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The '''Institutional Analysis and Development framework''' ('''IAD''') is a theoretical framework for investigating how people ("actors") interact with [[Common-pool resource|common-pool resources]] (CPRs). CPRs are economic goods which are rivalrous (i.e. one person's use reduces the ability of others to use) and non-excludable (i.e. it's impractical to prevent people accessing it) - examples include forests as a source of timber, or fields as a source of pasture.
It was developed by [[Elinor Ostrom]], an American [[political scientist]] and the first woman to receive the [[Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences]] in 2009.<ref>[[Elinor Ostrom|Ostrom, Elinor]]. (1990) ''Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action''. New York: Cambridge University.</ref> Ostrom researched which institutional structures supported CPR actors to sustainably use their resources, balancing individuals' use with the interest of a wider public. Under [[Rational choice theory|rational choice]] assumptions, the IAD was devised in an attempt to ''explain and predict'' outcomes by formally exploring and documenting governance structures, actors' positions, and informal and formal rules. Thus, the IAD is a [[Systematic sampling|systematic method]] to document policy analysis functions similar to [[analytical technique|analytic technique]] commonly used in [[Physical science|physical]] and [[social science]]s to understand how institutions operate and change over a period of time.<ref name="indiana">{{cite web|author1=Michael D. McGinnis|title=
== Components of the framework ==
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Ostrom thought of the IAD as a "multi-level conceptual map" with which one could zoom in and out of particular hierarchical parts of the governance structures in a social system.
The IAD framework helps to perceive complex collective action problems by dividing them into 'action arenas', that are smaller pieces of practically understandable function.<ref name="indiana" /> The analyst assumes that the structure of the action situation is fixed in the short-term. For an action situation to exist, there must be "actors in positions" (the number of possible roles that are available in this recurring interaction situation).<ref name="Understanding Institutional Diversity">{{cite book|url=http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/s8085.pdf|title=Understanding Institutional Diversity|author=Elinor Ostrom|date=2009|publisher=Princeton University Press|isbn=9781400831739|___location=Princeton|accessdate=30 January 2015}}</ref> Actors have choices within the existing (rule) structure. In the study of outcomes from collective choice situations, actors are influenced by the institutional arrangements, the socio-economic conditions, and the physical environment.<ref>{{cite journal|author1=Krister Andersson|title=Understanding decentralized forest governance: an application of the institutional analysis and development framework|url=http://sspp.proquest.com/archives/vol2iss1/0507-010.andersson.html|journal=Sustainability: Science, Practice, & Policy|date=2006 |volume=2 |issue=1 |page=25 |doi=10.1080/15487733.2006.11907975 |bibcode=2006SSPP....2...25A |accessdate=2 February 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150905060853/http://sspp.proquest.com/archives/vol2iss1/0507-010.andersson.html|archive-date=5 September 2015|url-status=dead|hdl=10535/5284|hdl-access=free}}</ref> The institutional arrangements can be studied by seven rule types (as per below).<ref name="Understanding Institutional Diversity" />
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