Power transition theory: Difference between revisions

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{{Use dmy dates|date=March 2020}}

'''Power transition theory''' is a theory about the nature of [[war]], in relation to the [[power in international relations]].<ref name="Organski">{{Cite book|last=Organski|first=AFK|authorlink=A.F.K. Organski|title=World Politics|year=1958|___location=[[New York City|New York]]}}</ref><ref name="Wittkopf">{{Cite book|last=Wittkopf|first=Eugene R.|title=World Politics: Trend and Transformation|year=1997|publisher=St. Martin's Press|___location=[[New York City|New York]]}}</ref><ref name="Tammen">{{Cite book|last=Tammen|first=Ronald L.|title=Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century|year=2000|publisher=Seven Bridges Press}}</ref> The theory was first published in 1958 by its creator, [[A.F.K. Organski]], in his textbook, ''World Politics'' (1958).

According to Organski:

<blockquote>An even distribution of political, economic, and military capabilities between contending groups of states is likely to increase the probability of war; peace is preserved best when there is an imbalance of national capabilities between disadvantaged and advantaged nations; the aggressor will come from a small group of dissatisfied strong countries; and it is the weaker, rather than the stronger power that is most likely to be the aggressor.</blockquote>

==Theory==

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While Organski's hierarchy initially referred only to the entire international system, Douglas Lemke later expanded the hierarchy model to include regional hierarchies, arguing that each region contains its own dominant, great, and small powers. Thus regional hierarchies exist embedded into the larger international hierarchy.<ref>Mold, Andrew. (2003). Regions of war and peace edited by Douglas Lemke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 235). Journal of International Development. 15. 805–806. {{doi|10.1002/jid.1014}}.</ref>

Power transition theory, a precursor of the [[Long Cycle Theory| long-cycle theory]] of [[hegemony]], seeks to explain trends between warring states in the past 500 years. It detects a general trend: a nation achieves [[hegemony| hegemonic power]] and then is challenged by a [[great power]]. This leads to a war which, in the past, has resulted a transition between two powers. Eugene R. Wittkopf explores past wars and their relation to power transition theory in his 1997 book ''World Politics: Trend and Transformation''. He explains the interactions using [[George Modelski]]'s Seapower Concentration Index.<ref name="Wittkopf" />

==Historical application==

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In general, hegemonic periods last approximately 60 to 90 years and conflicts which result in a period stabilization of power-distribution last approximately 20 years.<ref name="Wittkopf"/> This can be explained through [[war-weariness]] and the tendency (although this was broken in the first half of the 20th century) for nations not to engage themselves in another conflict after being involved in a power transition.<ref name="Wittkopf"/>

Power transitions play an important role in applications of the [[bargaining model of war]] where wars are more likely to break out and be severe in situations of uncertainty and of commitment problems. During power transitions, it is harder for actors to credibly commit to abide by any agreement, thus creating major commitment problems.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal|last= Powell |first= Robert|date=2006|title=War as a Commitment Problem|url= http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818306060061 |journal=International Organization|volume= 60|issue= 1|pages= |doi= 10.1017/s0020818306060061|s2cid= 15861342|issn= 0020-8183|via= |url-access= subscription}}</ref><ref name=":3">{{Cite book|last= Weisiger|first= Alex|date= 2013|title= Logics of War: Explanations for Limited and Unlimited Conflicts|url= https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt1xx5pk |language= en|publisher=Cornell University Press|volume= |pages= |jstor= 10.7591/j.ctt1xx5pk|isbn= 9780801451867 |via= }}</ref>

International relations scholars [[Randall Schweller]] and Xiaoyu Pu find that the challenger not only seeks to increase its material power but also to promote its own ideological and normative frameworks as alternatives to those propagated by the hegemon.<ref>Schweller, R. L., & Pu, X. (2011). After unipolarity: China's visions of international order in an era of US decline. ''International security'', ''36''(1), 41-72.</ref>

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==See also==

* [[Thucydides trap]]

* [[Kindleberger Trap]]

==References==

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==External links==

* [http://demonstrations.wolfram.com/HegemonicZonesOfInfluence/ Hegemonic Zones of Influence] by Michael Schreiber, [[The Wolfram Demonstrations Project]].

* [https://www.ciris.info/learningcenter/power-transition-theory/ Power Transition Theory] by CIRIS, [[CIRIS Learning Center]].

{{International power}}

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[[Category:1958 introductions]]

[[Category:International relations terminology]]

[[Category:International relations theory]]