Democracy movements of China: Difference between revisions

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{{Short description|Series of political movements in China}}

:\'\'This article is about the political movement in China. For the [[Guns N\' Roses]] album, see [[Chinese Democracy]].\'\'

{{expand Chinese|date=August 2025}}

{{Infobox civil conflict

| title = Democracy movements of China

| partof = [[politics in China]] and [[protest and dissent in China]]

| image =

| caption = Image from the [[Beijing Spring]]

| date = {{Start date|df=yes|1978|11}} – present ({{Age in years, months, weeks and days|month1=11|day1=9|year1=1978}})

| place = [[China]]

| coordinates =

| causes = Various, including:

* Discontent with the [[one-party rule]] of the [[Chinese Communist Party]] in China

* Discontent with bureaucratism ([[Democracy Wall]] movement)

* Discontent with poor management of student welfare (university movements from 1986–1989)

* Discontent with foreign policy (university movements from 1986–1989)

| status = Ongoing

| methods =

| casualties_label =

| arrests =

| injuries =

| howmany3 =

| notes =

}}

{{Chinese democracy movement}}

{{Contemporary Chinese political thought}}

[[Democracy promotion|Democracy movement]]s in the [[People's Republic of China]] are a series of organized [[political movement]]s, inside and outside of the country, addressing a variety of grievances, including objections to socialist [[bureaucratism]] and objections to the continuation of the [[one-party state|one-party rule]] of the [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP) itself. The [[Democracy Wall]] movement of November 1978 to spring 1981 is typically regarded as the beginning of contemporary Chinese democracy movement. In addition to the Democracy Wall movement, the events of the [[1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre]] are among the notable examples of Chinese democracy movements.

==History==

{{sources}}

{{Further|New Enlightenment (China)|Beijing Spring|Democracy Wall}}

The \'\'\'Chinese democracy movement\'\'\' ({{zh-stp|s=中国民主运动|t=中國民主運動|p=Zhōngguó Mínzhǔyùndòng}}, abbreviated as Mingyun \"民运\") is a loosely organized [[Political movements|political movement]] in the [[People\'s Republic of China]] against continued one-party rule by the [[Communist Party of China]]. The movement began during [[Beijing Spring]] in [[1978]] and played an important role in the [[Tiananmen Square protests of 1989]]. In the [[1990s]], the movement underwent a sharp decline both within China and overseas, and is currently fragmented and not considered by most analysts to be a serious threat to power to the [[Politics of China|Chinese government]].

==Origins= Origin ===

The beginning of China's democracy movements is usually regarded as the Democracy Wall movement of November 1978 to spring 1981.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal |last=Paltemaa |first=Lauri |date=24 October 2007 |title=The Democracy Wall Movement, Marxist Revisionism, and the Variations on Socialist Democracy |journal=[[Journal of Contemporary China]] |language=en |volume=16 |issue=53 |pages=601–625 |doi=10.1080/10670560701562325 |s2cid=143933209 |issn=1067-0564}}</ref> The Democracy Wall movement framed the key issue as the elimination of bureaucratism and the bureaucratic class.<ref name=":1" /> Former [[Red Guards]] from both rebel and conservative factions were the core of the movement.<ref name=":1" /> Democracy Wall participants agreed that "democracy" was the means to resolve the conflict between the bureaucratic class and the people, the nature of the proposed democratic institutions was a major source of disagreement.<ref name=":1" /> A majority of participants in the movement favored viewed the movement as part of a struggle between correct and incorrect notions of [[Marxism]].<ref name=":1" /> Many participants advocated [[Classical Marxism|classical Marxist]] views that drew on the [[Paris Commune]] for inspiration.<ref name=":1" /> The Democracy Wall movement also included non-Marxists and anti-Marxists, although these participants were a minority.<ref name=":1" /> Demands for "democracy" were frequent but without an agreed-upon meaning.<ref name=":5">{{Cite book |last=Wu |first=Yiching |url=https://archive.org/details/yiching-wu-the-cultural-revolution-at-the-margins |title=The Cultural Revolution at the Margins: Chinese Socialism in Crisis |date=2014 |publisher=[[Harvard University Press]] |isbn=978-0-674-41985-8 |___location=Cambridge, Mass. |pages=213–215 |oclc=881183403}}</ref> Participants in the movement variously associated the concept of democracy with socialism, communism, liberal democracy, capitalism, and Christianity.<ref name=":5" /> They drew on a diverse range of intellectual resources "ranging from classical Marxist and socialist traditions to Enlightenment philosophers, [socialist] experiments in Yugoslavia, and Western liberal democracy."<ref name=":5" />

TheSignificant origindocuments of the movementDemocracy canWall beMovement seen with the briefinclude [[liberalization]] known as [[Beijing Spring]] which occurred after the [[Cultural Revolution]]. The founding document of the movement can be considered to be the [[manifesto]], the [[Fifth Modernization]] authoredmanifesto by [[Wei Jingsheng]], who was sentenced to fifteen years in [[prison]] for authoring the document. In the documentit, Wei argued that thepolitical liberalization holdingand ofthe powerempowerment byof the laboring masses was essential for modernization, that the Communist PartyCCP was controlled by reactionaries, and that the people must struggle to overthrow the reactionaries via a long and possibly bloody fight.{{citation needed|date=August 2021}}

=== Development ===

Throughout the [[1980s]], these ideas increased in popularity among college educated Chinese. In response to the growing [[political corruption|corruption]], the economic dislocation, and the sense that reforms in the [[Soviet Union]] and [[Eastern Europe]] were leaving China behind, the Tiananmen Square protests erupted in [[1989]]. These protests were put down by government troops on [[June 4]], [[1989]]. In response, a number of pro-[[democracy]] organizations were formed by overseas Chinese [[Student activism|student activists]], and there was considerable Western sympathy for the movement.

Throughout the 1980s, these ideas increased in popularity among college-educated Chinese, through the "[[New Enlightenment (China)|New Enlightenment movement]]" led by intellectuals.<ref name=":12">{{Cite book |last=Li |first=Huaiyin |title=Reinventing Modern China: Imagination and Authenticity in Chinese Historical Writing |date=October 2012 |publisher=[[University of Hawaiʻi Press]] |isbn=9780824836085 |chapter=6 Challenging the Revolutionary Orthodoxy: “New Enlightenment” Historiography in the 1980s |doi=10.21313/hawaii/9780824836085.003.0006}}</ref><ref name=":4">{{Cite journal |last=Chen |first=Yan |date=2007 |title=意识形态的兴衰与知识分子的起落—— "反右"运动与八十年代"新启蒙"的背景分析 |trans-title=The rise and fall of ideology and intellectuals—background analysis of the Anti-Rightist Campaign and the New Enlightenment in the 1980s |url=https://www.modernchinastudies.org/us/issues/past-issues/97-mcs-2007-issue-3/1017-2012-01-05-15-35-22.html |journal=[[Modern China Studies]] |volume=3}}</ref>

Overseas pro-democracy organizations including the [[Chinese Alliance for Democracy]] were founded by Chinese activists. [[1986 Chinese student demonstrations|Student protests]] inspired by intellectuals broke out in 1986.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Shi |first=Tianjian |date=1990 |title=The Democratic Movement in China in 1989: Dynamics and Failure |journal=[[Asian Survey]] |volume=30 |issue=12 |pages=1186–1205 |doi=10.2307/2644993 |issn=0004-4687 |jstor=2644993}}</ref>

In the wake of growing [[corruption]] and economic dislocation, the [[1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre|Tiananmen Square protests]] erupted in 1989, which culminated in a military crackdown in June.

==Decline==

==Government's response==

In the [[1990s]], the Democracy movement underwent a sharp decline, both within and outside China. The difficulties that the [[Soviet Union]] had in converting to democracy and [[capitalism]] was used to validate the PRC\'s official position that slow gradual reform was a wise policy. Organizationally, democracy promotion organizations in the United States such as the [[China Alliance for Democracy]] and the [[Independent Federation of Chinese Students and Scholars]] suffered from internal disputes and infighting. Much support was lost over the issue of [[Most Favored Nation]] trade status and China\'s entry into the [[World Trade Organization]] which was popular both within and outside of China, but which were opposed by the overseas student movement.

{{Unreferenced section|date=January 2024}}

[[Ideology|Ideologically]], the government's first reaction to the democracy movement was an effort to focus on the personal behavior of individual dissidents and argue that they were tools of foreign powers. In the mid-1990s, the government began using more effective arguments which were influenced by [[Neoconservatism in the People's Republic of China|Chinese Neo-Conservatism]] and Western authors such as [[Edmund Burke]]. The main argument was that China's main priority was [[economic growth]], and economic growth required political stability. The democracy movement was flawed because it promoted [[Radicalism (historical)|radical]]ism and [[revolution]] which put the gains that China had made into jeopardy. In contrast to Wei's argument that democracy was essential to [[economic growth]], the government argued that economic growth must come before political liberalization, comparable to what happened in the [[Four Asian Tigers]].{{citation needed|date=January 2024}}

With regard to [[political dissent]] engendered by the movement, the government has taken a three-pronged approach. First, dissidents who are widely known in the West such as [[Wei Jingsheng]], [[Fang Lizhi]], and [[Wang Dan (dissident)|Wang Dan]] are deported. Although Chinese [[criminal law]] does not contain any provisions for [[exile|exiling]] citizens, these deportations are conducted by giving the dissident a severe jail sentence and then granting medical [[parole]]. Second, the less well-known leaders of a dissident movement are identified and given severe jail sentences. Generally, the government targets a relatively small number of organizers who are crucial in coordinating a movement and who are then charged with endangering [[national security|state security]] or revealing official secrets. Thirdly, the government attempts to address the grievances of possible supporters of the movement. This is intended to isolate the leadership of the movement, and prevent disconnected [[protest]]s from combining into a general organized protest that can threaten the CCP's hold on power.{{citation needed|date=January 2024}}

In addition, there began to be a [[generation gap]] between students and people born after the [[Cultural Revolution]] began entering college campuses. These students saw the older activists as more pro-American than pro-democracy, are far more supportive of the Communist Party and tend to be more nationalistic. The PRC government took advantage of this most recently in the 21st century by promoting consumerism and stirring up nationalist feelings directed against Japan and Taiwan. Internecine disputes within the movement over such issues as [[most-favored nation]] status (U.S. trade law) for China crippled the movement, as did the perception by many within China that overseas [[dissident]]s such as [[Harry Wu]] and [[Wei Jingsheng]] were simply out of touch with the growing economic prosperity and decreasing political control within China.

===Chinese socialist democracy===

==Government response==

CCP leaders assert there are already elements of democracy; they dubbed the term "Chinese socialist democracy" for what they describe as a participatory representative government.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2012-01-11 |title=Interview with Ambassador Liu Xiaoming On Nile TV International |url=http://big5.fmprc.gov.cn/gate/big5/eg.china-embassy.org/eng/dsxx/cfyj/2002/t77035.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120111065440/http://big5.fmprc.gov.cn/gate/big5/eg.china-embassy.org/eng/dsxx/cfyj/2002/t77035.htm |archive-date=2012-01-11 |access-date=2022-12-02 |website=[[Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China]]}}</ref>

== Academic interpretations ==

[[Ideology|Ideologically]], the government\'s first reaction to the democracy movement was a rather unconvincing effort to focus on the personal behavior of individual dissidents and argue that they were tools of foreign powers. In the mid-[[1990s]], the government began using more effective arguments which were influenced by [[Neoconservatism in China|Chinese Neo-Conservatism]] and Western authors such as [[Edmund Burke]]. The main argument was that China\'s main priority was [[economic growth]], and economic growth required political stability. The Democracy movement was flawed because it promoted [[Radicalism (historical)|radical]]ism and [[revolution]] which put the gains that China had made into jeopardy. In contrast to Wei\'s argument that democracy was essential to [[economic growth]], the government argued that economic growth must come before political liberalization, comparable to what happened in the [[Asian Tigers]].

Academic Lin Chun criticizes the phrase "democracy movement" as typically used in the scholarly and media discourse on China, noting that the term is often used exclusively to refer to the "demands and activism of an urban, educated group of people seeking liberal more than democratic values."<ref name=":0">{{Cite book |last=Lin |first=Chun |title=The transformation of Chinese socialism |date=2006 |publisher=[[Duke University Press]] |isbn=978-0-8223-3785-0 |___location=Durham [N.C.] |pages=208 |oclc=63178961}}</ref> She notes, for example, that the political turbulence in universities over the period 1986 to 1989 had specific flash points ranging from anger at the government's "too soft" position on [[China–Japan relations]] to poor management of student welfare.<ref name=":0" />

==The Impossibility Debate of China’s Democratization==

With regard to [[political dissent]] engendered by the movement, the government has taken a three pronged approach. First, dissidents who are widely known in the West such as [[Wei Jingsheng]], [[Fang Lizhi]], and [[Wang Dan]] are deported. Although Chinese [[criminal law]] does not contain any provisions for [[exile|exiling]] [[citizen]]s, these deportations are conducted by giving the dissident a severe jail sentence and the granting of medical [[parole]]. Second, the less well-known leaders of a dissident movement are identified and given severe jail sentences. Generally, the government targets a relative small number of organizers who are crucial in coordinating a movement and are charged with endangering [[national security|state security]] or revealing official secrets. Thirdly, the government attempts to address the grievances of possible supporters of the movement. This is intended to isolate the leadership of the movement, and prevent disconnected [[protest]]s which cannot threaten the Communist hold on power from combining into a general organized protest that can.

As China continues to rise without democratizing, discourse has emerged suggesting that democratization of China may be impossible forever.

{{ill|Makoto Mogi|lt=|ja|茂木誠}} explains the reasons why democratization of China is difficult by touching on [[geopolitics]], {{ill|An Ecological View of History|lt=|ja|文明の生態史観}}, and [[Oriental despotism]] of [[Karl Wittfogel]] in his YouTube videos and books.<ref>米中激突の地政学 茂木誠 P172</ref><ref>[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eSIwB45IQo4 アジア的専制と生態史観]</ref>

Similarly, based on the interpretation of {{ill|An Ecological View of History|lt=|ja|文明の生態史観}}, {{ill|Yang Haiying|lt=|ja|楊海英}} states, “Democratization does not arise from Chinese civilization.”<ref>[https://www.sankei.com/article/20180607-C7SFXFSTN5L6DOF7IZ234FCVT4/ 【正論】中華文明から民主化は生まれず　文化人類学者、静岡大学教授・楊海英]</ref>

{{ill|Sekihei|lt=|ja|石平 (評論家)}} explains in his book Why China Cannot Democratize Even if It Wants To: Understanding the Essence of “Imperial Politics” Reveals the Core of Modern China that Chinese people have a sentiment desiring a moderate emperor, which is why democratization cannot occur.<ref>[https://www.sankei.com/article/20180408-LNBHDGXMRJPFHOSBSPSNQ3LWFQ/ 【書評】『なぜ中国は民主化したくてもできないのか』石平著 - 産経ニュース]</ref><ref>[https://president.jp/articles/-/25150?page=1 なぜ中国は民主化より"皇帝"を求めるのか "習王朝"の次は"反乱"が歴史的必然 | PRESIDENT Online（プレジデントオンライン）]</ref>

==Modern democracy activism==

{{ill|Tanaka Sakai|lt=|ja|田中宇}} cites the decline of the democratization movement was due to the chaos caused by democratization and [[market economy]] reforms in [[Russia]], the spread of [[nationalism]]<ref name="aikoku">[https://web.archive.org/web/20000602183257/http://tanakanews.com/990611china.htm 「民主」が「愛国」に塗り替えられた中国の十年]</ref> the promotion of [[consumer society]] culture, and tolerance of criticism limited to corruption without rejecting the system itself.<ref>[https://tanakanews.com/b0101china.htm 活気あふれる中国（５）発展の裏側]</ref>

Many pro-democracy supporters noted that China has successfully overcome much of the challenges faced during the transition from a communist to a capitalist economy so there is no longer a need for prolonged political repression. Pro-democracy forces would not necessarily stall economic growth after the transition, as the Communist Party claims, and most importantly the presence of democracy would help to check wasteful corruption and achieve a more even distribution of wealth. Many believe that the Communist Party of China has no intention whatsoever to ever relinquish power even if all their economic goals are ever achieved. It is said that China would have refused the WTO if the terms of entry was linked to an improvement in human rights.

He also quoted an Australian think tank's analysis that “Democratic China is unpredictable,” warning that domestically internal conflicts and abroad patriotic politicians who stir nationalism would rise, posing danger.<ref>[https://tanakanews.com/g0307china.htm 日本を不幸にする中国の民主化]</ref><ref>[https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2006/03/01/2003295190 Democratic China very unpredictable, academics warn - Taipei Times]</ref>

Among commentators outside Japan, Hong Kong commentator [[Chip Tsao]] said, “China’s territory is large, like the United States, Canada, Russia, and Australia, and governing a large country is difficult. Moreover, Chinese people want to immigrate to the United States or Canada. China has an imperial culture, and for {{ill|China’s democratization|lt=|ja|中国民主化}}, federalism is difficult, so the only option is to break China into small countries.”<ref>[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h3cNTlvPc0Q 【陶傑開Talk】中國聯邦制？　三千年前已證冇可能]</ref>

Within China, most protest activity now is expressed in single-issue demonstrations, which are tolerated to a degree by the government, and in quasi-religious outlets such as [[Falun Gong]]. Some of the ideas of the movement have been incorporated in the Chinese liberal faction who tend to agree with [[neoconservative]]s that stability is important, but argue that political liberalization is essential to maintain stability. In contrast to Democracy movement activists, most members of the [[liberal]] faction do not overtly call for the overthrow of the Communist Party nor do they deny the possibility of reform from within the Party. As a result, members of the liberal faction are generally enjoying more official tolerance than persons who identify themselves as members of the democracy movement.

[[Lee Teng-hui]] stated in a speech at the Diet members’ office building, “Both the current Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are merely continuations of China’s 5,000 years of history, and China is still a regime that constantly repeats progress and regression. China’s 5,000-year history is a history connected from one dynasty to the next within a certain space and time; even a new dynasty is only an extension of the previous one.”<ref name="rito1">[https://chuanstudio.pixnet.net/blog/post/61297567 【李登輝さん・議員会館講演全文】台湾のパラダイムの変遷]</ref><ref name="rito2">[https://logmi.jp/main/social_economy/77806 台湾元総統・李登輝氏「台湾人に生まれた悲哀を深く感じます」日本と中国による統治時代を振り返る]</ref>

==See also==

*[[China Support Network]]

*[[Politics of the People\'s Republic of China]]

*[[List of Chinese dissidents]]

In his {{ill|Hong Kong city-state theory|lt=|ja|香港城邦論}}, {{ill|Chin Wan|lt=|ja|陳雲}} cites some misconduct by certain mainland Chinese.<ref name="hk_st1">{{cite book |author=陳雲 |title=香港城邦論 |year=2011 |publisher=天窗出版社有限公司 |___location= |isbn= }}</ref>{{rp|43–46}} Furthermore, he speculates that if China were to rapidly democratize, nine factors — "international humiliation, victim mentality, pressure on living space, anger over territorial loss, distrust of international morality, an industrially disciplined society, the spiritual narrowness of the middle class, patriotic impulses of large entrepreneurs, and the rapid increase in corporate productivity coupled with employment difficulties for the youth" — could easily become a breeding ground for totalitarianism similar to Nazism.<ref name="hk_st1"/>{{rp|51–52}}

==External links==

*[http://www.freechina.net Free China Movement]

*[http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/7288/fifth.htm The Fifth Modernization by Wei Jingsheng]

*[http://www.chinatoday.com.cn/English/e2005/e200503/p14.htm Chinese Officials Lighten Up Under Pressure (China Today)]

*[http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20050912_3.htm The Tragicomedy of the Overseas Chinese Democratic Movement] (English translation of an article with the title 台湾间谍林樵清打破沉默，披露“海外民运”内斗)

===Comparison with the Democratization of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan===

[[Category:People\'s Republic of China]]

A political thinker and historian, {{ill|Liu Zhongjing|lt=|ja|劉仲敬}}, compared the democracy and history of Japan, South Korea, and China, stating the following.<ref name="ryuu_jp_tw1">[https://liuzhongjing.medium.com/%E6%98%8E%E9%8F%A1%E8%A8%AA%E8%AB%87%E5%8A%89%E4%BB%B2%E6%95%AC-20170605-%E9%A1%9B%E8%A6%86%E5%A4%A7%E4%B8%80%E7%B5%B1%E4%B8%AD%E5%9C%8B%E5%8F%B2%E8%A7%80-793c1956ff24　明鏡訪談劉仲敬（20170605）：顛覆大一統中國史觀 20210514閲覧]</ref>

[[Category:Political movements]]

{{blockquote|As far as he knows about the entire course of world history, whether in Europe, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, or East Asia, the basic process was the same: the so-called democratic constitution was a form of governance formed in the process of the emergence of the nation-state. He concluded that it could not be applied to the multi-ethnic, multicultural great empires that existed prior to the nation-state—not only in China.

[[Category:Mainland China]]

It did not apply to the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East or to the Holy Roman Empire in Europe. In Europe, democracy succeeded only after the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire, and in the Middle East, only after [[Mustafa Kemal Atatürk]] dismantled the [[Ottoman Empire]]. Why was Japan able to achieve it? The answer, he says, is that Japan was the Britain of Asia and withdrew from the imperial system.

[[Category:Political repression in the People\'s Republic of China]]

Why did [[South Korea]] succeed? Although Korea had also belonged to the Ming and Qing empires, its success came after it withdrew from the Chinese imperial order.}}

He also analyzes that the Republic of China on Taiwan and [[Taiwan independence]] are not the same: the Republic of China on Taiwan is a political weapon, while Taiwan independence is the invention of a standard European-type state—that is, the emergence of a culturally [[Taiwanese nationalism]]-based nation-state.<ref name="ryuu_jp_tw1" /> Furthermore, he states that the factor behind Taiwan's democratization was its departure from the [[Great Unity]] [[Sinocentrism]], and that if Taiwan had been operating within the [[Sinocentrism]], democratization would have been absolutely impossible.<ref>遠東的線索：西方秩序的輸入與中國的演變 臺灣轉型為民主國家 第6章 冷戰與反殖民主義 P341</ref>

[[es:Movimiento Democrático de China]]

[[fr:Mouvement démocratique chinois]]

===Democratization of Taiwan and the Challenges of Democratizing China===

[[ja:中国民主化運動]]

[[Lee Teng-hui]] reflected on the historical process of Taiwan's democratization while discussing why democratizing China is difficult. Under the influence of two foreign regimes—the long period of Japanese rule and, subsequently, the Republic of China (Kuomintang) rule—Taiwan developed its own sense of agency and identity. In particular, following the [[February 28 Incident]] of 1947, the Taiwanese recognized the need for autonomous governance independent of foreign rule, culminating in the first-ever direct presidential election in 1996.<ref name="rito1" /><ref name="rito2" />

[[zh:中國民主運動]]

Lee pointed out that, considering China's historical governance system (the "[[Fǎtǒng]]"), regimes have traditionally been extensions of imperial authority based on the emperor, and there are few successful examples of political reform. Institutional changes, known as “reform by invoking the past” (託古改制), remained largely formal and did not achieve substantive democratization. Furthermore, Lee noted that regarding the Kuomintang and Communist Party governance in China, while their forms and ideologies differed, both maintained centralized control as foreign-imposed authorities, making it essentially equally difficult for the people of mainland China to achieve autonomous democratic societies.<ref name="rito1" /><ref name="rito2" />

As [[Lu Xun]] pointed out, Chinese society has a cultural tendency that makes it hard for reform pioneers or trailblazers to emerge, which acts as an obstacle to democratization. In contrast, Taiwan embraced the concept of “breaking from the old and creating the new” (脱古改新), breaking away from traditional Asian values and Chinese-style Fǎtǒng, successfully building a society as a self-directed democratic nation. The first wave of democratic reform achieved the collapse of the authoritarian regime, democratization of legislative and executive branches, and the establishment of a Taiwanese identity. However, in recent years, party conflicts and institutional limitations have shown signs of democratic fatigue, highlighting the need for a second wave of reform involving constitutional amendments and clearer separation of powers<ref name="rito1" />

==See also ==

*[[Protest and dissent in China]]

*[[2011 Chinese pro-democracy protests]]

*[[Liberalism in China]]

==References==

{{Reflist}}{{China topics}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Chinese Democracy Movement}}

[[Category:Chinese democracy movements| ]]

[[Category:Political movements]]

[[Category:Political repression in China]]