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{{Short description|Battle of World War II}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=January 2024}}
{{Infobox military conflict
| conflict = Battle of the Korsun–Cherkassy pocket
| partof = the [[Dnieper–Carpathian offensive]] on the [[Eastern Front (World War II)|Eastern Front]] of [[World War II]]
| image = RIAN archive 606710 Tank assault force in Korsun-Shevchenkovski region.jpg
| caption = Red Army assault force on [[T-26]] light tank in Korsun-Shevchenkovski region
| date = 24 January – 16 February 1944
| place = [[Cherkassy]] / [[Korsun-Shevchenkivskyi|Korsun]], [[Ukrainian SSR]], [[Soviet Union]]
| result = Soviet victory and successful encirclement<ref name=Zetterling_298/><ref name=Nash_382>Nash, p. 382</ref>
| combatant1 = {{flagcountry|Nazi Germany}}
| combatant2 = {{flag|Soviet Union|1936}}
| commander1 = [[Erich von Manstein]]<br/>[[Otto Wöhler]]<br/> [[Hermann Breith]]<br/>[[Wilhelm Stemmermann]]{{KIA}}
| commander2 = [[Georgy Zhukov]]<br/> [[Nikolai Vatutin]]<br/> [[Ivan Konev]]
| strength1 = 60,000 men in pocket<br/> 59 [[Armoured fighting vehicle|tanks]] in pocket<br />242 artillery pieces in pocket<ref name="Frieser, p. 397">Frieser, p. 397</ref><br />80,000 men (reinforcement)<br />III Panzer Corps (201 tanks) (reinforcement)<ref>Frieser, p. 400</ref><br />XLVII Panzer Corps (58 tanks) (reinforcement)<ref>Frieser, p. 399</ref>
| strength2 = 336,700 men<ref name="Krivosheev, p. 109">Krivosheev, p. 109</ref><br/> 524 tanks (initially)<br />400 tanks (reinforcement)<br />1,054 aircraft<br />5,300 artillery pieces and mortars<ref>Numbers of Soviet AFVs, aircraft, and guns taken from Frieser, p. 395</ref>
| casualties1 = In the pocket:
*30,000 killed, captured and wounded<ref>Zetterling & Frankson, p. 277</ref>
Outside the pocket:
*[[1st Panzer Army]]: 4,181 men<ref>Zetterling & Frankson, p. 285</ref>
*[[VII Army Corps (Wehrmacht)|VII Army Corps]]: 1,000 men<ref>Zetterling & Frankson, p. 288</ref>
*[[8th Army (Wehrmacht)|8th Army]]: 4,500 men<ref>Zetterling & Frankson, p. 289</ref>
'''Total:''' ~40,000 men<br />300 tanks and assault guns<ref>Zetterling & Frankson, p. 292</ref><br />50 aircraft<ref name="Frieser, p. 405">Frieser, p. 405</ref>
| casualties2 = '''Total:''' ~80,188
----24,286 killed or missing<br />55,902 wounded and sick<ref name="Glantz & House, p. 298">Glantz & House, p. 298</ref><ref name="Zetterling p. 283">Zetterling & Frankson, p. 283 (citing ''The Korsun-Shevchenkovskii Operation'', p. 41 and 52; Krivosheev, p. 109)</ref> <br /> 728 tanks<ref name="Frieser p. 417">Frieser, p. 417</ref>
}}
{{Campaignbox Axis–Soviet War}}
{{Campaignbox Dnieper–Carpathian Offensive}}
The '''Battle of Korsun–Cherkassy''' ({{langx|ru| Корсунь-Шевченковская операция}}; {{langx|uk| Корсунь-Шевченківська операція}}), also known as the '''Battle of the Korsun–Cherkassy Pocket''', was a [[World War II]] battle fought from 24 January to 16 February 1944 in the course of the Soviet [[Dnieper–Carpathian offensive]] in [[Ukraine]] following the [[Korsun–Shevchenkovsky offensive]].
In the battle, the [[1st Ukrainian Front|1st]] and [[2nd Ukrainian Front]]s, commanded, respectively, by [[Nikolai Vatutin]] and [[Ivan Konev]], encircled German forces of [[Army Group South]] in a pocket near the [[Dnieper River]]. During weeks of fighting, the two [[Red Army]] Fronts tried to eradicate the pocket. The encircled German units attempted a breakout in coordination with a relief attempt by other German forces, resulting in heavy casualties, estimates of which vary.
The Soviet victory in the Korsun–Cherkassy offensive marked the successful implementation of [[Soviet deep battle|Soviet deep operations]]. Soviet deep battle doctrine envisaged the breaking of the enemy's forward defences to allow fresh operational reserves to exploit the [[Breakthrough (military)|breakthrough]] by driving into the [[strategic depth]] of the enemy [[front (military)|front]]. The arrival of large numbers of [[Lend-Lease|American]]- and British-built [[truck]]s and [[halftrack]]s gave the Soviet forces much greater mobility than they had had before.{{sfn|Liddell Hart|1970|pp=664–665}} This, coupled with the Soviet capacity to hold large formations in reserve gave the Red Army the ability to drive deep behind German defenses again and again.{{sfn|Willmott|1984|p=180}}
Though the Soviet operation at Korsun did not result in the collapse in the German front that the Soviet command had hoped for, it marked a significant deterioration in the strength available to the German army on that front, especially in heavy weaponry, nearly all of which was lost during the breakout. Through the rest of the war the Red Army would place large German forces in jeopardy, while the Germans were stretched thin and constantly attempting to extract themselves from one crisis to the next. Mobile Soviet offensives were the hallmark of the Eastern front for the remainder of the war.
==January 1944==
In the autumn of 1943, the German forces of Field Marshal [[Erich von Manstein]]'s [[Army Group South]] including General [[Otto Wöhler]]'s [[8th Army (Wehrmacht)|8th Army]] had fallen back to the [[Panther–Wotan line]], a defensive position that in Ukraine followed the [[Dnieper]] river. However, when the German forces arrived, construction had only just been started, so the defensive positions essentially did not exist.
By 1 December 1943, the line had been broken and the Soviet Army had crossed the Dnieper in force. Only two corps, the [[XI Army Corps (Wehrmacht)|XI]] under General Wilhelm Stemmermann, the [[XLII Army Corps]] under Lieutenant General [[Theobald Lieb]] and the attached Corps Detachment B<ref>Corps Detachment B was organized as an infantry division with six infantry battalions and normal supporting divisional units. The unit had been formed from elements contributed by the 112th, 255th, and 332nd Infantry Divisions. Tessin, pp. 26–27.</ref> from the 8th Army were holding a [[Salients, re-entrants and pockets|salient]] in the new Soviet line. The salient to the west of [[Cherkassy]] extended some 100 kilometers to the Dnieper river settlement of Kanev, with the town of [[Korsun-Shevchenkivskyi|Korsun]] roughly in the center of the salient, with the 1st Ukrainian Front to its left and the 2nd Ukrainian Front to its right.
Marshal of the Soviet Union [[Georgy Zhukov]] realized the potential for destroying Wöhler's 8th Army, using tactics similar to those used to encircle and destroy Paulus's 6th Army in the [[Battle of Stalingrad]]. Zhukov recommended to the Soviet Supreme Command ([[Stavka]]) deploying the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts to form two armored rings of encirclement: an inner ring around the pocket, followed by the destruction of the forces it contained, and an external ring to prevent relief formations from reaching the surrounded units. Despite repeated warnings from Manstein and others, [[Hitler]] refused to allow the exposed units to be pulled back.
General Konev held a conference at his headquarters at Boltushki on 15 January with his commanders and their political commissars to pass on the orders received from Stavka.<ref>Zetterling & Frankson, p. 37</ref> The initial attack was to be conducted by Konev's own [[2nd Ukrainian Front]] from the southeast by the 53rd Army and 4th Guards Army, with the [[5th Guards Tank Army]] to exploit penetrations, supported by the 5th Air Army, to be joined in progress by the [[52nd Army (Soviet Union)|52nd Army]], 5th Guards Cavalry Corps and 2nd Tank Army. Additionally, from Vatutin's [[1st Ukrainian Front]], the [[27th Army (Soviet Union)|27th]] and [[40th Army (Soviet Union)|40th]] Armies were to be deployed from the northwest, with the [[6th Guards Tank Army|6th Tank Army]] to exploit penetrations, supported by the [[2nd Air Army]].<ref>Zetterling & Frankson, pp. 37–39</ref> Many of these formations had received an inflow of new personnel. Red Army planning further included extensive deception operations that the Soviets claimed were successful; however, the German 8th Army war diary shows clearly that the German staffs were concerned about the threat at hand.<ref>Zetterling & Frankson, p. 39</ref>
==Encirclement==
{{see also|Korsun–Cherkassy Pocket order of battle}}
[[File:OEF-map-6.jpg|thumb|250px|left|Sweeping [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] advances that created the pocket.]]
<!---[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-090-3912-05A, Russland, Panzer IV im Schnee.jpg|thumb|right|Panzer IV tank in the Soviet Union]]-->
The Soviet attack started on 24 January when Konev's 2nd Ukrainian Front attacked the salient from the southeast. A breakthrough was quickly achieved, and the penetration was exploited by the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps the following day.<ref name="Glantz, p. 187">Glantz & House, p. 187</ref> Despite the awareness of the German 8th Army's staff that an attack was imminent, they were surprised by the appearance of the 1st Ukrainian Front's newly formed 6th Tank Army.<ref>The 6th Tank Army had been formed on 20 January 1944. Dunn, ''Hitler's Nemesis''</ref> The 6th Tank Army, with 160 tanks and 50 self-propelled guns,<ref name="Erickson, p. 177">Erickson, p. 177</ref> was inexperienced and took longer than expected to penetrate the western flank of the salient. A "mobile group" from the 5th Mechanized Corps' 233rd Tank Brigade, under the command of General Savelev, with 50 tanks and 200 sub-machine gun armed infantrymen, occupied [[Lysyanka]] and moved into the outskirts of [[Zvenyhorodka]] by 28 January. Here, these troops of the 6th Tank Army met the 2nd Ukrainian Front's 20th Tank Corps. Over the next three days, the two tank armies formed a thinly manned outer ring around what was now the Korsun Pocket while another, inner, ring was formed by the Soviet 27th, 52nd, and 4th Guard Armies.<ref>Erickson, p. 177; Glantz & House, p. 187; and Frieser, p. 396</ref>
The Soviet commanders were optimistic about the progress of the operation. [[Joseph Stalin|Stalin]] was promised a second Stalingrad, and he expected it. Konev wired: "There is no need to worry, Comrade Stalin. The encircled enemy will not escape."<ref>Konev, ''Battles Hitler Lost'', quoted in Nash, p. 200</ref> Inside the pocket were nearly 60,000 men from six German divisions, at about 55% of their authorized strength, along with a number of smaller combat units. Among the trapped German forces were the [[SS Division (motorised) Wiking|5th SS Panzer Division ''Wiking'']], with the attached [[5th SS Volunteer Sturmbrigade Wallonien|5th SS Infantry Brigade ''Wallonien'']], the [[Estonia]]n SS infantry battalion ''Narwa'', and "several thousand" Russian auxiliaries.<ref>Nash, p. 27</ref> General [[Wilhelm Stemmermann]], the commander of the XI Corps, was placed in command of the forces in the pocket. These forces were designated ''Gruppe Stemmermann''. The 5th SS Panzer Division, with some 11,400 personnel,<ref name=Frieser_424>Frieser, p. 424</ref> had 30 operational [[Panzer III]]/[[Panzer IV|IV]] tanks and assault guns left, and six more under repair.<ref>Zetterling & Frankson, p. 335</ref> The division further had 47 artillery pieces, of which 12 were self-propelled guns.<ref>Zetterling & Frankson, p. 336; a total of 242 artillery pieces were inside the pocket.</ref>
==German relief attacks==
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-090-3913-24, Russland, Schützenpanzer und Panzer im Winter.jpg|thumb|right|The relief attempt begins. Tanks and halftracks of 1st Panzer Division begin movements towards the pocket, early February 1944<ref>Image description abbreviated from nearly same image in Nash, p. 161</ref>]]
Manstein moved quickly, and by early February the [[III Panzer Corps (Wehrmacht)|III]] and [[XLVII Panzer Corps (Germany)|XLVII Panzer Corps]] were assembled for a relief effort. Hitler intervened, however, and ordered the attack be transformed into an effort to counter-encircle the two Soviet army groups.
General [[Hermann Breith]], commander of the [[III Panzer Corps]], requested the relief formations be united to attempt to force a corridor to the encircled ''Gruppe Stemmermann''. This request was refused, and the counter-encirclement of the Soviet forces was attempted. The attack by the [[XLVII Panzer Corps]]' [[11th Panzer Division (Wehrmacht)|11th Panzer Division]] on the southeastern flank of the pocket quickly stalled, as it had only 27 tanks and 34 assault guns operational.<ref name=Perrett_167>Perrett, p. 167</ref> The III Panzer Corps' attempt continued until 8 February, when it became undeniable that the effort had failed.<ref>Frieser, p. 354</ref> Manstein ordered the corps to instead drive directly to the relief of ''Gruppe Stemmermann''. Pulling the III Panzer Corps back and reorganizing for the new attack 15 kilometers south of Boyarka took three days.<ref name="Frieser, p. 402">Frieser, p. 402</ref>
On 11 February, Breith began a push with the [[16th Panzer Division (Wehrmacht)|16th]] and [[17th Panzer Division (Wehrmacht)|17th]] Panzer Divisions driving toward the [[Hnylyi Tikych|Gniloy Tikich River]]. They initially made good progress. The [[1st Panzer Division (Wehrmacht)|1st Panzer Division]] and [[Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler|1st SS Panzer Division LSSAH]] covered the northern flank of the drive. As they drove deeper into the Soviet positions, Zhukov ordered [[Nikolai Vatutin|Vatutin]] to assemble four tank corps with the goal of cutting off the attacking German spearhead.<ref name="Nash, p. 162">Nash, p. 162</ref> The weather warmed, turning the roads to a soft mud and bogging down German progress. Here the liabilities of Germany's wheeled vehicles became evident. The Soviet forces had been provided lend-lease U.S. built four-wheel and six-wheel drive trucks. These were largely able to get through, whereas German two-wheel-drive vehicles were not.<ref name="Nash, p. 162"/>
Konev issued orders for the [[4th Guards Army]] and [[5th Guards Cavalry Corps]] to attempt to split the pocket on the night of 5–6 February. The strike was to fall on the boundary between the two German corps.<ref name="Zetterling & Frankson, p. 180">Zetterling & Frankson, p. 180</ref> As fighting progressed, the Soviet goal became clear to Stemmermann and Lieb. Stemmermann ordered the 5th SS Division's armor to the scene. Together with the [[72nd Infantry Division (Wehrmacht)|72nd Infantry Division]], it brought the Soviet attack to a halt, buying the Germans time.<ref name="Zetterling & Frankson, p. 180"/> Red Army efforts were renewed between 7–10 February. This effort was hobbled by supply shortages. The III Panzer Corps' penetrations toward the Gniloy Tikich River made the supply lines for Soviet formations such as Vatutin's [[6th Tank Army]] much longer.<ref>Zetterling & Frankson, p. 184</ref> The Red Air Force attempted to resupply some units using [[Polikarpov Po-2]] aircraft.<ref>Zetterling & Frankson, p. 185</ref> Despite logistical difficulties, units from the 2nd Ukrainian Front were able to close in on Korsun by 10 February, collapsing the pocket to an area of six by seven miles.<ref name="Erickson, p. 177"/>
==German maneuver within the pocket==
<!---[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-277-0835-02, Russland, Infanterie auf Panzer IV.jpg|thumb|right|Panzer IVs carry infantry, January 1944]]-->
On 11 February, the III Panzer Corps continued its drive east. The force reached the [[Gniloy Tikich River]] and established a small bridgehead on the eastern bank. It was unable to advance further, meaning that Group Stemmermann had to fight its way out.<ref>Group Stemmermann consisted of first divisions: the 57th, 72nd, 88th and 389th Divisions, Corps Detachment B (Division Group 112), all infantry formations with no armored components; and the 5th SS Panzer Division with the attached 5th SS Infantry Brigade and the ''Narwa'' Battalion. The only units considered still capable of offensive operations were the 72nd Infantry and 5th SS Divisions. (Department of the Army Pamphlet 20–234, pp. 19–20)</ref>
Both sides realized that the Wehrmacht relief efforts had reached a critical stage. Despite heavy Soviet propaganda inducements, very few German soldiers and no Waffen-SS men in the cauldron had surrendered.<ref>Nash, p. 194</ref> Zhukov thus decided to send ''[[parlementaire]]s'' under a white flag with surrender demands.<ref name=Perrett_167/> Red Army emissaries presented letters for both Stemmermann and Lieb signed by Marshal Zhukov and Generals Konev and Vatutin.<ref>DA Pamphlet 20–234, p. 22</ref> After cordial talks, refreshments and a handshake, the Soviet delegation departed without a positive answer.<ref>Nash, p. 198</ref>
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 141-1280, Russland, Kessel Tscherkassy.jpg|thumb|[[Junkers Ju 52|Ju 52]]s at Korsun airfield, [[Junkers Ju 87|Ju 87]]s in formation above (January 1944).]]
The German air force mounted an aerial resupply operation to both the encircled forces and the German relief columns. On 28 January, the [[8th Air Corps (Germany)|VIII Aviation Corps]] deployed 832 transport aircraft, 478 bombers (from which supplies were dropped at low altitude), 58 fighter bombers, and 168 fighters. Over the course of the operation, 32 transport aircraft, 13 bombers, and five fighters were lost.<ref name="Frieser, p. 405"/> After the Korsun airfield was abandoned on 12 February, deliveries were dropped in by parachute.
The Luftwaffe delivered 82,948 gallons of fuel, 868 tons of ammunition and four tons of medical supplies to the encircled forces and 325 tons of ammunition, 74,289 gallons of fuel and 24 tons of food to spearheads of the relief formations, as well as evacuating 4,161 wounded while the Korsun airfield remained operational.<ref>Nash, Appendix 8, p. 399</ref> The operation had only met about half (78 tons) of the daily requirements (150 tons) of the encircled troops as estimated by the German 8th Army headquarters.<ref name="Frieser, p. 405"/>
Stemmermann began withdrawing troops from the north side of the pocket, reorienting the thrust of the escape direction, and attacking south to move toward the relief forces on the north bank of the Gniloy Tikich. The encircled forces aimed to capture the villages of {{ill|Novo-Buda|uk|Нова Буда (Звенигородський район)}}, {{ill|Komarovka, Zvenyhorodka Raion|lt=Komarovka|uk|Комарівка (Звенигородський район)}}, {{ill|Khilki|uk|Хильки}} and {{ill|Shanderovka|uk|Шендерівка (Звенигородський район)}} at the southwestern perimeter of the pocket to reach a favorable jump-off line for the breakout.<ref>DA Pamphlet 20–234, p. 19</ref> On 11 and 12 February, elements of the [[72nd Infantry Division (Wehrmacht)|72nd Infantry Division]] captured Novo-Buda and Komarovka, respectively.<ref>Nash, pp. 212–214</ref> On the evening of 15 February, Khilki was secured, against a Soviet counterattack.<ref>Zetterling & Frankson, p. 245</ref> However, of all the German divisions in the pocket, the [[5th SS Panzer Division]] contributed the most to continued operations.<ref>Nash, p. 369</ref> Since the SS Division Wiking was the only truly mobile force inside the pocket, the division's tracked units were repeatedly shifted from one end of the pocket to the other to shore up crumbling lines.
The pocket had "wandered" south and half-way toward the relief force and rested on the village of Shanderovka. The settlement was heavily defended by the Soviets; it was captured by 72nd Infantry troops, retaken by units of the Soviet 27th Army and recaptured by the ''Germania'' regiment of 5th SS Panzer Division. By nightfall on 16 February, the III Panzer Corps fought its way closer to the encircled formations, with spearheads now seven kilometers from Group Stemmermann.<ref>Zetterling & Frankson, p. 255</ref>
==Appeal from the NKFD==
The pocket led to an attempt by the Soviet Union to enlist the [[National Committee for a Free Germany]] (NKFD) and the [[League of German Officers]] (BDO) in order to convince the German troops to surrender. The prisoners of war and BDO members Generals [[Walther von Seydlitz-Kurzbach]], [[Alexander Edler von Daniels]] and [[Otto Korfes]] visited the front on 10 February and made a personal appeal to the German commanders. Appeals were also made on the radio.{{sfn|Loeffel|2012|p=98}} More to it, the members of the NKFD were sent to the battlefield where they spread NKFD leaflets which served as safe conduct passes into captivity showing that the surrender is voluntary and that the soldiers with such leaflets should be handed over to the NKFD. The operation was relatively successful, and out of the 18,200 captured Germans each third produced an NKFD leaflet.<ref>{{cite book|author=Kai Schoenhals|title=The Free Germany Movement: A Case of Patriotism Or Treason?|year=1989|isbn=9780313263903|pages=|url=https://archive.org/details/freegermanymovem0000scho}}</ref> Despite the failure to alter the fighting resolution of the German Commander at Cherkassy, this operation raised the profile of the NKFD and BDO among both the Allies and Axis.{{sfn|Loeffel|2012|p=98}} Von Seydlitz was dismissed from the army and sentenced to death in absentia and Hitler personally authorized [[Sippenhaft]] against his family.{{sfn|Loeffel|2012|p=100}}
==Breakout attempt==
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-711-0438-05A, Russland-Süd, Marsch auf unbefestigter Straße.jpg|thumb|right|Congestion on the road]]
The northward thrust toward the pocket by the III Panzer Corps had been halted by Red Army determination, terrain and fuel shortages. After several failed attempts by German armored formations to seize and hold Hill 239 ({{coord|49|15.42|N|30|49.38|E}} [[Lysyanka]], Cherkasy Oblast, Ukraine) and advance on Shanderovka, Soviet counterattacks by the [[5th Guards Tank Army]] forced the III Panzer Corps into costly defensive fighting. The 8th Army radioed Stemmermann: "Capacity for action by III Panzer Corps limited by weather and supply situation. Gruppe Stemmermann must perform breakthrough as far as the line Zhurzintsy–Hill 239 by its own effort. There link up with III Panzer Corps."<ref>Nash, p. 258</ref>
The message did not specify that Zhurzintsy and the hill were still firmly in Soviet hands—a failure that caused Group Stemmermann severe casualties during the German breakout of the pocket. [[Theo-Helmut Lieb|General Lieutenant Lieb]] was appointed by the 8th Army to lead the breakout. In the seven kilometers that separated Group Stemmermann and the III Panzer Corps, Konev was positioning his forces for an attack slated for 17 February.<ref>Nash, p. 287</ref> His three armies – the 4th Guards, 27th, 52nd and 5th Guards Cavalry Corps – surrounded the encircled German forces. The Red Army force also included elements of the 5th Guards Tank Army, with its armor placed in the area that separated Group Stemmermann and the III Panzer Corps.<ref>Zetterling & Frankson, p. 244</ref><ref>Nash, p. 296, map of disposition of forces during the breakout</ref>
Stemmermann elected to stay behind with a rearguard of 6,500 men, the remaining combined strength of the [[57th Infantry Division (Wehrmacht)|57th]] and [[88th Infantry Division (Wehrmacht)|88th Infantry Divisions]]. The pocket was at this point just five kilometers in diameter, with no room to maneuver. Shanderovka, once seen as a viable escape route, became known as "Hell's Gate".<ref>Nash, p. 280</ref> The Red Army subjected the area to intense artillery and rocket fire, while the Red Air Force ground attack aircraft bombed and strafed the encircled troops, only infrequently challenged by the Luftwaffe. Various unit diaries described a scene of gloom, with fires caused by Soviet night bombing with incendiaries, destroyed or abandoned vehicles everywhere and wounded men and disorganized units on muddy roads. Konev ordered Cossack cavalry units to perform sabre attacks on the disorganised German units. Ukrainian civilians were caught between the combatants. On 16 February 1944, Manstein, without waiting for a decision by Hitler, sent a radio message to Stemmermann to authorize the breakout: "Password Freedom, objective Lysyanka, 2300 hours."{{citation needed|date=April 2016}}
[[File:OEF-map-5.jpg|thumb|240px|right|The German breakout]]
With extreme reluctance, Stemmermann and Lieb decided to leave 1,450 non-ambulatory wounded at Shanderovka, attended by doctors and orderlies.<ref>Perrett, p. 168</ref><ref>Nash, p. 283</ref><ref>Zetterling & Frankson, p. 242</ref> The troops then began to assemble at dusk into three assault columns, with Division Group 112 to the north, the 5th SS Panzer Division to the south and the 72nd Division in the center, with the reinforced 105th Regiment in the first echelon to provide assault power.<ref>Zetterling & Frankson, p. 257</ref> Several battalions and regiments reached the German lines at Oktyabr by 0410. The 105th entered [[Lysyanka]] at 0630.<ref>Nash, p. 300</ref>
At the left flank column, a reconnaissance patrol returned with the news that Hill 239 was occupied by Soviet T-34 tanks of the 5th Guards Tank Army. The high ground had to be bypassed. The direction of the German retreat had to veer off to the south toward the [[Hnyly Tikych|Gniloy Tikich]] River. When daylight arrived, the German breakout plan began to unravel. Very few armored vehicles and other heavy equipment could climb the slippery, thawing hillsides and the weapons had to be destroyed and abandoned.<ref name="DA Pamphlet 20-234, p. 40">DA Pamphlet 20–234, p. 40</ref>
[[File:Battle of the Korsun–Cherkassy Pocket Museum 13.jpg|thumb|500px|Diorama in Battle of the Korsun–Shevchenkovsky Pocket Museum, Korsun–Shevchenkovsky]]
General Konev, now aware of the German breakout, resolved to keep his promise to Stalin not to let the German forces escape. Soviet intelligence, however, at this stage vastly overestimated the armored strength of the III Panzer Corps, and Konev therefore proceeded in force. At this time, the 20th Tank Corps brought its brigade of the new [[Iosif Stalin tank#IS-2|Joseph Stalin-2]]s to the Korsun battlefield.<ref>Nash, p. 267. Editor's note – Soviet tank corps did not have organic heavy (JS-2) tank brigades. Nash may be referring to one of the independent heavy tank regiments that were assigned to the 2nd Ukrainian Front.</ref> Konev ordered all available armor and artillery to attack the escaping units, cut them into isolated groups and then destroy them piecemeal.<ref>The cavalry hacked at the German soldiers with their sabers. [Perrett, p. 169]</ref> The two blocking Soviet rifle divisions, the [[206th Rifle Division|206th Rifle]] and [[5th Guards Airborne Division|5th Guards Airborne]], had been smashed by the German assault forces; without infantry support Soviet tanks then fired into the German formations from a distance. With no anti-tank weapons in the field, T-34s commenced to wade into support troops, headquarters units, stragglers and Red-Cross identified medical columns.<ref>Nash, p. 308</ref><ref>Zetterling & Frankson, p. 267</ref>
{{Blockquote|Under the yellow sky of early morning and over ground covered with wet snow Soviet tanks made straight for the thick of the column, ploughing up and down, killing and crushing with their tracks. Almost simultaneously massed Cossack cavalry wheeled away from the tanks to hunt down and massacre men fleeing for the refuge of the hills: hands held high in surrender the Cossacks sliced off with their sabres. The killing in this human hunt went on for several hours and a new round opened on the banks of the river [[Hnylyi Tikych|Gniloy Tikich]], where the survivors of the first collision of the German column with Soviet troops dragged and fought their way.| John Erickson, in ''The Road to Berlin'', p. 178.}}
By
That many escaped back to the German lines at Lysyanka was due in great measure to the exertions of the III Panzer Corps as it drove in relief of Group Stemmermann. The unit was equipped with Tigers and Panthers and an engineer battalion with specialist bridging skills.<ref>Perrett, p. 169</ref>
==Outcome==
The Red Army encirclement of Cherkassy–Korsun inflicted serious damage on six German divisions, including the [[5th SS Panzer Division]]. Though most of the trapped men escaped, they had to leave nearly all of their heavy equipment behind. These units had to be withdrawn for rest and near complete re-equipping. The escaped wounded were transported from collection points near Uman to rehabilitation areas and hospitals in Poland, and were then sent on leave to their home towns.
[[File:Wreckedtruckserickson.jpg|thumb|left|alt=Many destroyed or damaged trucks scattered around a field. Snow and dirt cover everything.|Some of the destroyed German equipment following the attempt to break out from Korsun.]]
In a U.S. Army brief written following the war, Lieb commented that when he assumed command of Force Stemmermann:
<blockquote>
The 72nd and Wiking Divisions were completely intermingled. No longer did they have any tanks, artillery, vehicles or rations. Many soldiers were entirely without weapons, quite a few even without footgear. Neither division could be considered in any way able to fight. One regiment of Task Force B was intact and still had some artillery support. However, this regiment also had no vehicles and no rations left. All wounded, estimated at about 2,000, (...) were evacuated by air." He also stated: "For lack of vehicles and fuel, III Panzer Corps was unable to reinforce its units in the area of Lisyanka and Oktyabr. [It] had no extra supplies of any kind, and his forward elements were unable to provide rations for the troops emerging from the pocket.<ref name=DAPamphlet_31/>
</blockquote>
With German armored reserves drawn to the Korsun Pocket, the Soviets struck Army Group South in two other sectors. The 13th and 60th Armies (General Vatutin's 1st Ukrainian Front) advanced south of the [[Pripet Marshes|Pripiat' Marshes]], capturing the remnants of the [[XIII Army Corps (Wehrmacht)|German XIII Corps]] at the [[Battle of Rovno]]<ref>Haupt, pp. 211–212</ref> and advancing to [[Lutsk]]. To the south, the 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts (Generals Malinovsky and Tolbukhin) attacked along the bend of [[Dnepr River]], capturing [[Kryvyi Rih]].<ref name=Glantz_188>Glantz & House, p. 188</ref>
General Stemmermann was killed during the breakout when his command car was hit by a Soviet antitank gun.<ref>Nash 1995, p. 132</ref> General Lieb survived the war. General Vatutin was shot by Ukrainian Nationalist UPA insurgents on 29 February 1944 and died on 15 April.<ref name=Glantz_188/> The commander of 2nd Ukrainian Front, General Konev, was made a Marshal of the Soviet Union for his victory at Korsun. Konev also survived the war.
==Assessment==
[[File:Ucraina 1944.jpg|thumb|right|Soviet forces in Ukraine, 1944]]
The battle around Korsun was a major Soviet victory that enabled later advances the next spring into Romania.<ref name=Zetterling_298/><ref name=Nash_382/><ref>Nash 1995, pp. 3, 141–142</ref> An entire German army became trapped, and as the pocket collapsed the forces inside were forced to retreat through gaps in the Soviet forces surrounding them, resulting in significant losses in men and tremendous losses in equipment.
Hitler's insistence on holding the exposed salient strongly limited the options of German field commanders.<ref>Frieser, p. 394</ref> Once the Soviets had encircled the German forces, relief efforts produced mixed results. The effectiveness of the German counterattack was limited by Hitler's plan for splitting his strength to attempt a counter envelopment. The XLVII Panzer Corps' attacks were ineffective due to the weakness of its divisions. Though the III Panzer Corps was far more effective, the corps wasted a week on a failed attempt to encircle the Soviet forces.<ref name="Frieser, p. 402"/> When it was finally given the mission of relieving ''Gruppe Stemmermann'', the Germans were unable to provide Bäke's heavy tank regiment with adequate fuel supplies, leading Bäke to stop his advance on Hill 239 because one group of his tanks had run out of fuel.<ref>Frieser, p. 404</ref> This logistical failure was compounded by the vagueness of the radio message to General Stemmermann ordering the breakout attempt. Hill 239 remained under Soviet control, resulting in significant casualties among Stemmermann's retreating force.
The Soviet performance was also beset by errors. Soviet intelligence on German forces in the pocket was faulty in overestimating their strength.<ref name="Frieser, p. 397"/> At the same time, the Soviets underestimated German capability for a counterattack and hurriedly moved more forces forward to bolster the strength of their encircling rings.<ref>Nash 1995, pp. 149–150</ref> The Soviet air force was unable to significantly hinder the German aerial resupply effort.<ref name="Frieser, p. 405"/> Ultimately, the encircling forces were unable to prevent a German breakout, allowing a significant portion of the trapped Germans to escape. Given the initial circumstances of the battle, the degree of Soviet losses makes it clear that while the Soviets won at Korsun, it was a victory that came at a high price.<ref name=Zetterling_298/>
Soviet sources and testimonials from the front line assert that the total loss in German men was catastrophic, with estimates collected from mass graves and the battlefield accounting for roughly 55,000 dead and 18,000 German prisoners from the encircled formations alone.<ref>{{Cite book|title = Russia At War|last = Werth|first = Alexander|publisher = E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc.|year = 1964|isbn = 0786707224|___location = New York|pages = 782}}</ref> German sources differ on total losses, holding that of the 60,000 men originally inside the pocket, the number had shrunk to less than 50,000 by 16 February. 45,000 of these took part in the breakout, resulting in 27,703 German soldiers and 1,063 Russian auxiliaries breaking out unscathed. Total casualties killed, wounded or missing, were claimed at 31,000, yet these numbers do not count losses from the rescuing forces.<ref>Zetterling & Frankson, pp. 277–278</ref> German official documents listed total escapees as 40,423, including the wounded flown out of the pocket and evacuated from Lysyanka.<ref>Nash, p. 398</ref> While there were claims that "roughly two out of three" encircled men succeeding in escaping the pocket,<ref>Nash, p. 366</ref> "almost one third of their men [were either] dead or wounded."<ref>Zetterling & Frankson, p. 280</ref>
Soviet sources tally losses of 80,188 casualties for the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts, with 24,286 killed and missing, and 55,902 wounded. These losses were incurred over the period of 24 January – 17 February 1944 during both the encirclements and the breakout attempts.<ref name="Krivosheev, p. 109"/>
==Use in propaganda==
Both sides hailed the events at Korsun as a victory. Marshal Konev claimed to have inflicted 130,000 German casualties, an assertion that German official history dismissed. Soviet historian Sergey Smirnov described the victory at Korsun as a "Stalingrad on the Dnieper," and the victory was hailed as a culmination of Soviet armored strength against the ailing Wehrmacht. Marshal Zhukov disliked being overshadowed by his rival, noting that on 18 February 1944, official honors were given in Moscow to the [[2nd Ukrainian Front]]—but not the [[1st Ukrainian Front]]—"an unforgivable error of the part of the supreme commander [Stalin]".<ref>Frieser, p. 418</ref>
On the part of the Germans, the counterattack was depicted as a glorious success in which one group of brave German soldiers freed their equally heroic comrades who had been trapped in the pocket. However, [[Nikolaus von Vormann|General von Vormann]], who commanded the relief attempt of the XLVII Panzer Corps, bitterly noted that "the troops who took part were astonished and unbelieving when they were told they had won a great victory at Cherkassy in the Ukraine in 1944." The German high command was relieved that many troops were able to escape. Adolf Hitler supposedly only complained briefly about the amount of equipment that had to be left behind.<ref>Frieser, p. 419</ref>
==Historiography==
One of the initial historiographical works on the fighting at Korsun was a 1952 U.S. Army publication, DA Pamphlet 20–234, ''Operations of Encircled Forces: German Experiences in Russia''. This work was written in the context of NATO's [[Cold War]] confrontation with the Soviet Union, and the authors highlighted the historical experience of the Wehrmacht which might prove useful to [[NATO]] forces had a war between the Soviet Union and the NATO countries broken out.<ref>DA Pamphlet 20–234, p. 1</ref> Like most of the English-language works on the Eastern Front of this era, it was written from the German point of view and without the benefit of wartime records.
John Erickson's 1983 ''The Road to Berlin'' and David Glantz's 1995 (2015) ''When Titans Clashed'' covered events on the entire Eastern Front from a German and Soviet perspective, and devoted several pages to the fighting in the Korsun Pocket. Erickson did not question Soviet claims regarding German casualties, and Glantz questioned the veracity of German claims regarding the total of escapees from the pocket.<ref>Glantz & House, p. 188. In this work, Glantz is skeptical of German accounts, writing "Although German accounts claim that 30,000 troops escaped, the Soviet version is far more credible."</ref> Glantz has also translated the Soviet General Staff Study on the Korsun Operation into English as ''The Battle for the Ukraine: The Red Army's Korsun'-Shevchenkovkii Operation, 1944''.
More recently, the 2002 work by U.S. Army historian Douglas Nash, ''Hell's Gate: The Battle of the Cherkassy Pocket, January–February 1944'', took issue with Soviet claims that Korsun was another Stalingrad.<ref name=Nash_382q>"There was no Stalingrad on the Dnieper, as the Soviets claimed..." (Nash, p. 382)</ref> Similarly, the Swedish historians Niklas Zetterling and Anders Frankson disputed the assertions of the Soviet General Staff Study of the Korsun Operation in their 2008 work, ''The Korsun Pocket. The Encirclement and Breakout of a German Army in the East, 1944'', describing the staff study as "anything but accurate" and "completely unreliable." Both Nash and Zetterling/Frankson conclude that Korsun was a Soviet victory.<ref name=Zetterling_298>"Nevertheless, the Soviet position, relative to the Germans, was stronger after the battle than before, so Korsun may be viewed as a Soviet victory, even though it was bought at a considerably higher price than it ought to have been." (Zetterling & Frankson, p. 298)</ref><ref name=Nash_382/><ref>For example, U.S. Army historian Douglas E. Nash points to Soviet claims as being exaggerated; e.g., the Soviet 5th Cavalry Corps and 4th Guards Army "claimed that they had practically wiped out most of ''Wiking'' [on 6 February 1944], though this was not remotely close ... In fact, ''Wiking's'' biggest battles in the pocket were yet to come" (Nash, p. 110). The Soviets claimed "to have downed more than 329 aircraft" during the aerial supply operation; that number would have been more planes than the Luftwaffe had operational in its ''Korps'' area during this entire period and "should be regarded as an example of the degree of exaggeration to which the Soviets were prone. This would not be the last wildly inflated claim they would make" (Nash, p. 120).</ref>
In 2007, Volume 8 of the German semiofficial history of the war (''[[Germany and the Second World War]]'') was published, and part of the work authored by Karl-Heinz Frieser addressed the events at Korsun. This work also doubts Soviet claims regarding the German casualties while discussing the situation of the German forces in detail, using available data from the German archives. However, while German casualties in this work are taken from German archives, it bases its assessment of Soviet AFV and gun losses (uncritically) on German wartime claims.<ref>Frieser, pp. 394–419</ref> In 2011 author and historian Jean Lopez published, on Economica Edition ({{ISBN|978-2717860290}} ) a book named "Le chaudron de Tcherkassy-Korsun ", covering the battle.
==References==
{{Reflist|30em}}
==Bibliography==
*
*[http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/20234/20234.html Department of the Army Pamphlet 20–234] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080314065147/http://www.history.army.mil/BOOKS/WWII/20234/20234.html |date=14 March 2008 }}. ''Operations of Encircled Forces: German Experiences in Russia''. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952.
*Dunn, Walter S. ''Hitler's Nemesis The Red Army 1930–1945''. Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2009.
*Erickson, John. ''The Road to Berlin'', New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999.
* {{cite book
| last1 = Frieser
| first1 = Karl-Heinz
| author-link1 = Karl-Heinz Frieser
| first2 =Klaus
| last2 = Schmider
| first3 =Klaus
| last3 = Schönherr
| first4 = Gerhard
| last4 = Schreiber
| first5 = Kristián
| last5 = Ungváry
| author-link5 = Krisztián Ungváry
| first6 =Bernd
| last6=Wegner
| volume = VIII
| title = Die Ostfront 1943/44 – Der Krieg im Osten und an den Nebenfronten
| trans-title = The Eastern Front 1943–1944: The War in the East and on the Neighbouring Fronts
| publisher = Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt
| ___location = München
| year = 2007
| isbn = 978-3-421-06235-2
| language = German
}}
*[[David M. Glantz|Glantz, David]] & [[Jonathan House|House, Jonathan M.]] ''When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler''. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995. {{ISBN|0-7006-0717-X}}
*{{cite book|last=Haupt|first=Werner|title=Army Group South: The Wehrmacht in Russia 1941–1945|year=1998|publisher=Schiffer Military History|___location=Atglen, PA|isbn=0-7643-0385-6}}
*Krivosheev, G. F. ''Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century''. London: Greenhill Books, 1997. {{ISBN|1-85367-280-7}}.
* {{cite book |author-link=B. H. Liddell Hart |last=Liddell Hart |first=B. H. |title=History of the Second World War |___location=New York, NY |publisher=Putnam |date=1970}}
*{{cite book |last1=Loeffel |first1=Robert |title=Family Punishment in Nazi Germany: Sippenhaft, Terror and Myth |date=2012 |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |isbn=978-0-230-34305-4 |language=en}}
*Nash, Douglas E. [https://web.archive.org/web/20130408134331/http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA299260 ''No Stalingrad on the Dnieper'' (Paper written for the Command and General Staff College of the U.S. Army)], Fort Leavenworth: 1995
*Nash, Douglas E. [https://web.archive.org/web/20090911070809/http://search.barnesandnoble.com/booksearch/isbninquiry.asp?r=1&ean=0965758435 ''Hell's Gate: The Battle of the Cherkassy Pocket, January–February 1944 '']. Southbury, Connecticut: RZM Publishing, 2002. {{ISBN|0-9657584-3-5}}
*Perrett, Bryan. ''Knights of the Black Cross, Hitler's Panzerwaffe and Its Leaders''. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986. {{ISBN|0-7090-2806-7}}
*Shukman, Harold, ed. ''Stalin's Generals''. New York: Grove Press, 1993. {{ISBN|1-84212-513-3}}
*Tessin, Georg. ''Verbände und Truppen der deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS 1939 – 1945'', Vol. 14, Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1980. {{ISBN|3-7648-1111-0}}.
* {{cite book |last=Willmott |first=H. P. |title=June, 1944 |___location=New York, NY |publisher=Blandford Press |date=1984 |isbn=0-7137-1446-8}}
*Zetterling, Niklas & Frankson, Anders. ''The Korsun Pocket: The Encirclement and Breakout of a German Army in the East, 1944''. Drexel Hill (Philadelphia), Pennsylvania: Casemate Publishers. 2008. {{ISBN|978-1-932033-88-5}}.
==External links==
* [https://maps.google.com/maps?q=Korsun%27-Shevchenkivs%27kyi,+Cherkas%27ka,+Ukraine&hl=en&ll=49.217597,31.341248&spn=1.263009,2.90863&sll=37.0625,-95.677068&sspn=48.641855,93.076172&vpsrc=6&hnear=Korsun%27-Shevchenkivs%27kyi,+Korsun%27-Shevchenkivs%27kyi+district,+Cherkas%27ka+oblast,+Ukraine&t=p&z=9 Terrain view of the Korsun Pocket area]
* [https://maps.google.com/maps?q=Korsun%27-Shevchenkivs%27kyi,+Cherkas%27ka,+Ukraine&hl=en&ll=49.29468,30.94574&spn=0.157629,0.363579&sll=37.0625,-95.677068&sspn=48.641855,93.076172&vpsrc=6&hnear=Korsun%27-Shevchenkivs%27kyi,+Korsun%27-Shevchenkivs%27kyi+district,+Cherkas%27ka+oblast,+Ukraine&t=h&z=12 Satellite view of the German escape route]
{{World War II}}
{{Authority control}}
{{Tank battles|style=wide}}
{{Coord|49.4194|N|31.2772|E|source:wikidata-and-enwiki-cat-tree_region:DE|display=title}}
{{DEFAULTSORT:Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket}}
[[Category:1944 in the Soviet Union]]
[[Category:Battles and operations of the Soviet–German War]]
[[Category:Battles and operations of World War II involving Czechoslovakia]]
[[Category:Encirclements in World War II]]
[[Category:February 1944 in Europe]]
[[Category:January 1944 in Europe]]
[[Category:Korsun-Shevchenkivskyi]]
[[Category:Strategic operations of the Red Army in World War II]]
[[Category:Tank battles of World War II]]
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