Lawrence Kohlberg's stages of moral development: Difference between revisions

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{{Short description|Psychological theory describing the evolution of moral reasoning}}

'''Kohlberg's stages of moral development''' were conceived by [[Lawrence Kohlberg]] to explain the development of [[moral reasoning]]. Created while studying [[psychology]] at the [[University of Chicago]], it was inspired when he became fascinated with children's reactions to [[moral dilemma]]s through the work of [[Jean Piaget]]. He wrote his doctoral dissertation there in 1958, outlining what are now known as his stages of moral development.

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'''Lawrence Kohlberg's stages of moral development''' constitute an adaptation of a psychological theory originally conceived by the Swiss psychologist [[Jean Piaget]]. [[Lawrence Kohlberg|Kohlberg]] began work on this topic as a psychology graduate student at the [[University of Chicago]] in 1958 and expanded upon the theory throughout his life.<ref name="Crain">{{cite book |last=Crain |first=William C. |title=Theories of Development |edition=2Rev |url=https://archive.org/details/theoriesofdevelo0000crai |publisher=Prentice-Hall |year=1985 |isbn=978-0-13-913617-7 |url-access=registration }}</ref><ref name="KohlLevineHewer">{{cite book | last=Kohlberg | first=Lawrence | author-link=Lawrence Kohlberg |author2=Charles Levine |author3=Alexandra Hewer | title=Moral stages : a current formulation and a response to critics | publisher=Karger | ___location=Basel, NY | year=1983 |isbn=978-3-8055-3716-2}}</ref><ref name="Levine1985">{{cite journal |last1=Levine |first1=Charles |last2=Kohlberg |first2=Lawrence |last3=Hewer |first3=Alexandra |title=The Current Formulation of Kohlberg's Theory and a Response to Critics |journal=Human Development |date=1985 |volume=28 |issue=2 |pages=94–100 |doi=10.1159/000272945}}</ref>

The theory holds that [[moral reasoning]], a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for [[ethics|ethical]] behavior,<ref name="Kohlberg1977">{{cite journal |last1=Kohlberg |first1=Lawrence |last2=Hersh |first2=Richard H. |title=Moral development: A review of the theory |journal=Theory into Practice |date=1977 |volume=16 |issue=2 |pages=53–59 |doi=10.1080/00405847709542675}}</ref> has six [[constructivism (learning theory)|developmental stages]], each more adequate at responding to [[moral dilemmas]] than its predecessor.<ref name="highest stage">{{cite journal | last=Kohlberg | first=Lawrence | title=The Claim to Moral Adequacy of a Highest Stage of Moral Judgment | journal=Journal of Philosophy | volume=70 | year=1973 | pages=630–646 | doi=10.2307/2025030 | issue=18 | jstor=2025030 }}</ref> Kohlberg followed the development of moral judgment far beyond the ages studied earlier by Piaget, who also claimed that logic and morality develop through constructive stages.<ref name="piaget">{{cite book | last=Piaget | first=Jean | title=The Moral Judgment of the Child | publisher=Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co. | ___location=London | year=1932 |isbn=978-0-02-925240-6 }}</ref><ref name="highest stage" /> Expanding on Piaget's work, Kohlberg determined that the process of moral development was principally concerned with [[justice]] and that it continued throughout the individual's life, a notion that led to dialogue on the philosophical implications of such research.<ref name="dissertation">{{cite thesis | last=Kohlberg | first=Lawrence | title=The Development of Modes of Thinking and Choices in Years 10 to 16 | type=Ph.D. dissertation |publisher=University of Chicago | year=1958 }}</ref><ref name="philmoral">{{cite book |last=Kohlberg |first=Lawrence |title= Essays on Moral Development, Vol. I: The Philosophy of Moral Development |publisher=Harper & Row |___location=San Francisco, CA |year=1981 |isbn=978-0-06-064760-5 }}</ref><ref name="KohlLevineHewer" />

This theory holds that moral reasoning, which is the basis for [[ethical]] behavior, has six identifiable [[developmental stage]]s. He followed the development of moral judgment beyond the ages originally studied by Piaget, expanding considerably on such work. Kohlberg determined that the process of moral development continued throughout the [[lifespan]].

The six stages of moral development occur in phases of pre-conventional, conventional and post-conventional morality. For his studies, Kohlberg relied on stories such as the [[Heinz dilemma]] and was interested in how individuals would justify their actions if placed in similar moral dilemmas. He analyzed the form of moral reasoning displayed, rather than its conclusion and classified it into one of six stages.<ref name="KohlLevineHewer" /><ref name="istoought">{{cite book |last=Kohlberg |first=Lawrence |title= From ''Is'' to ''Ought'': How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away with It in the Study of Moral Development |publisher=Academic Press |___location=New York |year=1971 }}</ref><ref name="moralization">{{cite book |last=Kohlberg |first=Lawrence |editor-first=T. | editor-last=Lickona |title=Moral Development and Behavior: Theory, Research and Social Issues |publisher=Rinehart and Winston |___location=Holt, NY |year=1976 |chapter= Moral stages and moralization: The cognitive-developmental approach }}</ref><ref name="measurement">{{cite book |last=Colby |first=Anne |author2=Kohlberg, L. |title=The Measurement of Moral Judgment Vol. 2: Standard Issue Scoring Manual |publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=1987 | isbn=978-0-521-24447-3}}</ref>

There have been critiques of the theory from several perspectives. Arguments have been made that it emphasizes justice to the exclusion of other moral values, such as caring; that there is such an overlap between stages that they should more properly be regarded as domains or that evaluations of the reasons for moral choices are mostly ''post hoc'' rationalizations (by both decision makers and psychologists) of intuitive decisions.<ref name="gilligan">{{cite journal | last=Gilligan | first=Carol | title=In a Different Voice: Women's Conceptions of Self and Morality | journal=Harvard Educational Review | volume=47 | issue=4 | year=1982 | title-link=In a Different Voice: Women's Conceptions of Self and Morality }}</ref><ref name=Haidt>{{cite journal|last=Haidt|first=J|title=The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment|journal=Psychological Review|year=2001|volume=108|issue=4|pages=814–834 |url=http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jhaidt/home.html|doi=10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814|citeseerx=10.1.1.620.5536|pmid=11699120}}</ref>

A new field within psychology was created by Kohlberg's theory,<!-- incomplete citation: "Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Reasoning

Encyclopedia of Childhood and Adolescence" Dianne K. Daeg de Mott --> and according to Haggbloom et al.'s study of the most eminent psychologists of the 20th century, Kohlberg was the 16th most frequently cited in introductory psychology textbooks throughout the century, as well as the 30th most eminent.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Haggbloom | first1 = S.J. | display-authors = etal | year = 2002 | title = The 100 Most Eminent Psychologists of the 20th Century | journal = Review of General Psychology | volume = 6 | issue = 2| pages = 139–15 | doi=10.1037/1089-2680.6.2.139| citeseerx = 10.1.1.586.1913 | s2cid = 145668721 }}</ref> Kohlberg's scale is about how people justify behaviors and his stages are not a method of ranking how moral someone's behavior is; there should be a correlation between how someone scores on the scale and how they behave. The general hypothesis is that moral behaviour is more responsible, consistent and predictable from people at higher levels.<ref>[http://faculty.plts.edu/gpence/html/kohlberg.htm Section on Kohlberg's stages from "Theories of Development" by W.C. Crain (1985)] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111004152005/http://faculty.plts.edu/gpence/html/kohlberg.htm |date=2011-10-04 }}</ref>

==Stages==

Kohlberg's six stages werecan be more generally grouped into three levels of two stages each: pre-conventional, conventional, and post-conventional.<ref name="istoought" /><ref name="moralization" /><ref name="measurement" /> Following Piaget's [[constructivism (learning theory)|constructivist]] requirements for a [[Theory_of_cognitive_developmentTheory of cognitive development#General_Information_regarding_the_stagesPiaget's four stages|stage model]], itas isdescribed notin possiblehis to[[theory regressof backwardcognitive indevelopment]], stagesit (althoughis noneextremely functionrare atto theirregress highestin stagestages—to atlose allthe times).use Itof ishigher alsostage notabilities.<ref possiblename="walker">{{cite tojournal 'jump'|last=Walker stages;|first=Lawrence, eachJ. stage|date=February provides1989 a|title=A newlongitudinal yetstudy necessaryof perspective,moral andreasoning is|journal=Child moreDevelopment comprehensive,|volume=60 differentiated,|issue=1 and|pages=157–166 integrated|doi=10.2307/1131081 than|pmid=2702866 its|jstor=1131081 predecessors.}}</ref><ref name="colby">

{{cite book | first1=Anne | last1=Colby | last2=Gibbs | first2=J. | last3=Lieberman | first3= M. | last4=Kohlberg | first4=L. | title=A Longitudinal Study of Moral Judgment: A Monograph for the Society of Research in Child Development| publisher=The University of Chicago Press| year=1983| isbn=978-99932-7-870-2|___location= Chicago, IL}}</ref> Stages cannot be skipped; each provides a new and necessary perspective, more comprehensive and differentiated than its predecessors but integrated with them.<ref name="walker" /><ref name="colby" />

[[File:Kohlberg Model of Moral Development.svg|thumbnail|right|269px|Kohlberg's Model of Moral Development]]

:<u>'''[[Kohlberg's stages of moral development#Pre-Conventional|Level 1 (Pre-Conventional)]]'''</u>

:::1. Obedience and punishment orientation

::::: (''How can I avoid punishment?'')

:::2. Self-interest orientation

::::: (''What's in it for me?'')

::::: (''Paying for a benefit'')

:<u>'''[[Kohlberg's stages of moral development#Conventional|Level 2 (Conventional)]]'''</u>

:::3. Interpersonal accord and conformity

::::: (a.k.a. ''The good boy/good girlSocial attitudenorms'')

::::: (''The good boy/girl attitude'')

:::4. Authority and social-order maintaining orientation

:::::(a.k.a4. ''LawAuthority and social-order morality'')maintaining orientation

::::: (''Law and order morality'')

:<u>'''[[Kohlberg's stages of moral development#Post-Conventional|Level 3 (Post-Conventional)]]'''</u>

:::5. Social contract orientation

:::6. Universal ethical principles

::::: (a.k.a. ''Principled conscience'')

The understanding gained in each stage is retained in later stages, but may be regarded by those in later stages as simplistic, lacking in sufficient attention to detail.

=== Pre-Conventional ===

The pre-conventional level of moral reasoning is especially common in [[children]], although [[adults]] can also exhibit this level of reasoning. Reasoners in the pre-conventional level judge the [[morality]] of an action by its direct [[consequences]]. The pre-conventional level consists of the first and second stages of moral development, and are purely concerned with the self ([[egocentric]]).

===Pre-conventional===

:In <u>'''stage one'''</u>, individuals focus on the direct consequences that their actions will have for themselves. For example, an action is perceived as morally wrong if the person who commits it gets [[punishment|punished]]. In addition, there is no recognition that others' points of view are any different from one's own view. This stage may be viewed as a kind of [[authoritarianism]].

The pre-conventional level of moral reasoning is especially common in children and is expected to occur in animals, although adults can also exhibit this level of reasoning. Reasoners at this level judge the morality of an action by its direct consequences. The pre-conventional level consists of the first and second stages of moral development and is solely concerned with the self in an egocentric manner. A child with pre-conventional morality has not yet adopted or internalized society's conventions regarding what is right or wrong but instead focuses largely on external consequences that certain actions may bring.<ref name="istoought" /><ref name="moralization" /><ref name="measurement"/>

In ''Stage one'' (obedience- and punishment-driven), individuals focus on the direct consequences of their actions on themselves. For example, an action is perceived as morally wrong because the perpetrator is punished. "The last time I did that I got spanked, so I will not do it again." The worse the punishment for the act is, the more "bad" the act is perceived to be.<ref name="socialpersonalitydev">{{cite book | last=Shaffer | first=David R. | title=Social and Personality Development | edition=5th | publisher=Wadsworth Publishing | year=2004 |isbn=978-0-534-60700-5 }}</ref> This can give rise to an inference that even innocent victims are guilty in proportion to their suffering. It is "egocentric", lacking recognition that others' points of view are different from one's own.<ref name="edmoraldevfaith">{{cite journal | last=Kohlberg | first=Lawrence | title=Education, Moral Development and Faith | journal=Journal of Moral Education | volume=4 | date=Oct 1974 | pages=5–16 | doi=10.1080/0305724740040102 | issue=1}}</ref> There is "deference to superior power or prestige".<ref name="edmoraldevfaith" />

:<u>'''Stage two'''</u> espouses the ''what's in it for me'' position, right behavior being defined by what is in one's own best interest. Stage two reasoning shows a limited interest in the needs of others, but only to a point where it might further one's own interests, such as "you scratch my back, and I'll scratch yours." In stage two concern for others is not based on loyalty or [[intrinsic]] respect. Lacking a perspective of society in the pre-conventional level, this should not be confused with social contract (stage five), as all actions are performed to serve one's own needs or interests. For the stage two theorist, the perspective of the world is often seen as [[moral relativism|morally relative]].

An example of obedience- and punishment-driven morality would be a child refusing to do something because it is wrong and that the consequences could result in punishment. For example, a child's classmate tries to dare the child to skip school. The child would apply obedience- and punishment-driven morality by refusing to skip school because he would get punished.

=== Conventional ===

The conventional level of moral reasoning is typical of [[Adolescence|adolescents]] and adults. Persons who reason in a conventional way judge the morality of actions by comparing these actions to societal views and expectations. The conventional level consists of the third and fourth stages of moral development.

''Stage two'' (self-interest-driven) expresses the "what's in it for me" position, in which right behavior is defined by whatever the individual believes to be in their best interest, or whatever is "convenient," but understood in a narrow way which does not consider one's reputation or relationships to groups of people. Stage two reasoning shows a limited interest in the needs of others, but only to a point where it might further the individual's own interests. As a result, concern for others is not based on loyalty or [[intrinsic]] respect, but rather a "You scratch my back, and I'll scratch yours" mentality,<ref name="highest stage" /> which is commonly described as [[quid pro quo]], a Latin term that means doing or giving something in order to get something in return. The lack of a societal perspective in the pre-conventional level is quite different from the social contract (stage five), as all actions at this stage have the purpose of serving the individual's own needs or interests. For the stage two theorist, the world's perspective is often seen as [[moral relativism|morally relative]]. See also: [[reciprocal altruism]].

:In <u>'''Stage three'''</u>, the self enters society by filling [[social role|social roles]]. Individuals are receptive of approval or disapproval from other people as it reflects society's accordance with the perceived role. They try to be a ''good boy'' or ''good girl'' to live up to these expectations, having learned that there is inherent value in doing so. Stage three reasoning may judge the morality of an action by evaluating its consequences in terms of a person's [[relationships]], which now begin to include things like respect, gratitude and the '[[ethic of reciprocity|golden rule]]'. Desire to maintain [[law|rules]] and [[authority]] exists only to further support these stereotypical social roles. The intentions of actors play a more significant role in reasoning at this stage; 'they mean well...'.

===Conventional===

:In <u>'''Stage four'''</u>, it is important to obey [[law]]s, [[dictum]]s and [[social convention|social conventions]] because of their importance in maintaining a functioning [[society]]. Moral reasoning in stage four is thus beyond the need for individual approval exhibited in stage three; society must learn to transcend individual needs. A central ideal or ideals often perscribes what is right and wrong, such in the case of [[fundamentalism]]. If one person violates a law, perhaps everyone would - thus there is an obligation and a duty to uphold laws and rules. When someone does violate a law, it is morally wrong; [[culpability]] is thus a big factor in this stage as it separates the good from the bad.

The conventional level of moral reasoning is typical of [[adolescents]] and adults. To reason in a conventional way is to judge the morality of actions by comparing them to society's views and expectations. The conventional level consists of the third and fourth stages of moral development. Conventional morality is characterized by an acceptance of society's conventions concerning right and wrong. At this level an individual obeys rules and follows society's norms even when there are no consequences for obedience or disobedience. Adherence to rules and conventions is somewhat rigid, however, and a rule's appropriateness or fairness is seldom questioned.<ref name="istoought" /><ref name="moralization" /><ref name="measurement" />

In ''Stage three'' (good intentions as determined by social consensus), the self enters society by conforming to social standards. Individuals are receptive to approval or disapproval from others as it reflects society's views. They try to be a "good boy" or "good girl" to live up to these expectations,<ref name="highest stage" /> having learned that being regarded as good benefits the self. Stage three reasoning may judge the morality of an action by evaluating its consequences in terms of a person's [[Interpersonal relationship|relationships]], which now begin to include things like respect, gratitude, and the "[[ethic of reciprocity|golden rule]]". "I want to be liked and thought well of; apparently, not being naughty makes people like me." Conforming to the rules for one's social role is not yet fully understood. The intentions of actors play a more significant role in reasoning at this stage; one may feel more forgiving if one thinks that "they mean well".<ref name="highest stage" />

=== Post-Conventional ===

The post-conventional level, also known as the principled level, consists of stages five and six of moral development. Realization that individuals are separate entities from society now becomes salient. One's own perspective should be viewed before the society's is considered. (It is due to this 'nature of self before others' that the post-conventional level, especially stage six, is sometimes mistaken for pre-conventional behaviors.)

In ''Stage four'' (authority and social order obedience driven), it is important to obey laws, [[dictum|dicta]], and [[social convention]]s because of their importance in maintaining a functioning society. Moral reasoning in stage four is thus beyond the need for individual approval exhibited in stage three. A central ideal or ideals often prescribe what is right and wrong. If one person violates a law, perhaps everyone would—thus there is an obligation and a duty to uphold laws and rules. When someone does violate a law, it is morally wrong; [[culpability]] is thus a significant factor in this stage as it separates the bad domains from the good ones. Most active members of society remain at stage four, where morality is still predominantly dictated by an outside force.<ref name="highest stage" />

:In <u>'''Stage five'''</u>, individuals are viewed as holding different [[opinions]] and [[values]], and it is paramount that they be respected and honored [[impartiality|impartially]]. Issues that are not regarded as relative like [[life]] and [[choice]] should never be withheld or inhibited. In fact, no single choice is considered correct or absolute – 'who are you to judge if they are or not'? Along a similar vein, laws are regarded as [[social contract|social contracts]] rather than rigid dictums. Those that do not promote general [[social welfare]] should be changed when necessary to meet ''the greatest good for the greatest number of people''. This is attained through [[majority decision]], and inevitably [[compromise]]. In this way [[democratic government]] is ostensibly based on stage five reasoning.

===Post-conventional===

:In <u>'''Stage six'''</u>, moral reasoning is based on [[abstraction|abstract reasoning]] using [[universal ethical principles]]. Laws are valid only insofar as they are grounded in [[justice]], and that a commitment to justice carries with it an obligation to disobey unjust laws. Rights are unnecessary as social contracts are not esential for [[deontology|deontic]] moral action. Decisions are met [[categorical imperative|categorically]] in an absolute way rather than [[hypothetical imperative|hypothetically]] in a conditional way. This can be done by imagining what one would do being in anyone's shoes, who imagined what anyone would do thinking the same (see [[John Rawls]]'s '[[veil of ignorance]]'). The resulting [[consensus]] is the action taken. In this way action is never a means but always an end in itself; one acts ''because'' it is right, and not because it is instrumental, expected, legal or previously agreed upon. While Kohlberg insisted that stage six exists, he had difficulty finding participants who consistently used it. It appears that people rarely if ever reach stage six of Kohlberg's model.

The post-conventional level, also known as the principled level, is marked by a growing realization that individuals are separate entities from society, and that the individual's own perspective may take precedence over society's view; individuals may disobey rules inconsistent with their own principles. Post-conventional moralists live by their own ethical principles—principles that typically include such basic human rights as life, liberty, and justice. People who exhibit post-conventional morality view rules as useful but changeable mechanisms—ideally rules can maintain the general social order and protect human rights. Rules are not absolute dictates that must be obeyed without question. Because post-conventional individuals elevate their own moral evaluation of a situation over social conventions, their behavior, especially at stage six, can be confused with that of those at the pre-conventional level.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Development {{!}} Education, Society, & the K-12 Learner|url=https://courses.lumenlearning.com/teachereducationx92x1/chapter/kohlbergs-stages-of-moral-development/|access-date=2021-03-23|website=courses.lumenlearning.com}}</ref>{{Citation needed|date=June 2017}}

Kohlberg has speculated that many people may never reach this level of abstract moral reasoning.<ref name="istoought" /><ref name="moralization" /><ref name="measurement" />

:Through the influence of [[Jurgen Habermas]]'s [[discourse ethics]], Kohlberg came to change his understanding of stage six. Whereas previously he had understood the stage to ultimately be an expression of absolute moral principles, Kohlberg then went on to see the final stage as the manifestation of personal integrity in reasonable discourse.

In ''Stage five'' (social contract driven), the world is viewed as holding different opinions, rights, and values. Such perspectives should be mutually respected as unique to each person or community. Laws are regarded as [[social contract]]s rather than rigid edicts. Those that do not promote the general welfare should be changed when necessary to/that meet "the greatest good for the greatest number of people".<ref name="moralization" /> This is achieved through [[majority decision]] and inevitable [[compromise]]. [[Democratic government]] is ostensibly based on stage five reasoning.

=== Other notes on the stage model ===

In his empirical studies of persons across their life-span, Kohlberg came to notice that some people evidently had undergone moral stage regression. <!-- This was a startling result, which conflicted with his view of the stages as rigid and invariant. --> He was faced with the option of either conceding that moral regression could occur, or revise his theory. Kohlberg chose the latter, postulating the existence of sub-stages wherein the emerging stage has not yet been adequately integrated into the personality. In particular Kohlberg noted of a stage 4½ or 4+, which is a transition from stage four to stage five, sharing characteristics of both. In this stage the individual has become disaffected with the arbitrary nature of ''law and order'' reasoning. Culpability is frequently turned from being defined by society to having society itself be culpable (but still noticeably present). This stage is often mistaken for the moral relativism of stage two as the individual considers society's conflicting interests with their own choices relatively and morally wrong. Kohlberg noted that this was often seen in students entering [[college]].

<!-- I'm not sure this is true: "This transition stage may result in either progress to stage five or in regression to stage four." -->

In ''Stage six'' (universal ethical principles driven), moral reasoning is based on [[abstraction|abstract reasoning]] using universal ethical principles. Laws are valid only insofar as they are grounded in justice, and a commitment to justice carries with it an obligation to disobey unjust laws. [[Natural and legal rights|Legal rights]] are unnecessary, as social contracts are not essential for [[deontology|deontic]] moral action. Decisions are not reached [[hypothetical imperative|hypothetically]] in a conditional way but rather [[categorical imperative|categorically]] in an absolute way, as in the [[Kantian ethics|philosophy of Immanuel Kant]].<ref name="kant">{{cite book | author=Kant, Immanuel | title=Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals| publisher=Harper and Row Publishers, Inc | year=1964| isbn=978-0-06-131159-8| title-link=Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals| author-link=Immanuel Kant}}</ref> This involves an individual imagining what they would do in another's shoes, if they believed what that other person imagines to be true.<ref name="rawls">* {{cite book | last=Rawls | first=John | author-link=John Rawls | title=A Theory of Justice | publisher=Belkap Press of Harvard University Press | ___location=Cambridge, MA | year=1971 |isbn=978-0-674-01772-6 | title-link=A Theory of Justice }}</ref> The resulting consensus is the action taken.<ref name="colby" />

Kohlberg further speculated that a seventh stage may exist (Transcendental Morality or Morality of Cosmic Orientation) which would link [[religion]] with moral reasoning (see [[James W. Fowler]]'s [[stages of faith development]]).

In this way, action is never merely a means to an end, but an end in itself: the individual acts because it is right to do so—not to avoid punishment, serve personal interest, meet expectations, comply with the law, or honor prior agreements. Although Kohlberg insisted that stage six exists, he found it difficult to identify individuals who consistently operated at that level.<ref name="colby" /> Touro College Researcher Arthur P. Sullivan helped support the accuracy of Kohlberg's first five stages through data analysis, but could not provide statistical evidence for the existence of Kohlberg's sixth stage. Therefore, it is difficult to define/recognize as a concrete stage in moral development.

==Theoretical assumptions==

Kohlberg's theory is not value-neutral. It begins with a stake in certain perspectives in [[meta-ethics]]. These include:

* a view of human nature, and a certain understanding of the form and content of moral reasoning;

* a conception of the right, the scope of moral reasoning across societies, the relationship between morality and the world, between morality and logical expression, and the role of reason in morality;

* and view of the social and mental processes involved in moral reasoning.

===Further stages===

The picture of human nature which Kohlberg begins with is the view that humans are inherantly communicative and capable of reason, and they posess a desire to understand others and the world around them. The stages of Kohlberg's model refer to the qualitative moral ''[[reasoning]]s'' that people adopt, and thus do not translate directly into praise or blame of the actions or characters of persons. In order to argue that his theory measures moral reasoning and not particular moral conclusions, Kohlberg insists that the ''form and structure'' of moral arguments is independent of the ''content'' of the arguments, a position he calls "formalism".

In his empirical studies of individuals throughout their life, Kohlberg observed that some had apparently undergone moral stage regression. <!-- This was a startling result, which conflicted with his view of the stages as rigid and invariant. --> This could be resolved either by allowing for moral regression or by extending the theory. Kohlberg chose the latter, postulating the existence of sub-stages in which the emerging stage has not yet been fully integrated into the personality.<ref name="moralization" /> In particular Kohlberg noted a stage 4½ or 4+, a transition from stage four to five, that shared characteristics of both.<ref name="moralization" />

In this stage the individual is disaffected with the arbitrary nature of law and order reasoning; culpability is frequently turned from being defined by society to viewing society itself as culpable. This stage is often mistaken for the moral relativism of stage two, as the individual views those interests of society that conflict with their own as being relatively and morally wrong.<ref name="moralization" /> Kohlberg noted that this was often observed in students entering college.<ref name="moralization" /><ref name="colby" />

Kohlberg's theory revolves around the notion that justice is the essential feature of moral reasoning. By the same token, justice relies heavily upon the notion of sound reasoning upon principles. Despite being a justice-centered theory of morality, Kohlberg considered it to be compatible with plausible formulations of [[consequentialism]], [[deontology]], and [[eudaimonia]].

Kohlberg suggested that there may be a seventh stage—Transcendental Morality, or Morality of Cosmic Orientation—which linked religion with moral reasoning.<ref name="Power">{{cite book | last1=Kohlberg | first1= Lawrence | last2=Power| first2=Clark | editor-first=Lawrence | editor-last=Kohlberg| title=Essays on Moral Development Vol. I: Philosophy of Moral Development | publisher=Harper & Row |___location=San Francisco, CA | year=1981 |isbn=978-0-06-064760-5 |chapter= Moral Development, Religious Thinking, and the Question of a Seventh Stage }}</ref> Kohlberg's difficulties in obtaining [[empirical evidence]] for even a sixth stage,<ref name="colby" /> however, led him to emphasize the speculative nature of his seventh stage.<ref name="philmoral" />

Kohlberg's theory understands values as a critical component of the right. Whatever the right is, for Kohlberg, it must be universally valid across societies (a position known as "Universalism"): there can be no relativism. Moreover, morals are not natural features of the world; they are prescriptive. Nevertheless, moral judgments can be evaluated in logical terms of true and falsity.

==Theoretical assumptions (philosophy)==

According to Kohlberg, a person who progresses to a higher stage of moral reasoning cannot skip stages. For example, one cannot jump from being concerned mostly with peer judgments (stage three) to being a proponent of social contracts (stage five). However, when one encounters a moral dilemma and finds their current level of moral reasoning unsatisfactory, they will look to the next level. Discovery of the limitations of the current stage of thinking drives moral development as each progressive stage is more adequate than the last. This process is constructive: that is to say, it arises through the conscious construction of the actor, and is neither in any meaningful sense a component of the actor's innate dispositions, nor a result of past inductions.

Kohlberg's stages of moral development are based on the assumption that humans are inherently communicative, capable of reason and possess a desire to understand others and the world around them. The stages of this model relate to the qualitative moral ''reasonings'' adopted by individuals and do not translate directly into praise or blame of any individual's actions or character. Arguing that his theory measures moral reasoning and not particular moral conclusions, Kohlberg insists that the ''form and structure'' of moral arguments is independent of the ''content'' of those arguments, a position he calls "[[formalism (philosophy)|formalism]]".<ref name="KohlLevineHewer" /><ref name="istoought" />

Progress along these stages occurs because of the actor's increased competence in both psychologically and socially balancing conflicting value-claims. The name of ''"justice operation"'' is given to the process which resolves the dispute between conflicting claims and strikes an equilibrium between them. Kohlberg identifies two of these operations in ''"equality" and "reciprocity"'', which respectively involve an impartial regard for persons (i.e., irrespective of who the individual persons are), and a regard for the role of personal merit. For Kohlberg, the most adequate result of both operations is ''"reversibility"'', where a moral or dutiful act within a particular situation is evaluated in terms of whether or not the act would be satisfactory even if particular persons were to switch roles within the situation (also known colloquially as "moral musical chairs").

Kohlberg's theory follows the notion that justice is the essential characteristic of moral reasoning. Justice itself relies heavily upon the notion of sound reasoning based on principles. Despite being a justice-centered theory of morality, Kohlberg considered it to be compatible with plausible formulations of [[Deontological ethics|deontology]]<ref name="kant" /> and [[eudaimonia]].

Knowledge and learning contribute to moral development. Specifically important are the actor's ''view of persons'' and their ''social perspective level'', each of which becomes more complex and mature with each advancing stage. The view of persons can be understood as the actor's grasp of the psychology of other persons; it may be pictured as a spectrum, with stage one having no view of other persons at all, and stage six being entirely sociocentric. Similarly, the social perspective level involves the understanding of the social universe, differing from the view of persons in that it involves a grasp of norms.

Kohlberg's theory understands values as a critical component of "the right". Whatever the right is, for Kohlberg, it must be universally valid among societies (a position known as "[[moral universalism]]"):<ref name="istoought" /> there can be no [[moral relativism|relativism]]. Morals are not natural features of the world; they are [[prescriptivity|prescriptive]]. Nevertheless, moral judgments can be evaluated in logical terms of truth and falsity.

==Examples==

Kohlberg used moral dilemmas to determine which stage of moral reasoning a person uses. The dilemmas are short stories that describe situations in which a person has to make a moral decision, yet they provide no solution. The participant is asked what the right course of action is, as well as an explanation why. A dilemma that Kohlberg used in his original research was the druggist's dilemma:

According to Kohlberg, someone progressing to a higher stage of moral reasoning cannot skip stages. For example, an individual cannot jump from being concerned mostly with peer judgments (stage three) to being a proponent of social contracts (stage five).<ref name="colby" /> On encountering a moral dilemma and finding their current level of moral reasoning unsatisfactory, an individual will look to the next level. Realizing the limitations of the current stage of thinking is the driving force behind moral development, as each progressive stage is more adequate than the last.<ref name="colby" /> The process is therefore considered to be constructive, as it is initiated by the conscious construction of the individual and is not in any meaningful sense a component of the individual's innate dispositions or a result of past inductions.

'''Heinz Steals the Drug In Europe'''

===Formal elements===

A woman was near death from a special kind of [[cancer]]. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of [[radium]] that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to produce. He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about $ 1,000 which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said: "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's store to steal the drug-for his wife. (Kohlberg, 1963, p. 19)

[[Image:Kohlberg moral stages vop.gif|right]]

Progress through Kohlberg's stages happens due to the individual's increasing competence, psychologically and in balancing conflicting social-value claims. The process of resolving conflicting claims to reach an equilibrium is called "justice operation." Kohlberg identifies two of these justice operations: "[[egalitarianism|equality]]," which involves impartial regard for persons, and "[[ethic of reciprocity|reciprocity]]", which means regard for the role of personal merit. For Kohlberg, the most adequate result of both operations is "reversibility," in which a moral or dutiful act within a particular situation is evaluated in terms of whether or not the act would be satisfactory even if particular persons were to switch roles within that situation, also known colloquially as "moral [[musical chairs]]".<ref name="KohlLevineHewer" />

:''Should Heinz break into the laboratory to steal the drug for his wife? Why or why not?''

Knowledge and learning contribute to moral development. Specifically important are the individual's "view of persons" and their "social perspective level", each of which becomes more complex and mature with each advancing stage. The "view of persons" can be understood as the individual's grasp of the psychology of other persons; it may be pictured as a spectrum, with stage one having no view of other persons at all, and stage six being entirely [[Allocentrism|socio-centric]].<ref name="KohlLevineHewer" /> The social perspective level involves the understanding of the social universe, differing from the view of persons in that it involves an appreciation of social norms.

From a theoretical point of view, it is not important what the participant thinks that Heinz should ''do''. The point of interest is the ''justification'' that the participant offers. Below are examples of possible arguments that belong to the six stages. It is important to keep in mind that these arguments are only examples. It is possible that a participant reaches a completely different conclusion using the same stage of reasoning:

==Examples of applied moral dilemmas==

* <u>Stage one</u> (''obedience''): Heinz should not steal the medicine, because he will consequently be put in prison.

Kohlberg established the ''Moral Judgement Interview'' in his original 1958 dissertation.<ref name="dissertation" /> During the roughly 45-minute tape recorded [[structured interview|semi-structured interview]], the interviewer uses moral dilemmas to determine which stage of moral reasoning a person uses. The dilemmas are fictional short stories that describe situations in which a person has to make a moral decision. The participant is asked a systemic series of [[open-ended question]]s, like what they think the right course of action is, as well as justifications as to why certain actions are right or wrong. The form and structure of these replies are scored and not the content; over a set of multiple moral dilemmas an overall score is derived.<ref name="dissertation" /><ref name="measurement" />

* <u>Stage two</u> (''self-interest''): Heinz should steal the medicine, because he will be much happier if he saves his wife, even if he will have to serve a prison sentence.

* <u>Stage three</u> (''conformity''): Heinz should steal the medicine, because his wife expects it.

* <u>Stage four</u> (''law-and-order''): Heinz should not steal the medicine, because the law prohibits stealing.

* <u>Stage five</u> (''human rights''): Heinz should steal the medicine, because everyone has a right to live, regardless of the law. Or: Heinz should not steal the medicine, because the scientist has a right to fair compensation.

* <u>Stage six</u> (''universal human ethics''): Heinz should steal the medicine, because saving a human life is a more fundamental value than the property rights of another person. Or: Heinz should not steal the medicine, because that violates the golden rule of honesty and respect.

A dilemma that Kohlberg used in his original research was the [[Heinz dilemma|druggist's dilemma]]: ''Heinz Steals the Drug In Europe.'' Other stories on moral dilemma that Kohlberg used in his research were about two young men trying to skip town, both steal money to leave town but the question then becomes whose crime was worse out of the two. A boy, Joe, saving up money for camp and must decide whether to use his money for camp or give it to his father who wants to use the money to go on a trip with his friends. And a story about Judy and Louise, two sisters, and whether Louise should tell their mother the truth about Judy telling a lie to their mother, that she didn't have money to spend on clothes because she went to a concert.<ref name="philmoral" />

==Criticisms==

One criticism of Kohlberg's theory is that it emphasizes justice to the exclusion of other values. As a consequence of this, it may not adequately address the arguments of people who value other moral aspects of actions. For example, [[Carol Gilligan]] has argued that Kohlberg's theory is overly [[androcentrism|androcentric]]. His theory was the result of empirical research using only male participants. Gilligan argued that Kohlberg's theory therefore did not adequately describe the concerns of women. She developed an alternative theory of moral reasoning that is based on the [[ethics of care|ethics of caring]]. Although recent research has generally found no significant differences in moral development between genders, Gilligan's theory illustrates that theories on moral development do not need to solely focus on the value of justice.

==Critiques==

Other psychologists have challenged the assumption that moral action is primarily reached by [[formal reasoning]]. For example, [[social intuitionism|social intuitionists]] assume that people often make moral judgments without weighing concerns such as fairness, law, [[human rights]] and abstract ethical values. If this is true, the arguments that Kohlberg and other [[rationalist]] psychologists have analyzed are often no more than ''[[post hoc]]'' rationalizations of intuitive decisions. This would mean that moral reasoning is less relevant to moral action than it seems.

===Androcentrism===

{{See also|Ethics of care}}

A critique of Kohlberg's theory is that it emphasizes justice to the exclusion of other values and so may not adequately address the arguments of those who value other moral aspects of actions. [[Carol Gilligan]], in her book ''[[In a Different Voice]]'', has argued that Kohlberg's theory is excessively [[androcentrism|androcentric]].<ref name="gilligan"/> Kohlberg's theory was initially based on empirical research using only male participants; Gilligan argued that it did not adequately describe the concerns of women.<ref name=Woolfolk>{{cite book|last=Woolfolk|first=Anita|title=Educational Psychology|year=2012|publisher=Prentice Hall|isbn=9780132893589|pages=101|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Zp6aMQEACAAJ&q=anita+woolfolk+educational+psychology+12th+edition}}</ref>

Kohlberg stated that women tend to get stuck at level 3, being primarily concerned with details of how to maintain relationships and promote the welfare of family and friends. Men are likely to move on to the abstract principles and thus have less concern with the particulars of who is involved.<ref name="waller">{{cite book|last=Waller|first=Bruce|title=Consider Ethics: Theory, Readings, and Contemporary Issues|year=2005|publisher=Pearson Education|isbn=978-0321202802|pages=115|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ZujkAAAACAAJ&q=consider+ethics+waller+2005}}</ref>

Consistent with this observation, Gilligan's theory of moral development does not value justice above other considerations. She developed an alternative theory of moral reasoning based on the [[ethics of care|ethics of caring]].<ref name="gilligan" /> Critics such as [[Christina Hoff Sommers]] of the [[American Enterprise Institute]] argued that Gilligan's research is ill-founded and that no evidence exists to support her conclusion.<ref>{{cite book | last=Sommers | first=C.H. | title=The War Against Boys: How Misguided Policies are Harming Our Young Men | publisher=Simon & Schuster | year=2015 | isbn=978-1-5011-2542-3}}</ref>{{page number needed|date=October 2021}}

===Cross-cultural generalizability===

Kohlberg's stages are not culturally neutral, as demonstrated by its use for several cultures (particularly in the case of the highest developmental stages).<ref name="Crain" /><ref name="Gibbs2007">{{cite journal |last1=Gibbs |first1=John C. |last2=Basinger |first2=Karen S. |last3=Grime |first3=Rebecca L. |last4=Snarey |first4=John R. |title=Moral judgment development across cultures: Revisiting Kohlberg's universality claims |journal=Developmental Review |date=December 2007 |volume=27 |issue=4 |pages=443–500 |doi=10.1016/j.dr.2007.04.001}}</ref> Although they progress through the stages in the same order, individuals in different cultures seem to do so at different rates.<ref name="Harkness">{{cite journal | last1=Harkness| first1=Sara | first2=Carolyn P. | last2=Edwards | first3=Charles M. | last3=Super | title=The Claim to Moral Adequacy of a Highest Stage of Moral Judgment | journal=Developmental Psychology | volume=17 | year=1981 | pages=595–603 | doi=10.1037/0012-1649.17.5.595 | issue=5| url=http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1066&context=famconfacpub | url-access=subscription }}</ref> Kohlberg has responded by saying that although cultures inculcate different beliefs, his stages correspond to underlying modes of reasoning, rather than to beliefs.<ref name="Crain" /><ref name="kohlberg/gilligan">{{cite book |last= Kohlberg |first=Lawrence |title= The Adolescent as a Philosopher: The Discovery of the Self in a Postconventional World |publisher= Daedalus |year= 1971|author2=Carol Gilligan }}</ref>

Most cultures do place some value of life, truth, and law, but to assert that these values are virtually universal requires more research.<ref name="Gibbs2007" /> While there had been some research done to support Kohlberg's assumption of universality for his stages of moral development, there are still plenty of caveats and variations yet to be understood and researched. Regarding universality, stages 1, 2, and 3 of Kohlberg's theory can be seen as universal stages cross culturally, only until stages 4 and 5 does universality begin to be scrutinized.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Ma|first=Hing Keung|date=January 1988|title=The Chinese Perspectives on Moral Judgment Development|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00207598808247761|journal=International Journal of Psychology|volume=23|issue=1–6|pages=201–227|doi=10.1080/00207598808247761|issn=0020-7594|url-access=subscription}}</ref>

According to Snarey and Kelio, Kohlberg's theory of moral development is not represented in ideas like [[Gemeinschaft]] of the communitive feeling.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Snarey|first=John R.|date=1985|title=Cross-cultural universality of social-moral development: A critical review of Kohlbergian research.|url=http://doi.apa.org/getdoi.cfm?doi=10.1037/0033-2909.97.2.202|journal=Psychological Bulletin|language=en|volume=97|issue=2|pages=202–232|doi=10.1037/0033-2909.97.2.202|pmid=3983300|issn=1939-1455|url-access=subscription}}</ref> While there had been criticism directed towards the cross-cultural universality of Kohlberg's theory, Carolyn Edwards argued that the dilemma interview method, the standard scoring system, and the cognitive-development theory are all valid and productive in teaching and understanding of moral reasoning across all cultures.<ref>{{Citation|title=Cross-Cultural Research on Kohlberg's Stages: The Basisfor Consensus|date=1986-05-22|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203823781-41|work=Lawrence Kohlberg|pages=419–430|publisher=Routledge|doi=10.4324/9780203823781-41|isbn=978-0-429-23764-5|access-date=2021-03-20|url-access=subscription}}</ref>

===Inconsistency in moral judgments===

Another criticism of Kohlberg's theory is that people frequently demonstrate significant inconsistency in their moral judgements.<ref name=Parke>{{cite book|last1=Parke|first1=R. D.|last2=Gauvain|first2=M.|last3=Schmuckler|first3=M. A.|title=Child psychology : a contemporary viewpoint|year=2010|publisher=McGraw-Hill Ryerson|___location=Whitby, ON|isbn=978-0070782389|edition=3rd Canadian}}</ref> This often occurs in moral dilemmas involving drinking and driving and business situations where participants have been shown to reason at a subpar stage, typically using more self-interested reasoning (stage two) than authority and social order obedience reasoning (stage four).<ref name=Parke/><ref name=Carpendale>{{cite journal|last=Carpendale|first=J|title=Kohlberg and Piaget on Stages and Moral Reasoning|journal=Developmental Review|date=1 June 2000|volume=20|issue=2|pages=181–205|doi=10.1006/drev.1999.0500}}</ref> Kohlberg's theory is generally considered to be incompatible with inconsistencies in moral reasoning.<ref name=Parke/>

Jeremy Carpendale has argued that Kohlberg's theory should be modified to focus on the view that the process of moral reasoning involves integrating varying perspectives of a moral dilemma rather than simply fixating on applying rules.<ref name=Carpendale/> This view would allow for inconsistency in moral reasoning since individuals may be hampered by their inability to consider different perspectives.<ref name=Parke/>

Krebs and Denton have also attempted to modify Kohlberg's theory to account for conflicting findings but eventually concluded that the theory cannot account for how most individuals make moral decisions in their everyday lives.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Krebs|first=Dennis L.|author2=Denton, Kathy |title=Toward a More Pragmatic Approach to Morality: A Critical Evaluation of Kohlberg's Model.|journal=Psychological Review|date=1 January 2005|volume=112|issue=3|pages=629–649|doi=10.1037/0033-295X.112.3.629|url=https://www.sfu.ca/psyc/faculty/krebs/publications/Toward%20a%20More%20Pragmatic%20Approach%20to%20Morality.pdf|pmid=16060754}}</ref> [[Immanuel Kant]] "predicted" and rebutted that argument when he considered such actions as opening an exception for ourselves in the [[categorical imperative]].

===Reasoning vs. intuition===

{{Main|Social intuitionism}}

Other psychologists have questioned the assumption that moral action is primarily a result of [[formal reasoning]]. Social intuitionists such as [[Jonathan Haidt]] argue that individuals often make moral judgments without weighing concerns such as fairness, law, [[human rights]] or ethical values. Thus the arguments analyzed by Kohlberg and other [[rationalist]] psychologists could be considered ''[[post hoc theorizing|post hoc]]'' rationalizations of intuitive decisions; moral reasoning may be less relevant to moral action than Kohlberg's theory suggests.<ref name=Haidt />

===Apparent lack of postconventional reasoning in moral exemplars===

In 1999, some of Kohlberg's measures were tested when Anne Colby and William Damon published a study in which the development was examined in the lives of moral exemplars that exhibited high levels of moral commitment in their everyday behavior.<ref name="Colby1999">{{cite book |last1=Colby |first1=Anne |last2=Damon |first2=William |editor1-last=Killen |editor1-first=Melanie |editor2-last=Hart |editor2-first=Daniel |title=Morality in everyday life : developmental perspectives |date=October 1999 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=9780521665865 |pages=342–370 |chapter=The development of extraordinary moral commitment}}</ref> The researchers utilized the moral judgement interview (MJI) and two standard dilemmas to compare the 23 exemplars with a more ordinary group of people. The intention was to learn more about moral exemplars and to examine the strengths and weaknesses of the Kohlberg measure. They found that the MJI scores were not clustered at the high end of Kohlberg's scale; they ranged from stage 3 to stage 5. Half landed at the conventional level (stages 3, 3/4, and 4) and the other half landed at the postconventional level (stages 4/5 and 5).<ref name=":2"/>

Compared to the general population, the scores of the moral exemplars may be somewhat higher than those of groups not selected for outstanding moral behaviour. Researchers noted that the "moral judgement scores are clearly related to subjects' educational attainment in this study". Among the participants that had attained college education or above, there was no difference in moral judgement scores between genders. The study noted that although the exemplars' scores may have been higher than those of nonexemplars, it is also clear that one is not required to score at Kohlberg's highest stages in order to exhibit high degrees of moral commitment and exemplary behaviour.<ref name=":2">{{cite book|title=The Measurement of Moral Judgment|last1=Colby|first1=Anne|last2=Kohlberg|first2=Lawrence|date=1987|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-0-521-32565-3|series=Standard Issue Scoring Manual|volume=2|___location=Cambridge}}</ref>

Apart from their scores, it was found that the 23 participating moral exemplars described three similar themes within all of their moral developments: certainty, positivity, and the unity of self and moral goals. The unity between self and moral goals was highlighted as the most important theme as it is what truly sets the exemplars apart from the 'ordinary' people. It was discovered that the moral exemplars see their morality as a part of their sense of identity and sense of self, not as a conscious choice or chore. Also, the moral exemplars showed a much broader range of moral concern than did the ordinary people and go beyond the normal acts of daily moral engagements.

Rather than confirm the existence of a single highest stage, Larry Walker's [[cluster analysis]] of a wide variety of interview and survey variables for moral exemplars found three types: the "caring" or "communal" cluster was strongly relational and generative, the "deliberative" cluster had sophisticated [[epistemic]] and moral reasoning, and the "brave" or "ordinary" cluster was less distinguished by personality.<ref name="Walker2010">{{cite journal | last1=Walker | first1=Lawrence J. | last2=Frimer | first2=Jeremy A. | last3=Dunlop | first3=William L. | title=Varieties of moral personality: beyond the banality of heroism | journal=Journal of Personality | volume=78 | year=2010 | pages=907–942 | issue=3| pmid=20573130 | doi=10.1111/j.1467-6494.2010.00637.x}}</ref>

==Continued relevance==

Kohlberg's bodies of work on the stages of moral development have been utilized by others working in the field. One example is the ''[[Defining Issues Test]]'' (''DIT'') created in 1979 by [[James Rest]],<ref name="judgingmoralissues">{{cite book |last=Rest |first=James |author-link=James Rest |title=Development in Judging Moral Issues |year=1979 |publisher=University of Minnesota Press |isbn=978-0-8166-0891-1 }}</ref> originally as a pencil-and-paper alternative to the Moral Judgement Interview.<ref name="DIT-2">{{cite journal |last1=Rest |first1=James |author-link1=James Rest |last2=Narvaez|first2=D.|last3=Bebeau|first3=M.|last4=Thoma|first4=S. |year=1999 |title=DIT-2: Devising and testing a new instrument of moral judgment |journal=Journal of Educational Psychology |volume=91 |issue=4 |pages=644–659 |doi=10.1037/0022-0663.91.4.644 |citeseerx=10.1.1.415.6248 |s2cid=18117395 }}</ref> Heavily influenced by the six-stage model, it made efforts to improve the [[Test validity|validity]] criteria by using a [[Quantitative property|quantitative]] test, the [[Likert scale]], to rate moral dilemmas similar to Kohlberg's.<ref name="CSEDdilemma">{{cite web |url=http://www.centerforthestudyofethicaldevelopment.net/DIT%20--Sample%20Dilemma.htm |title=Center for the Study of Ethical Development |access-date=2006-12-05 |format=Website |work=DIT --Sample Dilemma: Heinz and the Drug |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070629030232/http://www.centerforthestudyofethicaldevelopment.net/DIT%20--Sample%20Dilemma.htm |archive-date=2007-06-29 }}</ref> It also used a large body of Kohlbergian theory such as the idea of "post-conventional thinking".<ref name="neokohlbergian">{{cite journal |last1=Rest |first1=James |author-link1=James Rest |last2=Narvaez|first2=D.|last3=Bebeau|first3=M.|last4=Thoma|first4=S. |year=1999 |title=A Neo-Kohlbergian Approach: The DIT and Schema Theory |journal=[[Educational Psychology Review]] |volume=11 |issue=4 |pages=291–324 |doi=10.1023/A:1022053215271 |s2cid=14483253 }}</ref><ref name="postconventional">{{cite book |last1=Rest |first1=James |author-link1=James Rest |last2=Narvaez|first2=D.|last3=Bebeau|first3=M.|last4=Thoma|first4=S. |title=Postconventional Moral Thinking: A Neo-Kohlbergian Approach |year=1999 |publisher=Lawrence Erlbaum Associates |___location=Mahwah, NJ |isbn=978-0-8058-3285-3 }}</ref>

In 1999 the ''DIT'' was revised as the ''DIT-2''.<ref name="DIT-2" /> The test continues to be used in many areas where moral testing is required,<ref name="restresearchtheory">{{cite book |last=Rest |first=James |author-link=James Rest |others=In collaboration with Barnett, R.; Bebeau, M.; Deemer, D.; Getz, I.; Moon, Y.; Spickelmeier, J.; Thoma, S. and Volker, J. |title=Moral development: Advances in research and theory |year=1986 |publisher=Praeger Publishers |isbn=978-0-275-92254-2}}</ref> such as divinity, politics, and medicine.<ref name="DITdivinitystudents">{{cite journal |last=Bunch |first=Wilton H. |year=2005|title=Changing moral judgement in divinity students |journal=Journal of Moral Education |volume=34 |issue=3 |pages=363–370|doi=10.1080/03057240500211543 |s2cid=144346620 }}</ref><ref name="DITpolitical">{{cite journal |last=Muhlberger |first=P. |year=2000 |title=Moral reasoning effects on political participation |journal=Political Psychology |volume=21 |issue=4 |pages=667–695 |doi=10.1111/0162-895X.00212 }}</ref><ref name="DIThealthstudents">{{cite journal |last1=Hedl |first1=John J.|last2=Glazer|first2=H.|last3=Chan|first3=F.|year=2005 |title=Improving the Moral Reasoning of Allied Health Students |journal=Journal of Allied Health |volume=34 |issue=2 |pages=121–122 |pmid=16032920 }}</ref>

===William Damon's contribution to Kohlberg's moral theory===

The American psychologist [[William Damon]] developed a theory that is based on Kohlberg's research. Still, it has the merit of focusing on and analysing moral reasoning's behavioural aspects and not just the idea of justice and rightness. Damon's methodology was experimental, using children aged between 3 and 9 who were required to share toys. The study applied the sharing resources technique to operationalise the dependent variable it measured: equity or justice.<ref name="humandevelopment">{{cite book |last=Vander Zanden |first=James Wilfried |author-link=James Wilfried Vander Zanden |title=Human Development |year=1985 |publisher=Knopf |isbn=978-0-3943-3621-3 }}</ref>

The results demonstrated an obvious stage presentation of the righteous, just behaviour.

According to William Damon's findings, justice, transposed into action, has 6 successive levels:<ref name="William Damon's Contribution to Kohlberg's Moral Theory">{{cite web |url=https://www.envisionyourevolution.com/explore/human-development/ |title=Human Development. Envision your Evolution Project |access-date=2021-03-27 |format=Website }}</ref>

* Level 1 – nothing stops the egocentric tendency. The children want all the toys without feeling the need to justify their preference. The justice criterion is the absolute wish of the self;

* Level 2 – the child wants almost all of the toys and justifies his choice in an arbitrary or egocentric manner (e.g., "I should play with them because I have a red dress", "They are mine because I like them!");

* Level 3 – the equality criterion emerges (e.g., "We should all have the same number of toys");

* Level 4 – the merit criterion emerges (e.g., "Johnny should take more because he was such a good boy");

* Level 5 – necessity is seen as the most important selection criterion (e.g., "She should take the most because she was sick", "Give more to Matt because he is poor");

* Level 6 – the dilemmas begin to come up: can justice be achieved, considering only one criterion? The consequence is the combining of criteria: equality + merit, equality + necessity, necessity + merit, equality + necessity + merit.

The final level of Damon's mini theory is an interesting display, in the social setting, of the logical cognitive operationalisation. This permits decentration and the combination of many points of view, favouring [[allocentrism]].

==See also==

{{Portal|Psychology}}

*[[Jean Piaget]], [[Theory of cognitive development]]

{{cols|colwidth=21em}}

*[[James W. Fowler]], [[Stages of faith development]]

* [[Elliot Turiel]]

*[[Jane Loevinger]], [[Loevinger's stages of ego development|Stages of ego development]].

*Erik [[Erikson'sJames stagesW. Fowler]]{{snd}} [[Stages of psychosocialfaith development]]

* [[Jane Loevinger]]{{snd}} [[Loevinger's stages of ego development|Stages of ego development]]

* [[Michael Commons]]{{snd}} [[Model of hierarchical complexity]]

* [[Moral hierarchy]]

* [[Positive disintegration]]

* [[Social cognitive theory of morality]]

* [[Universal value]]

{{colend}}

==References==

{{reflist|30em}}

==Further reading==

* {{cite book | last=Crain | first=William C. | title=Theories of Development | url=https://archive.org/details/theoriesofdevelo0000crai | url-access=registration | edition=2Rev | publisher=Prentice-Hall | year=1985 |isbn=978-0-13-913617-7 }}

* {{Cite book | publisher = Academic Press | isbn = 978-0-12-498640-4 | pages = [https://archive.org/details/cognitivedevelop0000unse_q9w1/page/151 151–284] |editor=Theodore Mischel | last = Kohlberg | first = Lawrence | title = Cognitive development and epistemology | chapter = From 'is' to 'ought': How to commit the naturalistic fallacy and get away with it in the study of moral development | ___location = New York | year = 1971 | chapter-url = https://archive.org/details/cognitivedevelop0000unse_q9w1/page/151 }}

* {{cite journal | last=Kohlberg | first=Lawrence | title=The Claim to Moral Adequacy of a Highest Stage of Moral Judgment | journal=Journal of Philosophy | volume=70 | year=1973 | pages=630–646 | doi=10.2307/2025030 | issue=18 | jstor=2025030 }}

* {{cite book |last=Kohlberg |first=Lawrence |title= Essays on Moral Development, Vol. I: The Philosophy of Moral Development |publisher=Harper & Row |___location=San Francisco, CA |year=1981 |isbn=978-0-06-064760-5 }}

* {{cite book | last=Kohlberg | first=Lawrence | author-link=Lawrence Kohlberg |author2=Charles Levine |author3=Alexandra Hewer | title=Moral stages : a current formulation and a response to critics | publisher=Karger | ___location=Basel, NY | year=1983 |isbn=978-3-8055-3716-2}}

==External links==

{{Library resources box|by=no|onlinebooks=no|about=yes|wikititle=Lawrence Kohlberg's stages of moral development}}

*[http://tigger.uic.edu/~lnucci/MoralEd/overview.html Moral Development and Moral Education: An Overview]

* [httphttps://www.haverfordmoraledk12.edu/psych/ddavis/p109gorg/lawrence-kohlberg.stages.html Kohlberg'sMoral Development and Moral StagesEducation: An Overview]

* [http://ww3.haverford.edu/psychology/ddavis/p109g/kohlberg.stages.html Kohlberg's Moral Stages]

*[http://bostonreview.net/BR30.5/saxe.html ''Boston Review'' article covering the topic and other related areas]

* [https://bostonreview.net/archives/BR30.5/saxe.php Do the Right Thing: Cognitive science’s search for a common morality] (''Boston Review'')

*[http://faculty.plts.edu/gpence/html/kohlberg.htm Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Development]

* {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141029150455/http://faculty.plts.edu/gpence/html/kohlberg.htm|date=2014-10-29|title=Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Development}}

* [http://www5.csudh.edu/dearhabermas/kohlberg01bk.htm A Summary Of Lawrence Kohlberg's Stages Of Moral Development]

{{Human psychological development}}

==References==

* Crain, W.C. (1985). [http://faculty.plts.edu/gpence/html/kohlberg.htm ''Theories of Development.''] pp. 118-136. Prentice-Hall.

* Lawrence Kohlberg, Charles Levine, Alexandra Hewer. (1983). ''Moral stages : a current formulation and a response to critics''. Basel ; New York : Karger, 1983

[[Category:Developmental psychology|Kohlberg]]

[[Category:HumanMoral developmentpsychology|Kohlberg]]

[[Category:Ethics1958 introductions]]

[[Category:CognitionDevelopmental stage theories]]

[[Category:Learning]]