Lithium Triangle: Difference between revisions

Revision as of 03:11, 15 December 2023

Revision as of 11:49, 16 December 2023

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As of 2017 the area was thought to hold around 54% of the world's lithium reserves,<ref>{{cite web|url=https://resourceworld.com/lithium-triangle/|title=South America's prospective - The Lithium Triangle|author=Ellsworth Dickson|work=Resource World|access-date=7 December 2019|year=2017}}</ref> however, these reserves, which are the largest in size and the highest in quality in the world, are not expected to make the surrounding countries wealthy, as oil has done for the [[Gulf Countries|Gulf countries]]. For example, the total amount of lithium minerals in [[Chile]] is worth "less than Saudi Arabia's three years' worth of oil exports."<ref>[https://oceanofpdf.com/authors/lukasz-bednarski/pdf-epub-lithium-the-global-race-for-battery-dominance-and-the-new-energy-revolution-download/?id=000715884250 Lithium: The Global Race for Battery Dominance and the New Energy Revolution.] 2021. L. Bednarski. {{ISBN|1787386732}}. p. 97.</ref>

Currently, many countries situated in the [[Global North and Global South|Global North]] are trying to incorporate [[technocratic solutions]] in order to achieve sustainability directives.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Parks, B. & Roberts, J. |title=Inequality and the global climate regime: breaking the north-south impasse |publisher=Routledge |year=2009 |isbn=9781315876177 |pages=161-191161–191}}</ref>. Many of these directives include solutions for which [[lithium]] is an essential resource, e.g., the shift to electric vehicles and battery storrage system. Yet, in most Global North countries, lithium is not nearly as abundant as in the lithium triangle. Therefore, contemporary power relations in [[geopolitics]] have enabled Global North countries to expand their [[resource frontier]] to the lithium triangle, touching upon notions of [[green extractivism]], to accomodateaccommodate their needs at the expense of the [[Global North and Global South|Global South]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Vera |first=María L. |last2=Torres |first2=Walter R. |last3=Galli |first3=Claudia I. |last4=Chagnes |first4=Alexandre |last5=Flexer |first5=Victoria |date=March 2023 |title=Environmental impact of direct lithium extraction from brines |url=https://www.nature.com/articles/s43017-022-00387-5 |journal=Nature Reviews Earth & Environment |language=en |volume=4 |issue=3 |pages=149–165 |doi=10.1038/s43017-022-00387-5 |issn=2662-138X}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Voskoboynik, D.M., & Andreucci, D. |date=2022 |title=Greening extractivism: environmental impact of direct lithium extraction from brines |journal=Nature Reviews Earth & Environment |volume=4 |pages=149-165149–165}}</ref>. This green extractivist practice taking place in the lithium triangle leads to severe impact on the environment and socio-economic/socio-cultural [[Livelihood|livelihoodslivelihood]]s of local residents .<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Agusdinata |first=Datu Buyung |last2=Liu |first2=Wenjuan |last3=Eakin |first3=Hallie |last4=Romero |first4=Hugo |date=November 2018 |title=Socio-environmental impacts of lithium mineral extraction: towards a research agenda |url=https://dx.doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aae9b1 |journal=Environmental Research Letters |language=en |volume=13 |issue=12 |pages=123001 |doi=10.1088/1748-9326/aae9b1 |issn=1748-9326}}</ref><ref name=":0">{{Cite journal |last=Dorn, F. M., Hafner, R., & Plank, C. |date=2022 |title=Towards a climate change consensus"how mining and agriculture legitimize green extractivism in Argentina |journal=The extractive industries and society}}</ref><ref name=":1">{{Cite journal |last=Giglio, E. |date=2022 |title=Extractivism and its socio-environmental impact in South America. Overview of the Lithium Triangle |journal=América Crítica |pages=47-5347–53}}</ref>. On of these countries facing such extraction on a large scale is Argentina.

According to ''[[The Economist]]'', Argentina was, by November 2022, the country with most ongoing lithium extraction projects; in total 40.<ref name=TheEco22>{{Cite news |title=Argentina could help the world by becoming a big lithium exporter |date=2022-11-15 |access-date=2023-04-21 |newspaper=[[The Economist]]|url=https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2022/11/15/argentina-could-help-the-world-by-becoming-a-big-lithium-exporter}}</ref> By one estimate Argentina could displace Chile as the second largest lithium producer by 2027.<ref name=TheEco22/> Similarly, there are estimates that posit Argentina producing 16% of the World's lithium by 2030 instead of the 6% it produced in 2021.<ref name=TheEco22/> Low [[royalty payment]]s when compared to Chile are cited by ''The Economist'' as a particular advantage.<ref name=TheEco22/>

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All lithium extracted in Chile as of 2023 comes from [[Salar de Atacama]].<ref name=Munita>{{Cite news |title=Control estatal de los salares, negociar con SQM y empresa nacional: Las claves de la estrategia del Gobierno por litio |url=https://www.emol.com/noticias/Economia/2023/04/21/1092883/claves-politica-nacional-litio.html |last=Munita C. |first=Ignacia |date=2023-04-21 |access-date=2023-04-21 |work=[[El Mercurio|Emol]] |language=Spanish}}</ref> The only two lithium-extracting companies currently operating in Chile, [[Sociedad Química y Minera|SQM]] and [[Albemarle Corporation|Albemarle]], have licenses to extract lithium until 2030 and 2043 respectively.<ref name=Munita/><ref name=exante21>{{Cite news |title=Las razones del desplome bursátil de SQM tras el anuncio presidencial del litio |url=https://www.ex-ante.cl/las-razones-del-desplome-bursatil-de-sqm-tras-el-anuncio-presidencial-del-litio/ |last=Browne R. |first=Vicente |date=2023-04-21 |access-date=2023-04-21 |work=[[Ex-Ante (online newspaper)|Ex-Ante]] |language=Spanish}}</ref> In April 2023, the Chilean government announced plans for nationalizing its lithium industry.<ref name=reuternat21>{{Cite news |title=Chile plans to nationalize its vast lithium industry |url=https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/chile-plans-nationalize-its-vast-lithium-industry-2023-04-21/ |last1=Villegas |first1=Alexander |date=2023-04-21 |access-date=2023-04-21 |work=Reuters |last2=Scheyder |first2=Ernest}}</ref> The announcement impacts chiefly the companies SQM and Albemarle.<ref name=reuternat21/> In response, the [[Share (finance)|shares]] of SQM in the [[Santiago Stock Exchange]] dropped by 15% during the day, their largest daily drop since September 20, 2022.<ref>{{Cite news |title=Acción de SQM se desploma por política del litio y borra más de US$ 3.300 millones en capitalización bursátil |url=https://www.df.cl/mercados/bolsa-monedas/bolsas-hoy-jaidx |last1=Pescio |first1=Benjamín |date=2023-04-21 |access-date=2023-04-22 |work=[[Diario Financiero]] |last2=Arvelo |first2=María C.|language=Spanish}}</ref> The government's decision was thought to have less impact for Albemarle than for SQM given that it had many more years to negotiate before its license expire.<ref name=exante21/> The state-owned copper company [[Codelco]] was commissioned by the government to negotiate nationalization with SQM.<ref name=exante21/>

The indigenous inhabitants of Salar de Atacama basin –the [[Atacama people|Likan Antay]]– have a history of both opposing lithium extraction and negotiating for [[shared benefits]] with lithium companies.<ref name=Lorca/> Negotiations occur under the framework of the [[Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989|Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention]] which Chile signed in 2008.<ref name=Lorca/> It is argued that "[a]greements between Indigenous organizations and lithium companies have brought significant economic resources for community development, but have also expanded the mining industry's capacity for social control in the area.".<ref name=Lorca>{{Cite journal |title=Mining indigenous territories: Consensus, tensions and ambivalences in the Salar de Atacama |journal=The Extractive Industries and Society |url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214790X22000053 |last1=Lorca |first1=Mauricio |volume=9 |last2=Olivera Andrade |first2=Manuel |doi=10.1016/j.exis.2022.101047 |year=2022 |last3=Escosteguy |first3=Melisa |last4=Köppel |first4=Jonas |last5=Scoville-Simonds |first5=Morgan |last6=Hufty |first6=Marc|page=101047 |s2cid=246456703 |doi-access=free }}</ref>.

This control is rooted in a dominant discourse that has taken root in the global rush to a sustainable future in light of global [[climate change]] .<ref name=":0" />. With lithium being a key strategic resource is facilitating this shift, many countries are rushing to acquire as much as possible.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Dorn |first=Felix M. |last2=Ruiz Peyré |first2=Fernando |date=2020 |title=Lithium as a Strategic Resource: Geopolitics, Industrialization, and Mining in Argentina |url=https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/15/article/772602 |journal=Journal of Latin American Geography |volume=19 |issue=4 |pages=68–90 |doi=10.1353/lag.2020.0101 |issn=1548-5811}}</ref>. Any for of protest against such mining operations is deemed to an opposition to climate change, ergo hindering the global agenda in combatting climate change .<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":0" />. This discourse has resulted in the marginalisation of opposed indigiouness voices rendering them nearly powerless .<ref name=":0" />.

==See also==