|
<center>
{| cellpadding="1" cellspacing="1" style="width:50%; border:1px solid #E0B030; margin-bottom:0em; vertical-align:center; background-color:#E0F050;"
|<big>'''TRADUZIONE IN CORSO DA [[:en:Conflict in the Niger Delta|EN.WIKI]]'''</big>
|}</center>
Il conflitto del delta del Niger è nato nei primi anni 90 a causa di tensioni tra le multinazionali produttrici di petrolio ed un numero di gruppi etnici della zona del delta che si sono sentiti defraudati e sfruttati, in particolare il gruppo degli Ogoni e quello degli [[Ijaw]]. I contrasti politici ed etnici sono continuati per tutti gli anni 90 a dispetto della conversione alla democrazia e dell'elezione dle governo di [[Obasanjo]] nel 1999. La competizione per la conquista dell'oro nero ha portato ad innumerevoli violenze fra gruppi etnici causando la militarizzazione dell'intera regione che è stata occupata da milizie quali l'esercito della Nigeria e forze di polizia (tra cui la Polizia Mobile paramilitare, MOPOL). Le vittime di crimini legate al conflitto quasi sempre evitano di cercare giustizia con azioni legali a causa della dilagante impunità degli esecutori e dei responsabili di questi [[crimini contro l'umanità|abusi dei diritti umani]]. Ciò ha creato un devastante circolo vizioso di violenza facendo degenerare il conflitto in vere e proprie guerriglie a sfondo etnico. I conflitti a livello regionale ed a sfondo etnico sono così numerosie diversificati che è pressochè impossibile e poco pratico farne una catalogazione dettagliata.
=== Il petrolio come causa di fondo ===
[[Image:NigerDeltaStates.png|thumb|325px|Mappa della Nigeria che mostra gli stati tipicamente considerati facenti parte del delta del Niger: 1. [[Abia]], 2. [[Akwa Ibom]], 3. [[Bayelsa]], 4. [[Cross River]], 5. [[Delta (stato)|Delta]], 6. [[Edo (stato)|Edo]], 7.[[Imo (stato)|Imo]], 8. [[Ondo]], 9. [[Rivers]].]]
La Nigeria, dopo circa quattro decenni di produzione ininterrotta di petrolio, è diventata, dagli inizi degli anni novanta, completamente dipendente a livello economico dall'estrazione petrolifera, generando con la produzione del grezzo il 40% del [[prodotto interno lordo]] (2000). A dispetto delle incredibili ricchezze generate dal petrolio, i benefici della produzione di questa materia prima hanno toccato marginalmente la popolazione nativa che solo lentamente, dagli anni sessanta in poi, hanno cominicato ad abbandonare le campagne e quella che è sempre stata la loro attività principale: l'agricoltura. La produzione annuale di prodotti agricoli è crollata nell'ultima decade del XX secolo; la produzione di cacao è diminuita del 43% (la Nigeria era una delle più grandi esportatrici di cacao negli anni sessanta); la produzione del grano è diminuita del 29%, quella del cotone del 65%, quella di arachidi del 64%. <ref name=vultures>[Where Vultures Feast](Okonta and Douglas, 2001)</ref>. A differenza del pur considerevole numero di nigeriani impiegati nell'industria petrolifera, la maggior parte degli strati della popolazione, specialmente di quella del delta del Niger, sono rimasti poveri e degradati esattamente come negli anni sessanta.
Il delta del Niger ha una popolazione stabilmente in crescita stimata in circa 30 milioni di persone (2005), il 23% circa della popolazione totale della Nigeria. La densità abitativa è tra le più alte del mondo con 265 individui per chilometro quadrato (riferimento: [[Commissione per lo sviluppo del Delta del Niger]], NDDC). Questa popolazione si sta espandendo al ritmo del 3% all'annao e la capitale del petrolio, [[Port Harcourt]], sta subendo una enorme crescita urbana. La povertà e l'urbanizzazione hanno portato ad uno stato in cui la corruzione è un fatto acquisito. Lo scenario risultante vede una incredibile urbanizzazione non accompagnata da sviluppo economico; di qui la disoccupazione a livelli intollerabili. La popolazione è stata forzata a distruggere lo stesso ecosistema che era basilare per il loro sostentamento<ref name=vultures/>.
=== Il caso degli Ogoni (1992-1995) ===
La zona del gruppo etnico degli Ogoni è un'area di 404 miglia quadrate situata nel sud-est del delta del Niger. Giacimenti di petrolio furono scoperte nelle terre degli Ogoni nel 1957, appena un anno dopo la scoperta del primo deposito di grezzo di tutta la Nigeria. Ciò ha portato, nei due decenni successivi, la Shell e la Chevron ad insediarsi stabilmente nella regione. Il popolo degli Ogoni, una minoranza etnica di circa mezzo milione di individui, è stata costretta ad abbandonare la loro terra per lasciarla alle multinazionali senza nessun preavviso o consultazione preventiva. Quasta azione è stata supportata inoltre da una legge costituzionale che ha reso il governo nigeriano l'unico proprietario e l'unico detentore dei diritti di tutto il territorio nigeriano; il compenso per l'abbandono delle terre di origine sarebbe stato valutato in base al valore dei raccolti prodotti nella regione al tempo dell'acquisizione e non sul valore effettivo degli stessi appezzamenti. Il governo nigeriano avrebbe poi potuto distribuire le terre alle compagnie petrolifere, calpestando ogni forma di diritto umano e scatenando la scintilla per gli attuali conflitti, etnici e non<ref name=HRW99>[http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nigeria The Price of Oil: Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria's Oil Producing Communities] (Human Rights Watch, 1999)</ref>.
The [[1970s]] and [[1980s]] saw the government's empty promises of benefits for the Niger Delta peoples fall through, with the Ogoni growing increasing dissatisfied and their environmental, social, and economic apparatus rapidly deteriorating the [[Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People]] (MOSOP) was formed in 1992. MOSOP, spearheaded by Ogoni playwright and author [[Ken Saro-Wiwa]], became the major campaigning organization representing the [[Ogoni people]] in their struggle for ethnic and environmental rights. Its primary targets, and at times adversaries, have been the Nigerian government and the oil company [[Royal Dutch Shell]].
[[Image:Flag of the Ogoni people.svg|thumb|Ogoni Flag created by [[Ken Saro-Wiwa]]]]
Beginning in December 1992, the conflict between Ogonis and the oil infrastructure escalated to a level of greater seriousness and intensity on both sides. Both parties began carrying out acts of violence and MOSOP issued an ultimatum to the oil companies (Shell, [[Chevron Corporation|Chevron]], and the [[Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation]]) which demanded some $10 billion in accumulated [[royalties]], damages and compensation, and "immediate stoppage of environmental degradation," and negotiations for mutual agreement on all future drilling.
The Ogonis threatened to embark on mass action to disrupt their operation if the companies failed to comply. By this act, the Ogoni shifted the focus of their actions from an unresponsive federal government to the oil companies engaged in their own region. The rationale for this assignment of responsibility were the benefits accrued by the oil companies from extracting the natural wealth of the Ogoni homeland, and neglect from central government.
The government responded by banning public gatherings and declaring that disturbances of oil production were acts of treason. Oil extraction from the territory had slowed to a trickle of 10,000 barrels per day (.5% of the national total). However, because the withdrawal was a temporary security measure, it provided the government with a compelling reason to 'restore order'.
Military repression escalated in May 1994. On [[May 21]], soldiers and mobile policemen appeared in most Ogoni villages. On that day, four Ogoni chiefs (all on the conservative side of a schism within MOSOP over strategy) were brutally murdered. Saro-Wiwa, head of the opposing faction, had been denied entry to Ogoniland on the day of the murders, but he was detained in connection with the killings. The occupying forces, led by Major [[Paul Okuntimo]] of [[Rivers State]] Internal Security, claimed to be 'searching for those directly responsible for the killings of the four Ogonis.' However, witnesses say that they engaged in terror operations against the general Ogoni population. [[Amnesty International]] characterized the policy as deliberate terrorism. By mid-June, 30 villages had been completely destroyed, 600 people had been detained, and at least 40 had been killed. An eventual total of around 100,000 internal refugees and an estimated 2,000 civilian deaths was recorded.
In [[May 1994]], nine activists from the movement who would become known as 'The Ogoni Nine', among them [[Ken Saro-Wiwa]], were arrested and accused of incitement to murder following the deaths of four Ogoni elders. Saro-Wiwa and his comrades denied the charges, but were imprisoned for over a year before being found guilty and sentenced to death by a specially convened tribunal, hand-selected by General [[Sani Abacha]], on [[10 November]] [[1995]]. The activists were denied [[due process]] and upon being found guilty, were executed via hanging by the Nigerian state.
The executions were met with an immediate international response. The trial was widely criticised by human rights organisations and the governments of other states, who condemned the Nigerian government's long history of detaining their critics, mainly pro-democracy and other political activists. The [[Commonwealth of Nations]], which had also plead for clemency, suspended Nigeria's membership in response. The [[United States]], the [[United Kingdom]], and the [[European Union|EU]] all implemented sanctions, however, none of these had an impact on oil production.
[[Royal Dutch Shell|Shell]] asked the Nigerian government for clemency towards those found guilty, but its request was refused. However, a 2001 [[Greenpeace]] report found that "two witnesses that accused them [Saro-Wiwa and the other activists] later admitted that Shell and the military had bribed them with promises of money and jobs at Shell. Shell admitted having given money to the Nigerian military, who brutally tried to silence the voices which claimed justice"<ref name=Greenpeace>[http://archive.greenpeace.org/toxics/reports/shellreport.pdf Contamination in Paulina by Aldrin, Dieldrin, Endrin and other toxic chemicals produced and disposed of by Shell Chemicals of Brazil] (Greenpeace, 2001)</ref>.
[[As of 2006]], the situation in Ogoniland has eased significantly, progressed by the transition to democratic rule in [[1999]]. However, no attempts have been made by the government or an international body to bring about justice by investigating and prosecuting those involved in the violence and property destruction that have occurred in Ogoniland. <ref name=HRW02>[http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/nigeria3/nigerdelta.pdf THE NIGER DELTA: NO DEMOCRATIC DIVIDEND] (Human Rights Watch, 2002)</ref>.
=== Ijaw-Itsekiri Conflicts (1997) ===
The late 1990s saw an increase in the number and severity of clashes between militants of the [[Ijaw]] ethnic group, the largest in the entire Delta region with a population of over 7 million, and those of [[Itsekiri]] origin whose number is only about 450,000. The conflict between the two groups has been particularly intense in the major town of [[Warri, Nigeria|Warri]].
While the Ijaw and the Itsekiri have lived alongside each other for centuries, for the most part harmoniously, the Itsekiri were first to make contact with European traders, as early as the 16th century, and they were more aggressive both in seeking Western education and in using the knowledge acquired to press their commercial advantages; until the arrival of Sir [[George Taubman Goldie|George Goldie]]'s National Africa Company (later renamed the [[Royal Niger Company]]) in 1879, Itsekiri chieftains monopolized trade with Europeans in the Western Niger region. Despite the loss of their monopoly, the advantages already held by the Itsekiri ensured that they continued to enjoy a superior position to that held by the Ijaw, breeding in the latter a sense of resentment at what they felt to be colonial favoritism towards the Itsekiri.
The departure of the British at independence did not lead, as might have been expected, to a decrease in tensions between the Ijaw and the Itsekiri. With the discovery of large [[petroleum|oil]] reserves in the Niger Delta region in the late 1950s, a new bone of contention was introduced, as the ability to claim ownership of a given piece of land now promised to yield immense benefits in terms of jobs and infrastructural benefits to be provided by the oil companies. Despite this new factor, rivalry between the Ijaw and the Itsekiri did not actually escalate to the level of violent conflict between the two groups until the late 1990s, when the death of General [[Sani Abacha]] in 1997 led to a re-emergence of local politics.
The issue of local government ward allocation has proven particularly contentious, as the Ijaw feel that the way in which wards have been allocated ensures that their superior numbers will not be reflected in the number of wards controlled by politicians of Ijaw ethnicity. Control of the city of Warri, the largest metropolitan area in Delta State and therefore a prime source of political patronage, has been an especially fiercely contested prize. This has given birth to heated disputes between the Ijaw, the Itsekiri and the [[Urhobo]] about which of the three groups are "truly" indigenous to the Warri region, with the underlying presumption being that the "real" indigenes should have control of the levers of power, regardless of the fact that all three groups enjoy ostensibly equal political rights in their places of residence.
=== Ijaw unrest (1998-1999) ===
The December 1998 All Ijaw Youths Conference crystallized the Ijaws' struggle for petroleum resource control with the formation of the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) and the issuing of the Kaiama Declaration. In it, long-held Ijaw concerns about the loss of control of their homeland and their own lives to the oil companies were joined with a commitment to direct action. In the declaration, and in a letter to the companies, the Ijaws called for oil companies to suspend operations and withdraw from Ijaw territory. The IYC pledged “to struggle peacefully for freedom, self-determination and ecological justice,” and prepared a campaign of celebration, prayer, and direct action '[[Operation Climate Change]]' beginning December 28.
In December 1998, two warships and 10-15,000 Nigerian troops occupied Bayelsa and Delta states as the [[Ijaw Youth Congress]] (IYC) mobilized for [[Operation Climate Change]]. Soldiers entering the Bayelsa state capital of Yenagoa announced they had come to attack the youths trying to stop the oil companies. On the morning of December 30, two thousand young people processed through Yenagoa, dressed in black, singing and dancing. Soldiers opened fire with rifles, machine guns, and tear gas, killing at least three protesters and arresting twenty-five more. After a march demanding the release of those detained was turned back by soldiers, three more protesters were shot dead including Nwashuku Okeri and Ghadafi Ezeifile. The military declared a state of emergency throughout Bayelsa state, imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew, and banned meetings. At military roadblocks, local residents were severely beaten or detained. At night, soldiers invaded private homes, terrorizing residents with beatings and women and girls with rape.
On January 4, 1999 about one hundred soldiers from the military base at [[Chevron Corporation|Chevron]]’s Escravos facility attacked Opia and Ikiyan, two Ijaw communities in Delta State. Bright Pablogba, the traditional leader of Ikiyan, who came to the river to negotiate with the soldiers, was shot along with a seven-year-old girl and possibly dozens of others. Of the approximately 1,000 people living in the two villages, four people were found dead and sixty-two were still missing months after the attack. The same soldiers set the villages ablaze, destroyed canoes and fishing equipment, killed livestock, and destroyed churches and religious shrines.
Nonetheless, Operation Climate Change continued, and disrupted Nigerian oil supplies through much of 1999 by turning off valves through Ijaw territory. In the context of high conflict between the Ijaw and the Nigerian Federal Government (and its police and army), the military carried out the [[Odi massacre]], killing scores if not hundreds of Ijaws.
Subsequent actions by Ijaws against the oil industry included both renewed efforts at nonviolent action and militarized attacks on foreign oil workers.
=== The Creation of the Niger Delta Development Commission (2000) ===
The [[Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC)]] was established by president, [[Olusegun Obasanjo]] with the sole mandate of developing the oil-rich Niger-Delta region of southern Nigeria. Since its inauguration, the [[Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC)|NDDC]] has focused on the development of social and physical infrastructures, ecological/environmental remediation and human development.
=== The emergence of armed groups in the Delta region (2003-2004) ===
The ethnic unrest and conflicts of the late 1990s (such as those between the Ijaw and Itsekiri), coupled with a spike in the availability of small arms and other weapons, led increasingly to the militarization of the Delta. By this time, local and state officials had become involved by offering financial support to those paramilitary groups they believed would attempt to enforce their own political agenda. Conflagrations have been concentrated primarily in [[Delta State (Nigeria)|Delta]] and [[Rivers State]]s.
Prior to [[2003]], the epicenter of regional violence was [[Warri, Nigeria|Warri]]. However, after the violent convergence of the largest military groups in the region, the [[Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force]] ('''NDPVF''') led by [[Mujahid Dokubo-Asari]] and the [[Niger Delta Vigilante]] ('''NDV''') led by [[Ateke Tom]] (both of which are comprised primarily of [[Ijaw]]s), conflict became focused on [[Port Harcourt]] and outlying towns. The two groups dwarf a plethora of smaller militias supposedly numbering more than one hundred. The Nigerian government classifies these groups as "cults", many of which began as local university [[fraternities]]. The groups have adopted names largely based on [[Western civilization|Western]] culture, some of which include Icelanders, Greenlanders, KKK, and Vultures. All of the groups are constituted mostly by disaffected young men from Warri, Port Harcourt, and their sub-urban areas. Although the smaller groups are autonomous from within, they have formed alliances with and are largely controlled from above by either Asari and his NDPDF or Tom's NDV who provided military support and instruction.
The NDPVF which was founded by Asari, a former president of the Ijaw Youth Council, in 2003 after he "retreated into the bush" to form the group with the explicit goal of acquiring control of regional petroleum resources. The NDPFV attempted to control such resources primarily through oil "bunkering", a process in which an oil [[Pipeline transport|pipeline]] is tapped and the oil extracted onto a barge. Bunkering is illegal in the eyes of both the Nigerian state and the oil corporations, but is justified by the militias on the basis that they are being exploited and have not received adequate profits from the monstrously profitable but ecologically destructive oil industry. Bunkered oil can still however be sold for profit, usually to destinations in [[West Africa]], but also abroad. Bunkering is a fairly common practice in the Delta but in this case the militia groups are the primary 'perpetrators'.<ref name=HRW05>[http://hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/nigeria0205/index.htm Rivers and Blood: Guns, Oil and Power in Nigeria’s Rivers State] (Human Rights Watch, 2005)</ref>.
The intense confrontation between the NDPVF and NDV seems to have been brought about by Asari’s political falling out with the NDPVF’s financial supporter [[Peter Odili]], governor of [[Rivers State]] following the [[April 2003]] local and state elections. After Asari publicly criticized the election process as fraudulent, the Odili government withdrew its financial support from the NDPVF and began to support Tom’s NDV, effectively launching a paramilitary campaign against the NDPVF.
Subsequent violence occurred chiefly in riverine villages southeast and southwest of Port Harcourt, with the two groups fighting for control of bunkering routes. The conflagrations spurred violent acts against the local population, resulting in numerous deaths and widespread displacement. Daily civilian life became totally disrupted, forcing schools and economic activity to shut down and resulting in widespread destruction of property.
The state campaign against the NDPVF emboldened Asari who began publicly articulating populist, anti-government views and attempted to frame the conflict in terms of pan-Ijaw nationalism and “self-determination”. Consequently the state government felt the escalated the campaign against him by bringing in [[Nigerian Mobile Police|police]], [[Army of Nigeria|army]], and [[Navy of Nigeria|navy]] forces that began occupation of the Port Harcourt in [[June 2004]].
The government forces openly collaborated with the NDV during the summer months, and were seen protecting NDV militiamen from attacks by the NDPVF. The state forces also not only failed to protect the civilian population from the violence, but actually increased the destruction of human livelihood and property. The Nigerian state forces were widely reported to have used the conflict as an excuse to raid the homes of villagers, claiming that innocent civilians were cahoots with the NDPVF. Government soldiers and police obtained and destroyed civilian property by force. The NDPVF also accused the military of conducting air bombing campaigns against several villages, effectively reducing them to rubble, because it was believed to be housing NDPVF soldiers (the military officially denied this, claiming they had engaged in aerial warfare only once in a genuine effort to wipe out an NDPVF stronghold).
The brutality of the fighting also precipitated several situations where innocent civilians were killed by NDPVF forces firing indiscriminately in order to engage their opponents. While at the end of [[August 2004]] there were several particularly brutal battles over the Port Harcourt waterfront in which residential slums were completely destroyed, with the NDPVF deliberately burning down buildings as a matter of strategy. By [[September 2004]], the situation was rapidly approaching a violent climax which caught the attention of the international community<ref name=HRW05/>.
=== The Nigerian oil crisis ===
After the launching of a mission to wipe out NDPVF, officially approved by [[President of Nigeria|President]] [[Olusegun Obasanjo]] in early September, [[Mujahid Dokubo-Asari|Asari]] declared “all-out war” with the Nigerian state as well as the [[oil industry|oil corporations]] and threatened to disrupt oil production activities through attacks on [[oil well|wells]] and pipelines. This quickly caused a major [[Nigerian Oil Crisis|crisis]] the following day on [[September 26]], as [[Royal Dutch Shell|Shell]] evacuated 235 non-essential personnel from two oil fields, cutting oil production by 30,000 barrels a day. The frantic days that followed were marked by a series of key events in attempt to put an end to what became known as the [[Nigerian Oil Crisis]]. {{seealso|Nigerian Oil Crisis}}
=== 2006 MEND hostage situation ===
{{seealso|Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta}}
== References ==
<references/>
== See also ==
*[[Petroleum in Nigeria]]
*[[United States Africa Command]]
== External links ==
* [http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2006/0426_nigeria.html Responding to Crisis in Nigeria] [[U.S. Institute of Peace]] Briefing, April 2006
* [http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2005/1219_nigerdelta.html Strategies for Peace in the Niger Delta] [[U.S. Institute of Peace]] Briefing, December 2005
* [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4732210.stm Nigeria's shadowy oil rebels] (BBC)
* [http://www.npr.org/documents/2005/aug/shell_wac_report.pdf Peace and Security in the Niger Delta: Baseline Study] [[WAC Global Services]] Baseline Study, December 2003
* [http://www.massobusa.org/ MASSOB in the USA]
* [http://www.massobusa.org/MessageBoard.aspx Biafrans Tell their stories]
* [http://www.massobusa.org/Resources.aspx Documents and Legal Resources]
* [http://allafrica.com/stories/200702070893.html U.S. Creating New Africa Command to Coordinate Military Efforts] (Feb. 6th, 2007)
* [http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4079474 The U.S. Military's Growing Role in Africa]
* [http://www.news24.com/News24/Africa/News/0,,2-11-1447_2065576,00.html Africa gets US military command]
*[http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2007/02/junger200702 "Blood Oil"] by [[Sebastian Junger]] in ''[[Vanity Fair]]'', February 2007 (accessed 28/1/2007)
<nowiki>[[Category:Current events]]
[[Category:History of Nigeria]]
[[de:Konflikte im Nigerdelta]]
[[nl:Conflict in de Nigerdelta]]</nowiki>
| 