Word and Object: Difference between revisions

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{{infobox book | <!-- See Wikipedia:WikiProject_Novels or Wikipedia:WikiProject_Books -->

| name = Word and Object

| image = File:Word and Object (first edition).jpg

| caption = Cover of the first edition

| author = [[Willard Van Orman Quine]]

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'''''Word and Object''''' is a 1960 work by the, philosopher [[Willard Van Orman Quine]],'s inmost whichfamous the authorwork, expands uponon the line of thought of his earlier writingsideas in ''From a Logical Point of View'' (1953), and reformulates some of his earlier arguments, such aslike his attack inon the [[analytic–synthetic distinction]] from "[[Two Dogmas of Empiricism]]" on the [[analytic–synthetic distinction]].<ref name="autobio">{{cite book |author= Quine, Willard Van Orman |editor= |title=The Time of My Life: An Autobiography |publisher=MIT Press |___location= Cambridge, Massachusetts |year=1985 |page=392 |isbn= 978-0262670043 |oclc= |doi= |accessdate=}}</ref> TheIt introduces the [[thought experiment]] of [[radical translation]] and the accompanyingrelated notionconcept of [[indeterminacy of translation]].<ref arename="Gibsonarticle">{{cite originalbook to|author=Gibson, ''WordRoger andF. Object'',|title=The whichCambridge isDictionary Quine'sof mostPhilosophy famous|publisher=Cambridge book.<refUniversity namePress |year="Gibsonarticle"1999 |isbn=0-521-63722-8 |editor=Audi, Robert |___location=Cambridge |pages=767–768}}</ref>

==Synopsis==

Quine emphasizes his [[Naturalism (philosophy)|naturalism]], the doctrine that philosophy should be pursued as part of natural science.<ref name="Hookway772">{{cite book |author=Hookway, C. J. |editor=Honderich, Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |publisher=Oxford University Press |___location=Oxford |year=2005 |page=779 |isbn=0-19-926479-1 |oclc= |doi= |accessdate=}}</ref> He argues in favor of naturalizing [[epistemology]], supports [[physicalism]] overas against [[phenomenalism]] and [[Mind–body dualism|mind-body dualism]], and [[extensionality]] overas against [[intension]]ality,. He also develops a behavioristic conception of sentence-meaning, theorizes about language learning, speculates on the ontogenesis of reference, explains various forms of ambiguity and vagueness, and recommends measures for regimenting language so as to eliminate ambiguity and vagueness as well as to make perspicuousa thetheory's logic and [[ontic]] commitments perspicuous ("to be is to be the value of theories,a bound variable"). He argues, moreover, against quantified modal logic and the [[essentialism]] it presupposes, argues for [[Platonic realism]] in mathematics, rejects [[instrumentalism]] in favor of [[scientific realism]], develops a view of philosophical analysis as explication, argues against analyticity and for [[holism]], against countenancing propositions, and tries to show that the meanings of theoretical sentences are indeterminate and that the reference of terms is inscrutable.<ref name="Gibsonarticle">{{citeCite book |authorurl=Gibson, Roger Fhttps://www. |editor=Audi, Robertcambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-dictionary-of-philosophy/50389231FC1A5DF1B1BF0F4140264792 |title=The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy |date=2015 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |___locationeditor-last=CambridgeAudi |yeareditor-first=1999Robert |pagesedition=767–7683 |isbn___location=0-521-63722-8Cambridge |oclcpages=897–898 |doi= 10.1017/cbo9781139057509|accessdateisbn=978-1-139-05750-9 }}</ref>

==Behaviorism==

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Central to Quine's philosophy is his linguistic [[behaviorism]]. Quine has remarked that one may or may not choose to be a behaviorist in psychology, but one has no choice but to be a behaviorist in linguistics.<ref>''The Cambridge Companion to Quine'', Roger F. Gibson, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 199</ref>

This influence can be seen in ''Word and Object''. In chapter 2 a linguist has to translate a native's unknown language into English. What is so specifically behavioristic there is that the linguist has nothing to go on but verbal behavior from the native and the visible environment the native interacts with. The same view is displayed in chapter 3 where Quine describes how a baby learns its first words. In this chapter Quine also mentions [[B.F. Skinner]], a well known behaviorist, as one of his influences. The opposite view to Quine's and Skinner's in [[philosophy of language]] is represented by [[Noam Chomsky]]'s [[linguistic nativism]].<ref name=WO>{{cite book |last=Quine |first=Willard Van Orman |date=2013 |origyearorig-year=1960 |title=Word and Object |edition=New |___location=Cambridge, MA |publisher=[[MIT Press]] |isbn=9780262518314 |oclc=808006883 |doi=10.7551/mitpress/9636.001.0001}} New edition with a foreword by [[Patricia Churchland]].</ref>{{rp|73}}

==Translation and meaning==

{{Main|Radical translation}}

In the second chapter of ''Word and Object'', Quine investigates the concept of meaning. He shows to what extent his own, empirical, notion of meaning can give an account for our intuitive concept of meaning: 'what a sentence shares with its translation'.<ref name=WO/>{{rp|29}} Quine also introduces his famous principle of ''indeterminacy of translation'', with the help of the [[thought experiment]] of [[radical translation]], i.e. translation of a hitherto unknown language (called Jungle by Quine) into English. The point of this thought experiment is to show that a [[Behaviorism|behavioristic]] account of meaning does not allow for the determination of the right manual for translating one language into another, as there is no such single right translation manual.<ref name="QuineComp">{{cite book |author=Harman, G.|editor=Harman, G. |editor2=Lepore, E. |title=A Companion to W.V.O. Quine|publisher=Wiley |___location=Hoboken, NJ |year=2013 |pages=236–237 |isbn=9781118607992 |oclc= |doi= |accessdate=}}</ref>

A linguist desiring to translate Jungle has to set up his translation manual based only on the events happening around him/her, the stimulations, combined with the verbal and non-verbal [[behaviour]] of Jungle natives.<ref name="Hookway740">{{cite book |author=Hookway, C. J. |editor=Honderich, Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |publisher=Oxford University Press |___location=Oxford |year=1995 |page=[https://archive.org/details/oxfordcompaniont00hond/page/740 740] |isbn=0-19-866132-0 |oclc= |doi= |accessdate= |url-access=registration |url=https://archive.org/details/oxfordcompaniont00hond/page/740 }}</ref> The linguist can thus only use empirical information, therefore, radical translation will tell us which part of our language can be accounted for by stimulus conditions. In the experiment, Quine assumes that functional Jungle equivalents of 'Yes' and 'No' are relatively easy to be found. This allows the linguist to actively query the utterances of the natives, by repeating words (s)he has heard the native utter, and to subsequently record the native's reaction of assent or dissent.

In determining the translation of the Jungle sentence 'Gavagai' (whose English equivalent would be 'Look, a rabbit'), the linguist first has to determine which [[stimulation]] prompt the native to assent, and which prompt him to dissent to the linguist uttering 'Gavagai'. For example, if the linguist sees a rabbit, and the native says 'Gavagai', the linguist may think that 'Gavagai' means 'Rabbit'. (S)he will then try the sentence 'Gavagai' in different situations caused by the stimulation of a rabbit, to see whether the native assents or dissents to the utterance. The native's reaction is elicited by the linguist's question and the prompting stimulation together. It is the stimulation that prompts the assent or dissent, not the object in the world, because an object in the world can be replaced by a replica, but then the stimulation stays the same. 'The class of all the stimulations [..] that would prompt his assent'<ref name=WO/>{{rp|29}} is the ''affirmative stimulus meaning'' of a certain sentence for a given speaker. ''Negative stimulus meaning'' is defined likewise, with assent and dissent interchanged. Quine calls these affirmative and negative stimulus meaning combined the ''stimulus meaning'' of the sentence. However, since we want to account for the fact that a speaker can change the meaning of a concept, we add the ''modulus'' to the definition of ''stimulus meaning'': the time frame in which the stimulations take place. Once the ''stimulus meaning'' has been found, the linguist can then compare it to the stimulus meanings of sentences in English. The English sentence with (near-) identical stimulus meaning to 'Gavagai' functions as a translation of 'Gavagai'.

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Having taken the first steps in translating sentences, the linguist still has no idea if the term 'gavagai' is actually synonymous to the term 'rabbit', as it is just as plausible to translate it as 'one second rabbit stage', 'undetached rabbit part', 'the spatial whole of all rabbits', or 'rabbithood'. Thus, the identical stimulus meaning of two sentences 'Gavagai' and 'Rabbit' does not mean that the terms 'gavagai' and 'rabbit' are synonymous (have the same meaning). In fact, we cannot even be sure that they are coextensive terms,<ref name=Becker/>{{rp|159}} because 'terms and reference are local to our conceptual scheme',<ref name=WO/>{{rp|48}} and cannot be accounted for by stimulus meaning. It appears therefore impossible to determine a unique correct translation of the term 'gavagai', since the linguist can take any of the mentioned possibilities and have it correspond to the stimulus meaning through adaptation of logical connectives. This implies there is no matter of fact to which the word refers. Quine calls this the [[inscrutability of reference]].<ref name="Marsoobian" />

This inscrutability leads to difficulties in translating sentences, especially with sentences that have no direct connection to stimuli. For example, the tautological Jungle sentence 'Gavagai xyz gavagai' could be translated (in accordance with stimulus meaning) as 'This rabbit is the same as this rabbit'. However, when 'gavagai' is taken as 'undetached rabbit part' and 'xyz' as 'is part of the same animal as', the English translation could also run 'This undetached rabbit part is part of the same animal as this undetached rabbit part'. The Jungle sentence and its two English translations all have the same stimulus meaning and truth conditions, even though the two translations are clearly different. Quine concludes that the linguist can set up his translation manual in different ways, that all fit the native's speech behaviour yet are mutually incompatible.<ref name=WO/>{{rp|24}} This is called [[holophrastic indeterminacy]]. There is no one correct translation of Jungle: translation is indeterminate.<ref name="Marsoobian ">{{cite book |author=Marsoobian, A. T., Ryder, J. |editor=Marsoobian, A. T. |editor2=Ryder, J. |title=The Blackwell Guide to American Philosophy |publisher=Wiley-Blackwell |___location= Hoboken, NJ |year=2003 |page=251 |isbn= 978-0-631-21623-0 |oclc= |doi= |accessdate=}}</ref>

===Analytical hypotheses===

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===Vagaries of reference and referential transparency===

In Chapter 4 of ''Word and Object'', Quine looks at the indeterminacies of reference that are inherent to the (English) language system. A term is ''vague'' if the boundaries of its reference are not clear. For a singular term this means that the boundaries of the object it refers to are not clear,; e.g. with the, 'mountain': for two neighboring mountains, it is not clear where the first mountain stops and the second one begins. General terms can be vague in this same way, but also in yet another way,: namely, that there are some objects of which it is not clear whether or not they should be included inamong the referencereferents of the term. For example, the term 'blue' is vague insofar as it is not clear whether or not some objects are blue or green. A second vagary of reference is ''ambiguity''. Ambiguity differs from vagueness in that for a vague term the (boundaries of) its reference are unsettleduncertain, whereas ambiguous terms do refer to clearly todelineated sets of objects,; however, there are objects of which they are clearly true ''and'' clearly false of the same objectssimultaneously. For example, the term 'light' is clearly true of a dark feather (''vis-á-vis'' weight), but at the same time clearly false of it (''vis-á-vis'' visual brightness).

Quine also introduces the term '[[referential transparency]]'. Quine wants to make explicit the ambiguities in language, and to show different interpretations of sentences, therefore, he has to know whereto what the terms in a sentence refer to. A term is used in ''purely referential position'' if its only purpose is to specify its object so that the rest of the sentence can say something about it. If a term is used in purely referential position, it is subject to the substituitivitysubstitutivity of identity: the term can be substituted by a [[Extension (semantics)|coextensive]] term (a term true of the same objects) without changing the truth-value of the sentence. In the sentence, 'Amsterdam rhymes with Peter Pan' you cannot substitute 'Amsterdam' with 'the capital of the Netherlands'. A construction, aconstruction—a way in which a singular term or a sentence is included in another singular term or sentence, has ''referential transparency'': it issentence—is either referentially transparent, or referentially opaque.; Aa construction is referentially transparent if it is the case that ifwhen anthe occurrenceincluded ofterm aor termsentence is purely referential in a sentence then, it is also purely referential also in the containing term or sentence. However(Referential opaqueness is not to be taken as a problem to be corrected, Quinehowever—Quine's goal here is to make clear which positions in a sentence are referentially transparent, not to make them all transparent.)

===Canonical notation===

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==Semantic ascent<!--'Semantic ascent' redirects here-->==

In the last paragraphsection of ''Word and Object'',<ref name=WO/>{{rp|56}} Quine asks the question why, in a book titled ''Word and Object'', we have talked more about words than about objects. He comes to the conclusion that this has to do with the distinction [[Rudolf Carnap]] makes between a material mode of speech and a formal one.<ref name=Carnap>Carnap, Rudolf, ''Logical Syntax of Language'' [1960]. The International Library of Philosophy: Philosophy of Mind and Language, Routledge, Reprint edition, 2010, pp. 63-64.</ref> In the material mode we talk about objects themselves and usually this is unproblematic. However, when two people with completely different ideas of whether or not there are such entities as miles, are discussing miles as the objects themselves this discussion will be fruitless. It is in these instances that we see what Quine calls '''semantic ascent'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA-->,<ref name=WO/>{{rp|249–254}} the shift from the material mode of language to the formal one. In the formal mode of language we are at a different level. Rather than talking about miles as objects we are talking about what this word 'mile' even means, what it refers to and if it even refers at all. In the formal mode, people with different conceptual schemes might be able to have a reasonable discussion because they are talking about something their conceptual schemes have in common: language.

Quine differs from Carnap in applicability of semantic ascent.<ref name=WO/>{{rp|250}} Carnap believes that talking in a formal mode is something that can only be done to some effect in philosophy. Quine, however, believes that semantic ascent is used in science as well. He argues that Einstein's theory of relativity wasn't just accepted by the scientific community because of what it had to say about 'time, light, headlong bodies and the perturbations of Mercury'<ref name=WO/>{{rp|251}} in the material mode, but also because of its simplicity compared to other theories in the formal mode. The formal mode allows for a more distant approach to certain problems; however, we are not able to reach a vantage point outside of our conceptual scheme, to Quine 'there is no such cosmic exile'.<ref name=WO/>{{rp|254}}

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