Word and Object: Difference between revisions

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'''''Word and Object''''' is a 1960 work by the philosopher [[Willard Van Orman Quine]], in which the author expands upon the line of thought of his earlier writings in ''From a Logical Point of View'' (1953), and reformulates some of his earlier arguments, such as his attack in "[[Two Dogmas of Empiricism]]" on the [[analytic–synthetic distinction]].<ref name="autobio">{{cite book |author= Quine, Willard Van Orman |title=The Time of My Life: An Autobiography |publisher=MIT Press |___location= Cambridge, Massachusetts |year=1985 |page=392 |isbn= 978-0262670043 }}</ref> The thought experiment of [[radical translation]] and the accompanying notion of [[indeterminacy of translation]] are original to ''Word and Object'', which is Quine's most famous book.<ref name="Gibsonarticle">{{cite book |author=Gibson, Roger F. |title=The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy |publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=1999 |isbn=0-521-63722-8 |editor=Audi, Robert |___location=Cambridge |pages=767–768}}</ref>
 
==Synopsis==
 
Quine emphasizes his [[Naturalism (philosophy)|naturalism]], the doctrine that philosophy should be pursued as part of natural science.<ref name="Hookway772">{{cite book |author=Hookway, C. J. |editor=Honderich, Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |publisher=Oxford University Press |___location=Oxford |year=2005 |page=779 |isbn=0-19-926479-1 }}</ref> He argues in favor of naturalizing [[epistemology]], supports [[physicalism]] overas against [[phenomenalism]] and [[Mind–body dualism|mind-body dualism]], and [[extensionality]] overas against [[intension]]ality,. He also develops a behavioristic conception of sentence-meaning, theorizes about language learning, speculates on the ontogenesis of reference, explains various forms of ambiguity and vagueness, and recommends measures for regimenting language so as to eliminate ambiguity and vagueness as well as to make perspicuousa theory's the logic and [[ontic]] commitments perspicuous ("to be is to be the value of theories,a bound variable"). He argues, moreover, against quantified modal logic and the [[essentialism]] it presupposes, argues for [[Platonic realism]] in mathematics, rejects [[instrumentalism]] in favor of [[scientific realism]], develops a view of philosophical analysis as explication, argues against analyticity and for [[holism]], against countenancing propositions, and tries to show that the meanings of theoretical sentences are indeterminate and that the reference of terms is inscrutable.<ref name="Gibsonarticle">{{citeCite book |authorurl=Gibson, Roger Fhttps://www.cambridge. |editor=Audi, Robertorg/core/books/cambridge-dictionary-of-philosophy/50389231FC1A5DF1B1BF0F4140264792 |title=The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy |date=2015 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |___locationeditor-last=CambridgeAudi |yeareditor-first=1999Robert |pagesedition=767–7683 |isbn___location=0-521-63722-8Cambridge |pages=897–898 |doi=10.1017/cbo9781139057509}}</ref>
 
==Behaviorism==