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[[File:Francesco Hayez 028.jpg|thumb|Odysseus Overcome by Demodocus' Song, by Francesco Hayez, 1813–15]]
'''Mythology''' refers variously to the collected [[myths]] of a group of people<ref>''Oxford English Dictionary'', {{nowrap|3rd ed.}} "myth, ''n.'' Oxford University Press (Oxford), 2003.</ref> or to the study of such myths.{{sfn|Kirk|1973|p=8}} Myths are the [[Narrative|stories]] people tell to explain nature, [[history]] and [[Norm (social)|customs]].
Myth is a feature of every [[culture]]. Many sources for myths have been proposed, ranging from personification of nature or [[mythopoeic thought|personification of natural phenomena]], to [[history|truthful]] or [[Hyperbole|hyperbolic]] accounts of [[euhemerism|historical events]] to [[myth and ritual|explanations of existing ritual]]<nowiki/>s. Mythologizing continues, as shown in contemporary [[mythopoeia]] such as [[urban legend]]s and the expansive [[canon (fiction)|fictional mythoi]] created by [[fantasy (genre)|fantasy novels]] and [[comics]]. A culture's collective mythology helps convey [[in-group|belonging]], shared and religious experiences, behavioral models and [[pedagogy|moral and practical lessons]].
The study of myth began in [[ancient history]]. Rival classes of the [[Greek myths]] by [[Euhemerus]], [[Plato]] and [[Sallustius]] were developed by the [[Neoplatonists]] and later revived by [[Renaissance]] [[mythographers]]. The nineteenth-century [[comparative mythology]] reinterpreted myth as a primitive and failed counterpart of [[science]] ([[E. B. Tylor|Tylor]]), a "disease of language" ([[Max Müller|Müller]]), or a misinterpretation of [[magic and religion|magical]] [[ritual]] ([[James Frazer|Frazer]]).
Recent approaches often view myths as manifestations of psychological, cultural, or societal truths, rather than as inaccurate historical accounts.
== Terminologia ==
Il termine "mitologia" può riferirsi sia alla ''studio'' dei miti che a una collezione degli stessi.<ref name="Kirk-p8">Kirk, p.8</ref> Ad esempio, la [[mitologia del territorio]] è lo studio delle caratteristiche di un territorio in termini di mitologia totemica, mentre la [[mitologia ittita]] è invece il complesso dei miti degli [[Ittiti]]. [[Alan Dundes]] definisce il mito come [[racconto]] [[sacro]], che spiega come il mondo e l'umanità si siano evoluti nella loro forma attuale. Il mito è per Dundes "una storia che serve a definire la visione fondamentale di una cultura spiegando gli aspetti del mondo naturale e delineando le pratiche psicologiche e sociali e gli ideali di una società".<ref name=grassie/>
Numerosi studiosi di altri settori usano però il termine "mito" in modi alquanto diversi;<ref name = "madness">Dundes, "Madness", p. 147</ref><ref>Doty, pp. 11–12</ref><ref>Segal, p. 5</ref> in un senso molto ampio, il vocabolo può riferirsi a qualunque [[racconto tradizionale]]<ref name="Kirk-p57,74" /> o, occasionalmente, a un [[preconcetto popolare]] o a un'entità immaginaria.<ref>{{cite book|title=[[Merriam-Webster]]'s Collegiate Dictionary|chapter=myth|page=770|edition=10th|publisher=[[Merriam-Webster]], Inc|___location=[[Springfield, Massachusetts]]|year=1993}}</ref>
Il mito viene spesso nettamente distinto da concetti della letteratura didattica come ad esempio le favole, ma il suo rapporto con altri tipi di letteratura popolare, come ad esempio la [[leggenda]] e il [[folclore]], è più nebuloso.{{sfn|Bascom|1965|p= 7}} I personaggi principali dei miti sono in genere [[divinità|dèi]], [[semidio|semidei]] o superuomini,{{sfn|Bascom|1965|p= 9}}<ref name="mythfolk">"myths", ''A Dictionary of English Folklore''</ref><ref>O'Flaherty, p.78: "I think it can be well argued as a matter of principle that, just as 'biography is about chaps', so mythology is about gods."</ref> mentre i protagonisti delle leggende sono generalmente costituiti da persone normali.{{sfn|Bascom|1965|p= 9}} Esistono però molte eccezioni a questi due caratteri; si possono riscontrare degli esempi di queste eccezioni nell'''[[Iliade]]'', nell<nowiki>'</nowiki>''[[Odissea]]'' e nell<nowiki>'</nowiki>''[[Eneide]]''.{{sfn|Kirk|1973|pp=22, 32}}{{sfn|Kirk|1984|p= 55}} I miti sono generalmente avallati da preti e capi politici e sono legati alla religione e alla spiritualità.{{sfn|Bascom|1965|p= 9}} Molte società raggruppano insieme la loro storia e i loro miti e leggende, considerando i miti come racconti fattuali del loro passato remoto.{{sfn|Bascom|1965|p= 9}}<ref name="mythfolk"/>{{sfn|Eliade|1998|p= 23}}{{sfn|Pettazzoni|1984|p= 102}} I [[Creazione (teologia)|miti sulla creazione]], in particolare, si svolgono sempre in un'epoca primordiale in cui il mondo non ha ancora raggiunto la sua forma attuale.{{sfn|Bascom|1965|p= 9}}{{sfn|Dundes|1984|p= 1}}{{sfn|Eliade|1998|p= 6}} Other myths explain how a society's [[norm (social)|customs]], [[institution]]s and [[taboo]]s were established and sanctified.{{sfn|Bascom|1965|p= 9}}{{sfn|Eliade|1998|p= 6}} A separate space is created for folktales,{{sfn|Bascom|1965|p= 17}}{{sfn|Eliade|1998|p= 10–11}}{{sfn|Pettazzoni|1984|pp= 99–101}} which are not considered true by anyone.{{sfn|Bascom|1965|p= 9}} As stories spread to other cultures or as faiths change, myths can come to be considered folktales.{{sfn|Doty|2004|p=114}}{{sfn|Bascom|1965|p= 13}} Its divine characters are recast as either as humans or demihumans such as [[Giant (mythology)|giant]]s, [[elf|elves]] and [[faerie]]s.<ref name="mythfolk"/>
==Origins==
[[File:Palmyrenian relief Louvre AO2398.jpg|thumb|[[Palmyrenian]] relief [[Louvre]]]]
===Euhemerism===
{{Voce principale|Euhemerism}}
{{vedi anche|Erodoto}}
One theory claims that myths are distorted accounts of historical events.{{sfn|Bulfinch|2004|p= 194}}{{sfn|Honko|1984|p= 45}} According to this theory, storytellers repeatedly elaborate upon historical accounts until the figures in those accounts gain the status of gods.{{sfn|Bulfinch|2004|p= 194}}{{sfn|Honko|1984|p= 45}} For example the myth of the wind-god [[Aeolus]] may have evolved from a historical account of a king who taught his people to use sails and interpret the winds.{{sfn|Bulfinch|2004|p= 194}} [[Herodotus]] (fifth-century BC) and [[Prodicus]] made claims of this kind.{{sfn|Honko|1984|p= 45}} This theory is named ''euhemerism'' after mythologist [[Euhemerus]] (c.320 BC), who suggested that Greek gods developed from legends about human beings.{{sfn|Honko|1984|p= 45}}<ref>"Euhemerism", ''The Concise Oxford Dictionary of World Religions''</ref>
===Allegory===
Some theories propose that myths began as allegories for natural phenomena: [[Apollo]] represents the sun, [[Poseidon]] represents water, and so on.{{sfn|Honko|1984|p= 45}} According to another theory, myths began as allegories for philosophical or spiritual concepts: [[Athena]] represents wise judgment, [[Aphrodite]] desire, and so on.{{sfn|Honko|1984|p= 45}} [[Max Müller|Müller]] supported an allegorical theory of myth. He believed myths began as allegorical descriptions of nature and gradually came to be interpreted literally. For example, a poetic description of the sea as "raging" was eventually taken literally and the sea was then thought of as a raging god.{{sfn|Segal|2015|p= 20}}
===Personification===
{{See also|Mythopoeic thought}}
Some thinkers claimed that myths result from the [[Anthropomorphism|personification]] of inanimate objects and forces. According to these thinkers, the ancients worshiped natural phenomena, such as fire and air, gradually deifying them.{{sfn|Bulfinch|2004|p= 195}} For example, according to this theory, ancients tended to view things as gods, not as mere objects.{{sfn|Frankfort|Frankfort|Wilson|Jacobsen|2013|p= 4}} Thus, they described natural events as acts of personal gods, giving rise to myths.{{sfn|Frankfort|Frankfort|Wilson|Jacobsen|2013|p= 15}}
[[File:Mythology.png|thumb|Most cultures across the globe have some form of mythology]]
===Myth-ritual theory===
{{See also|Myth and ritual}}
According to the myth-ritual theory, myth is tied to ritual.{{sfn|Segal|2015|p= 61}} In its most extreme form, this theory claims myths arose to explain rituals.{{sfn|Graf|1996|p= 40}} This claim was first put forward by [[William Robertson Smith|Smith]],{{sfn|Meletinsky|2014| pp=19–20}} who claimed that people begin performing rituals for reasons not related to myth. Forgetting the original reason for a ritual, they account for it by inventing a myth and claiming the ritual commemorates the events described in that myth.{{sfn|Segal|2015|p= 63}} [[James Frazer|Frazer]] claimed that humans started out with a belief in magical laws. Later, they began to lose faith in magic and invented myths about gods, claiming that their rituals were religious rituals intended to appease the gods.{{sfn|Frazer|1913|p= 711}}
==Functions==
[[File:Holy Grail digital art.jpg|thumb|250px|[[Holy Grail]] digital art part of [[Christian mythology]].]]
[[Mircea Eliade|Eliade]] argued that one of the foremost functions of myth is to establish models for behavior{{sfn|Eliade|1998|p= 8}}{{sfn|Honko|1984|p= 51}} and that myths may provide a religious experience. By telling or reenacting myths, members of traditional societies detach themselves from the present, returning to the mythical age, thereby coming closer to the divine.{{sfn|Eliade|1998|p= 23}}{{sfn|Honko|1984|p= 51}}{{sfn|Eliade|1998|p= 19}}
[[Lauri Honko|Honko]] asserted that, in some cases, a society reenacts a myth in an attempt to reproduce the conditions of the mythical age. For example, it might reenact the healing performed by a god at the beginning of time in order to heal someone in the present.{{sfn|Honko|1984| p=49}} Similarly, [[Roland Barthes|Barthes]] argued that modern culture explores religious experience. Since it is not the job of science to define human morality, a religious experience is an attempt to connect with a perceived moral past, which is in contrast with the technological present.{{sfn|Barthes|1972}}
[[Joseph Campbell|Campbell]] writes:
:"In the long view of the history of mankind, four essential functions of mythology can be discerned. The first and most distinctive – vitalizing all – is that of eliciting and supporting a sense of awe before the mystery of being."{{sfn|Campbell|1991|p=519}}
:"The second function of mythology is to render a cosmology, an image of the universe that will support and be supported by this sense of awe before the mystery of the presence and the presence of a mystery."{{sfn|Campbell|1991|p=519}}
:"A third function of mythology is to support the current social order, to integrate the individual organically with his group;"{{sfn|Campbell|1991|p=520}}
"The fourth function of mythology is to initiate the individual into the order of realities of his own psyche, guiding him toward his own spiritual enrichment and realization."{{sfn|Campbell|1991|p=521}}
In a later work Campbell explained the relationship of myth to civilization:
:The rise and fall of civilisations in the long, broad course of history can be seen largely to be a function of the integrity and cogency of their supporting canons of myth; for not authority but aspiration is the motivator, builder, and transformer of civilisation. A mythological canon is an organisation of symbols, ineffable in import, by which the energies of aspiration are evoked and gathered toward a focus.{{sfn|Campbell|1991|p=5}}
Yet the history of civilization is not one of harmony.
:There are two pathologies. One is interpreting myth as pseudo-science, as though it had to do with directing nature instead of putting oneself in accord with nature, and the other is the political interpretation of myths to the advantage of one group within a society, or one society within a group of nations.<ref>{{cite book|last=Boa|first=Fraser|title=The way of myth : talking with Joseph Campbell|year=1994|publisher=Shambhala|___location=Boston|isbn=1-57062-042-3|page=152|edition=1st Shambhala}}</ref>
Campbell answers the question, "''what is the function of myth today''?" in the second episode of [[Bill Moyers]]'s ''[[The Power of Myth]]'' series.
[[Devdutt Pattanaik|Pattanaik]] defines mythology as "a subjective truth of people that is communicated through stories, symbols and rituals". He adds, "unlike fantasy that is nobody’s truth, and history that seeks to be everybody’s truth, mythology is somebody’s truth."<ref name="PD2016">{{cite web | last=Pattanaik | first=Devdutt| title=Why I Insist On Calling Myself A Mythologist | website=Swarajya | date=14 September 2015 | url=http://swarajyamag.com/culture/why-i-insist-on-calling-myself-a-mythologist | accessdate=24 July 2016}}</ref>
==History of the academic discipline==
[[File:Myths and legends of Babylonia and Assyria (1916) (14801987593).jpg|thumb|Myths and legends of [[Babylonia]] and [[Assyria]] (1916).]]
Historically, the important approaches to the study of mythology have been those of [[Giambattista Vico|Vico]], [[Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling|Schelling]], [[Schiller]], [[Carl Jung|Jung]], [[Freud]], [[Lévy-Bruhl]], [[Lévi-Strauss]], [[Northrop Frye|Frye]], the Soviet school, and the [[Myth and Ritual School]].<ref>Guy Lanoue, Foreword to Meletinsky, p.viii</ref>
===Pre-modern===
The critical interpretation of myth began with the [[Pre-Socratic philosophy|Presocratics]].{{sfn|Segal|2015|p= 1}} Euhemerus was one of the most important pre-modern mythologists. He interpreted myths as accounts of actual historical events - distorted over many retellings. Sallustius<ref>On the Gods and the World, ch. 5, See Collected Writings on the Gods and the World, The Prometheus Trust, Frome, 1995</ref> divided myths into five categories – theological, physical (or concerning natural laws), animistic (or concerning soul), material, and mixed. Mixed concerns myths that show the interaction between two or more of the previous categories and are particularly used in initiations.
Plato famously condemned poetic myth when discussing education in the ''[[The Republic (Plato)|Republic]].'' His critique was primarily on the grounds that the uneducated might take the stories of gods and heroes literally. Nevertheless, he constantly referred to myths throughout his writings. As [[Platonism]] developed in the phases commonly called Middle Platonism and [[neoplatonism]], writers such as [[Plutarch]], [[Porphyry (philosopher)|Porphyry]], [[Proclus]], [[Olympiodorus the younger|Olympiodorus,]] and [[Damascius]] wrote explicitly about the symbolic interpretation of traditional and Orphic myths.<ref>Perhaps the most extended passage of philosophic interpretation of myth is to be found in the fifth and sixth essays of Proclus’ ''Commentary on the Republic'' (to be found in ''The Works of Plato I'', trans. Thomas Taylor, The Prometheus Trust, Frome, 1996); Porphyry’s analysis of the Homeric Cave of the Nymphs is another important work in this area (''Select Works of Porphyry'', Thomas Taylor The Prometheus Trust, Frome, 1994). See the external links below for a full English translation.</ref>
Interest in polytheistic mythology revived during the [[Renaissance]], with early works on mythography appearing in the sixteenth-century, such as the ''[[Theologia mythologica|Theologia Mythologica]]'' (1532). While myths are not the same as fables, legends, folktales, fairy tales, anecdotes, or fiction, the concepts may overlap. Notably, during the nineteenth century period of Romanticism, folktales and fairy tales were perceived as eroded fragments of earlier mythology (famously by the [[Brothers Grimm]] and [[Elias Lönnrot]]).
Mythological themes were consciously employed in literature, beginning with [[Homer]]. The resulting work may expressly refer to a mythological background without itself becoming part of a body of myths ([[Cupid and Psyche]]). Medieval romance in particular plays with this process of turning myth into literature. ''Euhemerism'', as stated earlier, refers to the rationalization of myths, putting themes formerly imbued with mythological qualities into pragmatic contexts. An example of this would be following a cultural or religious paradigm shift (notably the re-interpretation of [[Paganism|pagan]] mythology following [[Christianization]]).
Conversely, historical and literary material may acquire mythological qualities over time. For example, the [[Matter of Britain]] (the legendary history of Great Britain, especially those focused on [[King Arthur]] and [[Round Table|the knights of the Round Table]]) and the [[Matter of France]], based on historical events of the fifth and eighth-centuries respectively, were first made into [[epic poetry]] and became partly mythological over the following centuries. "Conscious generation" of mythology was termed ''mythopoeia'' by [[J. R. R. Tolkien|Tolkien]] and was notoriously also suggested, separately, by Nazi ideologist [[Alfred Rosenberg]].
===Nineteenth-century===
The first scholarly theories of myth appeared during the second half of the nineteenth-century.{{sfn|Segal|2015|p= 1}} In general, these nineteenth-century theories framed myth as a failed or obsolete mode of thought, often by interpreting myth as the primitive counterpart of modern science.{{sfn|Segal|2015|pp= 3–4}}
For example, [[Edward Burnett Tylor|Tylor]] interpreted myth as an attempt at a literal explanation for natural phenomena. Unable to conceive impersonal natural laws, early humans tried to explain natural phenomena by attributing souls to inanimate objects, giving rise to [[animism]].{{sfn|Segal|2015|p= 4}} According to Tylor, human thought evolved through stages, starting with mythological ideas and gradually progressing to scientific ideas. Not all scholars, not even all nineteenth-century scholars, accepted this view. [[Lucien Lévy-Bruhl|Lévy-Bruhl]] claimed "the primitive mentality is a condition of the human mind, and not a stage in its historical development."<ref>{{cite book|last=Mâche|title=Music, Myth and Nature, or The Dolphins of Arion| year=1992| pages= 8}}</ref>
[[Max Müller|Müller]] called myth a "disease of language". He speculated that myths arose due to the lack of abstract nouns and neuter gender in ancient languages. Anthropomorphic figures of speech, necessary in such languages, were eventually taken literally, leading to the idea that natural phenomena were in actuality conscious beings or gods.{{sfn|Segal|2015|p= 20}}
[[James George Frazer|Frazer]] saw myths as a misinterpretation of magical rituals, which were themselves based on a mistaken idea of natural law.{{sfn|Segal|2015|pp= 67–68}} According to Frazer, humans begin with an unfounded belief in impersonal magical laws. When they realize applications of these laws do not work, they give up their belief in natural law in favor of a belief in personal gods controlling nature, thus giving rise to religious myths. Meanwhile, humans continue practicing formerly magical rituals through force of habit, reinterpreting them as reenactments of mythical events. Finally humans come to realize nature follows natural laws, and they discover their true nature through science. Here again, science makes myth obsolete as humans progress "from magic through religion to science."{{sfn|Frazer|1913|p= 711}}
Segal asserted that by pitting mythical thought against modern scientific thought, such theories imply modern humans must abandon myth.{{sfn|Segal|2015|p= 3}}
===Twentieth-century===
[[File:Gustave Moreau Prometheus.jpg|thumb|''[[Prometheus]]'' (1868) by [[Gustave Moreau]]. In the mythos of [[Hesiodus]] and possibly [[Aeschylus]] (the [[Greek mythos|Greek]] trilogy ''[[Prometheus Bound]]'', ''[[Prometheus Unbound (Aeschylus)|Prometheus Unbound]]'' and ''[[Prometheus Pyrphoros]]''), Prometheus is bound and tortured for giving fire to humanity.]]
Many twentieth-century theories rejected the nineteenth-century theories' opposition of myth and science. In general, "twentieth-century theories have tended to see myth as almost anything but an outdated counterpart to science […]. Consequently, modern individuals are not obliged to abandon myth for science."{{sfn|Segal|2015|p= 3}}
[[Carl Jung|Jung]] tried to understand the psychology behind world myths. Jung asserted that all humans share certain innate unconscious psychological forces, which he called ''[[archetypes]]''. He believed similarities between the myths of different cultures reveals the existence of these universal archetypes.<ref>Boeree</ref>
Campbell described two orders of mythology: myths that "are metaphorical of spiritual potentiality in the human being," and myths "that have to do with specific societies."{{sfn|Campbell|1976|p=22}} His major work is ''The Masks of God I-IV''. In the first volume, ''Primitive Mythology'', he clearly outlines his intention:
{{quote|Without straining beyond the treasuries of evidence already on hand in these widely scattered departments of our subject, therefore, but simply gathering from them the membra disjuncta of a unitary mythological science, I attempt in the following pages the first sketch of a natural history of the gods and heroes, such as in its final form should include in its purview all divine beings—as zoology includes all animals and botany all plants—not regarding any as sacrosanct or beyond its scientific ___domain. For, as in the visible world of the vegetable and animal kingdoms, so also in the visionary world of the gods: there has been a history, an evolution, a series of mutations, governed by laws; and to show forth such laws is the proper aim of science.{{sfn|Campbell|1976|p=4}}}}
In his fourth volume Campbell coined the phrase, ''[[creative mythology]]'', which he explains as:
{{quote|In the context of traditional mythology, the symbols are presented in socially maintained rites, through which the individual is required to experience, or will pretend to have experienced, certain insights, sentiments and commitments. In what I'm calling creative mythology, on the other hand, this order is reversed: the individual has had an experience of his own – of order, horror, beauty, or even mere exhilaration-which he seeks to communicate through signs; and if his realization has been of a certain depth and import, his communication will have the force and value of living myth-for those, that is to say, who receive and respond to it of themselves, with recognition, uncoerced.{{sfn|Campbell|1991|p=4}}}}
[[Claude Lévi-Strauss|Lévi-Strauss]] believed myths reflect patterns in the mind and interpreted those patterns more as fixed mental structures, specifically pairs of opposites (good/evil, compassionate/callous), rather than unconscious feelings or urges.{{sfn|Segal|2015|p= 113}}
In his appendix to ''Myths, Dreams and Mysteries'', and in ''The Myth of the Eternal Return'', [[Mircea Eliade|Eliade]] attributed modern humans’ anxieties to their rejection of myths and the sense of the sacred.{{Citation needed|date=August 2015}}
In the 1950s, Barthes published a series of essays examining modern myths and the process of their creation in his book ''[[Mythologies (book)|Mythologies]]''.{{Citation needed|date=August 2015}}
Following the Structuralist Era (roughly the 1960s to 1980s), the predominant anthropological and sociological approaches to myth increasingly treated myth as a form of narrative that can be studied, interpreted and analyzed like ideology, history and culture. In other words, myth is a form of understanding and telling stories that is connected to power, political structures, and political and economic interests. These approaches contrast with approaches such as those of Campbell and Eliade that hold that myth has some type of essential connection to ultimate sacred meanings that transcend cultural specifics. In particular, myth was studied in relation to history from diverse social sciences. Most of these studies share the assumption that history and myth are not distinct in the sense that history is factual, real, accurate, and truth, while myth is the opposite.
==Comparative mythology==
{{Main article|Comparative mythology}}
Comparative mythology is the systematic comparison of myths from different cultures. It seeks to discover underlying themes that are common to the myths of multiple cultures. In some cases, comparative mythologists use the similarities between separate mythologies to argue that those mythologies have a common source. This source may inspire myths or provide a common "protomythology" that diverged into the mythologies of each culture.{{sfn|Littleton|1973|p=32}}
Nineteenth-century interpretations of myth were often comparative, seeking a common origin for all myths.{{sfn|Leonard|2007}} Later scholars tend to avoid universal statements about mythology. One exception to this modern trend is Campbell's ''[[The Hero With a Thousand Faces|The Hero with a Thousand Faces]]'' (1949), which claims that all [[hero]] myths follow the same underlying pattern. This theory of a [[monomyth]] later fell out of favor.{{sfn|Northup|2006|p=8}}
==Modern
[[File:10,000 Belgian francs of 1929 edited.jpg|thumb|1929 [[Belgium|Belgian]] [[banknote]], depicting [[Ceres (Roman mythology)|Ceres]], [[Neptune (mythology)|Neptune]] and [[caduceus]].]]
In modern society, myth is often regarded as a collection of stories. Scholars in the field of [[cultural studies]] research how myth has worked itself into modern discourses. Mythological discourse can reach greater audiences than ever before via digital media. Various mythic elements appear in [[television]], [[Film|cinema]] and [[video game]]s.
Although myth was traditionally transmitted through the oral tradition on a small scale, the film industry has enabled filmmakers to transmit myths to large audiences via film.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Cinematic Mythmaking: Philosophy in Film|last=Singer|first=Irving|publisher=MIT Press|year=2008|isbn=|___location=|pages=3–6}}</ref> In [[Carl Jung|Jung]]<nowiki/>ian psychology myths are the expression of a culture or society’s goals, fears, ambitions and dreams.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Indick|first=William|date=November 18, 2004|title=Classical Heroes in Modern Movies: Mythological Patterns of the Superhero|url=|journal=Journal of Media Psychology|doi=|pmid=|access-date=}}</ref> Film is an expression of the society in which it was produced and reflects the culture of its era and ___location.
The basis of modern visual storytelling is rooted in the mythological tradition. Many contemporary movies rely on ancient myths to construct narratives. [[Disney Corporation]] is well-known among cultural study scholars for "reinventing" traditional childhood myths.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Folklore Studies and Popular Film and Television: A Necessary Critical Survey|last=Koven|first=Michael|publisher=University of Illinois Press|year=2003|isbn=|___location=|pages=176–195}}</ref> While many films are not as obvious as Disney fairy tales, the plots of many films are based on the rough structure of myths. Mythological archetypes, such as the cautionary tale regarding the abuse of technology, battles between gods and creation stories, are often the subject of major film productions. These films are often created under the guise of [[cyberpunk]] [[action movies]], [[fantasy]], [[drama]]s and [[Apocalyptic literature|apocalyptic]] tales.{{sfn|Corner|1999|pp=47–59}}
Recent films such as ''[[Clash of the Titans (2010 film)|Clash of the Titans]]'', ''[[Immortals (2011 film)|Immortals]]'' and ''[[Thor (film)|Thor]]'' continue the trend of mining traditional mythology to frame modern plots. Authors use mythology as a basis for their books, such as [[Rick Riordan]], whose [[Percy Jackson & the Olympians|Percy Jackson and the Olympians]] series is situated in a modern-day world where the [[Twelve Olympians|Greek deities]] are manifest, as well as his [[The Kane Chronicles|Kane Chronicles]] with the [[Ancient Egyptian deities|Egyptian pantheon.]]
Modern myths such as [[urban legends]] shows that myth-making continues. Myth-making is not a collection of stories fixed to a remote time and place, but an ongoing social practice within every society.
==See also==
[[File:Anonymous-Fuxi and Nüwa.jpg|thumb|[[Fu Xi]] and [[Nüwa]] represented as half-snake, half-human creatures]]
;General
*[[Archetypal literary criticism]]
*[[Artificial mythology]]
*[[Creation myth]]
*[[Flood myth]]
*[[Fairy]]
*[[Fable]]
*[[Geomythology]]
*[[Legendary creature]]
*[[LGBT themes in mythology]]
*[[Mytheme]]
*[[Mythical place]]
{{Portal|Mythology}}
*[[National myth]]
*[[Origin-of-death myth]]
;Mythological archetypes
*[[Culture hero]]
*[[Death deity]]
*[[Earth Mother]]
*[[First man or woman (disambiguation)]]
*[[Hero]]
*[[Life-death-rebirth deity]]
*[[Lunar deity]]
*[[Psychopomp]]
*[[Sky father]]
*[[Solar deity]]
*[[Trickster]]
*[[Underworld]]
;Myth and religion
*[[Bengali mythology]]
*[[Chinese mythology]]
*[[Christian mythology]]
*[[Greek mythology]]
*[[Hindu mythology]]
*[[Hittite mythology]]
*[[Islamic mythology]]
*[[Japanese mythology]]
*[[Jesus Christ in comparative mythology]]
*[[Jewish mythology]]
*[[Magic and mythology]]
*[[Maya mythology]]
*[[Religion and mythology]]
*[[Roman mythology]]
;Lists
*[[List of deities]]
*[[List of legendary creatures by type]]
*[[List of legendary creatures]]
*[[List of mythical objects]]
*[[List of mythologies]]
*[[List of women warriors in folklore]]
== Journals about mythology==
* [http://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/AMAL Amaltea, Journal of Myth Criticism]
* [http://journals.sfu.ca/pgi/index.php/pacificamyth/index Mythological Studies Journal]
* [http://nouvellemythologiecomparee.hautetfort.com/ New Comparative Mythology / Nouvelle Mythologie Comparée]
* [http://www.sbec.be/index.php/publications/ollodagos Ollodagos]
* [http://sms.zrc-sazu.si/ Studia Mythologica Slavica]
* [http://www.jgmf.org/ The Journal of Germanic Mythology and Folklore]
==Notes==
{{Reflist|30em}}
== References==
*{{cite book|first=Karen |last=Armstrong|authorlink=Karen Armstrong|title=A Short History of Myth (Myths series)|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=QHbE9hRA10gC}}|date=29 October 2010|publisher=Knopf Canada|isbn=978-0-307-36729-7}}
*{{cite book|first=Roland |last=Barthes|authorlink=Roland Barthes|title=Mythologies|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=jP-DBAAAQBAJ}}|date=1 January 1972|publisher=Hill and Wang|isbn=978-0-8090-7193-7|ref=harv}}
*{{cite book|first=William Russell |last=Bascom|authorlink=William Bascom|title=The Forms of Folklore: Prose Narratives|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=AU0hNAAACAAJ}}|year=1965|publisher=University of California|ref=harv}}
*{{cite book|editor-first=Alan |editor-last=Dundes|title=Sacred Narrative: Readings in the Theory of Myth|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=l5Om2ALAFbEC}}|year=1984|publisher=University of California Press|isbn=978-0-520-05192-8|ref=harv}}
**{{cite book|last=Honko |first=Lauri |chapter=The Problem of Defining Myth |chapter-url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=l5Om2ALAFbEC}}|year=1984|ref=harv}}
**{{cite book|last=Kirk |first=G.S |chapter=On Defining Myths |chapter-url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=l5Om2ALAFbEC|page=53}}|pp=53–61|year=1984|ref=harv}}
**{{cite book|last=Pettazzoni |first=Raffaele |chapter=The Truth of Myth|chapter-url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=l5Om2ALAFbEC}}|year=1984|ref=harv}}
*{{cite book|first=Thomas |last=Bulfinch|authorlink=Thomas Bulfinch|title=Bulfinch's Mythology|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=OskAy9XOnIsC}}|date=June 2004|publisher=Kessinger Publishing|isbn=978-1-4191-1109-9|ref=harv}}
* {{cite book|last=Campbell|first=Joseph|title=Occidental Mythology|year=1991|publisher=Arkana|isbn=0-14-019441-X|ref=harv}}
* {{cite book|first=Joseph |last=Campbell|title=The Masks of God: Primitive mythology|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=kXUZAQAAMAAJ}}|date=1 June 1976|publisher=Penguin Books|isbn=978-0-14-004304-4|ref=harv}}
*{{cite book|first1=Joseph |last1=Campbell|authorlink1=Joseph Campbell|first2=Bill |last2=Moyers|authorlink2=Bill Moyers|title=The Power of Myth|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=2GOIGuh5GJ4C}}|date=18 May 2011|publisher=Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group|isbn=978-0-307-79472-7}}
*{{cite book|first=Joseph |last=Campbell|title=The Masks of God: Creative Mythology|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=XEUTF9fxYSQC}}|year=1991|publisher=Arkana|isbn=978-0-14-019440-1}}
*{{cite book|first=John |last=Corner|title=Critical Ideas in Television Studies|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=Ta9kAAAAMAAJ}}|year=1999|publisher=Clarendon Press |isbn=978-0-19-874221-0 |ref=harv}}
*{{cite book|first=William G. |last=Doty|title=Myth: A Handbook|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=qeI5UC1rmwwC}}|year=2004|publisher=Greenwood Publishing Group|isbn=978-0-313-32696-7|ref=harv}}
*{{cite book|first=Christine |last=Downing|title=The Goddess: Mythological Images of the Feminine|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=U7yNnQEACAAJ}}|year=1996|publisher=Continuum}}
*[[Alan Dundes|Dundes, Alan]]. "Binary Opposition in Myth: The Propp/Levi-Strauss Debate in Retrospect". ''Western Folklore'' 56 (Winter, 1997): 39–50.
*{{cite book|editor1-first=Laurie L. |editor1-last=Patton|editor2-first=Wendy |editor2-last=Doniger|title=Myth and Method|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=OgsTmeRHpeUC|page=147}}|year=1996|publisher=University of Virginia Press|isbn=978-0-8139-1657-6|pages=147–|last=Dundes |first=Alan |chapter=Madness in Method Plus a Plea for Projective Inversion in Myth}}
*{{cite book|first=Mircea |last=Eliade|authorlink=Mircea Eliade|title=Myth and Reality|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=CaIUAAAAQBAJ}}|date=22 June 1998|publisher=Waveland Press|isbn=978-1-4786-0861-5|ref=harv}}
*{{cite book|first=Mircea |last=Eliade|title=Myths, dreams, and mysteries: the encounter between contemporary faiths and archaic realities|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=XWZSvgAACAAJ}}|year=1960|publisher=Harvill Press|isbn=978-0-06-131320-2|translator-first=Philip |translator-last=Mairet|ref=harv}}
*{{cite book|first=John |last=Bowker|title=The Concise Oxford Dictionary of World Religions|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=mhF1QgAACAAJ}}|year=2005|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-861053-3|chapter=Euhemerism|chapter-url=http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t101.e2315}}
*[http://www.fupress.com/Archivio/pdf/3622.pdf Fabiani, Paolo "The Philosophy of the Imagination in Vico and Malebranche". F.U.P. (Florence UP), English edition 2009.] [[PDF]]
*{{cite book|first1=Henri |last1=Frankfort|authorlink1=Henri Frankfort|first2=H. A. |last2=Frankfort|first3=John A. |last3=Wilson|first4=Thorkild |last4=Jacobsen |first5=William A.|last5= Irwin|title=The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man: An Essay of Speculative Thought in the Ancient Near East|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=tSECAAAAQBAJ}}|date=28 June 2013|publisher=University of Chicago Press|isbn=978-0-226-11256-5|ref=harv}}
*{{cite book|first=Sir James George |last=Frazer|authorlink=James George Frazer|title=The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=z3sIAQAAIAAJ&pg=PR10}}|year=1913|publisher=Macmillan and Company, limited|pages=10–|ref=harv}}
*{{cite book|first=Fritz |last=Graf|title=Greek Mythology: An Introduction|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=L2yMRI5xML8C}}|date=9 May 1996|publisher=[[Johns Hopkins University Press]]|isbn=978-0-8018-5395-1 |translator-first=Thomas |translator-last=Marier|ref=harv}}
*{{cite book|last=Humphrey |first=Sheryl |title=The Haunted Garden: Death and Transfiguration in the Folklore of Plants|___location=New York |publisher=DCA Art Fund Grant from the Council on the Arts and Humanities for Staten Island and public funding from the [[New York City Department of Cultural Affairs]]|isbn= 978-1-300-55364-9 |year=2012}}
*{{cite book|first=Geoffrey Stephen |last=Kirk|title=Myth: Its Meaning and Functions in Ancient and Other Cultures|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=MXtfRwFwGzMC}}|year=1973|publisher=University of California Press|isbn=978-0-520-02389-5|ref=harv}}
*{{cite web|last=Leonard|first= Scott |title=The History of Mythology: Part I|date=August 2007|url=http://www.as.ysu.edu/~saleonard/History%20of%20Mythology%201.html |publisher=Youngstown State University |accessdate=17 November 2009|ref=harv}}
*{{cite book|first=C. Scott |last=Littleton|title=The New Comparative Mythology: An Anthropological Assessment of the Theories of Georges Dumézil|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=KuSy6xW99agC|page=1}}|date=1 January 1973|publisher=University of California Press|isbn=978-0-520-02404-5|pages=1–|ref=harv}}
*{{cite book|first=Eleazar M. |last=Meletinsky|title=The Poetics of Myth|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=kzmlAgAAQBAJ}}|date=21 January 2014|publisher=Taylor & Francis|isbn=978-1-135-59913-3|ref=harv}}
*"Myth". ''Encyclopædia Britannica''. 2009. [http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9108748 Encyclopædia Britannica Online], 21 March 2009
*"Myths". ''[http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t71.e725 A Dictionary of English Folklore]''. [[Jacqueline Simpson]] and Steve Roud. Oxford University Press, 2000. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press. UC – Berkeley Library. 20 March 2009
*{{Cite journal|date=2006-01-01|last=Northup|first=Lesley|title=Myth-Placed Priorities: Religion and the Study of Myth|url=http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1748-0922.2006.00018.x/abstract|journal=Religious Studies Review|language=en|volume=32|issue=1|pages=5–10|doi=10.1111/j.1748-0922.2006.00018.x|issn=1748-0922|ref=harv}}
*{{cite book|first=Wendy |last=Doniger|title=Hindu Myths: A Sourcebook Translated from the Sanskrit|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=KzlCthJ4SLkC}}|date=24 June 2004|publisher=Penguin Books Limited|isbn=978-0-14-190375-0}}
*{{cite book|first=Robert |last=Segal|title=Myth: A Very Short Introduction|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=wJu9CQAAQBAJ|page=19}}|date=23 July 2015|publisher=OUP Oxford|isbn=978-0-19-103769-6|pages=19–|ref=harv}}
*{{cite book|last=Apollodorus|title=Gods and Heroes of the Greeks: The Library of Apollodorus|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=3cmSa4H_C0oC}}|year=1976|publisher= [[University of Massachusetts Press]]|isbn=0-87023-206-1|translator-last=Simpson |translator-first=Michael|chapter= Introduction|___location= Amherst|ref=harv}}
*{{cite book|first=Irving |last=Singer|title=Cinematic Mythmaking: Philosophy in Film|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=DhrTiQW16-gC|page=1}}|date=24 September 2010|publisher=MIT Press|isbn=978-0-262-26484-6|pages=1–}}
*{{cite book|last=Slattery |first=Dennis Patrick |title=Bridge Work: Essays on Mythology, Literature and Psychology |___location=Carpinteria |publisher=Mandorla Books |year=2015}}
*{{cite journal|last=Indick |first=William |title=Classical Heroes in Modern Movies: Mythological Patterns of the Superhero |journal=Journal of Media Psychology |volume=9 |issue=3 |year=2004 |p=93–95}}
*{{Cite journal|last=Koven|first=Mikel J.|date=2003-05-22|title=Folklore Studies and Popular Film and Television: A Necessary Critical Survey|url=https://muse.jhu.edu/article/42709|journal=Journal of American Folklore|volume=116|issue=460|pages=176–195|doi=10.1353/jaf.2003.0027|issn=1535-1882|ref=harv}}
*{{cite web |last=Olson |first=Eric L. |title=Great Expectations: the Role of Myth in 1980s Films with Child Heroes |work= Virginia Polytechnic Scholarly Library |publisher=Virginia Polytechnic Institute And State University |date=May 3, 2011 |accessdate=October 24, 2011 |url=http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-05172011-113805/unrestricted/OLSON_EL_T_2011.pdf|format=PDF }}
*{{cite journal|last=Matira |first=Lopamundra |title=Children's Oral Literature and Modern Mass Media |journal=Indian Folklore Research Journal |volume=5 |issue=8 |year=2008 |pp=55–57}}
==Further reading==
* {{cite book|first=Stefan |last=Arvidsson|title=Aryan Idols: Indo-European Mythology as Ideology and Science|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=idTPDI6l0mkC}}|date=15 September 2006|publisher=University of Chicago Press|isbn=978-0-226-02860-6}}
*{{cite book|first=Kees W. |last=Bolle|title=The Freedom of Man in Myth|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=BXRMAwAAQBAJ|page=92}}|date=1 August 2010|publisher=Wipf and Stock Publishers|isbn=978-1-60899-265-2|pages=92–}}
*{{cite book|first=Eric |last=Csapo|title=Theories of Mythology|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=83P3qenuH9EC}}|date=24 January 2005|publisher=Wiley|isbn=978-0-631-23248-3}}
*{{cite book|first=Edith |last=Hamilton|authorlink=Edith Hamilton |title=Mythology: Timeless Tales of Gods and Heroes|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=qDi4RwAACAAJ}}|date=1 January 2011|publisher=Grand Central Publishing|isbn=978-0-446-57475-4}} [[Mythology (book)|WP article]] (1998)
*{{cite book|first=Robert |last=Graves|title=Larousse Encyclopedia of Mythology|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=ofyHvgAACAAJ}}|year=1959 |chapter=Introduction |translator1-first=Richard |translator1-last=Aldington |translator2-first=Delano |translator2-last=Ames|pp=v–viii}}
*[[Joseph Campbell]]
**{{cite book|first=Joseph |last=Campbell|title=The Hero with a Thousand Faces|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=I1uFuXlvFgMC}}|year=2008|publisher=New World Library|isbn=978-1-57731-593-3}} [[The Hero with a Thousand Faces|WP article]]
**{{cite book|first=Joseph |last=Campbell|title=The Flight of the Wild Gander: Explorations in the Mythological Dimension : Selected Essays, 1944-1968|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=oq-xLPfgvJ4C}}|year=2002|publisher=New World Library|isbn=978-1-57731-210-9}}
**{{cite book|first=Joseph |last=Campbell|title=Thou Art That: Transforming Religious Metaphor|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=1Kw5OWibZ0oC}}|date=September 2010|publisher=ReadHowYouWant.com|isbn=978-1-4587-5773-9}} [[Thou Art That (book)|WP article]]
*{{cite book |first1=José Manuel |last1=Losada |author1link=José Manuel Losada |first2=Antonella |last2=Lipscomb |title=Myths in Crisis. The Crisis of Myth |year=2015 |publisher=Cambridge Scholars Publishing |isbn=978-1-443-87814-2}}
*[[Mircea Eliade]]
**{{cite book|first=Mircea |last=Eliade|title=The Myth of the Eternal Return: Cosmos and History|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=zHjV4WICvSwC}}|year=2005|publisher=Princeton University Press|isbn=0-691-12350-0|ref=harv}}
**{{cite book|title=The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=zBzzv977CLgC}}|year=1959|publisher=Houghton Mifflin Harcourt|isbn=0-15-679201-X |translator-first=Willard R. |translator-last=Trask}}
*[[Louis Herbert Gray]] [ed.], ''[[The Mythology of All Races]]'', in 13 vols., 1916-1932.
*[[Lucien Lévy-Bruhl]]
**''Mental Functions in Primitive Societies'' (1910)
**''Primitive Mentality'' (1922)
**''The Soul of the Primitive'' (1928)
**''The Supernatural and the Nature of the Primitive Mind'' (1931)
**''Primitive Mythology'' (1935)
**''The Mystic Experience and Primitive Symbolism'' (1938)
*{{cite book|first=Maria |last=Petringa|title=Brazzà, A Life for Africa|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=USwXz-prS3wC}}|date=13 January 2006|publisher=AuthorHouse|isbn=978-1-4520-7605-8}}
*{{cite book|first=Barry B. |last=Powell|title=Classical Myth|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=dqOSAgAAQBAJ}}|year=2012|publisher=Pearson|isbn=978-0-205-17607-6}}
*{{cite book|first1=Giorgio |last1=De Santillana|first2=Hertha|last2= von Dechend|title=Hamlet's Mill: An Essay on Myth and the Frame of Time|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=ql7ATHGee50C}}|date=January 1977|publisher=David R. Godine Publisher|isbn=978-0-87923-215-3}}
<!--not useful to the modern reader*[[Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling|Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling]]
**''Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology'', 1856.
**''Philosophy of Mythology'', 1857.
**''Philosophy of Revelation'', 1858.-->
*{{cite book|first1=Isabelle Loring |last1=Wallace|first2=Jennie |last2=Hirsh|title=Contemporary Art and Classical Myth|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=lmTBt5_9AJ0C}}|year=2011|publisher=Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.|isbn=978-0-7546-6974-6}}
*{{cite book|first=Steven |last=Walker|title=Jung and the Jungians on Myth|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=VNhQAwAAQBAJ}}|date=8 April 2014|publisher=Taylor & Francis|isbn=978-1-135-34767-3}}
*{{cite book|first1=Vanda |last1=Zajko|first2=Miriam |last2=Leonard|title=Laughing with Medusa: Classical Myth and Feminist Thought|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=1kFQNAAACAAJ}}|date=10 January 2008|publisher=OUP Oxford|isbn=978-0-19-923794-4|ref=harv}}
*Zong, In-Sob. ''Folk Tales from Korea''. 3rd ed. Elizabeth: Hollym, 1989.
==External links==
*[[:s:The New Student's Reference Work/Mythology|The New Student's Reference Work/Mythology]], ed. Beach (1914), at [[wikisource]].
*[http://www.as.ysu.edu/~saleonard/History%20of%20Mythology%201.html Leonard, Scott. "The History of Mythology: Part I"]. [[Youngstown State University]].
*[http://www.theoi.com/ Greek mythology]
*[http://www.sacred-texts.com/ Sacred texts]
*[http://etext.virginia.edu/toc/modeng/public/FisMyth.html Myths and Myth-Makers] Old Tales and Superstitions Interpreted by comparative mythology by John Fiske.
*[http://www.limc-france.fr/presentation LIMC] [[Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae]], a database of ancient objects linked with mythology
*[http://vimeo.com/62378811 Joseph Campbell on Bill Moyers's ''The Power of Myth'']
*[http://ljubincic.com/dreams-visions-myths-making-sense-world/ Dreams, Visions, and Myths: Making Sense of Our World]
== Poteri e abilità ==
L'abilità mutante di Kitty consiste nell'attraversare qualsiasi oggetto solido si trovi sul suo cammino, riuscendo a "slegare" i propri atomi ed a passare tra gli spazi atomici di qualsiasi oggetto o materiale decida. Può anche estendere questo status d'intangibilità ad una dozzina di persone o di oggetti (aventi la stessa massa) attorno a lei, purché mantengano un contatto fisico. L'uso delle sue abilità interferisce con i sistemi elettrici attraverso cui passa interrompendo il flusso di [[elettrone|elettroni]] da atomo ad atomo; allo stesso modo interferisce anche con i sistemi bio-elettrici degli organismi viventi, quando si concentra nel modo giusto a tal fine.<ref>''X-Men Black Sun'' #1</ref> Ciò fa sì che possa mandare fuori controllo qualsiasi meccanismo elettronico stia attraversando, e causare shock e perdita di conoscenza agli esseri viventi che attraversa.
Kitty è attualmente in grado di decidere quando diventare "intangibile", ma per un periodo (di oltre dieci anni nella storia reale, e di circa due anni nei fumetti) è esistita nello stato intangibile e per ridiventare solida aveva bisogno di deciderlo consapevolmente.<ref>''X-Men True Friends'' #1 (1999)</ref> Mentre intangibile, lei non cammina fisicamente sulle superfici, ma piuttosto interagisce con le molecole d'aria sopra di loro, cosa che le permette di salire e scendere, ovvero di levitare. Sempre nella forma intangibile è immune alla maggior parte degli attacchi fisici ed è particolarmente resistene alla [[telepatia]]. Tuttavia se colpita violentemente o costretta ad attraversare materiali tossici (come l'adamantio), il suo fisico ne risente pesantemente, arrivando a farla disorientare o a provare dolore.<ref>''Wolverine'' vol. 1 #125</ref> La sua capacità di attraversare le sostanze è inoltre influenzata dalla sua capacità di trattenere il respiro. Se non arriva ad ossigenare il suo organismo non riesce ad attraversare correttamente un materiale con il rischio che le sue molecole si fondano e la uccidano.
Se tutto ciò non bastasse a fare di lei un'ottima X-Woman, Kitty è anche dotata di un altissimo quoziente intellettivo, ed è un genio dei computer. Dopo la possessione di Ogun, ha sviluppato un notevole talento nelle arti marziali (nelle quali è stata addestrata dallo stesso Wolverine), e si è allenata a passare dalla forma tangibile a quella intangibile inconsciamente, per essere sempre pronta ad un eventuale pericolo. Come si vede in una delle scene su Astonishing X-Men, quando venne scoperta nei laboratori segreti della Benetech e le spararono contro, il suo organismo passò dalla forma corporea a quella intangibile istantaneamente. Kitty è anche una ballerina professionista.
<!-- [[File:Washoe chimpanzee.jpg|thumb|right|300px|'''[[Washoe (chimpanzee)|Washoe]]''', a female [[common chimpanzee]] who was the first non-human to learn to communicate using [[American Sign Language]], as part of a [[animal research|research experiment]] on [[animal language acquisition]].]]
'''Animal cognition''' is the study of the mental capacities of [[animal]]s. It has developed out of [[comparative psychology]], including the study of animal conditioning and learning, but has also been strongly influenced by research in [[ethology]], [[behavioral ecology]], and [[evolutionary psychology]]. The alternative name [[cognitive ethology]] is therefore sometimes used; much of what used to be considered under the title of ''animal intelligence'' is now thought of under this heading.<ref name ="Shettleworth">{{cite book|author=Shettleworth, S.J.|year=2010|title=Cognition, Evolution and Behavior|edition=2|publisher=Oxford Press, New York}}</ref>
Research has examined animal cognition in [[mammals]] (especially [[primate intelligence|primates]], [[Cetacean intelligence|cetaceans]], [[elephant intelligence|elephants]], [[Dog intelligence|dogs]], [[Cat intelligence|cats]], [[horse]]s,<ref name=Krueger_heinze_2008>{{cite journal|author=Krueger, K. and Heinze, J.|year=2008|title=Horse sense: social status of horses (Equus caballus) affects their likelihood of copying other horses` behavior|journal=Animal Cognition|volume=11|issue=3|pages=431–439|DOI=10.1007/s10071-007-0133-0|url=http://epub.uni-regensburg.de/19384/3/Krueger_Heinze_2007_Horse_sense.pdf}}</ref><ref name=Krueger_farmer_heinze_2008>{{cite journal|author=Krueger, K., Farmer, K. and Heinze, J.|year=2013|title=The effects of age, rank and neophobia on social learning in horses|journal=Animal Cognition|volume=|pages=|url=http://epub.uni-regensburg.de/29424/1/Krueger_2013.pdf}}</ref> [[raccoons]] and [[rodents]]), [[bird intelligence|birds]] (including [[Parrots#Intelligence and learning|parrots]], [[Corvidae#Intelligence|corvids]] and [[Pigeon intelligence|pigeons]]), [[reptiles]] ([[Monitor lizard#Intelligence|lizards]] and [[snakes]]), [[fish]] and [[invertebrates]] (including [[cephalopod intelligence|cephalopods]], [[Pain in invertebrates#Cognitive abilities|spiders]] and [[Pain in invertebrates#Cognitive abilities|insects]]).<ref name ="Shettleworth" />
== Sfondo storico ==
=== La cognizione animale dagli annedoti al laboratorio ===
Il comportamento degli animali non umani ha catturato l'immaginazione umana fin dall'antichità, e nel corso dei secoli, molti scrittori hanno speculato sulla mente degli animali o sulla sua assenza, come ha creduto [[Cartesio]].<ref>Descartes, R. (1649), ''Passions of the Soul''</ref> La speculazione sull'intelligenza animale ha gradualmente ceduto il passo allo studio scientifico dopo che [[Charles Darwin|Darwin]] mise esseri umani ed animali in un continuum, anche se l'approccio in gran parte aneddotico di Darwin sull'argomento non sarebbe passato al vaglio scientifico successivo.<ref>Darwin, C. 1871, ''The descent of man, and selection in relation to sex''</ref> Insoddisfatto con il metodo aneddotico di Darwin e del suo protetto J.G. Romanes,<ref>Romanes, J. G. 1883, ''Animal Intelligence''</ref> [[Edward Lee Thorndike|E. L. Thorndike]] portò gli animali in laboratorio al fine di condurre un esame obiettivo del loro comportamento. Le attente osservazioni di Thorndike della fuga di gatti, cani e pulcini da scatole-puzzle lo hanno portato a concludere che il comportamento intelligente può essere composto da associazioni semplici e che le inferenze sulla ragione, o sull'intuizione o sulla coscienza degli animali sono inutili e fuorvianti.<ref>Thorndike, E. L. 1911, ''Animal intelligence''.</ref> All'incirca nello stesso periodo, [[Ivan Pavlov|I. P. Pavlov]] iniziò i suoi studi seminali sui riflessi condizionati nei cani. Pavlov presto abbandonò i tentativi di dedurre i processi mentali canini; tali tentativi, disse, hanno portato solo a disaccordo e confusione. Era, però, disposto a proporre processi fisiologici invisibili che avrebbero potuto spiegare le sue osservazioni.<ref>Pavlov, I.P. 1928, ''Lectures on conditioned reflexes''</ref>
=== Il mezzo secolo comportamentista ===
Il lavoro di Thorndike, Pavlov e poco più tardi dello schietto comportamentista [[John B. Watson]]<ref>Watson, J. B. (1913). Psychology as the Behaviorist Views it. ''Psychological Review, 20'', 158-177</ref> impostò la direzione di molte ricerche sul comportamento degli animali per più di mezzo secolo. Durante questo periodo ci fu un notevole progresso nella comprensione delle associazioni semplici; in particolare, intorno al 1930 furono chiarite le differenze tra il [[condizionamento operante]] di Thorndike e il [[condizionamento classico]] di Pavlov, prima da Miller e Kanorski e poi da [[B. F. Skinner]].<ref>Miller, S. & Konorski, J. (1928) Sur une forme particulière des reflexes conditionels. ''Comptes Rendus des Seances de la Societe de Biologie et de ses Filiales'', 99, 1155-1157</ref><ref>Skinner, B. F. (1932) ''The Behavior of Organisms''</ref> Seguirono molti esperimenti sul condizionamento, che generarono alcune teorie complesse,<ref>Hull, C. L. (1943) ''The Principles of Behavior''</ref> ma che fecero poco o nessun riferimento all'intervento di processi mentali. Probabilmente il licenziamento più esplicito dell'idea che il comportamento sia controllato da processi mentali è il [[comportamentismo radicale]] di Skinner. Questo punto di vista cerca di spiegare il comportamento, comprendente "eventi privati" come le immagini mentali, esclusivamente con riferimento alle contingenze ambientali che influiscono sull'essere umano o animale.<ref>Skinner, B. F. ''About Behaviorism'' 1976</ref>
Nonostante l'orientamento prevalentemente comportamentista della ricerca avvenuta prima del 1960, il rifiuto dell'idea che gli animali presentino processi mentali in quegli anni non fu comunque universale. Influenti eccezioni includono, per esempio, [[Wolfgang Köhler]]<ref>Köhler, W. (1917) ''The Mentality of Apes''</ref> e [[Edward Tolman]]. Le [[mappa cognitiva|mappe cognitive]] di quest'ultimo diedero un contributo significativo alla successiva ricerca sulla [[cognizione]] in esseri umani e animali.<ref>Tolman, E. C. (1948) ''Cognitive maps in rats and men'' Psychological Review, 55, 189-208</ref>
=== La rivoluzione cognitiva ===
A partire dal periodo intorno al 1960, la "[[psicologia cognitiva|rivoluzione cognitiva]]" della ricerca sugli esseri umani<ref>Niesser, U. (1967) ‘’Cognitive Psychology’’</ref> a poco a poco ha stimolato una simile trasformazione della ricerca con gli animali. Le inferenze su processi non direttamente osservabili diventarono prima accettabili e poi all'ordine del giorno. Un importante fautore di questo cambiamento nel modo di pensare fu [[Donald Olding Hebb|Donald O. Hebb]], il quale sostenne che "mente" è semplicemente un nome per i processi nella testa che controllano il comportamento complesso, e che è necessario e possibile dedurre tali processi dal comportamento.<ref>p. 3, Hebb, D. O. 1958 ‘’ A Textbook of Psychology’’</ref> Gli animali cominciarono ad essere visti come "agenti che cercano di raggiungere degli obiettivi e che acquisiscono, archiviano, recuperano, e processano internamente informazioni a vari livelli di complessità cognitiva".<ref name="Menzel">p. 2 , Menzel, R. & Fischer, J. (2010) ‘’Animal Thinking: Contemporary Issues in Comparative Cognition’’: "''goal seeking agents that acquire, store, retrieve, and internally process information at many levels of cognitive complexity''".</ref> Tuttavia è interessante notare che molti esperimenti cognitivi con gli animali hanno usato, e usano tuttora in modo ingegnoso i metodi di condizionamento iniziati da Thorndike e Pavlov.<ref name="Wass">Wasserman & Zentall (eds) (2006) ‘’Comparative Cognition’’</ref>
Lo statuto scientifico della "coscienza" negli animali continua ad essere dibattuto. Una seria considerazione del pensiero cosciente negli animali è stata difesa da alcuni ([[Donald Griffin]], ad esempio<ref>Griffin, D.(1985) ‘’Animal Thinking’’</ref>), ma la maggioranza della [[comunità scientifica]] è stata notevolmente fredda a riguardo di tali suggerimenti.<ref>p.8 ff, Wasserman & Zentall (eds) (2006) ‘’Comparative Cognition’’</ref>
== Metodi ==
L'accelerazione della ricerca sulla cognizione animale degli ultimi 50 anni ha portato ad una rapida espansione nella varietà delle specie studiate e dei metodi impiegati. Il comportamento notevole degli animali con cervello di grandi dimensioni come [[primati]] e [[cetacei]] ha rivendicato una particolare attenzione, ma tutte le specie di mammiferi grandi e piccoli, di uccelli, pesci, formiche, api e altri sono state portate in laboratorio o osservate in studi sul campo attentamente controllati. In laboratorio gli animali spingono leve, tirano stringhe, scavano per il cibo, nuotano in labirinti d'acqua, o rispondono a immagini su schermi di computer negli esperimenti sulla discriminazione, l'[[attenzione]], la [[memoria]] e la [[classificazione]].<ref name="Wass"/> Accurati studi sul campo esplorano la memoria dei nascondigli per il cibo, l'orientamento tramite le stelle<ref>[http://www.lescienze.it/news/2013/01/25/news/orientamento_scarabeo_via_lattea_cielo_stellato-1475604/ ''La danza dello scarabeo astronomo''], [[Le Scienze]].</ref>, la comunicazione, l'utilizzo di strumenti, l'identificazione di conspecifici e molte altre questioni. Gli studi spesso si concentrano sul comportamento degli animali nel loro ambiente naturale e servono alla discussione sulla funzione putativa del comportamento per la propagazione e la sopravvivenza delle specie. Questi sviluppi riflettono un aumento della "fertilizzazione incrociata" tra diversi campi di studio come l'[[etologia]] e la biologia comportamentale. Inoltre, i contributi delle [[psicobiologia|neuroscienze comportamentali]] stanno cominciando a chiarire il substrato fisiologico di qualcuno dei processi mentali derivati.
Diversi progetti di ricerca a lungo termine hanno catturato una buona dose di attenzione. Questi includono esperimenti sul [[linguaggio]] nelle scimmie, come quelli condotti su [[Washoe (scimpanzé)|Washoe]] e quelli su [[Nim Chimpsky]]. Altri progetti di ricerca comprendono la lunga serie di studi effettuata da [[Irene Pepperberg]] con il [[Pappagallo africano grigio]] [[Alex (pappagallo)|Alex]], il lavoro di [[Louis Herman]] sui [[tursiops|tursiopi]], e gli studi sulla memoria a lungo termine nei piccioni, in cui gli uccelli ricordavano delle foto dopo periodi di diversi anni.
Alcuni ricercatori hanno fatto un uso efficace di una metodologia [[Jean Piaget|Piagetiana]]: hanno preso alcuni compiti che i bambini riescono a risolvere a differenti stadi di sviluppo, e hanno indagato quali specie erano in grado di svolgere i diversi compiti. Altri sono stati ispirati da preoccupazioni [[animalismo|animalistiche]] e sulla gestione delle specie domestiche: ad esempio [[Temple Grandin]] ha sfruttato la sua esperienza unica nel campo del benessere animale e del trattamento etico degli animali da fattoria per evidenziare le similitudini sottostanti tra gli esseri umani e gli altri animali.<ref>Grandin, Temple (2009) ''Animals Make Us Human: Creating the Best life for Animals'' (con Catherine Johnson)</ref> Da un punto di vista metodologico, uno dei principali rischi di questo tipo di lavoro è però l'[[antropomorfismo]], la tendenza ad interpretare il comportamento di un animale in termini di [[sensazione|sensazioni]], pensieri e motivazioni umane.<ref name="Shettleworth"/>
== Questioni di ricerca ==
[[Image:Chimpanzee and stick.jpg|250px|thumb|right|Lo scimpanzé comune è in grado di usare degli strumenti. Quest'individuo sta usando un bastone per procurarsi del cibo.]]
La [[cognizione]] umana e quella animale hanno molto in comune, e questo si riflette nei temi di ricerca di seguito riassunti: la maggior parte delle voci che si trovano qui appaiono anche negli articoli sulla cognizione umana. Naturalmente, la ricerca nei due settori differisce sotto aspetti importanti. In particolare, gran parte della ricerca con gli esseri umani studia o coinvolge il linguaggio, e gran parte della ricerca con gli animali è invece legata direttamente o indirettamente ai comportamenti importanti per la sopravvivenza di quei particolari animali negli ambienti naturali. Di seguito sono riassunte alcune delle principali aree di ricerca nella cognizione animale.
=== Percezione ===
Come gli esseri umani, gli animali non umani elaborano le informazioni provenienti da occhi, orecchie e altri organi sensoriali per la percezione dell'ambiente. I processi percettivi sono stati studiati in molte specie, con risultati che sono spesso simili a quelli per gli umani. Altrettanto interessanti sono quei processi percettivi che differiscono da, o vanno oltre quelli che si trovano negli esseri umani, come ad esempio l'[[ecolocalizzazione]] di pipistrelli e delfini, il rilevamento di movimenti attuata dai [[Linea laterale|recettori della pelle]] dei pesci, e la straordinaria acuità visiva, sensibilità al movimento, e capacità di vedere la luce ultravioletta di alcuni [[visione negli uccelli|uccelli]].<ref>Stebbins, W. C. & M. A. Berkley (1990) ''Comparative Perception,Vol. I, Basic Mechanisms; Vol. II, Complex Signals'' New York: Wiley.</ref>
=== Attenzione ===
In qualsiasi momento, molto di ciò che sta accadendo nel mondo è irrilevante per il proprio comportamento attuale. L'[[attenzione]] è quell'insieme di processi mentali che selezionano le informazioni pertinenti, inibiscono le informazioni irrilevanti, e passano tra le informazioni in base a quanto la situazione richiede.<ref>Smith, E. E., and Kosslyn, S. M. (2007) "Cognitive Psychology: Mind and Brain" Pearson Prentice Hall.</ref> Spesso il processo selettivo è sintonizzato da prima che appaiano informazioni pertinenti; tale aspettativa rende rapida la selezione degli stimoli fondamentali quando questi diventano disponibili. Un ampio corpo di ricerca ha esplorato il modo in cui l'attenzione e le aspettative influenzano il comportamento degli animali non umani, e molto di questo lavoro suggerisce che l'attenzione opera negli uccelli, nei mammiferi e nei rettili più o meno allo stesso modo in cui lo fa negli esseri umani.<ref>Blough, D. S. (2006) Reaction-time explorations of visual attention, perception, and decision in pigeons. In E. A. Wasserman & T. R. Zentall (Eds) ''Comparative Cognition: Experimental Explorations of Animal Intelligence’’ pp. 89-105. New York: Oxford.</ref>
I paragrafi seguenti contengono brevi descrizioni di diversi esperimenti. Queste hanno lo scopo di dare un po' l'idea della ricerca sull'attenzione, sebbene in realtà ne graffino appena la superficie; il lettore può consultare i riferimenti (in [[lingua inglese|inglese]]) per le descrizioni di molti altri esperimenti. Inoltre, si deve interpretare effetti putativi "di attenzione" con cautela, perché possono spesso essere contabilizzati in diversi modi. Ad esempio, la mancanza di risposta ad uno stimolo attuale potrebbe riflettere disattenzione, ma potrebbe anche riflettere la mancanza di motivazione, o il risultato di apprendimento passato che sopprime la risposta a tale stimolo o promuova una risposta alternativa. La maggior parte degli esperimenti includono condizioni di controllo destinati a escludere quante interpretazioni alternative possibili.
The following paragraphs contain brief accounts of several experiments. These are intended to give the reader a bit of the flavor of research on attention, but they barely scratch the surface, and readers should consult the references for descriptions of many other experiments. Also, one must interpret putative "attentional" effects with caution, because they can often be accounted for in several different ways. For example, lack of response to a current stimulus might reflect inattention, but it might also reflect lack of motivation, or result from past learning that suppresses response to that stimulus or promotes an alternative response. Most experiments include control conditions intended to exclude as many alternative interpretations as possible.
==== Selective learning ====
Animals trained to discriminate between two stimuli, say black versus white, can be said to attend to the "brightness dimension," but this says little about whether this dimension is selected in preference to others. More enlightenment comes from experiments that allow the animal to choose from several alternatives. For example, several studies have shown that performance is better on, for example, a color discrimination (e.g. blue vs green) after the animal has learned another color discrimination (e.g. red vs orange) than it is after training on a different dimension such as an X shape versus and O shape. The reverse effect happens after training on forms. Thus, the earlier learning appears to affect which dimension, color or form, the animal will attend to.<ref>N. J. Mackintosh (1983) ''Conditioning and Associative Learning’’ New York: Oxford</ref>
Other experiments have shown that after animals have learned to respond to one aspect of the environment responsiveness to other aspects is suppressed. In "blocking", for example, an animal is conditioned to respond to one stimulus ("A") by pairing that stimulus with reward or punishment. After the animal responds consistently to A, a second stimulus ("B") accompanies A on additional training trials. Later tests with the B stimulus alone elicit little response, suggesting that learning about B has been blocked by prior learning about A .<ref>Kamin, L. J. (1969) Predictability, surprise, attention, and conditioning. In Campbell and Church (eds.) ‘’Punishment and aversive behavior’’, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts pp. 279-296</ref> This result supports the hypothesis that stimuli are neglected if they fail to provide new information. Thus, in the experiment just cited, the animal failed to attend to B because B added no information to that supplied by A. If true, this interpretation is an important insight into attentional processing, but this conclusion remains uncertain because blocking and several related phenomena can be explained by models of conditioning that do not invoke attention.<ref>Mackintosh, N. J. (1994) ‘’Animal Learning and Cognition’’ San Diego: Academic Press</ref>
==== Divided attention ====
Casual observation suggests that attention is a limited resource and is not all-or-none: the more attention is devoted to one aspect or dimension of the environment, the less is available for others.<ref>Zentall, T. R. (2004) Selective and divided attention in animals. ‘’Behavioural Processes’’ 69, 1-16</ref> In preparing a meal you may divide your attention among a number of things, but a sudden spill may distract you from a falling souffle. A number of experiments have studied this sort of thing in animals. For example, in one experiment, a tone and a light came on simultaneously. The pigeon subjects gained reward only by choosing the correct combination of the two dimensions (a high pitch together with a yellow light). The birds did fairly well at this task, presumably by dividing attention between the two dimensions. When only one of the stimulus dimensions varied, while the other was held at its rewarded value, discrimination improved on the variable stimulus, and later tests showed that discrimination had also gotten worse on the alternative stimulus dimension.<ref>Blough, D. S. (1969) Attention shifts in a maintained discrimination. ‘’[[Science (journal)|Science]]’’,166, 125-126</ref> These outcomes are consistent with the idea that attention is a limited resource that can be more or less focused among incoming stimuli.
==== Visual search and attentional priming ====
As noted above, attention functions to select information that is of special use to the animal. Visual search typically calls for this sort of selection, and search tasks have been used extensively in both humans and animals to determine the characteristics of attentional selection and the factors that control it.
Experimental research on visual search in animals was initially prompted by field observations published by Luc Tinbergen (1960).<ref>Tinbergen, L. (1960) The natural control of insects in pine woods: I. Factors influencing the intensity of predation by songbirds. ‘’Archives Néerlandasises de Zoologie’’ 13, 265-343.</ref> Tinbergen observed that birds are selective when foraging for insects. For example, he found that birds tended to catch the same type of insect repeatedly even though several types were available. Tinbergen suggested that this prey selection was caused by an attentional bias that improved detection of one type of insect while suppressing detection of others. This "attentional priming" is commonly said to result from a pretrial activation of a mental representation of the attended object, which Tinbergen called a "searching image."
Tinbergen’s field observations on priming have been supported by a number of experiments. For example, Pietrewicz and Kamil (1977, 1979)<ref>Pietrewicz, A. T. & Kamil, A. C. (1977) Visual detection of crypic prey by blue jays ‘’(Cyanocitta cristata). Science,’’ 195,580-582.</ref><ref>Pietrewicz, A. T. Kamil, A. C. (1979) Search image formation in the blue jay ‘’(Cyanocitta cristata). Science,’’ 204, 1332-1333)</ref> presented blue jays with pictures of tree trunks upon which rested either a moth of species A, a moth of species B, or no moth at all. The birds were rewarded for pecks at a picture showing a moth. Crucially, the probability with which a particular species of moth was detected was higher after repeated trials with that species (e.g. A, A, A,...) than it was after a mixture of trials (e.g. A, B, B, A, B, A, A...). These results suggest again that sequential encounters with an object can establish an attentional predisposition to see the object.
Another way to produce attentional priming in search is to provide an advance signal that is associated with the target. For example, if you hear a song sparrow you may be predisposed to detect a song sparrow in a shrub, or among other birds. A number of experiments have reproduced this effect in animal subjects.<ref>Blough, P. M. (1989). Attentional priming and visual search in pigeons. ‘’Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes,’’ 17, 292-298.</ref><ref>Kamil, A.C. & Bond, A. B. (2006) Selective attention, priming, and foraging behavior. In E. A. Wasserman and T. R. Zentall(eds) ‘’Comparative Cognition: Experimental Exploration of Animal Intelligence’’ New York: Oxford</ref>
Still other experiments have explored nature of stimulus factors that affect the speed and accuracy of visual search. For example, the time taken to find a single target increases as the number of items in the visual field increases. This rise in RT is steep if the distracters are similar to the target, less steep if they are dissimilar, and may not occur if the distracters are very different in from the target in form or color.<ref>Blough, D. S. & Blough, P. M. (1990) Reaction-time assessments of visual processes in pigeons. In M. Berkley & W. Stebbins (Eds.) ‘’Comparative perception (pp. 245-276). New York:Wiley.</ref>
=== Concepts and categories ===
Fundamental but difficult to define, the [[concept]] of "concept" was discussed for hundreds of years by philosophers before it became a focus of psychological study. Concepts enable humans and animals to organize the world into functional groups; the groups may be composed of perceptually similar objects or events, diverse things that have a common function, relationships such as same versus different, or relations among relations such as analogies.<ref name =Cats>E. E. Smith & D. L. Medin (1981) ‘’Categories and Concepts’’ Harvard Univ. Press</ref> Extensive discussions on these matters together with many references may be found in Shettleworth (2010)<ref name ="Shettleworth" /> Wasserman and Zentall (2006)<ref name="Wass"/> and in Zentall ''et al.'' (2008). The latter is freely available online<ref name = Zentall>Zentall, T. R., Wasserman, E. A., Lazareva, O. F., Thompson, R. R. K., Ratterman, M. J. (2008). Concept Learning in Animals. ‘’Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews’’, 3 , 13-45. Retrieved from http://psyc.queensu.ca/ccbr/index.html {{doi|10.3819/ccbr.2008.30002}}</ref>
==
Most work on animal concepts has been done with visual stimuli, which can easily be constructed and presented in great variety, but auditory and other stimuli have been used as well.<ref>Dooling, R. J., & Okanoya, K. (1995). Psychophysical methods for assessing perceptual categories. In G. M.Klump, R. J.Dooling, R. R.Fay, & W. C.Stebbins (Eds.),’’ Methods in Comparative Psychoacoustics’’ (pp. 307–318). Basel, Switzerland: Birkhäuser Verlag.</ref> Pigeons have been widely used, for they have excellent vision and are readily conditioned to respond to visual targets; other birds and a number of other animals have been studied as well.<ref name="Shettleworth" />
In a typical experiment, a bird or other animal confronts a computer monitor on which a large number of pictures appear one by one, and the subject gets a reward for pecking or touching a picture of a category item and no reward for non-category items. Alternatively, a subject may be offered a choice between two or more pictures. Many experiments end with the presentation of items never seen before; successful sorting of these items shows that the animal has not simply learned many specific stimulus-response associations. A related method, sometimes used to study relational concepts, is matching-to-sample. In this task an animal sees one stimulus and then chooses between two or more alternatives, one of which is the same as the first; the animal is then rewarded for choosing the matching stimulus.<ref name = "Shettleworth"/><ref name=Wass/><ref name =Zentall/>
==== Perceptual categories ====
Perceptual categorization is said to occur when a person or animal responds in a similar way to a range of stimuli that share common features. For example, a squirrel climbs a tree when it sees Rex, Shep, or Trixie, which suggests that it categorizes all three as something to avoid. This sorting of instances into groups is crucial to survival. Among other things, an animal must categorize if it is to apply learning about one object (e.g. Rex bit me) to new instances of that category (dogs may bite).<ref name = "Shettleworth"/><ref name=Wass/><ref name = Zentall/>
===== Natural categories =====
Many animals readily classify objects by perceived differences in form or color. For example, bees or pigeons quickly learn to choose any red object and reject any green object if red leads to reward and green does not. Seemingly much more difficult is an animal’s ability to categorize natural objects that vary a great deal in color and form even while belonging to the same group. In a classic study, [[Richard J. Herrnstein]] trained pigeons to respond to the presence or absence of human beings in photographs.<ref>R. J. Herrnstein (1964) ‘’Complex Visual Concept in the Pigeon’’ Science, 146, 549-551</ref> The birds readily learned to peck photos that contained partial or full views of humans and to avoid pecking photos with no human, despite great differences in the form, size, and color of both the humans displayed and in the non-human pictures. In follow-up studies, pigeons categorized other natural objects (e.g. trees) and after training they were able without reward to sort photos they had not seen before .<ref>R. J. Herrnstein (1979) ‘’Acquisition, Generalization, and Discrimination Reversal of a Natural Concept’’ J. of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 5, 116-129</ref><ref>R. S. Bhatt, E. A. Wasserman, W.F.J. Reynolds, & K. S.. Knauss (1988) ‘’Conceptual behavior in pigeons: Categorization of both familiar and novel examples from four classes of natural and articifial stimuli.’’ J. of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 14, 219-234</ref> Similar work has been done with natural auditory categories, for example, bird songs <ref>H-W Tu, E. Smith & R. J. Dooling, (2011). Acoustic and perceptual categories of vocal elements in the warble song of budgerigars (Melopsittacus undulates) ‘’J. of Comparative Psychology, 125, 420-430)’’</ref>
==== Functional or associative categories ====
Perceptually unrelated stimuli may come to be responded to as members of a class if they have a common use or lead to common consequences. An oft-cited study by Vaughan (1988) provides an example.<ref>W. Vaughan, Jr. (1988) Formation of equivalence sets in pigeons. ‘’Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Process 14, 36-42</ref> Vaughan divided a large set of unrelated pictures into two arbitrary sets, A and B. Pigeons got food for pecking at pictures in set A but not for pecks at pictures in set B. After they had learned this task fairly well, the outcome was reversed: items in set B led to food and items in set A did not. Then the outcome was reversed again, and then again, and so on. Vaughan found that after 20 or more reversals, associating reward with a few pictures in one set caused the birds to respond to the other pictures in that set without further reward, as if they were thinking "if these pictures in set A bring food, the others in set A must also bring food." That is, the birds now categorized the pictures in each set as functionally equivalent. Several other procedures have yielded similar results.<ref name = "Shettleworth"/><ref name = Zentall/>
==== Relational or abstract categories ====
When tested in a simple stimulus matching-to-sample task (described above) many animals readily learn specific item combinations, such as "touch red if the sample is red, touch green if the sample is green." But this does not demonstrate that they distinguish between "same" and "different" as general concepts. Better evidence is provided if, after training, an animal successfully makes a choice that matches a novel sample that it has never seen before. Monkeys and chimpanzees do learn to do this, as do pigeons if they are given a great deal of practice with many different stimuli. However, because the sample is presented first, successful matching might mean that the animal is simply choosing the most recently seen "familiar" item rather than the conceptually "same" item. A number of studies have attempted to distinguish these possibilities, with mixed results.<ref name = "Shettleworth"/><ref name=Zentall/>
==== Rule learning ====
The use of rules has sometimes been considered an ability restricted to humans, but a number of experiments have shown evidence of simple rule learning in primates<ref>See, e.g., D’Amato, M., & M. Columbo (1988). Representation of serial order in monkeys (‘’Cebus apella’’). ‘’Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes,’’ 14, 11-139</ref> and also in other animals. Much of the evidence has come from studies of sequence learning in which the "rule" consists of the order in which a series of events occurs. Rule use is shown if the animal learns to discriminate different orders of events and transfers this discrimination to new events arranged in the same order. For example, Murphy ''et al.'' (2008)<ref>Murphy, R. A., E. Mondragon & V. A. Murphy (2008) Rule learning by rats. ‘’Science’’, 319, 1849-1851.[http://www.cal-r.org/mondragon/home/Papers/MurphyMondragonMurphy-08.pdf]</ref> trained rats to discriminate between visual sequences. For one group ABA and BAB were rewarded, where A="bright light" and B="dim light." Other stimulus triplets were not rewarded. The rats learned the visual sequence, although both bright and dim lights were equally associated with reward. More importantly, in a second experiment with auditory stimuli, rats responded correctly to sequences of novel stimuli that were arranged in the same order as those previously learned. Similar sequence learning has been demonstrated in birds and other animals as well.<ref>Kundrey, S. M. A., B Strandell, H. Mathis & J. D. Rowan (2010) Learning of monotonic and nonmonotonic sequences in domesticated horses (‘’Equus callabus’’) and chickens (‘’Gallus domesticus’’). ‘’Learning and Motivation,’’ 14, 213-223.</ref>
=== Memory ===
The categories that have been developed to analyze [[memory|human memory]] ([[short term memory]], [[long term memory]], [[working memory]]) have been applied to the study of animal memory, and some of the phenomena characteristic of human short term memory (e.g. the [[serial position effect]]) have been detected in animals, particularly [[monkey]]s.<ref>{{cite journal |last1 = Wright |last2 = Santiago |last3 = Sands |last4 = Kendrick |last5 = Cook |year = 1985 |title = Memory processing of serial lists by pigeons, monkeys, and people |journal = Science |volume = 229 |pages = 287–289 |bibcode = 1985Sci...229..287W |first2 = Hector C. |first3 = Stephen F. |first4 = Donald F. |first5 = Robert G. |doi = 10.1126/science.9304205 |pmid = 9304205 |first1 = AA |issue = 4710 }}</ref> However most progress has been made in the analysis of [[spatial memory]]; some of this work has sought to clarify the physiological basis of spatial memory and the role of the [[hippocampus]]; other work has explored the spatial memory of [[scatter-hoarder]] animals such as [[Clark's Nutcracker]], certain [[jay]]s, [[tit (bird)|tits]] and certain [[squirrel]]s, whose ecological niches require them to remember the locations of thousands of caches,<ref name = "Shettleworth"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1 = Balda |first1 = R. |last2 = Kamil |first2 = A. C. |year = 1992 |title = Long-term spatial memory in Clark's nutcracker, ''Nucifraga columbiana'' |journal = Animal Behaviour |volume = 44 |pages = 761–769 |doi = 10.1016/S0003-3472(05)80302-1 |issue = 4 }}</ref> often following radical changes in the environment.
Memory has been widely investigated in foraging honeybees, ''Apis mellifera'', which use both transient short-term working memory that is non-feeder specific and a feeder specific
long-term reference memory.<ref name="Greggers and Menzel, (1993)">{{cite journal |last1 = Greggers |first1 = U. |last2 = Menzel |first2 = R. |year = 1993 |title = Memory dynamics and foraging strategies of honeybees |journal = [[Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology]] |volume = 32 |pages = 17–29 |doi = 10.1007/BF00172219 }}</ref><ref name="Menzel, (1993)">{{cite journal |last1 = Menzel |first1 = R. |year = 1993 |title = Associative learning in honey-bees |journal = Apidologie |volume = 24 |pages = 157–168 |doi = 10.1051/apido:19930301 |issue = 3 }}</ref><ref name="Wustenberg et al., (1998)">Wustenberg, D., Gerber, B. and Menzel, R. (1998). Long- but not medium-term retention of olfactory memory in honeybees is impaired by actinomycin D and anisomycin. ''European Journal of Neuroscience'', '''10'''': 2742-2745</ref> Memory induced in a free-flying honeybee by a single learning trial lasts for days and, by three learning trials, for a lifetime.<ref name="Hammer and Menzel, (1995)">{{cite journal |last1 = Hammer |first1 = M. |last2 = Menzel |first2 = R. |year = 1995 |title = Learning and memory in the honeybee |journal = Journal of Neuroscience |volume = 15 |pages = 1617–1630 |pmid = 7891123 |issue = 3 Pt 1 }}</ref> Slugs, ''Limax flavus'', have a short-term memory of approximately 1 min and long-term memory of 1 month.<ref name="Yamada et al., (1992)">{{cite journal |last1 = Yamada |first1 = A. |last2 = Sekiguchi |first2 = T. |last3 = Suzuki |first3 = H. |last4 = Mizukami |first4 = A. et al. |year = 1992 |title = Behavioral analysis of internal memory states using cooling-induced retrograde anmesia in Limax flavus |journal = The Journal of Neuroscience |volume = 12 |pages = 729–735 |pmid = 1545237 |issue = 3 }}</ref>
====Methods====
As in humans, research with animals distinguishes between “working” or “short-term” memory from “reference” or long-term memory. Tests of working memory evaluate memory for events that happened in the recent past, usually within the last few seconds or minutes. Tests of reference memory evaluate memory for regularities such as “pressing a lever brings food” or “children give me peanuts.”
=====Habituation=====
{{main|Habituation}}
This is one of the simplest tests for memory spanning a short time interval. The test compares an animal’s response to a stimulus or event on one occasion to its response on a previous occasion. If the second response differs consistently from the first, the animal must have remembered something about the first, unless some other factor such as motivation, sensory sensitivity, or the test stimulus has changed.
=====Delayed response=====
Delayed response tasks are among the most useful methods used to study short-term memory in animals. Dating from research by Hunter (1913), the animal was shown a stimulus, such as a picture or a colored light, and a few seconds or minutes later the animal had to choose among alternative stimuli. In Hunter's studies, for example, a light appeared briefly in one of three goal boxes and then later the animal was allowed to choose among the boxes, finding food behind the one that had been lighted.<ref>Hunter, W. S. (1913) "The delayed reaction in animals and children" Behavior Monographs, 2</ref> Most research has been done with some variation of the "delayed matching-to-sample" task. For example, in the initial study with this task, a pigeon was presented with a flickering or steady light. Then, a few seconds later, two pecking keys were illuminated, one with a steady light and one with a flickering light. The bird got food if it pecked the key that matched the original stimulus.<ref>Blough, D. S. (1958) "Delayed matching in the pigeon", Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 2, 151-160.</ref>
A commonly-used variation of the matching-to-sample task requires the animal to use the initial stimulus to control a later choice between different stimuli. For example, if the initial stimulus is a black circle, the animal learns to choose "red" after the delay; if it is a black square, the correct choice is "green". Ingenious variations of this method have been used to explore many aspects of memory, including forgetting due to interference and memory for multiple items.<ref name="Shettleworth"/>
=====Radial arm maze=====
{{main|Radial arm maze}}
The [[radial arm maze]] is used to test memory for spatial ___location and to determine the mental processes by which ___location is determined. In a radial maze test, an animal is placed on a small platform from which paths lead in various directions to goal boxes; the animal finds food in one or more goal boxes. Having found food in a box, the animal must return to the central platform. The maze may be used to test both reference and working memory. Suppose, for example, that over a number of sessions the same 4 arms of an 8-arm maze always lead to food. If in a later test session the animal goes to a box that has never been baited, this indicates a failure of reference memory. On the other hand, if the animal goes to a box that it has already emptied during the same test session, this indicates a failure of working memory. Various confounding factors, such as odor cues, are carefully controlled in such experiments.<ref>Shettleworth, S. J. (2010) "Cognition, Evolution, and Behavior" New York: Oxford</ref>
=====Water maze=====
{{main|Morris water navigation task}}
The [[water maze]] is used to test an animal's memory for spatial ___location and to discover how an animal is able to determine locations. Typically the maze is circular tank filled with water that has been made milky so that it is opaque. Located somewhere in the maze is small platform placed just below the surface of the water. When placed in the tank, the animal swims around until it finds and climbs up on the platform. With practice the animal finds the platform more and more quickly. Reference memory is assessed by removing the platform and observing the relative amount of time the animal spends swimming in the area where the platform had been located. Visual and other cues in and around the tank may be varied to assess the animal's reliance on landmarks and the geometric relations among them.<ref>Vorhees, C. V. & Williams, M. T. (2006) "Morris water maze: procedures for assessing spatial and related forms of learning and memory", Nature Protocols 1, - 848 - 858 Published online: 27 July 2006 {{DOI|10.1038/nprot.2006.116}}</ref>
=== Spatial cognition ===
Whether an animal ranges over a territory of measured in square kilometers or square meters, its survival typically depends on its ability to do such things as find a food source and then return to its nest. Sometimes such a task can be performed rather simply, for example by following a chemical trail. Typically, however, the animal must somehow acquire and use information about locations, directions, and distances. Following paragraphs outline some of the ways that animals do this.<ref name="Shettleworth"/><ref name="pigeon.psy.tufts.edu">[http://pigeon.psy.tufts.edu/asc/toc.htm Animal Spatial Cognition:Comparative, Neural & Computational Approaches]</ref>
*'''Beacons''' Animals often learn what their nest or other goal looks like, and if it is within sight they may simply move toward it; it is said to serve as a "beacon".
*'''Landmarks''' When an animal is unable to see its goal, it may learn the appearance of nearby objects and use these landmarks as guides. Researchers working with birds and bees have demonstrated this by moving prominent objects in the vicinity of nest sites, causing returning foragers to hunt for their nest in a new ___location.<ref name="Shettleworth"/>
*'''Dead reckoning''' [[Dead reckoning]], also known as "path integration," is the process of computing one's position by starting from a known ___location and keeping track of the distances and directions subsequently traveled. Classic experiments have shown that the desert ant keeps track of its position in this way as it wanders for many meters searching for food. Though it travels in a randomly twisted path, it heads straight home when it finds food. However, if the ant is picked up and released some meters to the east, for example, it heads for a ___location displaced by the same amount to the east of its home nest.
*'''Cognitive maps''' Some animals appear to construct a [[cognitive map]] of their surroundings, meaning that they acquire and use information that enables them to compute how far and in what direction to go to get from one ___location to another. Such a map-like representation is thought to be used, for example, when an animal goes directly from one food source to another even though its previous experience has involved only travel between each source and home.<ref name="Shettleworth"/><ref>{{cite book |author = Lund, Nick |title = Animal cognition |publisher = Psychology Press |year = 2002 |isbn = 978-0-415-25298-0 |page = 4 |url = http://books.google.com/books?id=Ti4cgStf6q8C&pg=PA4 }}</ref> Research in this area <ref name="pigeon.psy.tufts.edu"/> has also explored such topics as the use of geometric properties of the environment by rats and pigeons, and the ability of [[rat]]s to represent a spatial pattern in either [[radial arm maze]]s or [[Morris water navigation task|water mazes]]. Spatial cognition is sometimes explored in [[visual search]] experiments in which a human or animal searches the environment for a particular object.{{Citation needed|date=January 2012}}
====Long-distance navigation; homing====
{{main|Animal navigation}}
Many animals travel hundreds or thousands of miles in seasonal migrations or returns to breeding grounds. They may be guided by the sun, the stars, the polarization of light, magnetic cues, olfactory cues, winds, or a combination of these.
It has been hypothesized that animals such as apes and wolves are good at spatial cognition because this skill is necessary for survival. This ability may have eroded somewhat in dogs because humans have provided necessities such as food and shelter during some 15,000 years of domestication.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Savolainen|first=Peter|coauthors=Ya-ping Zhang, Jing Luo, Joakim Lundeberg, Thomas Leitner|title=Genetic Evidence for an East Asian Origin of Domestic Dogs|date=22 November 2002|volume=298|pages=1060–1062|url=http://www.sciencemag.org/content/298/5598/1610.full.pdf|bibcode=2002Sci...298.1610S|last2=Zhang|last3=Luo|last4=Lundeberg|last5=Leitner|journal=Science|doi=10.1126/science.1073906|issue=5598|pmid=12446907}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last=Fiset|first=Sylvain|author2=Vickie Plourde|title=Object Permanence in Domestic Dogs (Canis lupus familiaris) and Gray Wolves (Canis lupus)|journal=Journal of Comparative Psychology|date=29 October 2012|pages=2|doi=10.1037/a0030595}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last=Brauer|first=Juliane|coauthors=Juliane Kaminski, Julia Riedel, Josep Call, Michael Tomasello|title=Making Inferences About the Location of Hidden Food: Social Dog, Causal Ape|journal=Journal of Comparative Psychology|year=2006|volume=120|issue=1|pages=38–47|doi=10.1037/0735-7036.120.1.38|pmid=16551163}}</ref>
=== Timing ===
{{further|Time perception}}
==== Time of day: Circadian rhythms ====
{{main|Circadian rhythms}}
The behavior of most animals is synchronized with the earth's daily light-dark cycle. Thus, many animals are active during the day, others are active at night, still others near dawn and dusk. Though one might think that these "circadian rhythms" are controlled simply by the presence or absence of light, nearly every animal that has been studied has been shown to have a "biological clock" that yields cycles of activity even when the animal is in constant illumination or darkness.<ref name = "Shettleworth" /> Circadian rhythms are so automatic and fundamental to living things — they occur even in plants<ref>{{cite journal |last1 = Webb |first1 = Alex A.R. |year = 2003 |title = The physiology of circadian rhythms in plants |journal = New Phytologist |volume = 160 |pages = 281–303 |doi = 10.1046/j.1469-8137.2003.00895.x |issue = 2 }}</ref> - that they are usually discussed separately from cognitive processes, and the reader is referred to the main article ([[Circadian rhythms]]) for further information.
==== Interval timing ====
Survival often depends on an animal's ability to time intervals. For example, rufous hummingbirds feed on the nectar of flowers, and they often return to the same flower, but only after the flower had had enough time to replenish its supply of nectar. In one experiment hummingbirds fed on artificial flowers that quickly emptied of nectar but were refilled at some fixed time (e.g. twenty minutes) later. The birds learned to come back to the flowers at about the right time, learning the refill rates of up to eight separate flowers and remembering how long ago they had visited each one.<ref>{{cite journal |last1 = Henderson |first1 = et al. |year = 2006 |title = Timing in free-living rufous hummingbirds, ''Selasphorus rufus'' |journal = Current Biology |volume = 16 |pages = 512–515 |doi = 10.1016/j.cub.2006.01.054 |pmid = 16527747 |last2 = Hurly |first2 = TA |last3 = Bateson |first3 = M |last4 = Healy |first4 = SD |issue = 5 }}</ref>
The details of interval timing have been studied in a number of species. One of the most common methods is the "peak procedure". In a typical experiment, a rat in an [[operant chamber]] presses a lever for food. A light comes on, a lever-press brings a food pellet at a fixed later time, say 10 seconds, and then the light goes off. Timing is measured during occasional test trials on which no food is presented and the light stays on. On these test trials the rat presses the lever more and more until about 10 sec and then, when no food comes, gradually stops pressing. The time at which the rat presses most on these test trials is taken to be its estimate of the payoff time.
Experiments using the peak procedure and other methods have shown that animals can time short intervals quite exactly, can time more than one event at once, and can integrate time with spatial and other cues. Such tests have also been used for quantitative tests of theories of animal timing, though no one theory has yet gained unanimous agreement.<ref name="Shettleworth"/>
=== Tool and weapon use ===
{{Main|Tool use by animals}}
Because tool use is traditionally assumed to be a uniquely human trait, discussion of the cognitive underpinnings of animal tool use very often includes consideration of insight and comparisons of the overall intelligence and brain size. There is also considerable debate about what constitutes a "tool". A wide range of animals is considered to use tools including mammals, birds, fish, cephalopods and insects.
====Mammals====
Tool use has been reported many times in both wild and captive [[primate]]s, particularly the great apes. The use of tools by primates is varied and includes hunting (mammals, invertebrates, fish), collecting honey, processing food (nuts, fruits, vegetables and seeds), collecting water, weapons and shelter. Research in 2007 shows that chimpanzees in the [[Fongoli]] [[savannah]] sharpen sticks to use as [[spear]]s when hunting, considered the first evidence of systematic use of weapons in a species other than humans.<ref>[http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/02/070222-chimps-spears.html Chimps Use "Spears" to Hunt Mammals, Study Says] John Roach for National Geographic News (February 22, 2007) (accessed on June 12, 2010)</ref> Other mammals that spontaneously use tools in the wild and captive include [[elephant]]s, [[bear]]s, [[cetacean]]s, [[sea otter]]s and [[mongoose]]s.
====Birds====
Several species of birds have been recorded as using tools in the wild including Warblers, Parrots, Egyptian Vultures, Brown-headed Nuthatches, Gulls and Owls. One species examined extensively under laboratory conditions is the New Caledonian crow. One individual called “Betty”, spontaneously made a wire tool to solve a novel problem in the laboratory and attracted considerable attention. She was being tested to see whether she would select a wire hook rather than a straight wire to pull a little bucket of meat out of a well. Betty tried poking the straight wire at the meat. After a series of failures with this direct approach, she withdrew the wire and began directing it at the bottom of the well, which was secured to its base with duct tape. The wire soon became stuck, whereupon Betty pulled it sideways, bending it and unsticking it. She then inserted the hook into the well and extracted the meat. In all but one of 10 subsequent trials with only straight wire provided, she also made and used a hook in the same manner, but not before trying the straight wire first.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Hunt|first=G.R|title=Manufacture and use of hook-tools by New Caledonian crows|journal=Nature|volume=379|pages=249–251|doi=10.1038/379249a0|year=1996|issue=6562|bibcode = 1996Natur.379..249H }}</ref><ref name="psycnet">{{cite journal|last=Shettleworth|first=Sara J.|title=Do Animals Have Insight, and What Is Insight Anyway?|journal=Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology|year=2012|volume=66|issue=4|pages=217–226|doi=10.1037/a0030674|url=http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/cep/66/4/217.pdf}}</ref> Some other species of birds, such as the [[Woodpecker Finch]] of the [[Galapagos Islands]], use particular tools as an essential part of their [[foraging]] behavior. However, these behaviors are often quite inflexible and cannot be applied effectively in new situations.
Several species of [[corvid]]s have also been trained to use tools in controlled experiments, or use bread crumbs for bait-fishing.<ref>[http://www.orenhasson.com/EN/bait-fishing.htm]{{Verify credibility|date=January 2012}}</ref>{{Verify credibility|date=January 2012}}
====Fish====
Several species of [[wrasses]] have been observed using rocks as anvils to crack [[bivalve]] (scallops, urchins and clams) shells. It was first filmed [http://scienceblog.com/48078/video-show-tool-use-by-a-fish/] in an orange-dotted tuskfish (''Choerodon anchorago'') in 2009 by Giacomo Bernardi. The fish fans sand to unearth the bivalve, takes it into its mouth, swims several metres to a rock which it uses as an anvil by smashing the mollusc apart with sideward thrashes of the head. This behaviour has been recorded in a [[blackspot tuskfish]] (''Choerodon schoenleinii'') on Australia's Great Barrier Reef, yellowhead wrasse (''[[Halichoeres garnoti]]'') in Florida and a six-bar wrasse (''[[Thalassoma hardwicke]]'') in an aquarium setting. These species are at opposite ends of the phylogenetic tree in this [[Family (biology)|family]], so this behaviour may be a deep-seated trait in all wrasses.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://bio.research.ucsc.edu/people/bernardi/Bernardi/Publications/2011Tools.pdf|title=The use of tools by wrasses (Labridae). DOI=10.1007/s00338-011-0823-6|author=Bernardi, G.|year=2011|accessdate=July 7, 2013}}</ref>
====Invertebrates====
Some [[cephalopod]]s are known to use [[coconut]] shells for protection or [[camouflage]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last = Finn |first = J. K. |author2=Tregenza, T.|author3=Tregenza, N. |title = Defensive tool use in a coconut-carrying octopus |journal = Current Biology |volume = 19 |issue = 23 |pages = R1069–R1070 |year = 2009 |doi = 10.1016/j.cub.2009.10.052 |pmid = 20064403 }}</ref>
Ants of the species ''[[Conomyrma bicolor]]'' pick up stones and other small objects with their mandibles and drop them down the vertical entrances of rival colonies, allowing workers to forage for food without competition.<ref>{{cite journal |author=Michael H.J. Möglich & Gary D. Alpert |year=1979 |title=Stone dropping by Conomyrma bicolor (Hymenoptera: Formicidae): A new technique of interference competition |journal=[[Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology]] |volume=2 |issue=6 |pages=105–113 |jstor=4599265}}</ref>
=== Reasoning and problem solving ===
Closely related to tool use is the study of reasoning and problem solving. It has been observed that the manner in which chimpanzees solve problems, such as that of retrieving bananas positioned out of reach, is not through [[trial-and-error]]. Instead, they were observed to proceed in a manner that was "unwaveringly purposeful."<ref>Wolfgang Köhler ''The Mentality of Apes'' (1917)</ref>
It is clear that animals of quite a range of species are capable of solving a range of problems that are argued to involve abstract reasoning;<ref>For Chimpanzees, see for example [[David Premack]] (1983) ''[[The Mind of an Ape#Other concepts|The Mind of an Ape]]''</ref> modern research has tended to show that the performances of [[Wolfgang Köhler]]'s chimpanzees, who could achieve spontaneous solutions to problems without training, were by no means unique to that species, and that apparently similar behavior can be found in animals usually thought of as much less intelligent, if appropriate training is given.<ref>Pepperberg, I. M. (1999). The Alex Studies: Cognitive and Communicative Abilities of Grey Parrots. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.</ref> [[Causal Reasoning (Psychology)|Causal reasoning]] has also been observed in rooks and New Caledonian crows.<ref>{{cite journal |pmid = 17171360 |doi = 10.1007/s10071-006-0061-4 |volume = 10 |issue = 2 |title = Non-tool-using rooks, Corvus frugilegus, solve the trap-tube problem |date=April 2007 |journal = Anim Cogn |pages = 225–31 |last1 = Tebbich |first1 = Sabine |last2 = Seed |first2 = Amanda M. |last3 = Emery |first3 = Nathan J. |last4 = Clayton |first4 = Nicola S. }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |doi = 10.1098/rspb.2008.1107 |volume = 276 |issue = 1655 |title = Do New Caledonian crows solve physical problems through causal reasoning? |date=January 2009 |journal = Proc. R. Soc. B |pages = 247–254 |last1 = Taylor |first1 = A.H |last2 = Hunt |first2 = G.R |last3 = Medina |first3 = F.S |last4 = Gray |first4 = R.D |pmid = 18796393 |pmc = 2674354 }}</ref>
=== Language ===
{{main|Animal language}}
{{further|Talking animal}}
The modeling of human language in animals is known as [[animal language]] research. In addition to the ape-language experiments mentioned above, there have also been more or less successful attempts to teach language or language-like behavior to some non-primate species, including [[parrots]] and [[Great Spotted Woodpecker]]s. Arguing from his own results with the animal [[Nim Chimpsky]] and his analysis of others results, Herbert Terrace criticized the idea that chimps can produce new sentences.<ref>Terrace, H., L.A. Petitto, R.J. Sanders, T.G. Bever(1979)Science 206 (4421): 891–902</ref> Shortly thereafter [[Louis Herman]] published research on artificial language comprehension in the bottlenosed dolphin. (Herman, Richards, & Wolz, 1984). Though this sort of research has been controversial, especially among [[cognitive linguistics|cognitive linguists]], many researchers agree that many animals can understand the meaning of individual words, and some may understand simple sentences and syntactic variations, but there is little evidence that any animal can produce new strings of symbols that correspond to new sentences.<ref name = "Shettleworth"/>
=== Consciousness ===
[[File:Mirror test with a Baboon.JPG|thumb|Mirror test with a baboon]]
The sense in which animals can be said to have [[consciousness]] or a [[self-concept]] has been hotly debated; it is often referred to as the debate over animal minds. The best known research technique in this area is the [[mirror test]] devised by [[Gordon G. Gallup]], in which an animal's skin is marked in some way while it is asleep or sedated, and it is then allowed to see its reflection in a mirror; if the animal spontaneously directs grooming behavior towards the mark, that is taken as an indication that it is aware of itself. Self-awareness, by this criterion, has been reported for chimpanzees and also for other great apes, the [[European Magpie]],<ref>{{cite journal |first = Helmut, Ariane, and Onur |last = Prior, Schwarz, and Güntürkün |title = Mirror-Induced Behavior in the Magpie (Pica pica): Evidence of Self-Recognition |journal = PLoS Biology |publisher = Public Library of Science |year = 2008 |doi = 10.1371/journal.pbio.0060202 |accessdate = 2008-08-21 |url = http://biology.plosjournals.org/archive/1545-7885/6/8/pdf/10.1371_journal.pbio.0060202-L.pdf |volume = 6 |pages = e202 |pmid = 18715117 |last2 = Schwarz |first2 = A |last3 = Güntürkün |first3 = O |issue = 8 |pmc = 2517622 |last4 = De Waal |first4 = Frans | editor1-last=De Waal | editor1-first=Frans }}</ref> some [[cetaceans]] and a solitary [[elephant]], but not for monkeys. The mirror test has attracted controversy among some researchers because it is entirely focused on vision, the primary sense in humans, while other species rely more heavily on other senses such as the [[olfactory]] sense in dogs.{{Citation needed|date=April 2008}}
It has been suggested that [[metacognition]] in some animals provides some evidence for cognitive self-awareness.<ref>{{Cite journal |doi = 10.1037/a0020129 |last = Couchman |first = Justin J. |author2=Coutinho, M. V. C.|author3=Beran, M. J.|author4=Smith, J. D. |title = Beyond Stimulus Cues and Reinforcement Signals: A New Approach to Animal Metacognition |journal = Journal of Comparative Psychology |volume = 124 |issue = 4 |pages = , 356 –368 |year = 2010 |url = http://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/features/com-124-4-356.pdf |pmid = 20836592 |pmc = 2991470 }}</ref> The great apes, dolphins, and [[rhesus monkeys]] have demonstrated the ability to monitor their own mental states and use an "I don't know" response to avoid answering difficult questions. These species might also be aware of the strength of their memories. Unlike the mirror test, which relies primarily on body images and bodily self-awareness, uncertainty monitoring paradigms are focused on the kinds of mental states that might be linked to mental self-awareness.{{Citation needed|date=January 2012}}
A different approach to determine whether a non-human animal is conscious derives from passive speech research with a macaw (see [[Talking Birds#Arielle|Arielle]]). Some researchers propose that by passively listening to an animal's voluntary speech, it is possible to learn about the thoughts of another creature and to determine that the speaker is conscious. This type of research was originally used to investigate a child's [[crib talk|crib speech]] by Weir (1962) and in investigations of early speech in children by Greenfield and others (1976). With speech-capable birds, the methods of passive-speech research open a new avenue for investigation.{{Citation needed|date=January 2012}}
In July, 2012 during the "Consciousness in Human and Nonhuman Animals" conference in Cambridge a group of scientists announced and signed a declaration with the following conclusions:
{{quotation|Convergent evidence indicates that non-human animals have the neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and neurophysiological substrates of conscious states along with the capacity to exhibit intentional behaviors. Consequently, the weight of evidence indicates that humans are not unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness. Non-human animals, including all mammals and birds, and many other creatures, including octopuses, also possess these neurological substrates.<ref name=cdeclaration>{{cite web|title=The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness|url=http://fcmconference.org/img/CambridgeDeclarationOnConsciousness.pdf|accessdate=12 August 2012}}</ref>}}
=== Animal insight ===
{{See also|Reason}}
Along with consciousness comes insight. Do animals have that “outside-the-box” or the “Aha! experience", sometimes called the [[Eureka effect]]? That thinking process that helps them solve everyday problems and help them to adapt in the outside world. Some may argue that this is called instinct, but insight is different. [[Wolfgang Köhler]] is usually credited with introducing the concept of insight into the psychological world.<ref name="psycnet" /> Köhler worked with apes that became masters of solving puzzles he gave them. Köhler followed [[Edward Thorndike]]’s theory that animals solve problems gradually, first finding success through a process of trial and error and slowly becoming more skillful. Köhler came to disagree with this theory saying, “Thorndike’s animals could only escape by chance at first because their structure did not permit other kinds of situations.”<ref name="psycnet" /> More recently, it has been shown that Asian elephants (''Elephas maximus'') may exhibit insightful problem solving. A male was observed moving a box to a position where it could be stood upon to reach food that had been deliberately hung out of reach.<ref>{{cite doi|10.1371/journal.pone.0023251}}</ref>
Contemporary studies of human insight address the cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying problem-solving behavior that fit this definition. In the case of animals, this usually means associative learning. Because we cannot simply ask animals about their “aha” experiences we should define insightful behavior in terms of processes such as mental trial and error or casual understanding.<ref name="psycnet" />
=== Numeracy ===
Some animals are capable of distinguishing between different amounts and rudimentary counting. Elephants have been known to perform simple arithmetic, and rhesus monkeys and pigeons, in some sense, can count.<ref>[http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article4660924.ece Elephants show flair for arithmetic]</ref><ref>[http://www.columbia.edu/cu/psychology/primatecognitionlab/References/BrannonTerrace2000.pdf Representation of the Numerosities 1-9 by Rhesus Macaques (Macaca) mulatto]</ref><ref>[https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpbnxkYW1pYW5zY2FyZnBoZHxneDoyODc0NzAwNTQzMThiNjg2 Pigeons on Par with Primates in Numerical Competence]</ref> Ants are able to use quantitative values and transmit this information.<ref>Zhanna Reznikova, Boris Ryabko, "A Study of Ants' Numerical Competence". ''[[Electronic Transactions on Artificial Intelligence]]'', Issue: Vol. 5(2001): Section B: pp. 111-126</ref><ref>Reznikova, Zh. I. (2007). ''Animal Intelligence: From Individual to Social Cognition''. Cambridge University Press</ref> For instance, ants of several species are able to estimate quite precisely numbers of encounters with members of other colonies on their feeding territories.<ref>Reznikova, Zh. I. (1999). Ethological mechanisms of population dynamic in species ant communities. Russian Journal of Ecology, 30, 3, 187–197</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1 = Brown |first1 = M. J. F. |last2 = Gordon |first2 = D. M. |year = 2000 |title = How resources and encounters affect the distribution of foraging activity in a seed-harvesting ants |journal = Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology |volume = 47 |pages = 195–203 |doi = 10.1007/s002650050011 |issue = 3 }}</ref> Numeracy has been described in the yellow mealworm beetle, ''[[Tenebrio molitor]]'',<ref name="Carazo et al., 2009">{{cite journal |last1 = Carazo |first1 = P. |last2 = Font |first2 = E. |last3 = Forteza-Behrendt |first3 = E. |last4 = Desfilis |first4 = E. et al. | author-separator =, | author-name-separator= |year = 2009 |title = Quantity discrimination in Tenebrio molitor: evidence of numerosity discrimination in an invertebrate? |journal = Animal Cognition |volume = 12 |pages = 463–470 |doi = 10.1007/s10071-008-0207-7 |issue = 3 |pmid = 19118405 }}</ref> and the honeybee.<ref name="Dacke and Srinivasan, 2008">{{cite journal |last1 = Dacke |first1 = M. |last2 = Srinivasan |first2 = M.V. |year = 2008 |title = Evidence for counting in insects |journal = Animal Cognition |volume = 11 |pages = 683–689 |doi = 10.1007/s10071-008-0159-y |pmid = 18504627 |issue = 4 }}</ref>
[[Western lowland gorilla]]s given the choice between two food trays demonstrated the ability to choose the tray with more food items at a rate higher than chance after training.<ref>Anderson, U.S., Stoinski, T.S., Bloomsmith, M.A., Marr, M.J., Smith, A.D., & Maple, T.L. (2005). Relative numerousness judgment and summation in young and old western lowland gorillas" ''Journal of Comparative Psychology'' 119, 285–295.</ref> In a similar task, [[chimpanzee]]s chose the option with larger amount of food.<ref>Boysen S.T., Berntson G.G., Mukobi K.L. (2001) Size matters: impact of item size and quantity on array choice by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) J. Comp. Psychol, 115, 106–110.</ref> [[Salamander]]s given a choice between two displays with differing amounts of fruit flies, used as a food reward, reliably choose the display with more flies, as shown in a particular experiment.<ref>Uller C., Jaeger R., Guidry G., Martin C. (2003) Salamanders (Plethodon cinereus) go for more: rudiments of number in an amphibian. Anim Cogn, 6, 105-112.</ref>
Other experiments have been conducted that show animals’ abilities to differentiate between non-food quantities. [[American black bear]]s demonstrated quantity differentiation abilities in a task with a computer screen. The bears were trained to touch a computer monitor with a paw or nose to choose a quantity of dots in one of two boxes on the screen. Each bear was trained with [[reinforcement]] to pick a larger or smaller amount. During training, the bears were rewarded with food for a correct response. All bears performed better than what random error predicted on the trials with static, non-moving dots, indicating that they could differentiate between the two quantities. The bears choosing correctly in congruent (number of dots coincided with area of the dots) and incongruent (number of dots did not coincide with area of the dots) trials suggests that they were indeed choosing between quantities that appeared on the screen, not just a larger or smaller [[retina|retinal image]], which would indicate they are only judging size.<ref>Vonk J., Beran M.J. (2012) Bears ‘count’ too: quantity estimation and comparison in black bears, Ursus americanus, Animal Behaviour, 84, 1, 231-238.</ref>
[[Bottlenose dolphin]]s have shown the ability to choose an array with fewer dots compared to one with more dots. Experimenters set up two boards showing various numbers of dots in a poolside setup. The dolphins were initially trained to choose the board with the fewer number of dots. This was done by rewarding the dolphin when it chose the board with the fewer number of dots. In the experimental trials, two boards were set up, and the dolphin would emerge from the water and point to one board. The dolphins chose the arrays with fewer dots at a rate much larger than chance, indicating they can differentiate between quantities.<ref>Jaakkola K., Fellner W., Erb L., Rodriguez M., Guarino E. (2005) Understanding of the concept of numerically "less" by bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops truncatus) Journal of Comparative Psychology, 119, 286–303.</ref>
A particular [[African Grey Parrot|grey parrot]], after training, has shown the ability to differentiate between the numbers zero through six using [[Talking bird|vocalizations]]. After number and vocalization training, this was done by asking the parrot how many objects there were in a display. The parrot was able to identify the correct amount at a rate higher than chance.<ref>Pepperberg I. (2006) Grey parrot numerical competence: a review. Anim Cogn, 9, 377–391.</ref>
[[Pterophyllum|Angelfish]], when put in an unfamiliar environment will group together with conspecifics, an action named [[Shoaling and schooling|shoaling]]. Given the choice between two groups of differing size, the angelfish will choose the larger of the two groups. This can be seen with a discrimination ratio of 2:1 or greater, such that, as long as one group has at least twice the fish as another group, it will join the larger one.<ref>Gómez-Laplaza, L.M. & Gerlai, R. (2010). Can angelfish (Pterophyllum scalare) count? Discrimination between different shoal sizes follows Weber’s law. Anim. Cogn, 14, 1-9.</ref>
[[Monitor lizard]]s have been shown to be capable of numeracy, and some species can distinguish among numbers up to six.<ref>King, Dennis & Green, Brian. 1999. ''Goannas: The Biology of Varanid Lizards''. University of New South Wales Press. ISBN 0-86840-456-X, p. 43.</ref>
==Biological constraints==
[[File:AB003 Hedgehog from Rajasthan.jpg|right|200px|thumb|Hedgehogs instinctively roll into a ball when threatened, making them unsuitable for studies on aversion avoidance]]
Instinctive tendencies should be considered during interpretation of results from experiments on animal cognition. For example, dogs and rats easily learn to avoid an electric shock from the floor by moving to another part of the experimental chamber when they hear a tone preceding the shock. However, [[hedgehog]]s fail to learn this avoidance behavior. Whilst this might seem to show an inability to learn, the hedgehog's instinctive reaction to a threat is to curl up into a ball, a response that interferes with possible escape behavior in this situation.
[[Instinctive drift]] is another biological constraint that can influence interpretation of animal cognition studies. Instinctive drift is the tendency of an animal to revert to [[instinctive behavior]]s that can interfere with learned responses. The concept originated with [[Keller Breland|Keller]] and [[Marian Breland|Marian]] Breland when they taught a [[raccoon]] to put coins into a box. The raccoon drifted to its instinctive behavior of rubbing the coins with its paws, as it would do when forging for food.<ref name="Breland and Breland, (1961)">Breland, K. and Breland, M. (1961). The misbehavior of organisms" ''American Psychologist'' 16: 681-684</ref>
== Cognitive faculty by species ==
A common image is the ''[[Great chain of being|scala naturae]]'', the ladder of nature on which animals of different species occupy successively higher rungs, with humans typically at the top.<ref name=campbell1991snr>Campbell, C.B.G., & Hodos, W. (1991). The Scala Naturae revisited: Evolutionary scales and anagenesis in comparative psychology. J. Comp. Psychol. 105:211-221</ref>
A more fruitful approach has been to recognize that different animals may have different kinds of cognitive processes, which are better understood in terms of the ways in which they are cognitively adapted to their different ecological niches, than by positing any kind of hierarchy. (See [[Sara Shettleworth|Shettleworth]] (1998), Reznikova (2007).)
One question that can be asked coherently is how far different species are intelligent in the same ways as humans are, i.e., are their cognitive processes similar to ours. Not surprisingly, our closest biological relatives, the [[great ape]]s, tend to do best on such an assessment. Among the birds, [[corvid]]s and parrots have typically been found to perform well. [[Octopod]]es have also been shown to exhibit a number of higher-level skills such as tool use,<ref>{{cite journal |doi = 10.1016/j.cub.2009.10.052 |title = Defensive tool use in a coconut-carrying octopus |year = 2009 |last1 = Finn |first1 = Julian K. |last2 = Tregenza |first2 = Tom |last3 = Norman |first3 = Mark D. |journal = Current Biology |volume = 19 |issue = 23 |pages = R1069–70 |pmid = 20064403 }}</ref> but the amount of research on [[cephalopod intelligence]] is still limited.{{Citation needed|date=January 2012}}
[[Baboon]]s have been shown to be capable of recognizing words.<ref>[http://www.nature.com/news/baboons-can-learn-to-recognize-words-1.10432 Baboons can learn to recognize words; Monkeys' ability suggests that reading taps into general systems of pattern recognition] 12 April 2012 [[Nature (journal)|Nature]]</ref><ref>[http://www.latimes.com/news/science/la-sci-word-recognition-20120413,0,5510844.story Baboons can recognize written words, study finds; The monkeys don't assign meaning to them, but learn what letter combinations are common to real words, the study authors say] April 12, 2012 [[Los Angeles Times]]</ref><ref>[http://www.sciencenews.org/view/generic/id/339869/title/Baboons_show_their_word_skills Baboons show their word skills; Reading may stem from a visual aptitude shared by all primates] May 5, 2012</ref>
== See also ==
{{Portal|Thinking|Animals|Animal rights}}
* [[Anthropomorphism]]
* [[Cetacean intelligence]]
* [[Deception in animals]]
* [[Dog intelligence]]
* [[Pain in invertebrates#Cognitive abilities|Cognitive abilities]]
{{-}}
==References==
{{reflist|35em}}
== Further reading ==
* Brown, M.F., & Cook, R.G. (Eds.). (2006). Animal Spatial Cognition: Comparative, Neural, and Computational Approaches. [On-line]. Available: www.pigeon.psy.tufts.edu/asc/
* Goodall, J. (1991). ''Through a window''. London: Penguin.
* Griffin, D. R. (1992). ''Animal minds''. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
* Hilgard, E. R. (1958). ''Theories of learning'', 2nd edn. London: Methuen.
* Neisser, U. (1967). ''Cognitive psychology''. New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts.
* Romanes, G. J. (1886). ''Animal intelligence'', 4th edn. London: Kegan Paul, Trench.
* Shettleworth, S. J. (1998) (2010,2nd ed). ''Cognition, evolution and behavior''. New York: Oxford University Press.
* Skinner, B. F. (1969). ''Contingencies of reinforcement: a theoretical analysis''. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
* Narby, Jeremy. (2005) ''Intelligence In Nature''. New York: Penguin.
* Lurz, Robert W. (2009) [http://www.themontrealreview.com/2009/Mindreading-animals.php ''Mindreading Animals: The Debate over What Animals Know about Other Minds'']. The MIT Press.
== External links ==
* [http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=the-limits-of-intelligence The limits of intelligence] Douglas Fox, ''[[Scientific American]]'', 14 June 2011.
* {{Sep entry|cognition-animal|Animal Cognition|Kristin Andrews}}
* {{Sep entry|consciousness-animal|Animal Consciousness|Colin Allen}}
* [http://www.animalcognition.net/home.html Animal Cognition Network]
* {{IEP|ani-mind|Animal Minds}}
* [http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/biosciaviancog/ Center for Avian Cognition] University of Nebraska ([[Alan Kamil]], Alan Bond)
{{animal cognition|state=expanded}}
{{Animal communication}}
{{Great ape language}}
{{DEFAULTSORT:Animal Cognition}} -->
=Comparazioni con la neurobiologia=
Riga 264 ⟶ 554:
Viene detta intelligenza la capacità [[cognizione|cognitiva]] che permette ad un soggetto (individuo o animale) di comprendere l'ambiente e la propria interiorità, di adattarsi e di fronteggiare con successo nuove situazioni. In altre parole l'intelligenza è la capacità [[psiche|psichica]] e [[mente|mentale]] che permette - sulla base di informazioni e di [[memoria (psicologia)|ricordi]] già posseduti - di formulare autonomamente le informazioni e le idee necessarie per raggiungere i propri obiettivi (i quali non dovranno essere necessariamente consci o esplicitati)
Riga 275 ⟶ 565:
L'intelligenza è l'insieme di tutte le [[funzioni psichiche]]
Essa si percepisce nella capacità di comprendere, adattarsi e fronteggiare con successo nuove situazioni e può dunque essere concepita come una capacità di [[adattamento]] all'ambiente.
In particolare, l'intelligenza permette di rilevare o cogliere relazioni problematiche, contrasti e di risolvere autonomamente i problemi nuovi (effettivi, potenziali); comporta inoltre la capacità di prevedere e scongiurare il verificarsi di situazioni future negative, o di evitarlo (non necessariamente in maniera conscia), per merito delle proprie elaborazioni di informazioni, [[memoria (psicologia)|ricordi]] e/o [[sensazione|dati percettivi]], invece che unicamente per merito di un richiamo/riapplicazione automatico/a di informazioni o comportamenti pregressi.
L'[[Homo sapiens|Uomo]] è dotato di intelligenza concettuale: la [[comprensione]] per ''[[Homo Sapiens]]'' passa attraverso l'uso dei [[concetto|concetti]], ovvero di [[parola|parole]] a cui associare dei significati. La capacità di [[linguaggio]] è dunque un aspetto fondamentale dell'intelligenza umana, che permette, tra l'altro, il ragionamento complesso e astratto.<ref>Sorgenti: ↑ : Dictionnaire Encyclopédique Alpha, dictionnaires Larousse et Robert. Pour le raisonnement, dictionnaire en ligne TLFI ↑ Prolégomènes, tome II, page 323 http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/Ibn_Khaldoun/Prolegomenes_t2/ibn_pro_II.pdf [archive] ↑ Jean Piaget, La Construction du Réel, 1936 ↑ A formal definition of intelligence based on an intensional variant of Kolmogorov complexity, Jose Hernandez-orallo, Proceedings of the International Symposium of Engineering of Intelligent Systems (EIS'98). ↑ Marcus Hutter, « A Theory of Universal Artificial Intelligence based on Algorithmic Complexity », dans cs/0004001, 2000-04-03 [texte intégral [archive] (page consultée le 2010-03-11)] ↑ (en) Marcus Hutter, Universal Artificial Intelligence: Sequential Decisions Based On Algorithmic Probability, Berlin, SpringerVerlag, 2005 (ISBN 978-3-540-22139-5) (LCCN 2004112980) [lire en ligne [archive] (page consultée le 2010-04-30)] ↑ R. J Solomonoff, « A Formal Theory of Inductive Inference. Part I », dans Information and Control, vol. 7, no 1, 1964, p. 1-22 ↑ J. Veness, « A Monte Carlo AIXI Approximation », dans Arxiv preprint arXiv:0909.0801, 2009 ↑ a et b Aljoscha Neubauer, Les mille facettes de l'intelligence, Pour la Science, Cerveau & psycho, n°1, page 49.</ref>
Comportamenti assimilabili a quelli indotti dall'intelligenza animale sono riscontrabili anche nelle [[Plantæ|piante]], mentre i settori di [[ricerca scientifica|ricerca]] legati al campo dell'[[intelligenza artificiale]] tentano di creare delle [[macchina|macchine]] che siano in grado di riprodurre tali comportamenti.
Riga 297 ⟶ 587:
<del>Una definizione di intelligenza dotata delle qualità di sintesi, completezza e condivisione universale da parte della [[comunità scientifica]] è in verità ancora lontana dall'essere raggiungibile: la varietà delle manifestazioni comportamentali umane e animali associabili all'intelligenza è infatti estremamente ampia, dando adito, piuttosto, ad una pluralità di definizioni anche in seno [[Università|accademico]].</del>
<del>Tra i molti enunciati forniti, si segnala per importanza quello pubblicato su ''Mainstream Science on Intelligence'', una dichiarazione editoriale del 1994 firmata da cinquantadue ricercatori:</del>
Riga 337 ⟶ 627:
{{nota disambigua|altri significati|[[Intelligenza (disambigua)]]}}
L''''intelligenza''' è l'insieme di tutte le [[funzioni psichiche]]/[[mente|mentali]] che permettono ad un soggetto (individuo o animale) di capire cose ed eventi, scoprendo le relazioni che intercorrono tra di essi ed arrivando ad una conoscenza [[concetto|concettuale]] e razionale (ovvero non [[sensazione|percettiva]] o [[intuizione|intuitiva]]).
Essa si percepisce nella capacità di comprendere, adattarsi e fronteggiare con successo nuove situazioni, e può dunque essere concepita anche come una capacità di [[adattamento]] all'ambiente. In particolare, l'intelligenza permette di rilevare o cogliere relazioni problematiche e contrasti, di identificare i problemi nuovi, di risolverli autonomamente e di risolverli nel modo più appropriato alle situazioni in cui sono immersi; da essa consegue inoltre la capacità di un soggetto di prevedere e scongiurare, o evitare (non necessariamente in maniera conscia), il verificarsi di situazioni future negative, per merito delle proprie elaborazioni di informazioni, [[memoria (psicologia)|ricordi]] e/o [[sensazione|dati percettivi]] (ovvero, non unicamente per merito di un/una richiamo/riapplicazione automatico/a di informazioni o comportamenti pregressi).
Le [[Plantæ|piante]] presentano comportamenti che sono assimilabili a quelli indotti dall'intelligenza animale; i settori di [[ricerca scientifica|ricerca]] legati al campo dell'[[intelligenza artificiale]] tentano di creare delle [[macchina|macchine]] in grado di produrre anch'esse comportamenti intelligenti.
Riga 344 ⟶ 634:
<del>L''intelligenza'' è l'insieme di tutte le funzioni e facoltà [[funzioni psichiche|psichiche]]
<del>L'intelligenza si percepisce nella capacità di capire, scoprendo le relazioni intercorrenti tra elementi ed arrivando ad una conoscenza [[concetto|concettuale]] e razionale (ovvero non [[sensazione|percettiva]] o [[intuizione|intuitiva]]), consente di rilevare o cogliere relazioni problematiche e contrasti, di risolvere autonomamente i problemi nuovi e di risolverli nel modo più appropriato alle situazioni in cui sono immersi, e in base al suo grado di evoluzione può esprimersi anche nelle capacità di ragionare, di pensare in maniera astratta, di pianificare, di generare la previsione e prevenzione, o evitamento (non necessariamente conscio), del verificarsi di situazioni future negative sulla base di proprie elaborazioni di informazioni, [[memoria (psicologia)|ricordi]] e/o [[sensazione|dati percettivi]], piuttosto che unicamente tramite richiami/riapplicazioni automatici/automatiche di informazioni o comportamenti pregressi.</del>
<del>Si è riscontrato che anche le [[Plantæ|piante]] presentano comportamenti che sono assimilabili ad alcuni di quelli indotti dall'intelligenza animale, mentre i settori di [[ricerca scientifica|ricerca]] legati al campo dell'[[intelligenza artificiale]] tentano di creare delle [[macchina|macchine]] che siano in grado di produrre anch'esse comportamenti intelligenti.</del>
{{nota disambigua}}
L''''intelligenza''' attualmente non è [[#Definizioni scientifiche|ufficialmente]] definita; attenendosi al [[#Etimologia|significato etimologico del termine]] è però possibile identificarla come:
* Quel complesso di funzionalità e abilità [[psiche|psichiche]] e [[mente|mentali]] che consente ad un soggetto in primo luogo di ''capire'', ovvero di giungere autonomamente a delle [[conoscenza|conoscenze]] reali (che possono riguardare anche il modo di raggiungere degli obiettivi) grazie a propri trattamenti delle informazioni;
O come:
* La capacità generale di capire in sé.
Si tratta, in ogni caso, di quella proprietà [[cognizione|cognitiva]] che sottende alla ''buona'' esecuzione di tutte quelle attività del [[pensiero]] che implichino un "lavorare sulle informazioni che si possiede per ''andare oltre''"<ref name=generale>''[http://books.google.it/books?id=GpW9Le42bysC&pg=PA215&lpg=PA215&dq=%22di+pensare+bene%22+%26+%22intelligenza%22&source=bl&ots=nxn_INV_eh&sig=am-nOxlKN-dgQAa0tDNxt8yfYAo&hl=it&sa=X&ei=gzeXUt2UCcPDyQO_ooCwBQ&ved=0CEAQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=%22di%20pensare%20bene%22%20%26%20%22intelligenza%22&f=false Manuale di psicologia generale]'', p. 215.</ref> (attività del pensiero di cui degli esempi comprendono trarre delle conclusioni a partire da ciò che è noto, fare previsioni riguardo al futuro, elaborare giudizi, risolvere problemi in precedenza mai incontrati, scoprire nelle situazioni vissute aspetti prima non considerati, inventare prodotti nuovi<ref name=generale></ref> che risultino soddisfacenti). Funzione che si percepisce nella capacità di comprendere, adattarsi e fronteggiare con successo nuove situazioni, l'intelligenza può inoltre essere concepita anche come una capacità di adattamento attivo all'ambiente.
L'intelligenza è, inoltre, caratteristica propria in primo luogo dell'[[homo sapiens|uomo]] e delle specie animali; studi recenti testimoniano, tuttavia, che le [[Plantæ|piante]] presentano anch'esse dei comportamenti che sembrano rinviabili a forme di "capacità di capire"; e il termine "intelligenza" è oggi usato anche in riferimento alle [[macchina|macchine]], [[#L.27intelligenza_artificiale|il campo di ricerca dell'"intelligenza artificiale"]] tentante, infatti, di creare delle macchine che siano in grado di riprodurre l'intelligenza biologica almeno in alcuni aspetti.
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