Mediated reference theory: Difference between revisions

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A '''mediated reference theory'''<ref>Siobhan Chapman (ed.), ''Key Ideas in Linguistics and the Philosophy of Language'', Edinburgh University Press, 2009, p. 202.</ref> (also '''indirect reference theory''')<ref name=Berezowski>Leszek Berezowski, ''Articles and Proper Names'', University of Wrocław, 2001, p. 67.</ref> is any [[semantic]] theory that posits that words refer to something in the external world, but insists that there is more to the meaning of a name than simply the object to which it refers. It thus stands opposed to [[direct reference theory]]. [[Gottlob Frege]] is a well-known advocate of mediated reference theories.<ref name=Berezowski/><ref>G. W. Fitch, ''Naming and Believing'', Springer, 2012, p. 1.</ref> Similar theories were widely held in the middle of the twentieth century by philosophers such as [[Peter Strawson]] and [[John Searle]].

The '''mediated reference theory''' is a semantic theory that posits that words reference something in the external world, but are mediated by some other process. One of the paradigm cases of a mediated reference theory was formulated by mathematician and philosopher [[Gottlob Frege]].

[[Saul Kripke]], a proponent of direct reference theory, in his ''[[Naming and Necessity]]'' dubbed mediated reference theory the '''Frege–Russell view'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> and criticized it.<ref>[[Saul Kripke]], ''[[Naming and Necessity]]''. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972. p. 27.</ref> Subsequent scholarship refuted the claim that [[Bertrand Russell]]'s views on reference theory were the same as Frege's, since Russell was also a proponent of direct reference theory.<ref>Howard Wettstein, "Frege-Russell Semantics?", ''Dialectica'' '''44'''(1/2), 1990, pp. 113–135, esp. 115: "Russell maintains that when one is acquainted with something, say, a present sense datum or oneself, one can refer to it without the mediation of anything like a Fregean sense. One can refer to it, as we might say, ''directly''."</ref>

[[Image:Mediated_reference.gif|thumb|Mediated Reference]]

== See also ==

Frege saw that the semantics of words and expressions could be divided up into two elements: a meaning (or ''sense'') which is a (usually definite) description(s) by which we come to know the reference of an object; and the ''reference'', which is the actual thing being referred to. For example, "the morning star" and "the evening star" are two different senses (i.e. meanings or modes or presentation) which both refer to the object Venus. Both "the morning star" and "the evening star", for Frege, are [[abstract objects]] which exist in a ''third realm'' of thoughts, independent of the mind or the external physical world.

* [[Sense and reference]]

* [[Descriptivist theory of names]]

==References==

Moreover, sentences and names have different kinds of senses and referents. The sense of a sentence is a proposition, or state of affairs; the reference is a truth value -- "true" or "false". The sense of a proper name is a concept that describes some person; the referent of a proper name is the actual individual in the world.

{{reflist}}

==External links==

[Russell thought that names were a sort of description in disguise, which seems to be a similar position to Frege's. However, some scholars (such as [[Gareth Evans]]) have questioned whether Frege did hold such a view.]

* [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/meaning/ Theories of Meaning (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)]

[[Category:{{Philosophy of language]]}}

There are some exceptions to the mediated reference theory, however. Some names don't seem to point to things in the world as their referent. For example, if a person utters the statement "It is common knowledge that 'Mark Twain' was an author", they are not just talking about the man Mark Twain, but also talking about whether or not people know and recognize something about the expression "Mark Twain". In this case, the expression itself - the signs, the string of words - are the sense of the proposition, and not just the content of the expression. In today's language, these exceptions are called '''opaque contexts'''.

== See also ==

* [[Direct reference theory]]

* [[Sense and reference]]

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[[Category:Philosophy of language]]

[[Category:PhilosophicalTheories conceptsof language]]

[[Category:Meaning (philosophy of language)]]