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{{Short description|Socratic dialogue treating piety and justice}}
{{Dialogues of Plato}}
{{about|Plato's dialogue|the prophet for whom the dialogue is named|Euthyphro (prophet)}}
'''''Euthyphro''''' is one of [[Plato]]'s known early dialogues.
{{TOC-leftitalic title}}
{{Infobox medieval text
Shortly before the [[Ancient Greece|Greek]] [[philosopher]] [[Socrates]] is due to appear in court, he encounters a young man, [[Euthyphro]], who has gained the reputation of being a [[religious]] expert. Euthyphro has come to lay a series of charges against his father, that of [[murder]], as his father had allowed one of his workers to die without proper care and attention. The worker had killed a slave belonging to the family estate on the island of [[Naxos]], and while Euthyphro's father waited to hear from the authorities how to proceed the man died bound and gagged in a ditch. Socrates expresses his astonishment at the confidence of a young man able to take his own father to court on such a serious charge. In what may be perceived as a [[tongue in cheek]] fashion, Socrates states that Euthyphro obviously has a clear understanding of what is [[pious]] and impious. Since Socrates himself is facing a charge of impiety, by worshipping [[deity|gods]] not approved by the state, and is unclear what holiness is, he hopes to learn from Euthyphro.
| name = Euthyphro
| alternative title(s) = Εὐθύφρων
| image = Euthyphro Stephanus 1578 p 2.jpg
| caption = [[Henri Estienne]]'s 1578 edition of ''Euthyphro'', parallel Latin and Greek text.
| also known as = ''On Holiness''
| author(s) = [[Plato]]
| compiled by = [[Thrasyllus of Mendes]]
| language = [[Attic Greek]]
| date = 4th century BC
| provenance = [[Byzantine empire]]
| series = [[Dialogues of Plato]]
| manuscript(s) = [[List of manuscripts of Plato's dialogues|List]]
| principal manuscript(s) = [https://iiif.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/iiif/mirador/?iiif-content=https://iiif.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/iiif/manifest/f57d074b-cff1-4172-8236-797c7b8f0403.json Codex Oxoniensis Clarkianus 39] (Oxford, [[Bodleian Library]])
| first printed edition = 1513 by [[Aldus Manutius]]
| genre = [[Socratic dialogue]]
| subject = [[Piety]], [[Euthyphro dilemma]]
| setting = [[Stoa Basileios]], [[Ancient Athens]]
| personages = [[Socrates]], [[Euthyphro (prophet)|Euthyphro]]
}}
 
'''''Euthyphro''''' ({{IPAc-en|ˈ|juː|θ|ɪ|f|r|oʊ}}; {{langx|grc|[[wikt:Εὐθύφρων|Εὐθύφρων]]|translit=Euthyphrōn}}),<ref>a Greek given name meaning "sincere"; entry "[https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?l=euqu%2Ffrwn&la=greek#lexicon εὐθύφρων]" in Liddell, Scott, & Jones, ''An English–Greek Lexicon''.</ref> is a philosophical work by [[Plato]] written in the form of a [[Socratic dialogue]] set during the weeks before the [[trial of Socrates]] in 399 BC. In the dialogue, [[Socrates]] and [[Euthyphro (prophet)|Euthyphro]] attempt to establish a definition of ''[[piety]]''. This however leads to the main [[Euthyphro dilemma|dilemma of the dialogue]] when the two cannot come to a satisfactory conclusion. Is something pious because the gods approve of it? Or do the gods approve of it because it is pious? This [[aporia|aporetic]] ending has led to one of the longest theological and [[meta-ethics|meta-ethical]] debates in history.
Euthyphro claims that what lies behind the charge brought against Socrates by [[Meletus]] and the other accusers is Socrates's claim that he is subjected to a [[daimon]] or divine sign which warns him of various courses of action. Euthyphro is right; such a claim would be regarded with suspicion by many Athenians. So too would Socrates's views on some of the stories about the Greek gods, which the two men briefly discuss before plunging into the argument. Socrates expresses reservations about those accounts which show up the gods' cruelty. He mentions the castration of
the early sky god, [[Uranus (mythology)|Uranus]], by his son [[Cronos]], saying he finds such stories very difficult to accept.
 
==The argumentCharacters ==
*[[Socrates]], the Athenian philosopher, currently waiting at the [[Stoa Basileios|Porch of the King Archon]] to attend a preliminary hearing for his trial for impiety.{{sfn|Nails|2002|p=322}} He questions the nature of piety in this dialogue.
[[Image:Socrates_Louvre.jpg|thumb|Portrait of [[Socrates]], Roman marble, Louvre museum]]
*[[Euthyphro (prophet)|Euthyphro]] of [[Prospalta (Attica)|Prospalta]], a prophet, in his mid-forties.{{sfn|Nails|2002|pp=152-153}} He is at the court to prosecute his elderly father for the murder of a hireling.{{sfn|Nails|2002|pp=152-153}} His father owned land on the island of [[Naxos]], which they farmed together.{{sfn|Nails|2002|pp=152-153}} He is also mentioned in the ''[[Cratylus (dialogue)|Cratylus]]'', which takes place about twenty years earlier, as an expert in the names of the gods.{{sfn|Nails|2002|pp=152-153}}
Socrates's [[Inductive reasoning|inductive]] method of [[logical argument|arguing]] can be seen in the main part of the dialogue, in which Socrates invites Euthyphro to put forward definitions of holiness which the two can then discuss. From the definitions offered and discussed, an acceptable account of [[holiness]] (Piety) will be built up. It is clear that Socrates wants a definition of Piety which will be universally true, that is, it should apply to all people at all times, regardless of race, creed or culture. It will be a standard or template against which all actions can be measured in order to determine whether they are holy (pious) or not.
 
== Background ==
The stages of the argument can be summarised as follows
Under the government of [[Pericles]], in 447 BC, Athens had established a ''[[cleruchy]]'' on Naxos, sending 500 Athenian colonists to settle there after they had conquered it in order to help maintain their control over the island.{{sfn|Nails|2002|p=152-153}} The Athenians were expelled from Naxos in 404 BC, after the defeat at the [[Battle of Aegospotami]], at which point Euthyphro and his father would have been forced to relinquish this land.{{sfn|Nails|2002|pp=152-153}} The dialogue takes place in 399 BC, so Euthyphro's father must have killed the slave in Naxos at least five years ago, and he has been prosecuting his father for some time.{{sfn|Nails|2002|p=152-153}} As Euthyphro's relatives strongly oppose his prosecution of his own father, it is not unusual that the case has been drawn out for so long.{{sfn|Nails|2002|p=321}} It was claimed in antiquity that after this conversation took place, Euthyphro was persuaded not to prosecute his father,{{sfn|Nails|2002|p=153}} though this claim is not supported by any of Plato's own writings.<ref>Alexander Tulin: Dike Phonou. The Right of Prosecution and Attic Homicide Procedure, Stuttgart 1996, S. 73–77.</ref>
 
Socrates is awaiting a preliminary hearing for his trial for impiety, which is being prosecuted by [[Meletus]].{{sfn|Nails|2002|p=321}} This is the same trial that he will defend himself in during the events of the ''[[Apology (Plato)|Apology]]'', set roughly two months later.{{sfn|Nails|2002|p=322}} The events of the ''[[Theaetetus (dialogue)|Theaetetus]]'' are set on the same day as the ''Euthyphro''; at the end of that dialogue, Socrates had said that he was on his way to the preliminary hearing, promising to resume his discussion with Theaetetus the following day. That discussion, portrayed in the ''[[Sophist (dialogue)|Sophist]]'' and ''[[Statesman (dialogue)|Statesman]]'', occur on the following day after the ''Euthyphro''.{{sfn|Nails|2002|p=321}}
1. Euthyphro offers as his first definition of piety what he is doing now, that is, prosecuting his father for manslaughter. Socrates rejects this because it is an [[example]] or instance of holiness, not a definition. It does not provide the [[fundamental]] characteristic which makes holy (pious) things holy (pious).
 
It is easier to understand Socrates' arguments in this dialogue if the reader keeps in mind that Athenian religion revolved around specific rituals and practices with no reference to sacred scripture, at least in the same sense as later Abrahamic religions.<ref>{{cite book |editor-last=Pedro |editor-first=De Blas |date=2005 |isbn=9781593082697 |title=Essential Dialogues of Plato |publisher=Barnes and Noble |page=570}}</ref> Priests might worship only one specific god while not paying respect to the others. Euthyphro uses Zeus as evidence for his notions of piety while disregarding Uranus and Cronus, for example.{{cn|date=May 2025}}
2. Euthyphro's second definition: holiness (piety) is what the gods approve of. Socrates applauds this definition because it is expressed in a general form but criticises it on the grounds that the gods disagree among themselves as to what meets their approval. This would mean that a particular action, disputed by the gods, would be both holy (pious) and unholy (impious) at the same time — a logically impossible situation. Euthyphro tries to argue against Socrates's criticism by pointing out that not even the gods would disagree amongst themselves that someone who kills without justification should be punished, but Socrates argues that disputes would still arise — over just how much [[justification]] there actually was, and hence the same action could still be both holy (Pious) and unholy (impious).
 
== Summary ==
3. Euthyphro overcomes Socrates's objection by inserting the word 'all' into his former definition. Thus the third definition reads: What all the gods approve of is holy (pious), and what they all disapprove of is unholy (impious). At this point Socrates asks the crucial question: Do the gods approve an action because it is holy (pious), or is it holy (pious) because it is approved? He uses a typical Socratic technique, [[analogy]] or comparison, to make his question clearer and gets Euthyphro to agree that we call a carried thing carried simply because it is carried, not because it possesses some inherent [[characteristic]] or property that we could call 'carried'. Carried, that is, is not an inherent quality like weight. What he is trying to get Euthyphro to see is that we carry something that is already there. This thing exists without our carrying it; our carrying does not bring it into existence. So too as far as holiness (piety) is concerned; we approve or disapprove of something which is already, in some sense, there; our approving, by itself, does not make an action holy (pious). The approval follows from our recognition that an action is holy (pious); not the other way round. Or, to put it more simply, the holiness (piety) comes before the approval; in Euthyphro's definition it comes after the approval; it is a consequence of the approval. Euthyphro's definition is therefore flawed.
{{Platonism|dialogues=show}}
 
=== Prologue ===
Without realising that it contradicts his third definition, Euthyphro at this point agrees that the gods approve an action because it is holy (pious). (Later he will return to his earlier definition.) Socrates argues that the unanimous approval of the gods is merely an attribute of holiness (piety); it is not part of its defining characteristics. It does not define the essence of holiness (piety), what holiness (piety) is in itself; it does not give the idea of holiness (piety).
In this dialogue, Euthyphro meets Socrates outside the court of the [[King Archon]], where Socrates is currently waiting to attend to defend himself against the charges of [[Meletus]] on the grounds of [[impiety]]. Euthyphro faults Meletus for bringing the suit, and tells Socrates that these charges of impiety have resulted because Socrates is always talking about his ''[[daimon|daemon]]'', the divine sign which warns him of various courses of action, which the Athenians see as Socrates introducing innovations to their religion. Euthyphro then tells Socrates that, as a prophet, the Athenians also laugh at his divinely inspired predictions and call him crazy, even though the predictions all come true.<ref>2a-3c</ref>
 
Euthyphro assures Socrates that he thinks Socrates will defend his case well, and that he believes he will also succeed in his own: he is going to court himself to prosecute his elderly father for murder, because his father bound a worker in chains and left him to die, all despite the fact that his own family believe it is impious for a son to prosecute his father. Socrates is astonished by Euthyphro's confidence, but Euthyphro insists that doing so is pious, as a prophet he would know what piety is. Since Euthyphro seems so assured of himself, and Socrates is facing a trial for impiety, Socrates asks Euthyphro to help him with a definition of "piety" that he can use in his defence.<ref>3c-5d</ref>
In the second half of the discussion aiming to bring about a clear and distinct definition of holiness (piety), Socrates does more than just invite and then examine Euthyphro's definitions. It is he who puts forward the next definition of holiness (piety), gaining Euthyphro's immediate acceptance:
 
=== First definition: piety is prosecuting a wrongdoer ===
4. Holiness/piety belongs to those actions we call [[just]] or morally good. However, there are more than just holy/pious actions that we call just or morally good; for example, bravery, concern for others and so on. What is it, asks Socrates, that makes holiness/piety different from all those other actions that we call just?
Euthyphro's first definition of piety is what he is doing now, that is, prosecuting his father for manslaughter. Socrates rejects this definition, because it is only an ''example'' of piety, not a universally true definition, something that provides the essential characteristic that makes pious actions pious.<ref>5d-6e</ref>
 
=== Second definition: piety is what is pleasing to the gods ===
5. Euthyphro then suggests that holiness/piety is concerned with looking after the gods. Socrates objects immediately. If 'looking after' is used in its ordinary sense, which Euthyphro agrees it is, this would imply that when you perform a holy/pious action you make one of the gods better — a dangerous example of [[hubris]], which gods frowned upon. Euthyphro claims that caring for involves service. When questioned by Socrates as to exactly what is the end product of holiness/piety, Euthyphro can only fall back on his earlier claim — holiness/piety is what finds approval amongst all the gods.
Euthyphro's second definition is that Piety is what is ''pleasing'' to the gods. Socrates applauds this definition, because it is expressed in a general form, but criticizes it saying that the gods disagree among themselves as to what is pleasing, so a given action might be both pious and impious at the same time. Euthyphro counters that in his case, the gods would not disagree that someone who kills without justification ought to be punished, but Socrates observes that disputes could still arise over just how much justification actually existed; hence, the same action could be pious and impious.<ref>7a-9d</ref>
 
=== Third definition: piety is what is pleasing to all the gods ===
6. Euthyphro then proposes another definition: Holiness/piety, he says, is a sort of sacrifice and prayer. He puts forward the notion of holiness/piety as a form of commerce: giving the gods gifts, and asking favours of them in turn. Socrates presses Euthyphro to state what benefit the gods get from the gifts humans give to them. Euthyphro replies that they are not that sort of gift at all, but rather '[[honour]], [[esteem]] and [[gratitude]]'. In other words, as the young man admits, holiness/piety is intimately bound up with what the gods approve of. The discussion has come full circle; Euthyphro rushes off to another engagement, and Socrates faces a charge of unholiness/impiety.
Euthyphro's third definition of piety is: "What ''all'' the gods love is pious, and what they ''all'' hate is impious." In reply, Socrates poses what is now called the [[Euthyphro dilemma]]: "Is the pious loved by the gods ''because'' it is pious? Or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?". Euthyphro is unsure, so Socrates elaborate: Is something "beloved" in and of itself, or does it become beloved ''when'' it is loved by someone? Clearly, the answer is the latter, something ''becomes'' beloved when it is loved. So something beloved by the gods becomes so ''because'' it is loved by them, to which Euthyphro agrees. Socrates then reveals his contradiction: What is beloved by the gods cannot be pious: Euthyphro had said that something is loved by the gods ''because'' it is pious, which means that their love follows ''from'' something inherent in the pious. And yet they just agreed that what is beloved is put in that state as a result of being loved. So piety cannot belong to what is beloved by the gods since according to Euthyphro it does not acquire its characteristics by something (the act of being loved), in contrast to the things that are beloved, that are put in this state through the very act of being loved.<ref>9e-11b</ref>
 
=== Fourth definition: piety is a part of justice ===
==See also==
Socrates then suggests his own definition of piety, that piety is a part of justice. If piety is what is causing Euthyphro to prosecute his father, what is pious must be just. However, in the same sense that a definition of [[even numbers]] would not be the same as a definition of numbers, there are other actions that are just but not pious, such as courage or concern for others. Euthyphro says that piety is concerned with looking after the gods, but Socrates objects, saying that "looking after", if used in its ordinary sense (with which Euthyphro agrees) would imply that when one performs an act of piety one thus makes one of the gods better – an example of [[hubris]], a dangerous human emotion frowned upon by the Greek gods. In turn, Euthyphro responds that "looking after" involves service to others, and Socrates asks: What is the end product of piety? Euthyphro replies with his earlier (third) definition, that: Piety is what is loved by all the gods.<ref>11e-14b</ref>
{{wikisource}}
 
=== Final definition: piety is knowledge of sacrifice and prayer ===
Euthyphro then proposes a final definition: Piety is the knowledge of what sacrifices and prayers are pleasing to the gods. Socrates suggests that this implies that piety is knowledge of a type of commerce: sacrifice is a gift to the gods, and prayers are requests for favours in return, and piety consists in knowing what benefits the gods. Euthyphro objects that the gifts are not a ''quid pro quo'', between man and deity, but are gifts of "[[honour]], esteem, and favour", from man to deity. Socrates observes that this is the same as saying that piety is what is pleasing to the gods, which was where the dialogue had begun. Euthyphro concedes that they have made no progress, and Socrates proposes that they start again from the beginning, but Euthyphro excuses himself, stating that he is in a rush. Socrates concludes the dialogue by remarking that, since Euthyphro was unable to teach him about piety, Socrates has received nothing helpful to his defense against a formal charge of impiety.<ref>14b-16a</ref>
 
== Reception ==
 
=== Ancient ===
Fragments of this dialogue exist on a papyrus from the 2nd century.{{sfn|Pack|1965|pp=50,80-81}}
 
In the early 3rd century BC, the [[Epicureanism|Epicurean]] [[Metrodorus of Lampsacus (the younger)|Metrodorus of Lampsacus]] wrote a pamphlet titled ''Against the Euthyphro'' which is now lost.<ref>Philodemus, On Piety, col. 25, 702-5, col 34, 959-60, Obbink</ref>{{primary source inline|date=May 2025}} This is the oldest literary criticism of this dialogue in the ancient world.{{cn|date=May 2025}}
 
In the first century AD, [[Thrasyllus of Mendes]] listed the dialogue first in the first of his nine tetralogies of Plato's works, followed by the ''[[Apology (Plato)|Apology]]'', the ''[[Crito]]'', and the ''Phaedo''.<ref>{{cite LotEP|chapter=Plato}}</ref> [[Diogenes Laertius]] mentioned that it was one of the ''tentative'' dialogues and carried ''On Holiness'' as an alternate title, and that some teachers used it as the first dialogue in their courses meaning that it was in antiquity seen as the most suitable introduction to Plato's works.<ref>{{cite LotEP|chapter=Plato}}</ref>{{primary source inline|date=May 2025}}
 
In the surviving fragment of his work ''On Plato's Secret Doctrines'', [[Numenius of Apamea]] suggested that the character of ''Euthyphro'' was entirely fictitious and was intended to represent the Athenian popular religion, which Plato felt he had to attack indirectly in dialogue form in order to avoid being executed like Socrates himself.<ref>Numenios, fragment 23, ed. by Édouard des Places : Numénius: Fragments , Paris 1973, p. 61 f.</ref><ref>{{cite SEP|url-id=numenius|date=2021}}</ref>
 
=== Medieval and Renaissance ===
The oldest surviving medieval manuscript was made in 895 by [[Arethas of Caesarea]] and copied by Johannes Calligraphus. The dialogue was translated into [[Armenian language|Armenian]] in the 11th century.<ref>Zur armenischen Übersetzung siehe Elizabeth A. Duke u. a. (Hrsg.): Platonis opera, Band 1, Oxford 1995, S. XII; Frederick C. Conybeare: On the Ancient Armenian Version of Plato. In: The American Journal of Philology 12, 1891, S. 193–210.</ref> The Byzantine scholar [[Manuel Chrysoloras]] owned a copy of the ''Euthyphro.'' [[Francesco Filelfo]] completed the first Latin translation in 1436. Rinuccio da Castiglione completed a second translation a short time later in 1440 though it is considered of lower quality. [[Marsilio Ficino]] completed a third in 1484 in Florence in his translated collection of Plato's dialogues. The [[first edition]] of the Greek text appeared in Venice in September 1513 by [[Aldo Manuzio]] under an edition published by [[Markos Musuros]].
 
=== Modern ===
Many philosophers and theologians have addressed the Euthyphro dilemma since the time of Plato, though not always with reference to the Platonic dialogue itself. According to scholar [[Terence Irwin]], the issue and its connection with Plato was revived by the [[Cambridge Platonists]] [[Ralph Cudworth]] and [[Samuel Clarke]] in the 17th and 18th centuries.{{sfn|Irwin|2006}}
 
[[Peter Geach]] criticized the dilemma outlined in the Euthyphro because it implies you must search for a definition that fits piety rather than work backwards by deciding pious acts (i.e. you must know what piety is before you can list acts which are pious), and that it implies something cannot be pious if it is only intended to serve the gods without actually fulfilling any useful purpose.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Geach |first1=P. T. |title=PLATO'S "EUTHYPHRO": An Analysis and Commentary |journal=The Monist |date=1966 |volume=50 |issue=3 |pages=369–382 |doi=10.5840/monist196650327 |jstor=27901650 |url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/27901650 |access-date=9 May 2025 |issn=0026-9662|url-access=subscription }}</ref>
 
==Texts and translations==
*Greek text at [https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0169 Perseus]
*''Plato: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus.'' Greek with translation by Harold N. Fowler. Loeb Classical Library 36. Harvard Univ. Press (originally published 1914).
*[https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0170 Fowler translation at Perseus]
*''Plato: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo.'' Greek with translation by Chris Emlyn-Jones and William Preddy. Loeb Classical Library 36. Harvard Univ. Press, 2017. {{ISBN|9780674996878}} [http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674996878 HUP listing]
*Plato. ''Opera'', volume I. Oxford Classical Texts. {{ISBN|978-0198145691}}
*[http://ssrn.com/abstract=1023143 Translated by Woods & Pack, 2007]
**[http://ssrn.com/abstract=1023142 Bundled with ''Socrates' Defense'' (aka ''Apology''), ''Crito'', and the death scene from ''Phaedo'']
*[http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/euthyfro.html Translated by Jowett, 1891] at the [http://classics.mit.edu Classics Archive]
*G. Theodoridis, 2017: [https://bacchicstage.wordpress.com/plato/euthyphron-2/ full-text translation]
*{{cite book |translator-first1 = G.M.A. |translator-last1=Grube|translator-link1=George Grube |chapter = Euthyphro| editor-last1=Cooper |editor-first1=John M. |editor-last2=Hutchinson |editor-first2=D. S. |title=Plato: Complete works |date=1997 |publisher=Hackett Pub |___location=Indianapolis, Ind |isbn=9780872203495}}
*''The Last Days of Socrates'', translation of Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo. Hugh Tredennick, 1954. {{ISBN|978-0140440379}}. Made into a [https://genome.ch.bbc.co.uk/a809ca5ed4ce4e68b2b208df1e5cb78b BBC radio play] in 1986.
*"Four Texts on Socrates: Plato's Euthyphro, Apology, and Crito, and Aristophanes' Clouds." Translated by Thomas G. West and Grace Starry West. Cornell University Press, 1998. {{ISBN|978-0801485749}}
*''The Last Days of Socrates: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo.'' Translated by Christopher Rowe. Penguin Classics, 2010. {{ISBN|978-0141965888}}
 
==See also==
*[[Divine command theory]]
 
*[[Euthyphro Dilemma]]
==Notes==
{{notelist}}
{{reflist}}
 
==References==
* {{cite book |last=Irwin |first=Terence |year=2006 |chapter=Socrates and Euthyphro: The argument and its revival |editor=Lindsay Judson |editor2=V. Karasmanēs |title=Remembering Socrates: Philosophical Essays |publisher=Oxford University Press}}
* {{cite book |last1=Nails |first1=Debra |title=The People of Plato: A Prosopography of Plato and Other Socratics |date=15 November 2002 |publisher=Hackett Publishing |isbn=978-1-60384-027-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=cspgDwAAQBAJ |access-date=9 May 2025 |language=en}}
* {{cite book |last1=Pack |first1=Roger Ambrose |title=The Greek and Latin Literary Texts from Greco-Roman Egypt |date=1965 |publisher=University of Michigan Press |isbn=978-0-910294-22-5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=APHHb26-KdsC |access-date=25 April 2025 |language=en}}
 
==Further reading==
* {{cite book|last1=Allen|first1=Reginald E.|date=1970|title=Plato's 'Euthyphro' and the Earlier Theory of Forms|___location=London|publisher=Routledge & K. Paul|isbn=0-7100-6728-3}}
* {{cite encyclopedia|last1=Dorion|first1=Louis-André|date=2012|title=Euthyphron|editor1-last=Goulet|editor1-first=Richard|encyclopedia=Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques|volume=5, part 1|___location=Paris|publisher=CNRS|isbn=978-2-271-07335-8|pages=661–669}}
* {{Cite book |last=Willey |first=Hannah |url=https://books.openedition.org/pulg/17996?lang=en |title=Purity and purification in the ancient Greek world: texts, rituals, and norms |publisher=Centre International d’Étude de la Religion Grecque Antique |year=2018 |isbn=978-2-87562-159-7 |editor-last=Carbon |editor-first=Jan-Mathieu |___location=Liège |pages=113–131 |language=English |chapter=Social-status, legislation, and pollution in Plato’s « Euthyphro » |editor-last2=Peels-Matthey |editor-first2=Saskia}}
 
==External links==
{{commons category}}
*[http://www.theandros.com/euthyphro.html Absurd Wisdom: An Apology for Euthyphro]
{{wikisource|Euthyphro|''Euthyphro''}}
*[http://www.euthyphroproject.com The Euthyphro Project]
{{wikiquote}}
*[http://librivox.org/euthyphro-by-plato/ A free audiobook of ''Euthyphro''] at [http://www.librivox.org LibriVox]
* {{StandardEbooks|Standard Ebooks URL=https://standardebooks.org/ebooks/plato/dialogues/benjamin-jowett|Display Name=''{{PAGENAMEBASE}}'', in a collection of Plato's Dialogues|noitalics=true}}
*{{Librivox book |title=Euthyphro |author=Plato}}
*[https://web.archive.org/web/20110503011108/http://users.hartwick.edu/burringtond/dialogues/index.html Guides to the Socratic Dialogues], a beginner's guide
 
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