Strong cryptography: Difference between revisions

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The strong cryptography algorithms have high [[security strength]], for practical purposes usually defined as a number of bits in the [[Key (cryptography)|key]]. For example, the United States government, when dealing with [[Export of cryptography from the United States|export control of encryption]], considered {{asof|1999|lc=y}} any implementation of the [[symmetric encryption]] algorithm with the [[key length]] above 56 bits or its [[public key]] equivalent<ref>{{cite web |title=Encryption and Export Administration Regulations (EAR) |url=https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/encryption |website=bis.doc.gov |publisher=[[Bureau of Industry and Security]] |access-date=24 June 2023}}</ref> to be strong and thus potentially a subject to the [[Export control|export licensing]].{{sfn|Reinhold|1999|p=3}} To be strong, an algorithm needs to have a sufficiently long key and be free of known mathematical weaknesses, as exploitation of these effectively reduces the key size. At the beginning of the 21st century, the typical security strength of the strong symmetrical encryption algorithms is 128 bits (slightly lower values still can be strong, but usually there is little technical gain in using smaller key sizes).{{sfn|Reinhold|1999|p=3}}{{update after|2015}}
 
Demonstrating the resistance of any cryptographic scheme to attack is a complex matter, requiring extensive testing and reviews, preferably in a public forum. Good [[algorithm]]s and protocols are required (similarly, andgood materials are required to construct a strong building), but good system design and implementation is needed as well.: For"it instance,is thepossible operatingto build a cryptographically weak system onusing whichstrong algorithms and protocols" (just like the cryptographicuse softwareof runsgood shouldmaterials bein asconstruction carefullydoes securednot asguarantee a possiblesolid structure). UsersMany mayreal-life handlesystems passwordsturn insecurely,out orto trustbe 'service'weak personnelwhen overlythe much,strong orcryptography simplyis misusenot theused properly, for example, random [[softwareCryptographic nonce|nonces]]. (Seeare [[socialreused{{sfn|Schneier|1998|p=2}} engineeringA (security)successful attack might not even involve algorithm at all, for example, if the key is generated from a password, guessing a weak password is easy an does not depend on the strength of the encryption algorithm.{{sfn|socialSchneier|1998|p=3}} engineering]]A user can become the weakest link in the overall picture, for example, by sharing passwords and hardware tokens with the colleagues.){{sfn|Schneier|1998|p=4}}
 
==Background==