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While calculating the cost of the machine, Amdahl concluded that there was no way its sales could turn a profit. This was a serious risk to the company, as introducing a high-end machine that was guaranteed to lose money could be seen as anti-competitive behaviour, an attempt to take the market away from companies like CDC. IBM faced a similar problem with Stretch, but over time it was shown that the R&D in that project had been widely used in the company and if it was billed out then it was slightly positive.{{sfn|Aspray|2000|p=27}} To allow ACS/360 to more clearly turn a profit, Amdahl suggested producing three models of the same basic system, the original ACS/360, a smaller model with {{frac|3}} the performance, and an even smaller version with {{frac|9}}, which would still make it the fastest machine in IBM's lineup.{{sfn|Smotherman|Sussenguth|Robelen|2016|p=67}} This proposal was rejected.{{sfn|Aspray|2000|p=27}}
In May 1969, IBM upper management instead decided to cancel the entire project,{{sfn|Smotherman|Sussenguth|Robelen|2016|p=67}} apparently at Amdahl's suggestion.{{sfn|Aspray|2000|p=27}} What had initially been intended to be a project to compete with the fast-moving CDC had now stretched on for the better part of a decade and showed little evidence that it would release a machine in the short term. Amdahl later claimed
Shortly after the announcement of the project's cancellation, in August 1969, IBM announced the [[IBM System/360 Model 195]], a re-implementation of the Model 91 using [[integrated circuit]]s that made it twice as fast as the [[IBM System/360 Model 85|Model 85]], which at that time was the fastest machine in the lineup. To address the high-end market, a [[Vector processor|vector processing]] task force was started in Poughkeepsie.{{sfn|Smotherman|Sussenguth|Robelen|2016|p=68}}
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