Shock and awe: Difference between revisions

Revision as of 18:34, 24 March 2003

Latest revision as of 21:53, 24 August 2025

Line 1:

{{Short description|Military strategy based on overwhelming power}}

'''Rapid Dominance''' (or '''"Shock and Awe"''') is a military doctrine in which a massive strategic bombardment in the opening hours of a war quickly reduces the enemy's command and control capabilities to impotence. If the action is carried out quickly enough the command centers will not have time to regroup, and be so stunned by the rapidity of the action that morale will be affected as well.

{{Other uses|Shock and Awe (disambiguation)}}

{{war}}

'''Shock and awe''' (technically known as '''rapid dominance''') is a military strategy based on the use of [[overwhelming power]] and spectacular [[show of force|displays of force]] to paralyze the enemy's perception of the battlefield and destroy their will to fight.<ref name="oxfordref">{{cite web |url=http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100502693 |title=Shock and awe – Overview|access-date=May 18, 2015|publisher=Oxford University Press}}</ref><ref name="oxford">{{cite book |last=Knowles |first=Elizabeth |year=2006 |title=The Oxford Dictionary of Phrase and Fable |isbn=978-0-19-860981-0 |___location=Oxford, United Kingdom |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]]}}</ref> Though the concept has a variety of historical precedents, the doctrine was explained by [[Harlan K. Ullman]] and [[James P. Wade]] in 1996 and was developed specifically for application by the US military by the [[National Defense University (Washington, D.C.)|National Defense University]] of the United States.<ref name="oxford" /><ref name="oxfordref" />

The doctrine is described in <cite>Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance</cite>, a document written by Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade, and published by the [[National Defense University]] in [[1996]]. It was first applied as the basis of a war doctrine by the [[United States]] in its [[2003 invasion of Iraq]].

==Doctrine of rapid dominance==

== The doctrine of Rapid Dominance ==

Rapid dominance is defined by its authors, Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade, as attempting

{{Quote|to affect the will, perception, and understanding of the adversary to fight or respond to our strategic policy ends through imposing a regime of Shock and Awe.<ref name="rddef">Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade, <cite>[http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Ullman_Shock.pdf Shock And Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance]</cite> (National Defense University, 1996), XXIV.</ref>}}

The aim of Rapid Dominance is to reduce an adversary's understanding, ability, and will to respond to an attack; to create sufficient "shock and awe" to render the enemy impotent. To do this the aim is to hit every command and control center within the opening hours of a battle, allowing the enemy commanders no ability to plan the actions of their forces. The rapidity of the attack is key, if only a small number of centers are hit at any given time, the command network can move to other locations. If they are all hit at once, even with less force, the entire command structure "goes dark" at once.

Further, rapid dominance will, according to Ullman and Wade,

The principal mechanism for achieving these aims is the use of [[precision guided munition]]s on the headquaters and communications centers. This was a key technological advance needed to be able to conduct such an operation.

{{Quote|impose this overwhelming level of Shock and Awe against an adversary on an immediate or sufficiently timely basis to paralyze its will to carry on ... [to] seize control of the environment and paralyze or so overload an adversary's perceptions and understanding of events that the enemy would be incapable of resistance at the tactical and strategic levels.<ref name="rddef2">Ullman and Wade, <cite>Shock and Awe</cite>, XXV.</ref>}}

Critics argue that there is no historical or military reason to believe that shock and awe will work. They point to the fact that the doctrine of shock and awe is remarkably similar to doctrines regarding strategic bombing before [[World War II]], and that military and civilian populations have endured massive bombing such as [[the Blitz]] of World War II, and massive bombing often increases civilian and troop morale.

Introducing the doctrine in a report to the United States' National Defense University in 1996, Ullman and Wade describe it as an attempt to develop a post-[[Cold War]] military doctrine for the United States. Rapid dominance and shock and awe, they write, may become a "revolutionary change" as the [[United States military]] is reduced in size and information technology is increasingly integrated into warfare.<ref name="rdprologue">Ullman and Wade, <cite>Shock and Awe</cite>, Prologue.</ref> Subsequent U.S. military authors have written that rapid dominance exploits the "superior technology, precision engagement, and information dominance" of the United States.<ref name="rd3factors">David J. Gibson, <cite>[http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/fulcrum_main.pl?database=ft_u2&searchid=111016521012191&keyfieldvalue=ADA389508&filename=%2Ffulcrum%2Fdata%2FTR_fulltext%2Fdoc%2FADA389508.pdf Shock and Awe: A Sufficient Condition for Victory?] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110516045556/http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/fulcrum_main.pl?database=ft_u2&searchid=111016521012191&keyfieldvalue=ADA389508&filename=%2Ffulcrum%2Fdata%2FTR_fulltext%2Fdoc%2FADA389508.pdf |date=2011-05-16 }}</cite> (Newport: United States Naval War College, 2001), 17.</ref>

== Historical comparisons ==

Ullman and Wade identify four vital characteristics of rapid dominance:<ref name="rd4char">Ullman and Wade, <cite>Shock and Awe</cite>, XII.</ref>

====Blitzkrieg====

# near total or absolute knowledge and understanding of self, adversary, and environment;

Some people believe that the doctrine of "Rapid Dominance" is a [[technology|technologically]] updated version of the World War II-era [[blitzkrieg]]. However the link is tenuous at best.

# rapidity and timeliness in application;

# operational brilliance in execution; and

# (near) total control and signature management of the entire operational environment.

The term "shock and awe" is most consistently used by Ullman and Wade as the effect that rapid dominance seeks to impose upon an adversary. It is the desired state of helplessness and lack of will. It can be induced, they write, by direct force applied to command and control centers, selective denial of information and dissemination of [[disinformation]], overwhelming combat force, and rapidity of action.

Blitzkrieg is based on the idea of massing the entirety of an army's mobile forces at a single point in front of the enemy, breaking through due to your local superiority, and then running to the rear areas to cut off the front lines. Executed properly, a blitzkrieg will happen so fast that the enemy troops will have little idea what is going on, and will not be able to group for a defense or counterattack, as one is being set up, the battle has already passed.

The doctrine of rapid dominance has evolved from the concept of "decisive force". Ulman and Wade contrast the two concepts in terms of objective, use of force, force size, scope, speed, casualties, and technique.

Rapid Dominance, on the other hand, is based on a direct and furious attack on the command headquarters, both at the armed forces central commands, as well as the unit headquarters closer to the front. The aim is to cut off the troops from information and command, as opposed to supplies.

===Civilian casualties and destruction of infrastructure===

A key difference is the target of the two strategies. One is commanders, the other supplies. Another is the place where the battle takes place, one in the air hundreds of kilometres from the enemy front lines, the other at and just behind the front lines on the ground.

Although Ullman and Wade claim that the need to "[m]inimize [[civilian casualties]], loss of life, and [[collateral damage]]" is a "political sensitivity [which needs] to be understood up front", their doctrine of rapid dominance requires the capability to disrupt "means of communication, transportation, food production, water supply, and other aspects of infrastructure",<ref>Ullman and Wade, ''Shock and Awe,'' [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1996/shock-n-awe_intro.html Introduction].</ref> and, in practice, "the appropriate balance of Shock and Awe must cause ... the threat and fear of action that may shut down all or part of the adversary's society or render his ability to fight useless short of complete physical destruction."<ref>Ullman and Wade, ''Shock and Awe,'' [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1996/shock-n-awe_ch5.html Chapter 5].</ref>

Using as an example a theoretical invasion of Iraq 20 years after [[Operation Desert Storm]], the authors claimed, "Shutting the country down would entail both the physical destruction of appropriate infrastructure and the shutdown and control of the flow of all vital information and associated commerce so rapidly as to achieve a level of national shock akin to the effect that dropping [[nuclear weapons]] on [[Hiroshima]] and [[Nagasaki]] had on the Japanese."<ref>Ullman and Wade, ''Shock and Awe,'' [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1996/shock-n-awe_ch1.html Chapter 1].</ref>

====The capitulation of Japan====

The magnitude of "shock and awe" that the Rapid Dominance doctrine seeks to impose is the (possibly non-nuclear) equivalent of the impact that some claim the atomic weapons dropped on [[Hiroshima]] and [[Nagasaki]] had on the [[Japan]]ese at the end of [[World War II]]. The Japanese were prepared to offer suicidal resistance until shortly after the nuclear bombs were used. Many analysts believe that the impact of those weapons was sufficient to change both the attitude of the average Japanese citizen and the outlook of the Empire's leadership through this condition of shock and awe, that they were stunned by the destructive power carried by a single airplane, which produced a state of awe and the inability to resist. This view remains controversial, however, and is criticised for ignoring other major factors and being over-simplified.

Reiterating the example in an interview with [[CBS News]] several months before [[Operation Iraqi Freedom]], Ullman stated, "You're sitting in Baghdad and all of a sudden you're the general and 30 of your division headquarters have been wiped out. You also take the city down. By that I mean you get rid of their power, water. In 2, 3, 4, 5 days they are physically, emotionally and psychologically exhausted."<ref name="cbs">CBS Evening News (Jan. 24, 2003) [http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/01/24/eveningnews/main537928.shtml Interview with Harlan Ullman] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080926095451/http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/01/24/eveningnews/main537928.shtml |date=2008-09-26 }} accessed August 4, 2006.</ref>

It has been pointed out that Japan was defeated only at the end of a long and bloody war and that the Japanese decision to surrender was motivated not only by the atomic bomb but also by the collapse of Japanese armies in Manchuria. In addition, it has been pointed out that the Japanese surrender was greatly facilitated by the belief that the Allies would spare the [[Emperor of Japan]] upon surrender.

==Historical applications==

====Carpet bombing / Strategic bombing====

[[Image:Nagasakibomb.jpg|thumb|150px|According to its original theorists, shock and awe renders an adversary unwilling to resist through overwhelming displays of power. Ullman cites the atomic bombings of [[Hiroshima]] and [[Nagasaki]] (Nagasaki is pictured) as an example of shock and awe.]]

Ullman and Wade argue that there have been military applications that fall within some of the concepts of shock and awe. They enumerate nine examples:

* '''[[Force concentration|Overwhelming force]]''': The "application of massive or overwhelming force" to "disarm, incapacitate, or render the enemy militarily impotent with as few casualties to ourselves and to [[Non-combatant|noncombatants]] as possible."

* '''[[Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki|Hiroshima and Nagasaki]]''': The establishment of shock and awe through "instant, nearly incomprehensible levels of massive destruction directed at influencing society writ large, meaning its leadership and public, rather than targeting directly against military or strategic objectives even with relatively few numbers or systems."

* '''Massive bombardment''': Described as "precise destructive power largely against military targets and related sectors over time."

* '''[[Blitzkrieg]]''': The "intent was to apply precise, surgical amounts of tightly focused force to achieve maximum leverage but with total economies of scale."

* '''[[Sun Tzu]]''': The "selective, instant beheading of military or societal targets to achieve shock and awe."

* '''Haitian example''': This example (occasionally referred to as the [[Potemkin village]] example) refers to a martial parade staged in Haiti on behalf of the (then) colonial power France in the early 1800s in which the native Haitians marched a small number of battalions in a cyclical manner. This led the colonial power into the belief that the size of the native forces was large enough so as to make any military action infeasible.

* '''The [[Roman legion]]s''': "Achieving shock and awe rests in the ability to deter and overpower an adversary through the adversary's perception and fear of his vulnerability and our own invincibility."

* '''Decay and default''': "The imposition of societal breakdown over a lengthy period, but without the application of massive destruction."

=== First Chechen War ===

Some critics have even accused the Shock and Awe strategy of being a repackaging of [[carpet bombing]]. Carpet bombing deliberately targets dispersed targets with massive numbers of "dumb" bombs, and is effectively a long distance artillery. World War II [[British]] policy was to deliberately target civilian centers in order to destroy homes, thereby reducing Germany's industrial output as workers were displaced.

Russia's military strategy in the [[First Chechen War]], and particularly the [[Battle of Grozny (1994–95)|Battle of Grozny]], was described as "shock and awe."<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=H2MIFNEcPKcC&pg=PA125|title=Warfare in Woods and Forests|last=Clayton|first=Anthony|date=2011-12-07|publisher=Indiana University Press |isbn=978-0253005533|pages=125|language=en}}</ref>

=== Iraq War ===

Rapid Dominance is not similar in any way. It has very specific targets, ones that are attacked with precision guided weapons. Other military analysts find the comparison of modern precision weapons to the indiscriminate high-altitude bombing of sixty years ago to be absurd, and ridicule the idea that the US would have any problem establishing instantaneous and absolute air superiority.

{{main|2003 invasion of Iraq}}

==== Buildup ====

== "Shock and awe" in the 2003 invasion of Iraq ==

Before the [[2003 invasion of Iraq]], United States armed forces officials described their plan as employing shock and awe.<ref name="appterm">{{cite web |url=https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iraq-faces-massive-us-missile-barrage/ |title=Iraq Faces Massive U.S. Missile Barrage |website=[[CBS News]] |date=24 January 2003 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080926095451/http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/01/24/eveningnews/main537928.shtml |archive-date=2008-09-26 }}" ([[CBS News]], January 24, 2003.</ref> But, [[Tommy Franks]], commanding general of the invading forces, "had never cared for the use of the term 'shock and awe' " and "had not seen that effect as the point of the air offensive."<ref>{{Cite book |title=The Iraq war |last=Keegan |first=John |date=2004 |publisher=A.A. Knopf |isbn=9781400043446 |edition=1st American |___location=New York |oclc=647323673}}</ref>

==== Conflicting pre-war assessments ====

Although American officials had announced for weeks in advance of the invasion, that they intended an unprecedented bombing campaign, the actual campaign has seemed restrainted to many observers. In contrast to Desert Storm, the initial two nights of bombing were limited. In addition, the selection of targets in 2003 was much more limited than in Desert Storm, and many economic targets, most notably the power plants, have been spared.

Before its implementation, there was dissent within the Bush administration as to whether the shock and awe plan would work. According to a CBS News report, "One senior official called it a bunch of bull, but confirmed it is the concept on which the war plan is based." CBS Correspondent David Martin noted that during Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan in the prior year, the U.S. forces were "badly surprised by the willingness of al Qaeda to fight to the death. If the Iraqis fight, the U.S. would have to throw in reinforcements and win the old fashioned way by crushing the Republican Guards, and that would mean more casualties on both sides."<ref>{{cite news

|title=Iraq Faces Massive U.S. Missile Barrage

|url=https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iraq-faces-massive-us-missile-barrage/

|author=David Martin

|publisher=CBS News

|date=January 24, 2003

|access-date=March 8, 2005

|archive-date=September 26, 2008

|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080926095451/http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/01/24/eveningnews/main537928.shtml

|url-status=live

}}</ref>

==== Campaign ====

Some military analysts questioned the ability of the United States to carry out a program of shock and awe by pointing out that Baghdad has extensive batteries of surface to air missiles which limit the ability of aircraft to stay near Baghdad, and has been in extensive contact with [[Serbia]] to gain information on how to resist an American air attack. But the first night of successful targeted bombing of Baghdad has placed doubts in many of the validity of this claim.

Continuous bombing began on March 19, 2003, as United States forces unsuccessfully attempted to kill [[Saddam Hussein]] with [[decapitation strike]]s. Attacks continued against a small number of targets until March 21, 2003, when, at 1700 [[UTC]], the main bombing campaign of the US and their allies began. Its forces launched approximately 1,700 air sorties (504 using [[cruise missile]]s).<ref name="sorties">"[http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/uscentaf_oif_report_30apr2003.pdf Operation Iraqi Freedom - By the Numbers]", [[USCENTAF]], April 30, 2003, 15.</ref> Coalition ground forces had begun a "running start" offensive towards [[Baghdad]] on the previous day. Coalition ground forces seized Baghdad on April 5, and the United States declared victory on April 15. The term "shock and awe" is typically used to describe only the very beginning of the invasion of Iraq, not the larger war, nor [[Iraqi insurgency (2003–2011)|the ensuing insurgency]].

==== Conflicting post-war assessments ====

Thus far, the United States has attempted to resolve the contradiction between psychological impact on the enemy and PR impact at home by primarily targeting the symbols of the power of the Iraqi regime and by using third generation "[[smart bomb]]s" when those targets are close to civilian structures. So unlike "carpet bombing", they say, Shock and Awe seeks its aims through highly directed attacks against military and leadership targets and civilian targets are intentionally left alone. As of March 22, 2003 the Iraqi regime has claimed that two civilians were killed and about 200 injured in the massive Shock and Awe attack on Baghdad. This is far fewer than the thousands of deaths that critics of this strategy claimed would occur. The electrical, sewer, water and other public infrastructure was also not destroyed in the city during the attack.

To what extent the United States fought a campaign of shock and awe is unclear as post-war assessments are contradictory. Within two weeks of the United States' victory declaration, on April 27, ''[[The Washington Post]]'' published an interview with Iraqi military personnel detailing demoralization and lack of command.<ref name="wpinterview">William Branigin, "[https://web.archive.org/web/20110516150946/http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&contentId=A42721-2003Apr26&notFound=true A Brief, Bitter War for Iraq's Military Officers]", [[Washington Post]], October 27, 2003.</ref> According to the soldiers, Coalition bombing was surprisingly widespread and had a severely demoralizing effect. When United States tanks passed through the Iraqi military's [[Iraqi Republican Guard|Republican Guard]] and [[Iraqi Special Republican Guard|Special Republican Guard]] units outside Baghdad to Saddam's presidential palaces, it caused a shock to troops inside Baghdad. Iraqi soldiers said there was no organization intact by the time the United States entered Baghdad and that resistance crumbled under the presumption that "it wasn't a war, it was suicide."

In contrast, in an October 2003 presentation to the [[United States House of Representatives|United States House]] Committee on Armed Services, staff of the United States Army War College did not attribute their performance to rapid dominance. Rather, they cited technological superiority and "Iraqi ineptitude". The speed of the coalition's actions ("rapidity"), they said, did not affect Iraqi morale. Further, they said that Iraqi armed forces ceased resistance only after direct force-on-force combat within cities.<ref name="usawc">"[http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2003_hr/03-10-21warcollege.pdf Iraq and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy]", presentation by the United States Army War College to United States House Committee on Armed Services, October 21, 2003.</ref>

== External link ==

According to ''National Geographic'' researcher Bijal Trivedi, "Even after several days of bombing the Iraqis showed remarkable resilience. Many continued with their daily lives, working and shopping, as bombs continued to fall around them. According to some analysts, the military's attack was perhaps too precise. It did not trigger shock and awe in the Iraqis and, in the end, the city was only captured after close combat on the outskirts of Baghdad."<ref name="NatlGeo">{{cite web

* [http://www.dodccrp.org/shockIndex.html Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance]

|title=Inside Shock and Awe

* ''Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance'' - ISBN 1-579-06030-7

|url=http://blogs.nationalgeographic.com/channel/blog/2005/03/explorer_shockawe.html

|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050407005312/http://blogs.nationalgeographic.com/channel/blog/2005/03/explorer_shockawe.html

|url-status=dead

|archive-date=April 7, 2005

|author=Bijal Trivedi

|publisher=National Geographic Channel

|date=February 14, 2005}}</ref>

==== Criticism of execution ====

According to ''[[The Guardian]]'' correspondent [[Brian Whitaker]] in 2003, "To some in the Arab and Muslim countries, Shock and Awe is terrorism by another name; to others, a crime that compares unfavourably with September 11."<ref name="Guardian">Whitaker, B. (March 24, 2003) "Flags in the dust" ''Guardian Unlimited'' [http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,920806,00.html Iraq special report at guardian.co.uk] accessed July 30, 2006.</ref> Anti-war protesters in 2003 also claimed that "the shock and awe pummeling of Baghdad [was] a kind of terrorism."<ref>{{cite news

|title=Antiwar Protesters Spar With Police

|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A11085-2003Mar22?language=printer

|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180810155953/https://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A11085-2003Mar22/?language=printer

|url-status=dead

|archive-date=August 10, 2018

|newspaper=The Washington Post

|date=March 22, 2003}}</ref>

==== Casualties ====

A dossier released by [[Iraq Body Count]], a project of the U.K. non-governmental non-violent and disarmament organization [[Oxford Research Group]], attributed approximately 6,616 civilian deaths to the actions of U.S.-led forces during the "invasion phase", including the shock-and-awe bombing campaign on Baghdad.<ref>{{cite web

|url=http://www.iraqbodycount.org/press/pr12.php

|title=A Dossier of Civilian Casualties in Iraq 2003–2005

|publisher=Iraq Body Count

|date=July 18, 2005}}</ref>

These findings were disputed by both the U.S. military and the Iraqi government. Lieutenant Colonel Steve Boylan, the spokesman for the U.S. military in Baghdad, stated, "I don't know how they are doing their methodology and can't talk to how they calculate their numbers," as well as "we do everything we can to avoid civilian casualties in all of our operations."<ref>{{cite news

|title=Iraq war takes heavy toll on civilians

|url=https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna8628614

|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050721003842/http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8628614/

|url-status=live

|archive-date=July 21, 2005

|publisher=Reuters/MSNBC.com

|date=July 19, 2005}}</ref> National Geographic researcher Bijal Trivedi stated, "Civilian casualties did occur, but the strikes, for the most part, were surgical."<ref name="NatlGeo"/>

==In popular culture==

Following the [[2003 invasion of Iraq]] by the US, the term "shock and awe" has been used for commercial purposes. The [[United States Patent and Trademark Office]] received at least 29 trademark applications in 2003 for exclusive use of the term.<ref name="29patents">Robert Longley, "[http://usgovinfo.about.com/cs/censusstatistic/a/shockandawe.htm Patent Office Suffers 'Shock and Awe' Attack] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140713143740/http://usgovinfo.about.com/cs/censusstatistic/a/shockandawe.htm |date=2014-07-13 }}", [[About.com]], October 27, 2003.</ref> The first came from a fireworks company on the day the US started bombing [[Baghdad]]. [[Sony]] registered the trademark the day after the beginning of the operation for use in a video game title but later withdrew the application and described it as "an exercise of regrettable bad judgment."<ref>{{cite news

|title=Tech Briefs: Sony says it's sorry for 'shock and awe' idea

|url=http://www.seattlepi.com/business/118102_tbrf18.html

|publisher=Seattle Post-Intelligencer

|date=April 18, 2003}}</ref>

In an interview, [[Harlan K. Ullman|Harlan Ullman]] stated that he believed that using the term to try to sell products was "probably a mistake", and that "the marketing value will be somewhere between slim and none".<ref>{{cite news

|title=US companies battle over 'shock and awe' copyright

|url=http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2003/s856964.htm

|publisher=The World Today

|author=Agnes Cusack

|date=May 16, 2003}}</ref>

The 2007 American [[first-person shooter]] ''[[Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare]]'' features a level entitled "Shock and Awe".<ref>{{cite web |last1=Franklin |first1=Anthony |title=All About the Boom: ‘Call of Duty’ and Its Emphasis on Action |url=https://www.vice.com/en/article/all-about-the-boom-call-of-duty-and-its-emphasis-on-action/ |website=VICE |access-date=18 February 2025 |date=27 December 2024}}</ref>

The 2017 film [[Shock and Awe (film)|''Shock and Awe'']] takes its name from the concept and focuses on the [[2003 invasion of Iraq]].

==See also==

* [[Demoralization (military)]]

* [[Hearts and minds (Iraq)]]

* [[Powell Doctrine]]

* [[Psychological warfare]]

* [[Rumsfeld Doctrine]]

* [[Terror (politics)]]

* [[London Blitz]]

* [[Blitzkrieg]]

==Notes==

{{Reflist}}

<!-- Dead note "USciv": "[https://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/22/opinion/22SAT1.html?th The Blitz Over Baghdad]", [[The New York Times]], March 22, 2003. -->

==Further reading==

* Blakesley, Paul J. "Shock and Awe: A Widely Misunderstood Effect". ''United States Army Command and General Staff College'', June 17, 2004.

* Branigin, William. "[https://web.archive.org/web/20110516150946/http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&contentId=A42721-2003Apr26&notFound=true A Brief, Bitter War for Iraq's Military Officers]". ''[[Washington Post]]'', October 27, 2003.

* Peterson, Scott. "[https://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0130/p06s01-woiq.html US mulls air strategies in Iraq]". ''[[Christian Science Monitor]]'', January 30, 2003.

* Ullman, Harlan K. and Wade, James P. <cite>Rapid Dominance: A Force for All Seasons</cite>. Royal United Services Institute in Defense Studies, 1998.

==External links==

{{Wiktionary}}

*[http://www.sourcewatch.org/wiki.phtml?title=Shock_and_awe Shock and awe] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070312071948/http://www.sourcewatch.org/wiki.phtml?title=Shock_and_awe |date=2007-03-12 }}, from [[SourceWatch]]

*[http://www.dodccrp.org Command and Control Research Program]

{{Military and war}}

{{Authority control}}

[[Category:1996 neologisms]]

[[Category:English phrases]]

[[Category:Iraq War terminology]]

[[Category:Military doctrines]]

[[Category:Military terminology]]

[[Category:Psychological warfare techniques]]

[[Category:Warfare of the late modern period]]