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{{short description|Theory in social psychology}}
{{Self sidebar}}'''Self-categorization theory''' is a theory in [[social psychology]] that describes the circumstances under which a person will perceive collections of people (including themselves) as a group, as well as the consequences of perceiving people in group terms.<ref name="Haslam (1997)">{{cite journal|last=Haslam|first=S. A.|title=Stereotyping and social influence: Foundations of stereotype consensus|journal=The Social Psychology of Stereotyping and Group Life|year=1997|pages=119–143|editor1-first=R.|editor1-last=Spears|editor2-first=P.J.|editor2-last=Oakes|editor3-first=N.|editor3-last=Ellemers|editor4-first=S.A.|display-editors = 3 |editor4-last=Haslam}}</ref> Although the theory is often introduced as an explanation of psychological group formation (which was one of its early goals), it is more accurately thought of as general analysis of the functioning of [[categorization]] processes in [[social perception]] and interaction that speaks to issues of individual identity as much as group phenomena.<ref name="Oakes et al. (1994).">{{cite book | last1 = Oakes | first1 = Penny | last2 = Haslam | first2 = Alex | last3 = Turner | first3 = John | title = Stereotyping and social reality | year = 1994 | publisher = Oxford | ___location = Blackwell}}</ref> It was developed by [[John C. Turner|John Turner]] and colleagues, and along with [[social identity theory]] it is a constituent part of the [[social identity approach]]. It was in part developed to address questions that arose in response to social identity theory about the mechanistic underpinnings of social identification.<ref name="Turner & Oakes (1986).">{{cite journal|lastlast1 = Turner|firstfirst1 = John|last2=Oakes|first2=Penny|title = The significance of the social identity concept for social psychology with reference to individualism, interactionism and social influence|journal = British Journal of Social Psychology|volume = 25| issue = 3| pages = 237–252|year = 1986|doi=10.1111/j.2044-8309.1986.tb00732.x|doi-access = free}}</ref><ref name="Haslam et al. (1996).">{{cite journal | last1 = Haslam | first1 = Alex | last2 = Oakes | first2 = Penny | last3 = Turner | first3 = John | last4 = McGarty | first4 = Craig | editor-last = Sorrentino | editor-first = Richard | editor2-last = Higgins | editor2-first = Edward | year = 1996 | title = Social identity, self-categorization, and the perceived homogeneity of ingroups and outgroups: The interaction between social motivation and cognition | journal = Handbook of Motivation and Cognition: The Interpersonal Context, Handbook of Motivation and Cognition | volume = 3 | pages = 182–222 }}</ref><ref name="Turner (1999)">{{cite journal|last=Turner|first=J. C.|title=Some current issues in research on social identity and self-categorization theories|journal=Social Identity|year=1999|pages=6–34|editor1-first=N.|editor1-last=Ellemers|editor2-first=R.|editor2-last=Spears|editor3-first=B.|editor3-last=Doosje}}</ref><ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001).">[[Alex Haslam|Haslam, A. S.]] (2001). Psychology in Organizations. London, SAGE Publications.</ref>
 
Self-categorization theory has been influential in the academic field of [[social psychology]] and beyond.<ref name="Postmes, T. & Branscombe, N. (2010)">Postmes, T. & Branscombe, N. (2010). Sources of social identity. In T. Postmes & N. Branscombe (Eds). Rediscovering Social Identity: Core Sources. Psychology Press.</ref> It was first applied to the topics of [[Self-categorization theory#Social influence|social influence]], [[Group cohesiveness|group cohesion]], [[group polarization]], and [[collective action]].<ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987).">Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D. & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory. Oxford: Blackwell</ref> In subsequent years the theory, often as part of the social identity approach, has been applied to further topics such as [[leadership]],<ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001)."/><ref name="Haslam, et al. (2011)."/> [[personality]],<ref name="Turner & Onorato (1998)">{{cite journal|last1=Turner|first1=J. C.|last2=Onorato|first2=R. S.|title=Social identity, personality, and the self-concept: A self-categorization perspective|journal=The Psychology of the Social Self|volume=26|issue=4|year=1998|pages=11–46|editor1-first=T. R.|editor1-last=Tyler|editor2-first=R. M.|editor2-last=Kramer|editor3-first=O. P.|editor3-last=John|doi=10.1080/03060497.1998.11085868}}</ref> [[Self-categorization theory#Out-group homogeneity|outgroup homogeneity]], and [[power (social and political)|power]].<ref name="Turner (2005)">{{cite journal|last=Turner|first=J. C.|title=Explaining the nature of power: A three-process theory|journal=European Journal of Social Psychology|year=2005|volume=35|issue=1|pages=1–22|doi=10.1002/ejsp.244|doi-access=free}}</ref> One tenet of the theory is that the self should not be considered as a foundational aspect of [[cognition]], but rather the self should be seen as a product of the cognitive system at work.<ref name="Turner & Onorato (1998)"/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1994).">{{cite journal | last1 = Turner | first1 = J. C. | last2 = Oakes | first2 = P. J. | last3 = Haslam | first3 = S. A. | last4 = McGarty | first4 = C. | year = 1994 | title = Self and collective: Cognition and social context | journal = Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin | volume = 20 | issue = 5| pages = 454–463 | doi=10.1177/0146167294205002| s2cid = 143918437 }}</ref><ref name="Reynolds & Turner (2006).">{{cite journal |last1= Reynolds |first1= K. J. |last2= Turner |first2= J. C.|year= 2006|title= Individuality and the prejudiced personality |journal= European Review of Social Psychology| volume= 17|issue= 1|pages= 233–270|doi=10.1080/10463280601050880|s2cid= 143708527 }}</ref><ref name="Onorato & Turner (2004)">{{cite journal|last=Onorato|author2=Turner |title=Fluidity in the self-concept: The shift from personal to social identity|journal=European Journal of Social Psychology|year=2004|volume=34|issue=3 |pages=257–278|doi=10.1002/ejsp.195 |doi-access=free}}</ref>
 
==Aspects of the theory==
[[File:UNSW Rugby players.jpg|thumb|alt= Rugby operates using self-categorization theory processes.|The clear intergroup structure of team sports means that such contexts are often used to illustrate self-categorization theory processes.<ref name="McGarty, C (1999)."/><ref name="Haslam, et al. (2011).">{{cite book |lastlast1=Haslam |firstfirst1=S. Alexander |last2=Reicher |first2=Stephen D. |last3=Platow |first3=Michael J. |title=The new psychology of leadership: Identity, influence and power |year=2011 |publisher=Psychology Press |___location=New York, NY |isbn=978-1-84169-610-2}}</ref>]]
===Levels of abstraction===
Drawing inspiration from cognitive psychology,<ref name="Turner (1985)">{{cite journal| last1=Turner| first1=J.C.| editor-last =Lawler| editor-first =E. J.| year=1985| title=Social categorization and the self-concept: A social cognitive theory of group behavior| journal=Advances in Group Processes: Theory and Research|volume=2|pages=77–122}}</ref><ref name="Oakes & Turner (1990)">{{cite journal|last1=Oakes|first1=P. J.|last2=Turner|first2=J. C.|title=Is limited information processing capacity the cause of social stereotyping|journal=European Review of Social Psychology|year=1990|volume=1|issue=1|pages=111–135|doi=10.1080/14792779108401859}}</ref><ref name="Turner, J. C. & Reynolds, K. J. (2010)">Turner, J. C. & Reynolds, K. J. (2010). The story of social identity. In T. Postmes & N. Branscombe (Eds). Rediscovering Social Identity: Core Sources. Psychology Press.</ref> self-categorization theory assumes that the self can be categorized at various levels of abstraction. In other words, humans may categorize the self as a singular "I"(personal identity), or as a more inclusive "we"(social identity). In the latter case the self is cognitively grouped as identical and interchangeable to other stimuli within that category.<ref name="Turner & Oakes (1986)."/> It is argued that it is this variation in self categorization that underpins many intergroup phenomena,<ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/> including those described in social identity theory.<ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001)."/>
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In self-categorization theory, categorizing people does not simply involve the redescription of characteristics and categories present in social stimuli. Rather, salient ''social categories'' form the basis of a social world that is enriched with meaning. This is achieved through a non-conscious process of accentuation, where ''differences between'' social categories are accentuated along with the ''similarities within'' social categories.<ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1994)."/><ref name="Haslam et al. (1995)">{{cite journal | last1 = Haslam | first1 = S. A. | last2 = Oakes | first2 = P. J. | last3 = Turner | first3 = J. C. | last4 = McGarty | first4 = C. | year = 1995 | title = Social categorization and group homogeneity: Changes in the perceived applicability of stereotype content as a function of comparative context and trait favourableness | journal = British Journal of Social Psychology | volume = 34 | issue = 2| pages = 139–160 | doi=10.1111/j.2044-8309.1995.tb01054.x| pmid = 7620843 }}</ref> The resulting augmentation of social content allows the perceiver to interact with others with greater confidence and ease.
 
The accentuation component of self-categorization theory stems from prior research that demonstrated an [[accentuation effect]] for categorized non-social stimuli.<ref name="Turner, J. C. & Reynolds, K. J. (2010)"/> A prototypical example of non-social accentuation came from Tajfel and Wilkes, who found that when a categorization scheme corresponded to line length participants would view lines belonging to different categories as more different than if no categorization scheme was present.<ref name="Tajfel & Wilkes (1963)">{{cite journal|last1=Tajfel|first1=H.|last2=Wilkes|first2=A. L.|title=Classification and quantitative judgement|journal=British Journal of Psychology|year=1963|volume=54|issue=2|pages=101–114|pmid=13980241|doi=10.1111/j.2044-8295.1963.tb00865.x|s2cid=41404673 }}</ref> Consistent with the idea that an efficient cognitive system would, where possible, use the same systems regardless of the social or non-social nature of the stimuli,<ref name="Van rooy et al. (2003)">{{cite journal | last1 = Van Rooy | first1 = D. | last2 = Van Overwalle | first2 = F. | last3 = Vanhoomissen | first3 = T. | last4 = Labiouse | first4 = C. | last5 = French | first5 = R. | year = 2003 | title = A recurrent connectionist model of group biases | journal = Psychological Review | volume = 110 | issue = 3| pages = 536–563 | pmid = 12885114 | doi=10.1037/0033-295x.110.3.536| citeseerx = 10.1.1.72.3496 }}</ref> self-categorization theorists have demonstrated similar effects for social stimuli. For example, Haslam and Turner found that a perceiver would describe another person as more or less similar to themselves as a function of the likely categorization scheme.<ref name="Haslam & Turner (1992).">{{cite journal | last1 = Haslam | first1 = Alex | last2 = Turner | first2 = John | year = 1992 | title = Context-dependent variation in social stereotyping 2: The relationship between frame of reference, self-categorization and accentuation. | journal = European Journal of Social Psychology| volume = 22 | issue = 3| pages = 251–277 | doi=10.1002/ejsp.2420220305}}</ref>
 
===Depersonalization and self-stereotyping ===
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Self-categorization theorists posit "self-categorization is comparative, inherently variable, fluid and context dependent."<ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1994)."/> They reject the notion that self concepts are stored invariant structures that exist ready for application.<ref name="Oakes & Turner (1990)"/> Where stability is observed in self perception this is not attributed to stored stable categories, but rather to stability in both the perceiver and the social context in which the perceiver is situated.<ref name="Oakes et al. (1994)."/><ref name="McGarty, C (1999).">McGarty, C. (1999). Categorization in social psychology. Sage Publications: London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi.</ref><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1994)."/> This variability is systematic and occurs in response to the changing context in which the perceiver is situated. As an example, the category of [[psychologists]] can be perceived quite differently if compared to [[physicists]] as opposed to [[artists]] (with variation perhaps on how [[Scientific method|scientific]] psychologists are perceived to be).<ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001)."/> In self-categorization theory contextual changes to the salient social category are sometimes referred to as shifting [[Self-categorization theory#Prototypicality|prototypicality]].
 
Although the theory accepts that prior categorization behaviour impacts present perception (i.e., as part of perceiver readiness), self-categorization theory has key advantages over descriptions of social categorization where categories are rigid and invariant cognitive structures that are stored in comparative isolation prior to application. One advantage is that this perspective removes the [[implausibility]] of storing enough categorical information to account for all the nuanced categorization that humans use daily.<ref name="McGarty, C (1999)."/><ref name="Turner & Onorato (1998)"/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1994)."/> Another advantage is that it brings social cognition in line with a [[Connectionism|connectionist approach]] to cognition.<ref name="McGarty (2002)"/> The connectionist approach is a neurologically plausible model of cognition where semantic units are not stored, but rather semantic information forms as a consequence of network pattern activation (both current and prior).<ref name="Smith, E. R. (1996).">{{cite journal | last1 = Smith | first1 = E. R. | year = 1996 | title = What do connectionism and social psychology offer each other? | journal = Journal of Personality and Social Psychology | volume = 70 | issue = 5| pages = 893–912 | pmid = 8656338 | doi=10.1037/0022-3514.70.5.893}}</ref><ref name="Smith, E. R. & Semin, G. R. (2007).">{{cite journal | last1 = Smith | first1 = E. R. | last2 = Semin | first2 = G. R. | year = 2007 | title = Situated social cognition | journal = Current Directions in Psychological Science | volume = 16 | issue = 3| pages = 132–135 | doi=10.1111/j.1467-8721.2007.00490.x| citeseerx = 10.1.1.731.9217 | s2cid = 6833413 }}</ref>
 
===Prototypicality===
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Outgroup homogeneity can be defined as seeing the outgroup members as more homogeneous than ingroup members.<ref name="Quattrone & Jones (1980)">{{cite journal|last1=Quattrone|first1=George A.|last2=Jones|first2=Edward E.|title=The perception of variability within in-groups and out-groups: Implications for the law of small numbers.|journal=Journal of Personality and Social Psychology|volume=38|issue=1|year=1980|pages=141–152|issn=0022-3514|doi=10.1037/0022-3514.38.1.141}}</ref> Self-categorization accounts for the outgroup homogeneity effect as a function of perceiver motivation and the resultant [[Self-categorization theory#Comparative fit|comparative context]],<ref name="Haslam et al. (1996)."/><ref name="McGarty, C (1999)."/> which is a description of the psychologically available stimuli at any one time. The theory argues that when perceiving an outgroup the psychologically available stimuli include both ingroup and outgroup members. Under these conditions the perceiver is more likely to categorize in accordance with ingroup and outgroup memberships and is consequently naturally motivated to [[Self-categorization theory#Accentuation|accentuate]] intergroup differences as well as intragroup similarities. Conversely, when perceiving an ingroup the outgroup members may not be psychologically available. In such circumstances there is no ingroup-outgroup categorization and thus no accentuation. Indeed, accentuation of intragroup differences may occur under these circumstances for the same sense making reasons.
 
In line with this explanation it has been shown that in an intergroup context both the ingroup and outgroup is perceived as more homogeneous, while when judged in isolation the ingroup is perceived as comparatively [[Homogeneity and heterogeneity|heterogeneous]].<ref name="Haslam et al. (1995)"/><ref name=" Haslam, et al. (1996).">Halsam, S. A., Oakes, P. J., Turner, J. C., & McGarty, C. (1995). Social identity, self-categorization and the perceived homogeneity of ingroups and outgroups: the interaction between social motivation and cognition. In R. M. Sorrentino & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Handbook of Motivation and Cognition (Vol. 3, pp. 182-222). New York: Guilford</ref> This is also congruent with depersonalization, where under certain circumstances perceivers may see themselves as interchangeable members of the ingroup.<ref name="De Cremer 138–146">{{cite journal| last=De Cremer| first=David| title= Perceptions of group homogeneity as a function of social comparison: The mediating role of group identity| journal=Current Psychology| date=1 August 2001| volume=20| issue=2| pages=138–146| doi=10.1007/s12144-001-1021-4| s2cid=143658588}}</ref> The self-categorization theory eliminates the need to posit differing processing mechanisms for ingroups and outroups, as well as accounting for findings of outgroup homogeneity in the [[minimal group paradigm]].<ref name="McGarty, C (1999)."/>
 
==Controversies==
 
===Meta-theoretical debate===
The social identity approach explicitly rejects the metatheory of research that regards limited information processing as the cause of social stereotyping.<ref name="Oakes et al. (1994)."/><ref name="McGarty (2002)">{{cite book |last= McGarty|first= C. |year= 2002|titlechapter= Stereotype formation as category formation |journal= Stereotypes as Explanations |pages= 16–37 |editor1-first= C.|editor1-last= McGarty |editor2-first= V.Y. |editor2-last= Yzerbyt |editor3-first= R. |editor3-last= Spears |doi= 10.1017/CBO9780511489877.003 |isbn= 9780511489877 }}</ref><ref name="Oakes & Turner (1996)">{{cite journal | last1 = Oakes | first1 = Penny | last2 = Turner | first2 = John | editor-last = Stroebe | editor-first = Wolfgang | editor-link1= Wolfgang Stroebe|editor2-last = Hewstone | editor2-first = Miles | year = 1990 | title = Is limited information processing capacity the cause of social stereotyping? | journal = European Review of Social Psychology | volume = 1 | pages = 111–135 | doi=10.1080/14792779108401859}}</ref> Specifically, where other researchers adopt the position that stereotyping is second best to other information processing techniques (e.g., individuation), social identity theorists argue that in many contexts a stereotypical perspective is entirely appropriate. Moreover, it is argued that in many intergroup contexts to take an individualistic view would be decidedly maladaptive and demonstrate ignorance of important social realities.<ref name="Haslam et al. (1996)."/><ref name="Haslam & Turner (1992)."/>
 
===Category hierarchies===