto the bill, calling it "an economic stupidity".<ref>{{cite magazine|url=http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,960038,00.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101029201229/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,960038,00.html|archive-date=October 29, 2010|title=Shades of Smoot–Hawley|magazine=[[Time (magazine)|Time]]|date=October 7, 1985}}</ref> [[J.P. Morgan & Co.|J. P. Morgan]]'s Chief Executive [[Thomas W. Lamont]] said he "almost went down on [his] knees to beg Herbert Hoover to veto the asinine Hawley–Smoot tariff".<ref>{{Citation|first=Ron|last=Chernow|title=The House of Morgan: An American Banking Dynasty and the Rise of Modern Finance|___location=New York|publisher=Atlantic Monthly Press|page=[https://archive.org/details/houseofmorganame00cher_0/page/323 323]|year=1990|isbn=0-87113-338-5|url=https://archive.org/details/houseofmorganame00cher_0/page/323}}.</ref>

While Hoover joined the economists in opposing the bill, calling it "vicious, extortionate, and obnoxious" because he felt it would undermine the commitment he had pledged to international cooperation, he eventually signed the bill after he yielded to influence from his own political party (Republican), his Cabinet (who had threatened to resign), and other business leaders.<ref name="Sobel 1972">{{cite book|last=Sobel|first=Robert|title=The Age of Giant Corporations: A Microeconomic History of American Business, 1914–1970|year=1972|___location=Westport|publisher=Greenwood Press|pages=[https://archive.org/details/ageofgiantcorpor0000sobe/page/87 87–88]|isbn=0-8371-6404-4|url=https://archive.org/details/ageofgiantcorpor0000sobe/page/87}}</ref> After the bill became law, in retaliation, Canada and other countries raised their own tariffs on U.S. goods.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Steward |first1=James B. |title=What History Has to Say about the 'Winners' in Trade Wars |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/08/business/tariff-trump-trade-wars.html |access-date=7 November 2021 |work=The New York Times |issue=International edition |date=March 8, 2018 |___location=New York}}</ref> [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] spoke against the act during [[1932 United States presidential election|his successful campaign for president]] in 1932.<ref name="economist" />

== Retaliation ==

Most of the decline in trade was due to a plunge in GDP in the U.S. and worldwide. Beyond that was an additional decline. Some countries protested and others also retaliated with trade restrictions and tariffs. American exports to the protesters fell by 18%, and exports to those which retaliated fell by 31%.<ref name=mitchener>{{Cite journal |last1=Mitchener |first1=Kris James |last2=O'Rourke |first2=Kevin Hjortshøj |last3=Wandschneider |first3=Kirsten |date=2022 |title=The Smoot–Hawley Trade War |journal=Economic Journal |volume=132 |issue=647 |pages=2500–2533 |doi=10.1093/ej/ueac006 |doi-access=free}}</ref> Threats of retaliation by other countries began long before the bill was enacted into law in June 1930. As the House of Representatives passed it in May 1929, boycotts broke out, and foreign governments moved to increase rates against American products, although US rates could be increased or decreased by the Senate or by the conference committee.<ref name="economist" />

By September 1929, Hoover's administration had received protest notes from 23 trading partners, but the threats of retaliatory actions were ignored.<ref name="economist" /> In May 1930, Canada, the most loyal trading partner for the U.S., took action by imposing new tariffs on 16 products which accounted altogether for approximately 30% of U.S. exports to Canada.<ref>{{cite book|first1=Wilson B.|last1=Brown|first2=Jan S.|last2=Hogendorn|title= International Economics: In the Age of Globalization|year=2000|___location=Toronto|publisher=University of Toronto Press|page=246|isbn=1-55111-261-2}}.</ref> Later, Canada forged closer economic links with the [[British Empire]] via the [[British Empire Economic Conference]] of 1932. Nations other than Canada that enacted retaliatory tariffs included Cuba, Mexico, France, Italy, Spain, Argentina, Australia, New Zealand, and Switzerland.<ref name=mitchener /> France and Britain protested and developed new trading partners. Germany developed a system of trade via clearing.

The economic depression worsened for workers and farmers despite Smoot and Hawley's promises of prosperity from high tariffs. Consequently, Hawley lost re-nomination, while Smoot was one of 12 Republican senators who lost their seats in [[1932 United States Senate elections|the 1932 elections]], with the swing being the largest in Senate history, being equaled in [[1958 United States Senate elections|1958]] and [[1980 United States Senate elections|1980]].<ref>{{cite book|first=Rhodri |last=Jeffreys-Jones|title=Changing Differences: Women and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy, 1917–1994|year=1997|publisher=Rutgers University Press|page=48}}</ref>

== Tariff levels ==

[[File:Average Tariff Rates in USA (1821-2016).png|thumb|450px|Average tariff rates in the United States, 1821–2016]]

In the two-volume series published by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, "The Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Bicentennial Edition", tariff rates have been represented in two forms. The dutiable tariff rate peak of 1932 was 59.1%, second only to the 61.7% rate of 1830.<ref>{{Cite web |last=DeSilver |first=Drew |url=https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/03/22/u-s-tariffs-are-among-the-lowest-in-the-world-and-in-the-nations-history/ |title = U.S. Tariffs are among the lowest in the world – and in the nation's history |date=March 22, 2018 |publisher=Pew Research Center}}</ref>

However, 63% of all imports in 1933 were not taxed, which the dutiable tariff rate does not reflect. The free and dutiable rate in 1929 was 13.5% and peaked under Smoot–Hawley in 1933 at 19.8%, one-third below the average 29.7% "free and dutiable rate" in the United States from 1821 to 1900.<ref>{{cite book|title=The Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Bicentennial Edition|volume=Part 2|page=888|url=https://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical_abstract.html|publisher=U.S. Census Bureau}} Table: Series U207-212 (Part 2 ZIP file: file named CT1970p2-08.pdf).</ref> The average tariff rate, which was applied on dutiable imports,<ref name=":0">{{citation |author=Office of Analysis and Research Services |date=March 2017 |title=U.S. imports for consumption, duties collected, and ratio of duties to value, 1891–2016. U.S. imports for consumption under tariff preference programs, 1976–2016 |publisher=U.S. International Trade Commission |url=https://www.usitc.gov/documents/dataweb/ave_table_1891_2016.pdf}}</ref><ref name=":1">{{Citation | url=https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/1208 |title = Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1957|year = 1960}}</ref> increased from 40.1% in 1929 to 59.1% in 1932 (+19%).<ref name=":0" /><ref name=":1" />

== After enactment ==

The tariffs initially appeared to be a success; according to historian [[Robert Sobel]], "Factory payrolls, construction contracts, and industrial production all increased sharply." However, larger economic problems loomed in the guise of weak banks. When the [[Creditanstalt]] of [[Austria]] failed in 1931, the global deficiencies of the Smoot–Hawley Tariff became apparent.<ref name="Sobel 1972" />

U.S. imports decreased 66% from $4.4 billion (1929) to $1.5 billion (1933), and exports decreased 61% from $5.4 billion to $2.1 billion. US gross national product fell from $103.1 billion in 1929 to $75.8 billion in 1931 and bottomed out at $55.6 billion in 1933.<ref>Bureau of the Census, ''Historical Statistics'' series F-1</ref> Imports from Europe decreased from a 1929 high of $1.3 billion, to $390 million in 1932. U.S. exports to Europe decreased from $2.3 billion in 1929 to $784 million in 1932. Overall, world trade decreased by some 66% between 1929 and 1934.<ref>{{cite book|url=http://future.state.gov/when/timeline/1921_timeline/smoot_tariff.html|title=Smoot–Hawley Tariff|series=U.S. Department of State|date=2003|isbn=0-8240-5367-2|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090312055958/http://future.state.gov/when/timeline/1921_timeline/smoot_tariff.html|archive-date=March 12, 2009|last1=Jones|first1=Joseph Marion|publisher=Garland Pub. }}</ref>

Unemployment was 8% in 1930 when the Smoot–Hawley Act was passed but the new law failed to lower it. The rate jumped to 16% in 1931 and to 25% in 1932–1933.<ref>{{Citation|author= U.S. Bureau of the Census|author2=Social Science Research Council|title=Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957|___location=Washington, DC|publisher=Govt. Print. Office| year=1960|page=70}}.</ref> There is some contention about whether this can necessarily be attributed to the tariff.{{sfn|Eckes|1995|p=113}}{{sfn|Irwin|1998|pp=332–333}} The [[Great Depression]] was already in motion before Smoot-Hawley, mainly due to financial instability, falling demand, and poor banking practices. However, the tariff worsened the crisis by shrinking global trade, hurting farmers, and reducing employment in export-dependent industries. Had it not passed, the Depression still would have occurred, but perhaps with less severity.

It was only during [[World War II]], when "the American economy expanded at an unprecedented rate",<ref>{{cite encyclopedia |last=Tassava |first=Christopher |chapter-url=http://eh.net/encyclopedia/the-american-economy-during-world-war-ii/ |article=The American Economy during World War II |encyclopedia=EH.Net Encyclopedia |editor-first=Robert |editor-last=Whaples |date=February 10, 2008}}</ref> that unemployment fell below 1930s levels.<ref>[[Bureau of Labor Statistics]], [http://herb.ashp.cuny.edu/items/show/1510 "Graph of U.S. Unemployment Rate, 1930–1945"], ''HERB: Resources for Teachers'', retrieved April 24, 2015.</ref> Imports in 1929 were only 4.2% of the U.S. GNP, and exports were only 5.0%. [[Monetarists]], such as [[Milton Friedman]], who emphasized the central role of the money supply in causing the depression, considered the Smoot–Hawley Act to be only a minor cause of the [[Great Depression in the United States]].<ref>{{cite book |first1=Milton |last1=Friedman |first2=Anna Jacobson |last2=Schwartz |title=A monetary history of the United States, 1867–1960 |date=1963 |page=342}}</ref>

== End of tariffs ==

The 1932 [[Democratic Party (United States)|Democratic]] campaign platform pledged to lower tariffs. After winning the election, President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] and the now-Democratic Congress passed the [[Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act]] of 1934. This act allowed the president to negotiate tariff reductions on a bilateral basis and treated such a tariff agreement as regular legislation, requiring only a majority, rather than as a treaty requiring a two-thirds vote. This was one of the core components of the trade negotiating framework that developed after World War II.

After World War II, that understanding supported a push toward multilateral trading agreements that would prevent similar situations in the future. While the [[Bretton Woods system|Bretton Woods Agreement]] of 1944 focused on foreign exchange and did not directly address tariffs, those involved wanted a similar framework for [[international trade]]. President [[Harry S. Truman]] launched this process in November 1945 with negotiations for the creation of a proposed [[International Trade Organization]] (ITO).<ref>{{cite web |title=Statement by the President on the Forthcoming International Conference on Tariffs and Trade |url=https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/public-papers/248/statement-president-forthcoming-international-conference-tariffs-and |work=[[Harry S. Truman Library & Museum]]}}</ref>

As it happened, separate negotiations on the [[General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]] (GATT) moved more quickly, with an agreement signed in October 1947. In the end, the United States never signed the ITO agreement. Adding a multilateral "most-favored-nation" component to that of reciprocity, the GATT served as a framework for the gradual reduction of tariffs over the subsequent half century.<ref>{{Citation |url=http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm|title=Understand the WTO: The GATT years: from Havana to Marrakesh|work=[[World Trade Organization]]}}.</ref>

Postwar changes to the Smoot–Hawley tariffs reflected a general tendency of the United States to reduce its tariff levels unilaterally while its trading partners retained their high levels. The American Tariff League Study of 1951 compared the free and dutiable tariff rates of 43 countries. It found that only seven nations had a lower tariff level than the United States (5.1%), and eleven nations had free and dutiable tariff rates higher than the Smoot–Hawley peak of 19.8%, including the United Kingdom with 25.6%. The 43-country average was 14.4%, which was 0.9% higher than the U.S. level of 1929, demonstrating that few nations were reciprocating in reducing their levels, as the United States reduced its own.<ref>Lloyd, Lewis E. ''Tariffs: The Case for Protection''. The Devin-Adair Co., 1955, Appendix, Table VI, pp. 188–189</ref>

== Ensuing political dialogue ==

In 1993, in discussion leading up to the passage of the [[North American Free Trade Agreement]] (NAFTA), then-Vice President [[Al Gore]] mentioned the Smoot–Hawley Tariff as a response to NAFTA objections voiced by [[H. Ross Perot|Ross Perot]] during [[H. Ross Perot#Reform Party and 1996 presidential campaign|a debate]] they had on ''[[The Larry King Show]]''. He gave Perot a framed photograph of Smoot and Hawley shaking hands after passage of the act.<ref name="economist"/>

In April 2009, then-Representative [[Michele Bachmann]] made news when, during a speech, she referred incorrectly to the Smoot–Hawley Tariff as "the Hoot–Smalley Act", misattributed its signing to [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]], and blamed him for the [[Great Depression]].<ref>{{cite magazine |last=Benen |first=Steve |url=https://washingtonmonthly.com/2009/04/30/hoot-smalley/|title='Hoot–Smalley'|magazine=[[Washington Monthly]] |author-link=Steve Benen |date=April 30, 2009|access-date=December 10, 2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/historian-michele-bachmann-blames-fdr-s-hoot-smalley-tariffs-for-great-depression|title=Historian Michele Bachmann Blames FDR's 'Hoot–Smalley' Tariffs For Great Depression|work=[[Talking Points Memo]]|first=Eric |last=Kleefeld|date=April 29, 2009|access-date=December 10, 2021}}</ref><ref name="Yglesias 2009">{{cite web |last=Yglesias |first=Matthew |url=http://yglesias.thinkprogress.org/archives/2009/04/michelle-bachmann-embraces-ignorance-reverse-causation.php |title=Michelle Bachmann Embraces Ignorance, Reverse Causation |author-link=Matthew Yglesias |work=[[ThinkProgress]] |date=April 29, 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090502184835/http://yglesias.thinkprogress.org/archives/2009/04/michelle-bachmann-embraces-ignorance-reverse-causation.php |archive-date=2 May 2009 }}</ref> The act has been compared to the 2010 [[Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act]] (FATCA), with Andrew Quinlan from the [[Center for Freedom and Prosperity]] calling FATCA "the worst economic idea to come out of Congress since Smoot–Hawley".<ref>{{cite web |last=Jatras |first=James George |date=23 April 2013 |url=http://repealfatca.com/index.asp?idmenu=4&idsubmenu=124&title=lets-get-republican-presidential-candidates-uon-the-recordu-for-fatca-repeal |title=Senator Rand Paul Introduces Bill to Repeal FATCA! |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160808053036/http://repealfatca.com/index.asp?idmenu=4&idsubmenu=124&title=lets-get-republican-presidential-candidates-uon-the-recordu-for-fatca-repeal |archive-date=8 August 2016 }}</ref>

=== In the second Trump administration ===

{{Main|Tariffs in the second Trump administration}}

During his [[Donald Trump 2024 presidential campaign|2024 political campaign]], [[Donald Trump]] pledged to institute similar tariffs.{{clarify|reason=Similar to what?|date=April 2025}}<ref>{{Cite magazine|first=Keith|last=Johnson|url=https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2024/11/trump-tariffs-china-how-would-they-work-what-does-it-mean.html|title=How Trump Could Make His Tariff Promises Happen—and the Potential Fallout That Awaits|magazine=[[Slate (magazine)|Slate]]|date=November 26, 2024}}</ref>

In its annual forecast supplement for the global economy that was published in November 2024 ('Year Ahead' for 2025), ''[[The Economist]]'' observed that [in the wake of the Tariff Act] "... global trade fell by two-thirds. It was so catastrophic for growth in America and around the world that legislators have not touched the issue since. 'Smoot-Hawley' became synonymous with disastrous policy making".<ref>{{cite magazine |last=Fulwood |first=Alice |date=20 November 2024 |title=What Donald Trump's election means for the global economy |url=https://www.economist.com/the-world-ahead/2024/11/20/what-donald-trumps-election-means-for-the-global-economy |magazine=The Economist}} [[Alice Fulwood]] is the Wall Street editor of the Economist</ref>

The [[Tariffs in the second Trump administration|tariffs announced on April 2, 2025]], which could raise tariff levels higher than the rates during the Smoot–Hawley Tariffs,<ref>{{Cite web |last=Donnan |first=Shawn |date=31 March 2025 |title=Trump's Tariffs Set to Make History and Break a System MAGA Loathes |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2025-03-31/trump-s-reciprocal-tariffs-risk-us-recession-trade-turmoil |website=[[Bloomberg News|Bloomberg]]}}</ref> brought renewed attention to the Smoot–Hawley Act.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2025-04-03 |title=Her great-grandfather was behind the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act. She thinks Trump's tariffs are 'terrible.' |url=https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/smoot-hawley-tariff-act-relative-rcna199405 |access-date=2025-04-03 |website=NBC News |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Opinion {{!}} 'The Case for Tariffs' Confuses U.S. History |url=https://www.wsj.com/opinion/the-case-for-tariffs-confuses-u-s-history-smoot-hawley-depression-trump-64e73480 |access-date=2025-04-03 |website=WSJ |language=en-US}}</ref>

==Convict-made goods==

Prior to 2016, the Tariff Act provided that "[a]ll goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part in any foreign country by [[convict labor]] or/and [[forced labor]] or/and indentured labor under penal sanctions shall not be entitled to entry at any of the ports of the United States" with a specific exception known as the "consumptive demand exception", which allowed forced labor-based imports of goods where United States domestic production was not sufficient to meet consumer demand.<ref>Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930, quoted in Altschuller, S., [https://www.globalbusinessandhumanrights.com/2016/02/16/u-s-congress-finally-eliminates-the-consumptive-demand-exception/ U.S. Congress Finally Eliminates the Consumptive Demand Exception], ''Global Business and Human Rights'', published by [[Foley Hoag LLP]], 16 February 2016, accessed 22 November 2020</ref> The exception was removed under [[Wisconsin]] Representative [[Ron Kind]]'s amendment bill,<ref>[[GovTrack.us]], [https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr1903 H.R. 1903 (114th): To amend the Tariff Act of 1930 to eliminate the consumptive demand exception to prohibition on importation of goods made with convict labor, forced labor, or indentured labor, and for other purposes], accessed on 3 June 2025</ref> which was incorporated into the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 and signed by President [[Barack Obama]] in February 2016.

== In popular culture ==

In the 1986 film, ''[[Ferris Bueller's Day Off]]'', [[Ben Stein]], playing a high school economics teacher, references the tariff in a lecture to his students.<ref>{{Citation |title=Ferris Bueller's Day Off (1986) |website= IMDb |url=http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0091042/characters/nm0825401 |access-date=2023-12-03}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Snow |first=Kirstin |date=2018-03-11 |title=How 'Ferris Bueller's Day Off' prepared us for Trump's tariffs |url=https://www.pennlive.com/opinion/2018/03/how_ferris_buellers_day_off_pr.html |access-date=2023-12-03 |website=pennlive |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Gabriel |first=Jon |title=Gabriel: Ferris Bueller could teach Trump a thing or two about tariffs |url=https://www.azcentral.com/story/opinion/op-ed/2018/03/08/ferris-bueller-can-teach-trump-thing-2-economics/403608002/ |date=March 8, 2018 |access-date=December 3, 2023 |website=[[The Arizona Republic]] |language=en-US}}</ref>

The tariff act is heavily featured in the 1989 book ''Dave Barry Slept Here: A Sort of History of the United States'' by author and columnist [[Dave Barry]].<ref>{{cite book |last1=Barry |first1=Dave |title=Dave Barry Slept Here |date=1989 |publisher=Random House Publishing Group |___location=New York |isbn=0-449-90462-8 |pages=112-113, 123, 157}}</ref>

== See also ==

* [[Country of origin]]

* [[List of tariff laws in the United States]]

* [[Plant Patent Act of 1930]] (originally enacted as Title III of the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act)

* [[Protectionism in the United States]]

* [[History of tariffs in the United States]]

== References ==

{{Reflist}}

== Sources ==

{{Refbegin|colwidth=60em}}

* {{Citation|last1=Archibald|first1=Robert B.|last2=Feldman|first2=David H.|year=1998|title=Investment During the Great Depression: Uncertainty and the Role of the Smoot–Hawley Tariff|journal=Southern Economic Journal|volume=64|issue=4|pages=857–879|doi=10.2307/1061208|jstor=1061208}}

* {{Citation|last=Crucini|first=Mario J.|year=1994|title=Sources of variation in real tariff rates: The United States 1900 to 1940|journal=American Economic Review| volume=84|issue=3|pages=346–353|jstor=2118081}}

* {{Citation|last1=Crucini|first1=Mario J.|last2=Kahn|first2=James|year=1996|title=Tariffs and Aggregate Economic Activity: Lessons from the Great Depression|journal=Journal of Monetary Economics|volume=38|issue=3|pages=427–467|doi=10.1016/S0304-3932(96)01298-6|doi-access=free}}

* {{Citation|title=Opening America's Market: U.S. Foreign Trade Policy since 1776|last=Eckes|first=Alfred|year=1995|publisher=University of North Carolina Press|___location=Chapel Hill|isbn=0-585-02905-9}}

* {{Citation|last=Eichengreen|first=Barry|author-link=Barry Eichengreen|year=1989|title=The Political Economy of the Smoot–Hawley Tariff|journal=Research in Economic History|volume=12|pages=1–43}}

* {{cite journal | last=Irwin | first=Douglas A. | title=The Smoot–Hawley Tariff: A Quantitative Assessment | journal=The Review of Economics and Statistics | publisher=The MIT Press | volume=80 | issue=2 | date=May 1998 | issn=0034-6535 | jstor=2646642 | pages=326–334 |doi=10.1162/003465398557410 |s2cid=57562207| url=http://papers.nber.org/papers/w5509.pdf }} Previously published as {{citation | last=Irwin | first=Douglas A. |author-mask=0 |date=March 1996 |title=The Smoot–Hawley Tariff: A Quantitative Assessment |work=NBER Working Paper Series |publisher=National Bureau of Economic Research |url=http://www.nber.org/papers/w5509.pdf}}

* {{Citation|title=Peddling Protectionism: Smoot–Hawley and the Great Depression|last=Irwin|first=Douglas|year=2011|publisher=Princeton University Press|isbn=978-0-691-15032-1}}; [https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/journals/cato/v31i3/f_0023218_19007.pdf online book review]

* {{Citation|title=American Trade Policy: 1923–1995|last=Kaplan|first=Edward S.|year=1996|publisher=Greenwood Press|___location=London|isbn=0-313-29480-1}}

* {{Citation|last=Kottman|first=Richard N.|title=Herbert Hoover and the Smoot–Hawley Tariff: Canada, A Case Study|jstor=2936217|journal=Journal of American History|volume=62|issue=3|year=1975|pages=609–635|doi=10.2307/2936217}}

* {{Citation|last=Koyama|first=Kumiko|title=The Passage of the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act: Why Did the President Sign the Bill?|journal=Journal of Policy History|volume=21|issue=2|year=2009|pages=163–186|doi=10.1017/S0898030609090071|s2cid=154415038}}

* {{Citation|last1=McDonald|first1=Judith|last2=O'Brien|first2= Anthony Patrick|last3= Callahan|first3= Colleen|year=1997|title=Trade Wars: Canada's Reaction to the Smoot–Hawley Tariff|journal= Journal of Economic History|volume=57|issue=4|pages=802–826|doi=10.1017/S0022050700019549|jstor=2951161|s2cid=154380335 }}

* {{Citation|last=Madsen|first=Jakob B.|year=2001|title=Trade Barriers and the Collapse of World Trade during the Great Depression|journal=Southern Economic Journal| volume=67|issue=4|pages=848–868|doi=10.2307/1061574|jstor=1061574}}

* {{Citation|title=Reed Smoot: Apostle in Politics|last=Merill|first=Milton|year=1990|publisher=Utah State Press|___location=Logan, UT|isbn=0-87421-127-1}}

*{{Cite journal |last1=Mitchener |first1=Kris James |last2=O'Rourke |first2=Kevin Hjortshøj |last3=Wandschneider |first3=Kirsten |date=2022 |title=The Smoot–Hawley Trade War |journal=Economic Journal |volume=132 |issue=647 |pages=2500–2533 |doi=10.1093/ej/ueac006 |doi-access=free}}

* {{Citation|last=O'Brien|first=Anthony|title=Smoot–Hawley Tariff|encyclopedia=EH Encyclopedia|url=http://www.eh.net/encyclopedia/article/obrien.hawley-smoot.tariff|archive-url=http://arquivo.pt/wayback/20091002093955/http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/obrien.hawley-smoot.tariff|archive-date=October 2, 2009}}

* {{Citation|title=Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, 1929–1976|last=Pastor|first=Robert|year=1980|publisher=University of California Press|___location=Berkeley|isbn=0-520-03904-1|url=https://archive.org/details/congresspolitics0000past}}

* {{Citation|title=Politics, Pressures and the Tariff|last=Schattschneider|first=E. E.|author-link= Elmer Eric Schattschneider|year=1935|publisher=Prentice-Hall|___location=New York}} – Classic study of passage of Hawley–Smoot Tariff

* {{Citation|title=The Tariff History of the United States|last=Taussig|first=F. W.|author-link= Frank William Taussig|edition=8th|year=1931|publisher=G. P. Putnam's Sons|___location=New York|url=https://www.mises.org/etexts/taussig.pdf}}

* {{Citation|title=Lessons from the Great Depression|last=Temin|first=Peter|year=1989|publisher=MIT Press|___location=Cambridge, MA|isbn=0-262-20073-2|url-access=registration|url=https://archive.org/details/lessonsfromgreat0000temi}}

* {{Citation|title=Tariffs and Trade in U.S. History: An Encyclopedia|last1=Turney|first1=Elaine C. Prange|last2=Northrup|first2= Cynthia Clark|year=2003}}

{{Refend}}

== External links ==

* {{commons-inline}}

* [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/id/17606.htm Smoot-Hawley Tariff page] on the [[United States Department of State]] website

* [https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/COMPS-8183/uslm/COMPS-8183.xml Tariff Act of 1930] as amended ([https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/COMPS-8183/pdf/COMPS-8183.pdf PDF]/[https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/COMPS-8183 details]) in the [[United States Government Publishing Office|GPO]] [https://www.govinfo.gov/help/comps Statute Compilations collection]

{{Herbert Hoover}}

{{US tax acts}}

{{GreatDepr nav}}

{{authority control}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act}}

[[Category:Great Depression]]

[[Category:United1930 Statesin tradeAmerican law]]

[[Category:1930Great Depression in lawthe United States]]

[[Category:Tariff laws in the United States]]

[[Category:1930 in international relations]]

[[Category:June 1930 in the United States]]

[[Category:1930 in economic history]]

[[Category:Presidency of Herbert Hoover]]